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THE UNITY OF NATURE:
DECONTSTRUCTING A CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL
METANARRATIVE.

by Alan Marshall

ABSTRACT
The Unity of Nature idea is a strong metatheoretical theme in a number o f scientific
and environmental fields (from ecosystems ecology, through quantum physics to environmental
philosophy and ecopolitics). Why this is so is discussed. One of the prime reasons the Unity of
Nature idea is adopted in these fields is to give rise to an inspiring, optimistic, socially-responsive
and environmentally-friendly worldview. Why this is so is also discussed. These fields o f science and
environmentalism have inherited this metatheoretical theme o f natural unity through an intellectual
lineage that passes through many non-scientific and non-environmental fields (sociology, theology
and political philosophy, for instance). Many of these non-environmental and non-scientific fields
have used natural unity in a way which is in stark metaphysical and political opposition to the
metaphysical and political desires o f those who promulgate the unity of nature for progressive social
change. The exact way this has transpired is discussed so that the various social and intellectual
processes that have been at work can be examined. Such social and intellectual processes include the
social construction of the Organicism Vs Mechanicism debate in ecology, the intellectual links
between neo-classical economic principles and the New Sciences, the techno-scientific background of
Gaia theory, and the social conservatism o f ecological functionalism. After this is done, and after the
ecopolitical importance o f the Unity o f Nature idea has been thoroughly questioned, an alternative
suggestion towards a non-unity worldview is made which draws strength from contemporary
developments in postmodern theory, ecological thought and ethological sstudy.
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INTRODUCTION
This work enters into a critique of a body of recent natural philosophical
literature which is self-consciously amalgamating itself together (under various labels)
in order to initiate a paradigm change in the way both science and society look at the
larger world. This new way of looking at the world is via unity: everything in the
living world is united.
One of the major political aims of this worldview is to promote environmental
friendliness. Often pronouncements about the unity of nature are heralded as being so
utterly important to humanity’s ideas about itself and about nature that they have been
described as being fundamental precepts within human knowledge. The very idea of
nature in unity is thought to stir the blood of humans towards a kindness to the
environment. It is a concept that is supposed to intellectually inspire humans;
promoting within us a sense of a togetherness and belonging with the Earth. Unity is
therefore something to be revered, cherished and respected.
This work, however, takes a different tack. Rather than simply revering the unity
of nature, this work aims to investigate the cultural milieu that has produced the
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concept. While doing this I argue that the body of literature extolling this worldview
of unity may well possess an internal coherence, but it is also replete with
metaphysical, ethical and social connotations that may contradict the very political
aims that its supporters extol. One of the manifestations of this important point is that
a lot of the discussion about the unity of nature has been made in an attempt to add
value to, and protect, the environment. It is my contention that the unity of nature
may well devalue the environment. This is most especially the case when the unity of
nature concept makes knowledge claims with regards to the nature of the terrestrial
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H ow ever, I intend to suggest that such ecological value is undermined and
overwhelm ed when these ecological communities are made to submit to the unity o f
nature concept. Such conclusions are quite radical and l w ouldn’t want to suggest
that they are necessarily more than a rhetorical exercise aimed just as much at
engaging the theorists o f unity on som e o f the problems o f their w orldview as it is a
presentation o f an alternative reading. Let me acknowledge here, too, that I
understand w ell that my particular reading o f unity is almost entirely against the grain
o f m ost Unitarian thinking. But that is my point, to produce an alternative reading
w hich prompts a response from Unitarians, in order that they defend them selves and
their ideas better.

If the reader is to accept my reading of unitarianism, then they might find that the
potential malevolency of the unity of nature concept does not stop in the realm of the
ecological; it is also apparent in the realm of the social. The unity of nature concept
does not just exist on its own as an independent idea. It has a whole attendant army of
supporting concepts, narratives and metaphors which it feeds from and feeds into; for
example unity has attachments to the concepts of balance, order, hierarchy, stability,
organicism, and the system. In this work, these companion concepts are filtered out of
the unity of nature concept and then, one by one, deconstructed so as to show their
potential social malevolence. In the end I surmise that the concept of the System may
be the most entrenched and lethal of these companion concepts.
If it is held that the unity of nature concept might be an inappropriate
metanarrative given the character of its late Twentieth Century intellectual expression,
then we might reasonably ask what would be a more appropriate ecological narrative?
The answer to this, as it applies to terrestrial ecological communities (most notably
forest communities), is foreshadowed throughout this work but reaches its climax in *
the final chapter as I enter into a discussion about a possible alternative. This
alternative narrative is at least as well equipped to handle the ecopolitical metaphysics
of environmentalism within the context of terrestrial ecological communities as the
unity of nature concept, without needlessly inflicting the negative consequences of
unitarianism upon the social and ecological world.
When examining the cultural milieu surrounding the unity of nature concept, an
intense investigation of humanity’s relationship with nature must ensue. Sociologists,

6

philosophers, historians, scientists, and environmentalists have all studied various
aspects o f humanity’s relationship with nature in an intensive way for many years
now. It is from all of these disciplines that this work brings ideas. Despite this
eclecticism it is still possible to locate this work within a certain disciplinary
perspective: it is a piece of work that forges out an articulation between the social and
cultural study of science and technology and the social and cultural study of the
environment (STS and Environmental Studies, respectively), especially with regards
to the way that both of these fields may reflect upon grand metaphysical issues in
science and environmentalism. This means that studnets of the culture of
environmentalism and students of the culture of science would probably be in the best
position to appreciate the nuances explored.
Within these disciplines (and many more besides) there is an ongoing debate
between naturalism and realism on the one hand and cultural constructionism on the
other; and I should state at the outset that I am, myself, more allied to the latter than
to the former. Within the history and sociology of science and environmentalism this
debate now seems ever-present and from it emerges much of the analytical spirit
applied in the arguments contained within the work. I use the word ‘spirit’ rather than
some other word such as ‘tool’ to indicate that while there are some well-constructed
core theoretical frameworks within the history and sociology of science, these
frameworks are only used sparingly in this work compared to a wider focus upon the
social, cultural, political and metatheoretical problems in ecological science,
environmentalism and natural philosophy. This is to say that this work is no mere
‘history o f ecological science’ or ‘history of environmentalism’ or ‘history of natural
philosophy’ but a work that whole-heartedly enters into the theoretical details that
ecological scientists, environmentalists and natural philosophers talk about as well as
proffering some sociological and ecological insights into the problems that infect, give
rise to, arise from these theoretical details.
Having declared my constructionist sympathies 1 can now admit that such a route
foregoes the production of the ultimate word on: 1) the reality of nature, 2) the reality
of the social, 3) the reality of a specific interaction between the two, and 4) the
objectivity of a narrative that might explain this interaction. A constructionist
approach nevertheless presents an opportunity to address some of the issues within
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environmental studies in a much more creative and tangential way than most
scholarship yet undertaken in the field since, as a distinct discipline, environmental
studies has only just entered into the waters of social constructionism in the past few
years. As we shall see in the final chapter, however, it is likely that environmental
studies presents social constructionism with a challenging perspective, too. The
approach explored here suggests that social constructionism might need to anticipate
its own widening to take account of the critique of humanity’s claim to be the only
social creatures upon the planet that are capable of social construction.
Above I refer to this work as a critique of a body of emerging literature. The
purveyors ot this literature I label either ‘natural philosophers’ or ‘environmental
thinkers’. I use the term natural philosophers since those I label as such are at once
philosophical enunciators about nature as well as late Twentieth Century practitioners
of the tradition known as natural philosophy; a tradition which has in the past
involved the setting up o f grand sweeping schemes that detail how the universe is
organised. I use the term environmental thinker, because many of these writers are
politically or metaphysically or intellectually inspired towards the protection of the
environment. From this inspiration there flows concern within their thinking for
analysing the social, political and cultural causes o f the environmental crisis.
If, as social constructionists might advocate, terms and names are
socially-negotiated appendages that float somewhat incongruously above the referent
about which they make descriptions, rather than being firmly attached to some or
other characteristic of a real object, then it is hard for any terms or names to be used
with absolute confidence in a scholarly exercise such as this. Thus when detailing a set
of ideas under the rubric o f a specific paradigm, or announcing the commonality of
certain thinkers as belonging to that paradigm, one must do so with a clear caveat in
mind. In this respect some of the players that I label as team-mates, due to their
respective adherence to a particular mode of metaphysics, sometimes make strange
bed fellows. Likewise, by classifying all the players that I examine in this work under a
catch-all phrase—say ‘environmental thinkers’ or ‘natural philosophers’—it is always
probable that some players would hardly consider themselves either ‘environmental’,
or ‘thinkers’, or ‘philosophers’. Nevertheless, these phrases, along with the terms
‘environmental thinking’ and ‘natural philosophy’, are adequate enough to distinguish

*
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or "thinkers’, or "philosophers’. Nevertheless, these phrases, along with the terms
‘environmental thinking’ and "natural philosophy’, are adequate enough to distinguish
a group of thinkers whose natural philosophical assumptions and environmental
assertions are similar enough for a sustained critique to be employed. All this goes
towards a declaration which would state that although they might disagree with each
other over many things, the ‘environmental thinkers/natural philosophers’ here-in
analysed are nevertheless contributors towards, and products of’ a unified discourse
on nature. If nothing else (and there are actually a lot of elses) they all believe in the
‘unity of nature’.
In light of the above points it may also be suitable to class this work as a critique
of four prominent players in the field of contemporary natural philosophy, namely
Fritjof Capra, James Lovelock, Edward Goldsmith and Paul Davies1. More

1 A short biography to introduce these four thinkers would read as follows:
Fntjof Capra is by training a theoretical high-energy physicist, but he is more reknown for his writing of
popular science works. Bom in Vienna, he received his Ph.D. on stellar astronomy from the University of Vienna
in 1966 where he studied with Werner Heisenberg. He taught and researched theoretical high-energy physics at
Orsay in Paris from 1966-1968, the University of California in Santa Cruz from 1968-1970, Stanford Linear
Accelerator Centre, and at the Imperial College m London. Capra founded and served as Director of the Elmwood
Institute, Berkeley, which is dedicated to nurturing new ecological visions and applying them to current social,
economic and environmental problems. He has published many technical papers and lectured extensively on the
philosophical implications o f modem science. He does research at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and lectures
at the University of California, Berkeley.
James Lovelock describes himself as an inventor, a scientist and an independent scholar. Others have
described him as a philosopher, a scientific maverick, and a visionary. As an inventor o f atmospheric measuring
instruments (for eg: the electron capture detector) Lovelock was one of a team invited, in the 1960s, to devise tests
for life on Mars by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. After time spent at NASA he pointed out,
in a senes of popular and academic papers, that the composition of the Earth's atmosphere is far out of chemical
equilibrium because of the living processes that interact with it. Mars or any other planet with life on it should
show chemical imbalance in the composition o f its atmosphere. This led him to what became known as the Gaia
hypothesis, that the Earth as a whole fimctions as a single living organism, regulating its environment (for
example, temperature and atmospheric oxygen) to serve its life needs. Gaia, as novelist William Golding pointed
out to Lovelock in the 1970s, was the name for the Greek goddess of the Earth, so Lovelock adopted it as a name
for his theory; a theory which looked at the processes of the whole Earth. For many people Lovelock's Gaia has
become a symbol of ecological concerns and respect for the complex, interconnected, life-supporting processes of
our home planet.
Edward Goldsmith has, for over 30 years, been in the forefront of efforts both to warn about the scale and
seriousness o f environmental destruction and to present proposals to reverse it. His principal vehicle has been the
magazine The Ecologist, which was founded in 1969, with Goldsmith first as Editor, then as Co-Editor, now as
publisher. The Ecologist first came to prominence in 1972 with its issue entitled 'Blueprint for Survival’, which
sold half a million copies in 17 languages. One purported result was the formation of a green party in the UK., the
first in the world. Several times thereafter The Ecologist was to adopt a radical stance on some issue which was
subsequently to become a prime campaigning focus for other groups. Goldsmith is also a notable scholar on both
theoretical and applied matters. With regard to the latter he was the co-author in the 1980s, with Nicholas
Hildyard, now a co-editor of The Ecologist, o f a monumental three volume study. The Social and Environmental
Effects o f Large Dams. With regard to the former. Goldsmith has been a key contnbutro to a senes of seminars
exploring and developing the implications ot James Lovelock s Gaia Hypothesis which perceives.
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specifically this work might be recognised as a concerted eftort to critique the four
respective books by these natural philosophers that deal with the unity of nature
concept; Capra’s The Web o f Life, Goldsmith’s The Way, Lovelock’s Healing Gaia
and Davies’ The Cosmic Blueprint. All of these writers are major players in either
natural philosophical discourse and all of these works might be considered major
works in recent natural philosophy. While these four works might be said to form the
hub of what this work sets out to critique, many other players exist in the field and
their works, too, are often observed and critiqued in a systematic way.
A sub-text that might be seen to emerge as a corollary to this critique is the
laying down of an attempt to disenfranchise the competence of the knowledge claims
of those listed above when they specifically deal with ecological science. This is the
science that unity of nature supporters often appeal to and this is the science in which
they believe they can have a lot of influence. It has become my view, however, that
their claims to know how to operate with, and extend, ecological ideas are riddled
with intellectual lacunae and scholarly synecdoche. Theirs is an ecology that stumbles
from what is uncertain in ecological theory to what is certain in environmental
evaluation and theirs is an ecology that confuses the whole of ecological science for a
part.
This work is organised into three parts which are divided into eight chapters
which are, themselves, divided into numerous sections. Each section represents a
portion of supporting evidence and theory that contributes to the main argument of
the chapter.
Paul Davies was bom in London and gained his terminating degree from University College London in
1970. Since then he has held academic appoinments at Cambridge and London Universities until he was appointed
Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. He remained there until his emigration „
to Australia in 1990 to take the Chair of Mathematical Physics at The University of Adelaide. In May 1993 the
University created a new position. Professor of Natural Philosophy, specially lor him. In May 1997 he decided to
take early retirement from the University. He currently holds a Visiting Professor position at imperial College,
London. Paul Davies has published numerous papers in physics journals, in the fields of cosmology, gravitation,
and quantum field theory, with particular emphasis on black holes and the origin ot the universe. He is also
interested in the nature of time, high energy particle physics, the foundations ot quantum mechamcs. chaos theory
and the theory of complex sy stems. His former colleagues at the University ol Adelaide are investigating topics in
quantum gravity including superstnngs. higher-dimensional black holes and quantum cosmology, in addition to
his research, Paul Davies is well known as an author, broadcaster and public lecturer. He has written man\ popular
science books for the general public. Davies writes regularly lor newspapers, journals and magazines in several
countries, both about science and the political and social aspects ol science and technology. He has been a
longstanding contributor to The Guardian, The Economist, 'The Independent and The Daily 'Telegraph in the UK.,
and the The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald in Australia, as well as more specialist publications such
as New Scientist.
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20th Century: Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative, introduces the unity of
nature concept as an identitiably environmental or ecopolitical worldview. It identifies
the (uncontroversial) idea that the scientific conception of the unity of nature concept
is, at least in part, a construction of the environmental movement which has much
ecopolitical investment in the concept. To environmentalists, the unity of nature
suggests the need to tread lightly on the Earth since what we may do to one part of it
will always have ramifications for many other parts. There is a common historical
narrative told and retold by environmentalists when they discuss the broader cultural
acceptance o f these views. This common historical narrative is recounted in Chapter
One and it is a narrative that generally suggests that bad thinking, especially that
which posits a non-united nature, leads to bad environmental practices. From this
perspective the environmental crisis is, at least in part, a result of an ecopolitically
inappropriate non-unitarian worldview.
Chapter Two, l he Unity o f Nature, Differing Eecological Sciences a?id
Over-Zealous Ecological Holism, makes the point that, despite their best intentions,
Unitarians have often entered into an ecological and environmental discourse which
exhibits over-zealous use of holism. The unity of nature concept may be so full of
anti-individualism, physical reductionism and hierarchical epistemological schemes
that it hardly rates well as an environmentally-friendly metanarrative. In Chapter Two
the historical and intellectual heritage of the unity of nature concept is analysed to
reveal these over-zealous holist tendencies.
Chapter Three, Gaia: The Living Embodiment o f the Unity o f Nature, addresses
one of the best organised attempts at establishing a distinct theory of natural unity: the
Gaia theory. As a brand of unitarianism that is intellectually tied to those analysed in
Chapter Two, it is suggested that the Gaia theory might not be as ecopolitically
relevant as some people have thought. Certainly, it is premature to proffer Gaia
theory as the new environmental narrative for the Twenty First century as some
environmental thinkers have suggested. Gaia, in fact, may just be the product of a
functionalist, technocentric approach to ecological and environmental problems.
Chapter Four, The Unity o f Nature: A Metanarrative o f Social Conservatismf
examines whether or not the unity of nature concept might possess conservative
tendencies when it is transferred from the study of nature and utilised in the study of

society. The conclusion reached is that it does. Whether or not these tendencies are
inherent and necessary is still left open but the specific intellectual milieu surrounding
and feeding into the very unitarianism that environmentalists and ecologists theorise
(and promote) is profoundly continuous with the unitarianism promoted by
conservative thinkers. This chapter goes on to describe exactly how these links are
forged through an adherence to social and ecological functionalism, and social
systems theory.
Chapter Five, The Unity o f Nature: Uniting the Ecosystem with the Economy?,
examines the possible links between the unity of nature concept (and its recent
scientific representation within Unitarian theories such Chaos theory, Complexity
theory and Self-organisation theory) and the ideas of liberal capitalism. Chapter Five
suggests that the newest configurations o f unitarianism are intellectually and
historically associated with some of the oldest self-legitimising ideas within liberal
capitalism. If environmental thinkers are to continue to expound the idea of
unitarianism, they may find, it is suggested in this chapter, that they are expounding
metaphysical elaborations of, and support for, liberal capitalism also. This link
between unitarianism and liberal capitalism revolves around the various concepts that
directly interplay with the unity concept as it is conceptualised by a group of
scientifically literate Unitarians called the ‘New Scientists". It is apparent that the New
Scientists operate their scientific programme with direct reference to the unity of
nature and its attendant army of accompanying ideas.
Chapter Six, What Is This Thing Called Postmodern Science?, investigates how
the unity of nature concept has become a central tenet in Postmodern Science and
then goes on to identify the nature of Postmodern Science and its relationship to the
postmodern intellectual movement generally. In this chapter 1 detail how Postmodern
Science is unable to eject from itself many Modernist tendencies. Because of this I
conclude that Postmodern Science, despite its name, is far from postmodern.
Chapter Seven, Mechanicism Vs Organicism-. A Ealse Dichotomy‘s looks at the
links between the unity of nature, mechanicism and organicism and goes on to
indicate how these three things are intimately connected. Their connections are such
that it no longer seems tenable to regard mechanicism and organicism as generic
bi-polar opposites in environmental and ecological thinking.
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Chapter Eight, An(other) Postmodern Ecology, assumes that Chapters Two
through Seven have shown the inadequacy o f the unity of nature concept as an
environmental and ecological metanarrative. Chapter Eight seeks to investigate the
possibility of suggesting an alternative postmodern conceptualisation o f ecology
whereby nature itself may be deconstructed in an ecopolitically benign way through an
awareness of ‘otherness’. Within such a perspective it is believed that we should not
be scared o f identifying and locating the differences between the various members of
the environment; splitting them up, and atomising them, since if we do it with a view
to celebrating otherness then we may well contribute to an environmental narrative
that is better equipped to value the individual lives of each living member in the world.
These chapters are arranged into three Parts which delineate the peculiar scholarly
themes to which they belong. The first part {It ’s A ll an Environmentalist Plot!)
suggests how environmental thinkers have constructed the unity o f nature concept as
part o f a contemporary environmental natural philosophy. Part Two {IPs All a
Bourgeois Plot!) revolves around the consideration that the unity of nature idea is just
as much a social construction of conservatism, fascism and liberal capitalism as it is a
social construction of environmentalism. Part Three {It’s All a Postmodern
Plot[lessnessJ!) brings in the theme that the unity of nature concept may or may not
be a decidedly postmodern concept and it investigates how ‘constructive’ Postmodern
Science constructs the unity of nature concept and how
‘deconstructive’postmodernists might deconstruct it.

PARTA
I t’s All an Environmentalist
Plot!

INTRODUCTION TO PARI A

Part A recounts the well-worn idea that the unity of nature concept is
quintessentially an environmental idea. As such, environmentalists have colonised the
concept, reinvented it, and reinvigorated it to serve as a legitimising tool in their
environmental aims. This colonisation, reinvention and remvigoration has been so
successful that today the unity of nature is commonly accepted within many facets of
Western culture as the intellectual preserve of environmentalists and environmental
sympathisers.
Part A is comprised of only one chapter; An Introduction to the Unity oj Nature
Concept in the Late Iwentieth Century: Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative.
This chapter serves as an introduction to the rest of the chapters in this work. It is
important since it lays down, as a baseline, the fundamental partnership between
environmentalism and the unity of nature concept as conceived by its environmental
supporters. It is important, also, since it lays down the tundamental relationship
between scientific thinking and social practice as conceived by both environmental
thinkers and natural philosophers. It also recounts a peculiarly environmental narrative
with regards to the history of environmental thought; a narrative which divides the
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history o f Western natural philosophy into three distinct stages whilst proposing that
late Twentieth Century society sits at the cusp o f the second and third stages. Such an
introduction is needed at this point in the work since the fundamental stories of
environmentalism and the unity of nature concept are the ones that will be
re-examined again and again as this work proceeds.
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CHAPTER 1
An Introduction to the Unity o f Nature Concept
in the Late Twentieth Century:
Unity as an Environmental Metanarrative

THINKING ABOUT NATURE. AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT

Social paradigms are linked to scientific paradigms. This is the thesis of Fritjof
Capra (1996), Edward Goldsmith (1993), Paul Davies (1987), Charles Birch (1990),
Arran Gare (1995), David Pepper (1984), Arthur Fabel (1994), Bill Devall and
George Sessions (1985), Theodore Roszak (1979), Frederick Ferre (1993), Carolyn
Merchant (1980), David Abram (1992), David Bohm (1994), John Cobb (1988), and
countless others who write about science, society, nature, and the environment.
Within such a framework it is held that scientific outlooks, metaphysical overviews,
cosmological worldviews—call them what you will--profoundly afreet social practices
and political activities. By extending Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms into the
wider realm of the social, environmental thinkers and natural philosophers have made
links between how we think about nature and the effect of this thinking on both nature
and society. By doing this environmental thinkers are able to see exactly which natural
philosophies/social paradigms/metaphysical outlooks give rise to exactly which social
and ecological situations. In environmental scholarship it is apparent that very specific
ideas seem to have given rise to very specific social practices.
With regard to this last point it is notable that environmental scholars often lay
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much blame for the environmental woes of the Twentieth Century on the fragmented,
mechanistic and atomistic way that the natural environment is viewed since this way
ot viewing produces a fragmented, partial and incomplete appraisal of environmental
problems and fosters a fragmented, partial and incomplete set of practices that might
steer us away from the environmental crisis.
What is needed is a recognition of, and a commitment to, what the
environmentalists regard as a truism of ecology (and what many ancient and modem
day natural philosophers regard as a truism of nature); the natural world exists as an
interconnected unity:

To accept the biocentnc outlook and regard ourselves and our place in the world
from its perspective is to see the whole natural order of the Earth’s biosphere as a
complex but unified web of interconnected organisms, objects and events.
(Taylor. 1981:111).

We must rediscover the unity of humanity and all creation. (Pomtt. 1984:211).

The grandeur and majesty of oneness 1 have only found in nature. (Spretnak, 1986:8).

Life is fundamentally one. (Naess, 1989:192).

No one can deny that we are all interdependent with each other and with all of nature.
(Nicholson. 1992:11).

The biosphere is one. (Goldsmith, 1993:96).

Here the above writers may be presumed to be either: a) stating the truth of
matters, or b) utilising an as yet to be determined truth for political purposes. Whether
or not you believe that ‘a’ or ‘b’ is correct it would be difficult to deny that the above
references to the unity of nature are being made for wholly non-political purposes and
were mere pronouncements of the way things are. When suggesting and reiterating
the unity of nature, the above writers are making political as well as metaphysical
points. Environmentalists are using unity to claim that nature can only be looked after
properly if it is held to be united.
Within this structure of thinking, humans are held to be morally obliged to look
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after nature because they are a part of it. If humans are separate from nature, or if
nature is held to be separated into various bits and pieces, then environmental
problems will continue indefinitely since humanity will not be obliged to care for
something that is not connected to itself (i.e. does not aftect humans) and its
members will always presume that what they do to one part of nature will only be
localised to that part (and therefore they will hardly worry about the aftect it has on
the rest o f nature). None of these statements are controversial: they are merely
reflecting the mainstream environmental line when dealing with intellectual matters
about the nature of nature.
If we are convinced that how we think about nature somehow determines how
humanity operates in practice then it is obvious that how we think about the world is
profoundly important. There are many examples emanating from environmental
writing which detail the precise relationship between how we think about nature and
how this thinking influences humanity and aftects nature. Here are a tew:
In this phase of human history there is widespread conflict between our conception of
ourselves and our conception o f the world. We see ourselves as beings that are
conscious, that are rational, we have freewill and are purposive. But we see the world
as consisting o f mindless, meaningless, totally determined physical bits and pieces that
are non-purposive. A society that lives with this dichotomy is operating
on a profound error that is destroying much that is worth while both in ourselves and
in the world. (Birch, 1990:ix).

[TJhe major problems o f our time--the growing threat o f nuclear war. the devastation of
our natural environment, our inability to deal with poverty and starvation around the
world, to name just the most urgent ones—are all diff erent facets o f one single crisis,
which is essentially a crisis of perception...ft derives from the fact that most of us. and
especially our large social institutions, subscribe to the
concepts of an outdated worldview , inadequate for dealing with the problems of an
overpopulated, globally interconnected world. (Capra. 1996:4).

We have seen that fragmentary thinking is giving rise to a reality that is constantlybreaking up into disorderly, disharmonious and partial, destructive activities. (Bohm,
1994:350).

In these quotes a specific link is alluded to over and over again: bad thinking,
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especially that which posits a fragmentary nature, leads to bad environmental
practices. The environmental crisis is thus, at least in part, a result o f ‘outdated’,
‘erroneous’, ‘fragmentary’ natural philosophy.

THE STORY SO FAR: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEWS
ACCORDING TO ‘NEW P ARADIGMERS’

In their elaboration of this link, environmental thinkers have often embarked
upon a three stage narrative history of the origins and development of this situation. It
goes something like this:
Stage 1: Ancient natural philosophy:
Before modem times the world was not viewed as ‘fragmented’ and ‘dead’ but
‘organic’ and ‘alive’. Humans did not regard themselves as over and above nature but
as an intimate part of it. This ‘organic’ worldview--as Bohm (1994:343) calls it--was
epitomised, according to modem day natural philosopher; Paul Davies, by:
Itjhe Greek philosopher Aristotle [who (constructed a picture of the universe closely
in accord with this intuitive feeling of holistic harmony. (Davies, 1987: 6).

This organic view of the world as characterised by Aristotle (and more
importantly, according to George Sessions, by the pre-Socratics“) vitalised the Earth,
casting all its members as alive rather than dead and interconnected rather than
isolated. The Earth, too, was seen as alive; it possessed an overall harmony and
integrity much the same as the harmony and integrity of a single living creature. Such
respect for, and emphasis on, living things, and upon the unity of all these living
things, suggests, according to modern-day environmentalists, a non-anthropocentric
value system since Earthlings were living in a world with other beings whom they
were deeply interconnected with, and they were also living in a world where the Earth
itself was an organic being.2

2George Sessions believes that casting Aristotle as some sort o f ancient environmental philosopher is somewhat
dubious since:
"Although Aristotle’s philosophy was biologically inspired, nevertheless he arrived at a hierarchical
concept o f the ‘great chain of being’ in which nature made plants for animals, and ammals were made for
the sake o f humans.” (Sessions, 1994:142).
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Western philosophy, o f course, did not originate or exclusively own such organic
worldviews and much is said within environmentalism about how non-Western
cultures had almost invariably held the sacred unity of the world and the sacredness of
non-human beings within it. For such ‘primal cultures’, as Sessions, 1994, calls them,
(or ‘vernacular societies’, as Goldsmith, 1993, calls them) the sacred unity of nature
bestowed a certain moral and metaphysical outlook: “[tjhese cosmologies, involving a
sacred sense of the earth and all its inhabitants, helped order their lives and determine
their values” (Sessions, 1994:140). Traditional societies thus had lives and values, say
Sessions and Goldsmith, that revered both the world and the beings in it.
Stage 2: Cartesian natural philosophy and 19th century advent of Modernism,
Enter Rene Descartes, the environmental evil one; mid-wife o f mechanicism and
hinderer o f holism. Cartesian philosophy, it is said, “separated mind from body”
(Zohar and Marshall, 1993:46), isolating the world from the observer, and it
emphasised the mechanical nature of things; thus breaking up the unity and
interconnectedness of the universe into machine-like parts. This:
mechanicism stresses an unbridgeable gulf between human beings and the physical
world... We can see in such a distorted perception the origins o f our current ecological
cnsis. (Zohar and Marshall, 1993:5).

A break was thus made between ancient/primal ‘natural philosophy’ and modem
‘science’, and between traditional and modem ways of looking at life and living
things:
[wjhereas traditional biology had explained the activity , organisation, and direction
o f lite by a hierarchy of vegetative, sensitive and intelligent faculties or souls,
Descartes reduced the involuntary physiological process of the body to mechanical
processes and eliminated the vegetative and animal souls from physiology. Sensitivity
and thought were confined to humans and attributed to an immaterial rational soul.
(Christensen, 1994:252).

There was thus an “emphatic rejection ot all forms ot animism or finalism, and
most modem biologists are strongly mechanistic and reductionist in their approach”
(Davies, 1987:8). According to Pepper (1984:50) “Descartes extended the concept of
nature as a machine initiated by Kepler and Galileo”, and he:
viewed animals, and the human body, too, as machines. They were automata, and their
workings could be fully known by reducing them to matters ot physics and chemistry,
which in turn could be understood in terms of mathematics. (Pepper. 1984:50).
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All in all, Cartesian philosophy was the onset o f the ‘modem era’, and:
[wjith the coming of the modem era...nature could be thoroughly understood and
eventually brought under control by means of the systematic development of
scientific knowledge. (Bohm. 1994:432).

In the modem era “Aristotelian ideas were banished from the physical sciences”
(Davies, 1987:7) and purpose and teleology as explanatory devices were confined to
the intellectual dustbin of superstition and religion. The modem era pictured “the
universe as a gigantic contrivance and ourselves as small contrivances or machines”
(Birch, 1991:x).
The history of environmental thought generally continues in this vein with
regards to the rise and rise of mechanicism, atomism, reductionism and rationalism in
the modem era of Newton’s time: “Newtonian physics was in the same spirit as
Cartesian philosophy” (Zohar and Marshall, 1993:108), we are told, and
the general picture most of us have about the world is derived from Newton’s
mechanics o f the Seventeenth century (Birch, 1991 :ix).

According to Bohm:
the mechanistic view in physics., .was characteristic of the modem view and...reached
its highest point towards the end of the nineteenth century... this view remains the
basis of the approach of most physicists and other scientists today. (Bohm, 1994:343).

When scientists, and science popularisers, in the mid-19th century became aware
o f their own power to prescribe worldviews for the rest of society to follow, and
when these people rallied with the Western world’s leaders and managers to promote
an optmistic view of relentless scientific and technological progress, then a new belief
in progressive human betterment developed. This belief is often referred to as
Modernism.
The current (or modem or ‘Modernist’) paradigm forged by Cartesianism and
Newtonianism, and self-consciously disseminated by 19th Century scientists and
natural philosophers, about the dead, fragmentary nature of all existence is inimical to
nature and nature’s components. Or so suggest many late Twentieth Century
environmental thinkers. This is because Newtonianism rejects natural freedoms in
favour o f physical determinism, converts all things to machines—devaluing them in the
process—and then goes on to simplify the processes of nature into simple mechanical
systems o f interaction like the physics of a billiard-ball table:
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In classical Newtonian mechanics, once the initial conditions and the force laws are
given, everything is calculable forever before and alter. The sy stem is governed
completely by the laws o f mechanics and o f conservation o f energy. It is totally
determined. It has no freedom. (Birch. 1991 fix).

When trying to unearth the negative effects o f the mechanical worldview it is
often the case that three philosophical relations o f mechanicism are unearthed as well.
These are ‘atomism7, ‘reductionism7 and ‘dualism7. As Davies points out reductionism
is:
The procedure o f breaking down physical sy stems into their elementary components
and looking for an explanation o f their behaviour. (Davies, 1987:13).

Reductionism is usually thought to be strongly related to atomism, a view that all
the world is made up o f distinct independent bits and pieces:
The Newtonian paradigm fits in well with the philosophy o f atomism...The behaviour
o f a macroscopic body can be reduced to the motion o f its constituent atoms moving
according to Newton’s physical laws (Davies. 1987).

As Davies and Birch would explain it, these law-obeying bits and pieces are
generally what reductionism reduces natural phenomena and processes to. In modem
science such bits and pieces might be atomic or sub-atomic particles or they might be
the molecules that make up the genetic codes ofliving things.
Dualism, the third relative o f mechanicism, is variously held to be that brand of
Cartesian philosophy that either separates mind from matter or humans from
non-humans. Since, within Cartesian natural philosophy, humans are the only things
that possess mind then both o f these variants amount to the rejection of non-humans
from the realm of the truly conscious and animated. Non-human beings, including our
own bodies, are mere machines with no animate soul. The human mind, on the other
hand, exists above these things as the divine or evolutionary epitome o f all existence
since it is the realm to which all human thinking and feeling belongs.
According to many late Twentieth Century environmental scholars and natural
philosophers this quartet o f modernist foes; mechanicism, dualism, reductionism and
atomism, are the intellectual harbingers of death. They deaden the environment by
reducing the natural world to broken up bits and pieces which have no soul, no
animation, no life. The only thing within this world that does possesses life in its frill
and glorious extent, and therefore the only thing worthy of complete respect, is

human consciousness—and as such, everything else is subordinated in value to it.
You do not have to be an environmentalist to see mechanicism, dualism,
reductionism and atomism as the quartet o f death. For late Twentieth Century natural
philosophers who have no special interest in the environmental crisis, like Paul Davies
for example, this quartet o f death has manipulated science and produced a worldview
o f death, decay and pessimism. Davies admits that mechanicism has succeeded in
providing modem society with very many of its scientific and technological marvels
but he feels that these have come at the price of seeing the world as meaningless and
purposeless (see Davies, 1987, and Davies, 1993).
This modem tendency towards meaninglessness and purposelessness is most
stark, according to Davies (1987), if we consider the cosmological implications o f the
mechanical worldview. Once the mechanistic worldview was interpreted through the
Nineteenth Century science o f thermodynamics and then reapplied to the universe as a
whole, it was soon realised that the universe was decaying. Just as a Nineteenth
Century machine could not hope to operate without converting some o f its tiiel into
waste heat as it struggled to do productive work, so the universe as a whole must
struggle with its daily loses o f energy through heat waste until one day it has no
energy left to exist. Or as Davies puts it:
Everyday the universe depletes its stock o f available, potent energy, dissipating it
into waste heat. The inexorable squandering o f this finite and irretrievable resource
im plies that the universe is slowly but surely dying (Davies, 1987:19).

Because o f this cosmological picture that Newtonianism presents to modem day
science and modem day society:
[wje have come to believe that the total useful, or working, energy o f the universe,
according to the laws o f physics,...is gradually running down. (Sahtouris, 1992:21).

If the universe is dying—slowly decaying towards non-existence—then, alludes
Davies, a vast shadow o f pessimism seems to descend upon all human endeavours.
Any hope for an eternal life for humanity, or just a better one for our descendants, is
pointless since the universe itself will one day die, taking with it any degree of
purpose that may have existed within it.
Stage 3: The New Paradigm:
Because “there is growing dissatisfaction with sweeping reductionism, a feeling
that the whole really is the sum o f its parts” (Davies, 1987:8), and because of “the
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sweeping nature o f scientific discoveries in cosmology, fundamental physics and
biology” (Davies, 1987:8), Paul Davies, amongst many others, believes that a new set
o f scientific disciplines are arising which present a new scientific outlook on life and a
new worldview o f the cosmos. This new view emphasises, once again, the organic,
dynamic, holistic nature o f the universe.
O f this current eclipsing o f the modem way o f thinking about science and nature
Charles Birch says:
It | he mechanical images no longer fit. They are giving way to quite a ditterent image of
the universe and ourselves. This discovery is being made simultaneously by a
science, a philosophy and a theology as yet little known. Its new images are no longer
mechanical: they are organic and ecological. The universe turns out to be less like a
machine and more like a life. This constitutes a new revolution in the science,
philosophy and theology o f our time. (Birch, 1990::xi).

Fritjof Capra, too, expresses the eclipse o f the modem way o f thinking in similar
terms:
The social paradigm now receding has dominated our culture for several hundred
years, during which it has shaped our modem Western society and has significantly
influenced the rest o f the world. The paradigm consists o f a number o f ideas and
values, among them the view o f the universe as a mechanical sy stem composed of
elementary building blocks, the view o f the human body as a machine, the view o f
life in society as a competitive struggle for existence, the belief in unlimited material
progress to be achieved through economic and technical growth. (Capra, 1996:6).

O f the new way o f thinking Birch and Capra declare that a more complex,
life-affirming, interactive and interdependent sensibility is emerging; one which affirms
the principles o f ecology and reaffirms the ancient ideas of unity and holism.
Davies (1987) and Fabel (1994) find that the social utility o f the new paradigm
revolves around its inherent optimism since while Cartesianism and Newtonianism
promoted a worldview o f death and decay for the universe, the new paradigm “just
now arising, may set aside this pessimistic view, replacing it with a conception o f the
cosmos as a self-organising genesis” (Fabel 1994:303). Davies (1987:197) in this
regard believes that the social acceptance of holism is directly related to collective
pessimism and “despair o f a reductionist universe”.
Capra, Goldsmith, Birch, Sahtouris, Spretnak and many others, however, feel
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that the social repercussions go much further than this; that the new paradigm is
producing new environmentally friendly narratives: “the emerging new paradigm may
be called a holistic, or an ecological, worldview” (Capra, 1996:6). And by
calling the emerging new vision o f reality 'ecological5...we emphasise that life is at its
very centre. This is an important point for science, because in the old paradigm physics
has been the model and source o f

all metaphors for all other sciences. (Capra,

1996:12).

The new emerging paradigm, in contrast to its ‘modem’ predecessor, reasserts
the organismic, biological basis o f reality in an Aristotelian vein. The living organism
becomes the metaphor o f choice and nature is no longer regarded as a disparate
collection o f clashing parts but as an interconnected and interdependent unity.
This association with unity is what new paradigmers feel affords the organic
paradigm an inherently environmental stance since it is the unity o f nature which has
also served as a metaphysical constant for environmentalists when they choose to
philosophise about nature. The new paradigmers believe that environmental
conceptualisations o f unity have been influenced and informed by the ideas of both
ancient science and by very recent scientific developments.
Within these new ‘organic’ and ‘ecological’ developments:
researchers in several scientific disciplines, various social movements, and numerous
alternative organisations and networks are developing a new vision o f reality that
will form the basis o f our future technologies, economic systems and social institutions.
(Capra, 1994:335).

CONCLUSION: A PROLEGOMENON TO PARTS B & C

This three-staged historical narrative is common throughout the body of
literature that has amalgamated itself under the title ‘the New Paradigm’. It is a story
which is repeatedly told within this body of literature. For instance, it is retold, or
alluded to, in Roszak (1979), Bohm (1980), Merchant (1980), Capra (1982), Cobb
(1982), Pepper (1984), Devall and Sessions (1985), Griffin (1988), Cobb (1988),
Ferre (1988), Davies (1987), Birch (1990), Roszak (1991), Fabel (1994), Abram
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(1992), Nicholson and Rosen, eds (1992), Zohar and Marshall (1992), Ferre (1993),
Goldsmith (1993), Bohm (1994), Gare (1995), and Capra (1996).
There are a number o f obvious problems with this three stage environmental
version o f the history and philosophy o f changing ‘paradigms’. Most notably:
1) are the links between social and scientific paradigms really as natural
philosophers describe (i.e. does bad thinking really give rise to bad practices)?
2) If we admit that bad thinking can lead to bad practices, what relevance has this
got to environmentalism (i.e.: does this necessarily mean that bad environmental
thinking has caused the environmental crisis)?
3) Is the historical representation o f Cartesian/Newtonian/Modemist philosophy
as contributory intellectual factors in the rise o f anti-environmental thought valid (i.e. .
might the environmentalist characterisation and periodization o f Cartesianism and
Newtonianism be less than solid bases (maybe examples of inverse Whiggism) upon
which to make comparisons o f pro-environmental and anti-environmental
metaphysics)?
These problems are major but they are not the ones considered in the chapters
that follow. Instead this work enters wholeheartedly into the arguments that the ‘new
paradigmers’ themselves make. It enters into the terms of the debate as actually set
out by the natural philosophers and environmental thinkers that adhere to the new
paradigm o f unity, organicism and holism, rather than stepping back and attacking
them from outside their intellectual domain. In doing this, however, we see that the
terms o f debate internal to the natural philosophy o f the new paradigm are often
morally flawed (in the way they philosophise and politicise natural phenomenon) and
also self-contradictory (in that the new paradigm is replete with the very social and
environmental dangers that new paradigmers accuse modem paradigmers of).
Before I go on beyond this introduction to the unity of nature as perceived by its
supporters, a warning must be issued with regard to some labels. Where I have talked
o f ‘new paradigmers’ here as those that hold to philosophical beliefs in organicism,
holism, oneness, and unity, in other chapters (and for specific reasons) they come to
be known under various other labels. For instance, in Chapters Two to Four 1 refer to
them under the general name o f ‘Unitarians’, in Chapter Five they are referred to as
‘New Scientists’, and in Chapter Six they become known as ‘Postmodern Scientists’.
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There are very good reasons for me to use these various labels at varying points in
this work since I am shadowing the self-conscious invention o f these names by their
users who, despite slight variations, can all be described as story-tellers o f the
Unitarian narrative. I shall alert the reader o f the reasons for these various names as
the work proceeds. Note that 1 shall only endeavour to jump from one name to
another after adequate warnings as to the exact relationship between those who
operate under the respective names.
As far as labels like ‘concept5, ‘metaphysics5, ‘paradigm5 and ‘worldview5 go, I
use these words in a contiguous manner because, again, I shadow the terminology as
played out in the writings o f those natural philosophers and environmental thinkers
whom I examine. For instance, Paul Davies (1987) usually sticks to the label
‘worldview5 to describe his grand schemes about the nature o f the universe, whilst
someone like Griftin (1988) utilises the label ‘paradigm5 tor the same sort of job. 1
myself will shadow these usages but it will still aid the reader if I can identity the exact
parameters in which I use the labels listed above, despite how they are configured by
the various people I study.
I use the label ‘concept5 to describe an abstract idea whose abstractness may not
be generally acknowledged within the literature, while 1 utilise the word ‘metaphysics5
to describe an abstract idea whose abstractness is well-known at least in the scholarly
literature. Beyond this, the labels ‘paradigm5 and ‘worldview51 take to refer to a
concept or a metaphysical point o f view that has become so general within a certain
scientific or cultural framework that it is used to categorise and explain all (or many)
other concepts. Another name tor such all-embracing stories is ‘metanarrative5, and
this is the word (derived from Lyotard, 1984) that I tend to favour when discussing
the story o f unity since it is the more favoured term when describing grandiose
theories in contemporary academic discourse. What I intend all this to mean is that
when Griffin talks of a ‘paradigm5; when Davies talks of a ‘worldview5; and when
Lyotard talks o f a ‘metanarrative5, they are all referring to a grand story that is held to
possess such undeniable explanatory ability that it forms the basis of a whole field of
knowledge. It might be noted, then, that unity can be described at once, as a
paradigm, a worldview, a metanarrative, a metaphysics, and, given its abstractness, a
concept.
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Whilst I am explaining labels 1 might also introduce some others that are
sometimes used synonymously in the literature that I am exploring but which 1 tend to
differentiate within my own writing. In this particular work ‘ecology’ refers to the
science o f ecology and not to the social movement involved with protecting specific
ecological and environmental settings. The latter is termed ‘environmentalism’. A
contributing factor to the prevalence o f the idea that ecology deals with and operates
within the paradigm o f natural unity is this conflation between ecology and
environmentalism under the term ‘ecology’. Often people hear talk coming from
‘ecologists’ who are actually ‘environmentalists’ and then go on to suppose that their
messages (including those o f metaphysical unity) are part o f an acknowledged
scientific tradition and/or position. Most, but not all, writers examined in this work,
do not succumb to this conflation but I suggest that their readers often do.
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PAR T B:
All a Bour^

Plot!

INTRODUCTION TO PART B

Part B forges a story about the unity o f nature that differs from that recounted in
Part A. Instead o f suggesting that the unity o f nature is a conceptualisation/cultural
construct o f environmental discourse it suggests that the unity o f nature is the cultural
construct o f potent conservative, fascist, liberal, capitalist and technocentric forces in
contemporary Western culture. It could thus be described by those o f a left-wing
persuasion as a product o f the bourgeoisie; the product of those with capital and
power. It should be noted, however, that this is a cursory note used to categorise the
thesis into its appropriate parts rather than a commitment to make any sustained
Marxist analysis of the unity o f nature metanarrative.
Part B is divided into four chapters. Chapter Two looks at the specific ecological
problems within Unitarian thought. It examines the probability that the Twentieth
Century renderings o f the unity o f nature manifest a type of holism which is
ecologically fascist since it denies the value and stories o f individual organisms in
favour o f collective wholes. Chapter Three investigates the philosophical and
environmental premises o f the Gaia theory and how it, too, is a function o f the same
type o f holism described in Chapter Two. Chapter Three also examines some o f the
technocentric and anthropocentric impulses within the Gaia theory. Chapter Four
works with the familiar sociological idea that biological intrusions into the social
sciences are often o f a conservative bent. This idea is examined in relation to the unity
o f nature concept. Chapter Five identifies yet another distinct cultural impulse within
the unity o f nature concept; its close intellectual heritage with liberal capitalist
thought. This heritage flows into late Twentieth Century versions o f the unity of
nature concept via various political, philosophical and metaphysical conduits. These
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conduits are studied so as to betray their association with the liberalist (neo-classical)
agenda in contemporary Western economics.
What tends to unite all o f these chapters is a critical focus upon the concept of
the ‘system’. The system is such a strong model for unity in late Twentieth Century
natural philosophising that it has bound nature and humanity together within various
discourses so that the Earth’s natural ecological systems are held to give enormous
insight into the operation o f human social and economic systems.
Any intrusion o f biological models into the study o f social phenomenon is
inherently a hazardous exercises, as has been outlined many times before (see, for
example, Biggins, 1976; Sahlins, 1977; Lewontin et al, 1984; Levins and Lewontin,
1985; Young, 1985). Many o f these writers see such an enterprise as inherently
conservative and they have laid down a general, standing-order critique o f such an
enterprise. I should say at this introduction to the following chapters that I do not
necessarily adhere to this critique, though (as reflected in Chapter Four) I do have
sympathy tor it. Rather, I adhere to a view that says that we can not get away from
modelling the social world without the use of narratives which at one time or another
were used to narrate about nature. A social narrative must not be castigated as
inappropriate just because it seems to come from nature to society. Each model has to
be judged on its own merits, within the historical context of its use. The important
thing to note here, as I introduce the chapters of Part B, is that unity o f nature is a
narrative incapable of providing a normative framework that works well enough
within ecopolitical discourse to be used as the primary environmental narrative.
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CHAPTER 2
The Unity o f Nature, D ifferent Ecological
Sciences and O ver-Zealous Ecological Holism,

INTRODUCTION

As I have noted in Chapter One, exclamations about the natural reality of
unity—and the necessity to recognise this in ecological and environmental ideas and
practices—seems to be a theoretical and rhetorical necessity for many environmental
thinkers. All is not well and finally resolved in this regard however. By placing an
over-arching emphasis upon unity, environmental thinkers might open themselves up
to the criticism o f being branded promotional agents for some politically offensive
ideas that they would normally, themselves, protest against. Over-zealous use of
ecological holism is one particular charge that is often made for instance and this
chapter will explore this charge3.
The sense in which I use the phrase "over-zealous ecological holism’ revolves
around the tendency to devalue individuality while being intolerant o f difference,
dissension and plurality.

OVER-ZEALOUS ECOLOGICAL HOLISM

If the emphasis is upon unity and holism in the natural world (which includes
humans) does not the individual (whether human or not) get swallowed up in the

3 Often this over-zealous use of holism is described as ‘ecological fascism’ (see Weston, 1987; Marrietta, 1993;
Pepper, 1993; and Marshall, 1997) but due to the potential misunderstandings this phrase may cause within
readers 1 have elected not to use i t .

whole unity? According to many Unitarian thinkers it does not. For instance Macy
states:
Do not think that to broaden the construct o f the self in this way involves an eclipse
o f one's distinctiveness. Do not think that you lose your identity like a drop in the
ocean merging into the oneness o f Brahman. From the systems perspective, this
interaction, creating larger wholes and patterns, fosters and requires diversity . You
become more yourself. Integration and differentiation go hand in hand. (Macy.
1994:297).

Alas these retorts in the face o f the fascism charge do not allay the fears o f those
making the charges. Marietta signifies this when she states:
The dire picture o f the effects o f holism is not simply a response to what the holists
have said. It is also based upon possibilities that holists did not mention and that
they may not have foreseen. (Marietta: 1993, 407).

Any claim that a worldview o f natural unity might immediately give rise to
dangerous fascist ideas within social thought can only come about if there is slippage
between ecological unity and social unity. This slippage is made possible in
environmental thinking, as it is in a lot of scientific thinking, by the—albeit sometimes
vague—acknowledgement that there is an ontological unity between humanity and
nature. As humans are biological, ecological and physical organisms,
environmentalists generally claim that there is no distinction between humans and the
rest o f the ecological world. We humans are derived from that world (both historically
and physically) and we are an intimate interacting part o f it. Many people have thus
drawn the conclusion that the natural world in a strong sense shapes human nature
and human society; or to say this differently: society reflects at least some natural
processes.
However, others that hold to the unity o f nature concept believe that although
humans are intimately connected with nature, human society possesses its own unique
characteristics which are not derived from nature. This particular way of looking at
unity is used as a defence by committed Unitarian holists, like Freya Mathews
(Mathews, 1991), who believe that the charge of fascism cannot stand since
recognising the inherent unity o f nature does not mean the recognition of, or support
for, social unity.
Suppose we accept this point as valid: natural unity does not necessarily force
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upon human society a social unity. If we do accept it as valid, this only defends the
unity of nature narrative from social fascism. Claims o f ecological fascism—that the
unity o f nature narrative is anti-individualistic and intolerant o f dissent and difference
in non-human ecological settings—may still remain. This is the topic in question in this
chapter.
In the late Twentieth Century it has become axiomatic within a variety o f human
scientific endeavours that natural unity exists in one form or another. Physicists have
held that quantum mechanics shows a world in unity. Biologists hold that the living
world is united by a common evolutionary ancestry. Environmental scientists adhere
to unitarianism when describing the flow o f materials through environmental systems.
The unity o f nature is hardly a Twentieth Century peculiarity but the degree of its
scientization is. The paradigmatic example o f a science that recognises the unity o f
nature concept is ecology. Ecology studies all sorts o f things, o f course, from the
behaviour o f single animals to the behaviour o f whole landscapes; from the life
histories o f house flies to the trans-continental migration of birds. In all this diversity
o f study, however, there is (according to Fritjof Capra, Paul Davies, Edward
Goldsmith and others) a common metaphysical commitment to unity. The very
essence o f ecological science, according to Capra, for example, is its recognition of
natural unity: “ecological awareness...recognises the fundamental interdependence of
all phenomena” (Capra, 1994:335).

FREDERIC CLEMENTS AND THE USE OF UNITY AS A METAPHOR

There are numerous traditions that Unitarians draw upon to announce the
legitimacy and truth o f the unity o f nature concept but the most revered site tor the
science and metaphysics o f unity is modem day ecology. Ecological science is held to
prove that natural things upon the Earth are interrelated and interdependent to the
point o f being in unity: “[tjhe ecological point of view is, first o f all, holistic. It
focuses upon the ‘all-ness’ o f nature” declares Partridge (1984:106).“Ecology is
holistic” repeats (Goldsmith, 1993:15).
One o f the first manifestations o f this scientization of holism was when the

American prairie ecologist Frederic Clements developed and promoted his
superorganism thesis in the early Twentieth Century (see Clements, 1916). To
Clements the prairie community of plants and animals had a structure and a
physiology analogous to that ot an organism. The prairie community grew like an
organism, reproduced like an organism, and maintained its boundary integrity like an
organism does. To modern-day environmentalist Edward Goldsmith, the
superorganism is what distinguishes ecology from just plain old biology45.
The use of the word superorganism by Clements, and his modern-day intellectual
followers like Goldsmith, might immediately strike one to believe that Clements meant
that the prairies were in fact great big vast organisms but really it could mean any
manner o f things. The open-endedness of the metaphor allows for a variety of
meanings. For instance; that the prairie has boundaries like a living organism but no
physiology. Or conversely it has a physiology but no boundaries. In other words, the
prairie is significantly comparable to an organism or some of the aspects of an
organism but is not actually an organism itself The ‘prairie as an organism’ is merely
metaphorical. In the vein of Aristotle' we can describe it as an attempt to see similars
amongst dissimilars, a quest to elucidate the unfamiliar (the properties of prairies) in
terms o f the familiar (the properties of an organism).
The very fact that the superorganism is a metaphor might mean to some that we
should not take it too seriously. Ecological communities are only like organisms.
They are not put forward as organisms. Clements himself, tor instance, “called the
climax a complex organism to distinguish it from the well recognised individual
organism” says Golley (1993:24), a modem day ecologist. Similar arguments are
made by environmental philosophers as well as ecologists. For example, Laura
Westra, says:
Of course, there is no claim made here that individuals and ecosystems are analogous
in all respects. It simply appears that their status as developing, changing entities
containing life, renders them similar to each other in some relevant respects. (Westra ,

4See Chapters 2-4 in Goldsmith (1993).
5 See Aristotle’s P o e tic s , in, for example Aristotle (1941). Don Miller (1983) points out that .Aristotle's is still the
dominant Western configuration of metaphor and he points us (Miller, 1983:1) towards the Oxford English
Dictionary as an example of how this configuration is defined. The Oxford English Dictionary states that a
metaphor is: 1) “the application of a name or a description to something to which it is not literally applicable or
2) “an instance of this” (Thompson, ed, 1996:55).
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1994:43).

This is an argument that may be raised again and again against some o f the points
in this work since it is a work that deals with both acknowledged and
unacknowledged metaphors; i.e.: ‘because the metaphors are loose and only an
attempt to explain what things are tike rather than how things are one should restrain
oneself from investigating metaphors too intensely lest one falls into an
over-determined explanation tor their application7. Why investigate metaphors, this
argument would ask, when, after all, the progress o f science has a way o f weeding out
metaphors that are wrong or inaccurate and only leaving those that truly reflect
reality?67
If we consider that metaphor is an inferior, non-translating and non-literal form
of human expression, we are, however, still left with two undeniable problems in the
use of holistic metaphors in ecology. Firstly, the metaphors that ecologists such as
Clements use are often not utilised as loose descriptions at all but as appeals to the
literal truth. Clements7 superorganisms are not just rhetorical devices that attempt to
elucidate the unfamiliar in terms o f the familiar but are attempts to categorise the
reality o f a certain circumstance. Even Clements, for instance, speaks o f his
organismic metaphors as more than heuristic tools (see McIntosh, 1985, and Hagen,
1992). They are sustained attempts to positively say that something is so comparable
to something else that they both belong to the same category o f things7.

6This is a simple expression of one of two main contemporary philosophical conceptualisations of metaphor (as
noted, for example, by Miller (1982). Derived from Aristotle's P o e tic s this view of metaphor holds that metaphor
is a primitive, imperfect, non-representational, non-translating, rudimentary, pre-scientific. rhetorical, immature,
polvsemic, artistic, figurative, non-corresponding, poetic tool in human speech, behaviour and activities that can be
contrasted with rational, monosemic, scientific, literal, logical, translatable, natural, linear, referential,
representational language and thought upon which our proper attention should be focused. From this perspective
metaphor, while clever and poetic, is also a danger to scientific discourse since while it may possibly make things
easier to comprehend, too often it fogs over what is literally true with various kinds of rhetorical wizardry . The
other main contemporary philosophical conceptualisation of metaphor, reports Miller (1982), declares that
metaphor is not just an inferior poetic form of expression subservient to representational language and thought but
that metaphor is the only available form of expression. From this point of view -w ith which Miller agrees and
with which I have much sympathy-representational language and thought is but a part of metaphor: a part that,
according to Miller, denies its own metaphoricity in order to increase the depth of its knowledge claims. M iller's
ideas upon metaphor feed into those examined later in this work: see Chapters Five. Six. Seven and Eight. Miller
himself acknowledges the influence of a diverse variety of scholars of metaphor in his work: these include:
Frederick Nietzsche. Max Black. Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricouer. George Lakoff and M. Johnson. For works on
metaphor by these scholars see: Nietzsche (1979), Black (1979). Derrida (1974), Ricouer (1977), Lakoff and
Johnson (1980).
7 That Clements' use of holistic ideas are sustained attempts to codify the superorgaiiism into the realm of the
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The same can be said o f modem day ecological/environmental thinkers and their
use o f holistic metaphors. For instance, Capra (1982:308) writes “[tjhe Earth, then, is
a living system; it functions not just like an organism but actually seems to be an
organism—Gaia, a living being”. Similarly “[t]or Goodwin and Mitchell, the
emergence o f such regularities is what characterises a superorganism, rather than its
being like a superorganism” (Lewin, 1996:29).
Secondly, there is the question; ‘how come one particular metaphor was chosen
over others?5 Why is the ecology o f the world more like a superorganism than a
machine, a river, a whistling wind? If there are a whole lot o f potentially available
metaphors, why are particular ones chosen over others? These two replies draw us
into taking metaphors seriously.

ECOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SUPERORGANISM

For Clements, in the early part o f the Twentieth Century, and tor modem-day
holist ecologists, like Goldsmith, Goodwin and Mitchell, the superorganism is
supposed to be composed o f individuals and species that are so interrelated and
interdependent that the community or ecosystem they comprise can be regarded as a
balanced, self-regulating and highly defined organic unit; a unit whose constituent
species possess a certain ecological complimentarity with one another such that it has
the characteristics of stability, resilience and non-invasibility conferred upon it.
Because o f all o f this the larger community some how resembles an organism. Roger
Lewin puts it this way:
[ajlthough a prerise definition is elusive, a superorganism can be thought of as a
group of individual organisms whose collective behaviour leads to group level_______
literal, rather than a passing rhetorical strategy, can be realised if we acknowledge the length of time that Clements
stuck with it. From Clements (1916) until Clements (1936) we can note that he had invested much of his
professional life championing the literal truth of the climax community as a real superorganism.
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Junctions that resemble the behaviour of a single organism. (Lewin. 1996:31).

Clements’ superorganism not only exists in space; it also exists in time: a
superorganism grows or evolves. This is encapsulated in Clements well-known theory
o f ecological succession. Succession theory is a theory of ecological development
which posits that progressive sequential vegetation change on any given geographical
site proceeds from invading pioneer species through intermediary stages to a stable,
mature and relatively uniformly-arranged climax community. This process not only
occurred in Clements’ beloved prairie regions. Clements thought that it was a near
universal phenomena in all terrestrial communities from mountain forests in Canada to
swamps in Florida.
The Succession process was not only universal but also somewhat predictable,
too. Given a certain bunch o f initial species, and given a certain set geographical
factors (such as rainfall, soil type and atmospheric temperature), the sequence of
succession was teleologically destined towards a single resultant community of plants
(or to a very tew variations o f this result).
Clements was a major figure in pre-War American science, having contributed to
the development o f two icons o f ecological theory and practice; firstly, the theory of
Succession as just outlined; and secondly, the quadratic sampling technique (see
Clements, 1905). With regards to the second, Clements, in his early years, at the
Universities o f Chicago and Nebraska around the turn of the century, was determined
to turn the rather patchy intellectual profession of botanical natural history into a
‘real’ science; the science o f ecology. According to Macintosh (1985:77) Clements:
decried... descriptive ecology, meaning verbal descriptions of vegetation, often only
accompanied by species lists. Clements wrote of such descriptive ecology that no
method can ‘yield results farther from the truth ...[frjcology was, in Clements’
conception, quantitative.

Clements’ model discipline in this endeavour to quantify ecology was physiology
(as it was for so many other young biological disciplines in the early Twentieth
Century*). By constantly measuring the physical and numerical parameters of his
subject o f study, the prairie communities o f the Midwest, Clements moved ecology
towards the status of being a real science. He, himselfi also moved up the ranks of the

8 On this see Nordenskiold (1928), Morton (1981), Tobey (1981), McIntosh (1985)

37

scientific establishment and in the 1920s reached the higher echelons o f American
biology when he was awarded a permanent research position at the new Carnegie
Institute.
By the 1940s however the quantitative appeal o f Clements’ botanical studies
were outshone by his growing theoretical obsession with superorganicism and
Succession (see Tobey, 1981; McIntosh, 1985; Hagen, 1992 and Golley, 1993).
Although Succession is still much discussed today within terrestrial ecology circles, it
is usually described as an ideal model and often given only a pedagogical role. In most
places o f professional ecology Succession theory is thought o f as being an
over-generalising, deterministic view o f natural communities. These problems were
becoming aware to Clements’ later contemporaries and very few o f them actually
thought Succession was quite deserving o f the theoretical purity that Clements
attached to it. For instance, Tobey (1981) and McIntosh (1985) explain how some of
contemporary Clements’ critics, like S. A. Cain, regarded his propensity to classify
and categorise hundreds o f different types o f Climax communities as
self-contradictory proof that Climax communities were not deterministically inclined
towards a particular endpoint. In contrast, Clements continued to think o f both
Climax and Succession as central concepts to the study of virtually all terrestrial
ecological settings.
Although he had many supporters, Clements also had some detractors, and these
grew in number as his career and life went on. It might be noted that none of this
criticism or support for Clements ever fell away after his death and today we can still
discern two ways o f thinking within professional terrestrial ecology; that of
unitarianism and that o f anti-unitarianism (although these two schools of ecological
thought are usually labelled using the terms o f ‘holism’ and ‘anti-holism’).
The anti-unitarians are often castigated by holist thinkers as mechanistic,
reductionist^, and unworthy o f the title o f ecologist (see, as a recent example, Rowe,
1997). The world, the holists often believe, is made a poorer place by the presence of
such ‘atomistic’ ecologists in it. Edward Goldsmith (Goldsmith, 1993) and Lynn
Margulis (see Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, 1989), for example, are adherents of this
position. Goldsmith, for example, when writing to honour a man he perceives to be a
modem day Clementsian ecologist finds it impossible not to have a stab at atomistic
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ecology:
I am indebted to Hugene Odum, one o f the few remaining academic ecologists whose
work has not been perverted to fit in the paradigm o f mechanistic science.

(Goldsmith, 1993 :xix).

The loudness o f the holist intellectual movement in ecology and
environmentalism is, however, probably matched by the sheer number o f anti-holist
ecologists in the profession o f ecology. Although there is a lot of it, the presence of
anti-holism in ecological science is generally ignored by environmentalists. Or to put it
more accurately, the implications of the professional ecological distrust o f holism is
ignored. (Actually, this generalisation is also inaccurate to some extent since some
environmental holist thinkers do acknowledge the prevalence o f anti-unitarians within
ecological science but this is generally to promote themselves as the underdogs and
the victims o f a metaphysical war against their pro-atomist toe). Many environmental
thinkers however are just about totally ignorant o f professional anti-unitarianism in
ecology and so go on to believe that ecology is really the only discipline in science
where holism is concomitantly supported in both theory and practice9.
Despite being variously aware and unaware o f anti-holism in ecological science,
environmentalism generally still hails ecology as the holistic science. Many
professional ecologists are somewhat bewildered by the continued appraisal that
‘ecology equals holism’ when their own professional lives revolve around working
with theories that declare the subjects of their study are somewhat atomistic in nature.
Such anti-unitarianism started early within professional ecological science. Scientists
such as Henry Cowles, P.J. Ramensky, W.S. Cooper, Arthur Tansley, Forrest Shreve,
S.A. Cain and Henry Gleason reacted, mostly gently, against Clements and his
supporters’ use o f superorganisms. The most celebrated and perhaps the most
relevant o f these anti-unitarians was Henry Gleason.
Henry Gleason’s reactions are best recorded in a 1926 paper that has come to be
regarded as a classic in the science o f ecology10. In this paper Gleason described
ecological communities not as interdependent unities but as fortuitous associations of

9 This might apply, for instance to Capra (1996), Fabel (1994) and Bohm (1994).
l0Gleason’s 1926 paper is reprinted in an anthclc gy edited by Real and Brown (1991) that is entitled F o u n d a tio n s
o f E c o lo g y : C la s s ic P a p e r s w ith C o m m e n ta rie s.

ecologically and genetically unrelated plants brought together by chance happenings in
their history and migration. The Gleasonian view o f ecological communities
emphasises that the well-defined and integrated character o f any particular
naturally-occurring group ot plants and animals is a human abstraction, and that
communities are anarchic, stochastic and fluctuating. Species composition is not
uniform but continuously varies over space and time in such a disjointed and
unpredictable manner that generalisations such as succession are impossible or
useless. Plant aggregates are thus boundless and bondless associations rather than
hard and fast well-defined unities. Or in Gleason’s own words:
just as it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to locate satisfactorily the
boundaries of an association in space, so it is frequently impossible to distinguish
accurately the beginning or the end of an association m time... A community is
frequently so heterogeneous as to lead observers to conflicting ideas as to its
associational identity, its boundaries may be so poorly marked that they
can not be located with any degree of accuracy, its origins and disappearance may be so
gradual that its time boundaries can not be located; small fragments of associations
with only small proportions of their normal components of species are often observed;
the duration of a community may be so short that it tails to show a period of
equilibrium in its structure. (Gleason, 1926:13).

Another important difference between Clemenstian and Gleasonian ecology is
their respective attitude to the unusual in ecological situations. Whereas Clements7
superorganismic theory o f communities would regard fragments o f vegetation that do
not conform to the regional climax community as being peculiar, Gleason’s outlook
would see these non-conformities as typical:
[ejveiy ecologist has seen these fragmented associations, or instances of distribution,
but they are generally passed by as negligible exceptions to what is regarded as the
general rule. (Gleason; 1926:12).

If the superorganism and the community were Clements’ main metaphors of
elucidation then Gleason’s main metaphor o f elucidation was the ‘association’. Within
the framework o f the association, ecological groupings of organisms may possess
interdependent relationships—that may even be obligatory for the individuals and
species involved—but the whole aggregate does not register holistic properties that
confer upon it the status o f a unity.
It may, at this point, be useful to concoct a definition o f Gleason’s association
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versus Clements’ superorganísmic unities in order to elaborate upon the difference
between the tw o11.
-a unity is a united entity composed of non-separable parts which act in a unified,
integrated and interdependent manner, whether conscious o f it or not, toward a
common agenda; the maintenance of the unit-entity as a whole.
-an association is a loosely-gathered group o f coincidentally-arranged, separate
‘unitary’ organisms living together, sometimes in an interactive and interdependent
way, but which act individualistically and without contribution to a common agenda.
Although Gleasonian ecological settings exist more as random and ill-defined
associations rather than the bounded and integrated superorganismic unities that
Clements and his followers suppose, this does not mean that ecological associations
are never at all integrated, that the members that compose them are not highly
interdependent in particular situations and that the individual members do not enter
the occasional strategic alliance in order to uphold a common interest. It is highly
improbable that any one individual exists as an isolated ecological atom in an
association (although this may happen sometimes). Most individuals do interact but
Gleason would say that this would be at a localised scale rather than at the whole
community or ecosystem scale as advocated by Clementsian ecologists or modem day
advocates o f Unitarian ecology. The Gleasonian view of ecology can just a well be
read as a recommendation to recognise the interactions of ecological agents but, as
we shall see, Gleasonian ecology suggests that this ecological interaction is not o f the
type that Unitarians uphold.
From the 1940s on, the debate between anti-unitarians and Unitarians became
significantly more complicated and sophisticated. Tansley had introduced the
ecosystem concept so as to put the organic holism of Clements into a more acceptable
‘scientific’ framework. When Tansley put forward his ecosystem concept, he was
“qualifying without disabling” Clements’ earlier organismic concepts (Hagen
1992:80).
While Tansley invented the ecosystem concept in 1935, it was not until 1941 that
someone, the Yale ecologist Raymond Lindeman, actually found one: the Cedar

11While acknowledging that this may be dangerous since singular definitions often do not do justice to the myriad
uses of the terms that they attempt to define.
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Creek Bog ecosystem in Minnesota. Instead o f studying incidental organisms in this
bog, Lindeman studied, and more importantly for most scientists, he measured, the
bog’s energy characteristics (see Lindeman, 1941 and Lindeman, 1942). By doing
this--by asserting that energy flowed throughout the ecosystem—Lindeman came to
realise that everything was interconnected and united within the bog because of this
flow. This uncompromising appeal to quantitative energy measurement and tracking
distinguished Lindeman from his contemporaries who were unready to apply
Tansley’s ecosystem ideas to their own field studies.
Hagen (1992:97) confirms this when he says:
what most clearly distinguished Lindeman from older ecologists was his use of the
ecosystem concept. With this concept he was able to synthesise elements taken from
traditional studies in fisheries biology and limnology, the newer biogeochemical
approach to studying lakes, Elton’s terrestrial ecology and traditional plant ecology.

In the 1950s and 1960s:
most studies essentially repeated Lindeman’s study of Cedar Bog lake, in that they
aggregated the diverse fauna and flora into a small set of trophic groups, determined the
flows of energy and materials between groups, calculated ratios of inputs and outputs.
(Golley, 1993:72).

The differing viewpoints o f ecology that variously correspond to an adherence of
a superorganismic outlook or an association outlook parallel the different approaches
between two breeds o f professional ecology; ‘ecosystem ecology’ and ‘community
ecology’:
[wjhile neo-individualist theories tend to view succession as a consequence of the
plants that dominate a system the ecosystem theorist might view the successional
change as being manifested in the balancing ol production and respiration or of
equilibrium of input and output of major nutrients. (Shugart, 1984:19).

The irony within community ecology is that community ecologists often do not
believe in the concept o f the community whilst ecosystems ecologists believe in both
the community and ecosystem concepts as being applicable to ecological reality. For
ecosystem ecologists “the ecosystem is the more fundamental unit” (Lindeman, 1942)
o f ecology but they are still inclined to invoke the community concept as defining the
biological component o f that ecosystem. For community ecologists, on the other
hand, the various organismic members o f a community and their immediate
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relationships are the fundamental units o f ecology. Given their chaotic, ill-defined
state, however, communities themselves are just arbitrarily defined abstractions.
Whereas community ecologists usually hail from traditional zoology and botany
schools (or ecology departments that evolved from such schools) ecosystem
ecologists are just as likely to be physical or mathematical scientists as experienced
biologists. Not content to set about describing the enormous variability in the
ecological world by the pragmatic and fragmentary methods o f botany and zoology,
systems-inclined ecologists have attempted to harden the discipline o f ecology into a
‘real7 science; one replete with universal scientific laws.
List (1994) argues that ecologists have never arrived at a scientific law as one
finds in the physical sciences; ecological laws are much too flimsy or specific. This
on-going criticism—which emerges from within and without the ranks o f ecology—has
prompted the (now-ageing) program o f the transference o f techniques associated with
geochemistry, process engineering, network analysis and cybernetics into the study o f
ecological subjects.
Although the critique o f ecology’s inability to formulate basic laws continues and
although ecosystem ecologists continue to try and physicalise and quantity thensubjects o f study to arrive at those laws, community ecologists generally go merrily
along on their way ignoring such criticism as they set about describing the actions and
interactions within particular ecological settings. This difference in ecological
approach is by no means new: in the 1950s:
Hutchinson and Wollack...identified a dichotomy in ecology which was to become
increasingly evident as ecosystem ecology developed. One method of ecology, they
said, concentrated on the ‘biosociologicaT, based on individual species and their
relations. The other isolated a space and studied the transference of matter and/or
energy across the boundaries of space. (McIntosh, 1985:133).

While the superorganismic concept was suffering intellectual suspicion during
Clements’ declining years12, it was, soon after, to be reconstituted and reconfigured
into ecosystem ecology. As Richardson argues (1980:466) the ecosystem approach is,
at least in part, “a child o f the organismic concept—a child that in turn has nurtured its

12As exemplified in the works of Gleason (1926) and Tansley (1935). Both of whom were suspicious of the ability
of Clements’ claim that Succession theory was an all-embracing theory with applicability to all terrestrial
ecological situations.
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embattled parent”.
This philosophical affinity between superorganismic unity and the ecosystem
concept is transparent in the writings o f modem day ecological/environmental
thinkers. Capra (1994:27), for instance, writes: “a system has come to mean an
integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its
parts, and ‘systems thinking’, the understanding o f a phenomenon within the context
o f a larger whole” (Capra, 1994:27).

SYSTEMS ECOLOGY AND THE UNITY OF NATURE

At the extreme end o f ecosystem science is what is called ‘systems ecology’.
Systems ecology is often perceived as being distinct from ecosystem ecology (the
latter being a biological discipline which makes extensive use o f physical science
methods to analyse ecological situations whereas the former defines biological and
ecological activity purely by the operations o f physical processes discovered by such
methods) but the division between the two is somewhat fuzzy. They exist side by side
with regards to having many common analytical techniques and similar conceptual
frameworks13. Thus any criticism directed at either systems ecology or ecosystems
ecology in particular usually must tall upon both o f them.
Within the metaphysics o f systems ecology all living things on the planet are
united and unified due to the physical transfer o f materials and energy between the
system constituents. The cycling o f ‘nutrients’ (a term that embodies both matter and
energy) is a key focus o f study in unity approach, as Tyler Volk makes clear in his
short exposition o f the work o f two particular systems ecologists:
Tim Allen and Thomas Hoekstra see nutrient cycles as the very markers for
designating the existence o f ecosystems. (Volk, 1998:53).14
Systems ecology is a functional ecology: it sets out to functionalise its subjects ot
study; be that subject a pond, a stand o f trees, an ocean or the whole entire planet. To
Frank Golley (1993:80) the enthusiasm within systems/ecosystems ecology:

13 For instance, they share a penchant for mathématisation, quantification, the tracking of material exchange
within ecological settings and the use of models of cycles, flows and networks.
14Allen and Hoekstra’s unification of ecology via the use of nutrient cycling studies (and ecological hierarchy) is
elaborated in a book of theirs entitled T o w a rd a U n ifie d E c o lo g y . See Alien and Hoekstra (1992).
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for a physical or engineering approach to systems tended to de-emphasise the
significance ol biological differences. Species and individuals were represented as
mass, energy or chemical elements...[AJlthough the advantages were many, the
disadvantage was that most of the biological reality encompassed in the species was lost.

“In the ecosystem model”, carries on Golley (1993:80), “species acted abstractly like
robots” .
When talking about the whole planet, the term biosphere sometimes rears its
head in systems talk. The biosphere is the largest ecosystem and it comprises all living
things on the planet plus the geochemical systems that they are a part of. By
systematising the whole planet, all the different and separate members o f that
biosphere become functionalised; placed into categories and awarded a role. Rather
than existing as distinct living beings, individual organisms—and the local collections
that they comprise—are turned into components in a system. Each component is then
judged by its contribution to the continued cycling or transfer o f matter and energy
within the system. Often the exact species are o f no importance in this process o f
systematisation. For instance:
[wjhen the Odums had studied the metabolism of the reef at Eniwetok A toll, they were
not concerned with individual species. Indeed, at the time they were unable to identify
them. (Hagen, 1992:139).

The conceptual framework o f systems ecology rapidly transforms individual
living beings and collections o f living beings into typological categories according to
their particular role in the ecosystem (see Bookchin, 1990, and Marshall, 1998). For,
instance a wattle becomes a carbon-fixing autotroph which transforms so many
einsteins o f light into carbon over so many years, a wombat becomes a heterotrophic
carbon consumer releasing x amount o f calories into the system cycle per unit time,
and woodrot fungi becomes a decomposing component working at so and so rate of
efficiency as ascribed by its functional status. It matters little whether the plant is a
wattle, an exotic pine, a great vat o f seaweed or an amorphous blob o f plant cells,
since its function as a photosynthetic carbon producer is all that is cared about.
This emphasis on the link between unity and function is also brought out by some
environmental philosophers. For instance Westra shows a predilection toward
Unitarian functionalism by saying “integrity conveys the idea o f wholeness and
unbroken functioning” (Westra, 1994:xi).
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Given the systems stance it might be suggested that a change in the biotic
construction o f an ecological setting (such as species composition) is unimportant if
the matter and energy flow systems are maintained. This is apparently the view of
many ecologists who exhibit a penchant for superorganismic theories. For example,
Robert O ’Neill is cited as taking such an extreme view as this for he is said to
maintain that ecosystems retain their character even when the individual or species
composition changes (see Burrows, 1990:426). Systems ecologist Pat Klinger, also
tends to do this. Klinger is quoted in Lewin (1996:31) as saying:
1 could show you a handful of vegetation from a peat bog and challenge you to tell me
whether it came from the Congo or northern Minnesota. You couldn’t say and that is
because, structurally they are all the same. Yes, the species may be different in different
parts of the world, but often the genera are the same. And in terms of physical form--the
shape of the mosses, the sedges and other bog species—they are the same the world over.

This fixation o f genera over species shows the primacy o f generalisations over
specifics within systems ecology. When Lindeman was unearthing his handful o f mud
from a Minnesota Cedar Bog he might as well have been unearthing it from a
Congolese bog; so common are their attributes, according to Lewin and Klinger. A
similar tendency towards the primacy o f generalisations can be seen in the following
passage by Edward Goldsmith (which tries to prove the unitary nature o f ecosystems
and communities):
A number of experiments have been carried out to determine whether ecosystems
display resilience stability and, if so, whether this can be attributed to their own
efforts-and hence whether they are cybernetic or self-regulating systems, capable
of maintaining homeostasis. The best known of such experiments are those conducted
by Simberloff and E.O.L. Wilson. They removed all the fauna from several small
mangrove islets and then closely watched the way they were re-colonised by
terrestrial arthropods. They established that although the islets were eventually
populated by very different species from the original ones, the total number ot species
was very much the same. (Goldsmith, 1993:131).

Goldsmith is a very strong advocate tor unity and the superorganism idea but his
preoccupation with unity and finding generalisation means that he ignores the very
differences that exist within ecological settings. This is to say that species differences
in any particular comparison between two different ecological settings are cast aside
in Goldsmith’s approach in order for him to make a statement about the ecological
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reality o f unity.
Reiterating Goldsmith’s preoccupation with overall structural similarities (instead
o f specific differences) is Pat Klinger:
Klinger strongly believes that the robust dynamics of succession towards peatland
displays the characteristics of a complex system, partly because they promote their own
formation but also because they are so similar in fundamental structure. (Lewin, 1996:
31).

The tact that Klinger sees the peatbogs as all showing a few community types
shows his assumptions towards climax and superorganicism since Clements’
succession theory also presupposed a few common types of climax community.
Klinger admits as much to Lewin, who says of his work: “Klinger’s peat bogs figure
in the current revival of the idea of the superorganism” (Lewin, 1996:28).

THE ASSOCIATION PERSPECTIVE : GLEASON’S ECOLOGY OF
INDIVIDUALS

In contrast to the unity perspective of superorganicism one of the important ideas
to emerge out of the association way of looking at ecological communities is that
when the individual or species composition of an ecological community change, then
the whole community can be considered to have changed. This is not merely a
statement of the value of individual organisms, it can also be considered a description
of ecological reality, since:
as far as is known, each species is uniquely different from each other species in at least
some respects. This means each species must respond uniquely to the ecological
situation in which it occurs, compared with other species exposed to the same set of
conditions. In tact...genotypic variation within species and even within individuals
will produce some ecological difference between populations of the same species.
(Burrows, 1990:82).

This statement, from a community ecologist, concurs with another, from an
environmental philosopher:
To speak of human uniqueness is quite acceptable as long as we are prepared to accept
that chimpanzees, dolphins, bees and humming-birds are also unique.
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(Horrigan: 1988:105).

Such an overwhelming quantity o f uniqueness within and between species would
surely suggest that any competent ecological science would acknowledge the sheer
complicated texture o f the ecological world. Schulze and Zwolfer (1987), for
instance, maintain that the reason for difficulties in formulating universal laws in
theoretical ecology is the sheer diversity of the behaviour, interactions and adaptations
of individual species. If the diversity between and within species is so great then, far
from retaining its character in the face o f a change to its species composition, as
Robert O ’Neill would assert, species composition is an important defining feature of
ecological communities.
It may also be the case that the personal history of an individual (and the
localised context in which it is embedded) might suggest that uniqueness is an
individual property and not just a species property. For instance, if we could analyse
genotypic twin plants as they grew in slightly different environmental conditions we
might find that after years of separate development, each plant would react to a
similar situation (say a certain predation rate or a certain amount o f rainfall) in a
different way. This effect would not come from genetic heritage but from the lived
experience o f the plants15. From this point of view it seems fair to say that the

15 Evidence which might support such a conclusion can be offered in the case of plants which produce toxins in
relation to the specific herbivoiy episodes they experience. Rhoades (1979). for instance, details how some plants
react to such heibivory in a specific way according to the exact nature of the predation. If such a plant had a twin
who was predated upon differently, then these plants, taken together, may react to identical ecological situations in
different ways given their past variations in lived history.
It might also be noted here that one of the strongest pieces of evidence which would cast ecological
communities as being decidedly more Gleasonian than Clementsian (i.e.: individualistic rather than united) would
be a situation like the colonization of new areas whereby we could find out if successive individuals of named
species were in anvwav influenced by --or influential to—other individuals of named species that either preceeded
them or came after them. This is what Burrows (1990) and White (1979) and others have done and what they have
found was this: in a situation whereby a new area has been colonised by new and different plant species (say a
newlv created volcanic island, a receding glacier, the barren ground of a felled forest) Burrows and White found
that the successional processes did not depend on the presence of various species types. So when a bunch of pioneer
species invaded the new sites, they did not prepare or facilitate further invasion, since even if the pioneer species
did not arrive, second-commer species would arrive anyway. Thus pioneer species weren’t pioneering the land for
others, they were merely pioneering it for themselves. Pioneer, in this context, just means ‘the first ones there ,
rather than the ‘pathfinders’ or the ‘trail-blazers’. The secondary invader species did not have their prospects
enhanced or diminished by the pioneers. In contrast to such an interactive assumption, the second-commers either
arrived at the same timeas the pioneers and just took a little bit longer to grow or they took a little longer to get
there (because, for instance, their vectors of transport were slower). Similarly any species that arrived after the
second-commers were not affected, either positively or negatively, by the presence of the pioneers or
second-commers, they just took a bit longer to arrive, germinate and establish. The first-commers, in turn were not
necessarily affected tty the late-commers, since they had either expired through the possession of a far shorter
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character o f any one ecological community must be peculiar to that particular
community; not only because it has a unique assemblage of unique species, but
because it has a unique assemblage o f unique individuals.
While the composite members o f an ecological community all possess their own
unique character, for nearly all individuals this character is not independent of its
environmental context. This is to say that there are interactions within the abstract
community that have the capacity to influence the nature of the individuals and
species within it. This is done through the medium of emergent properties. Emergent
properties such as soil fertility, nutrient availability, predation rates, niche patterns and
resource distribution commonly affect the character of individuals within a
community16.
Herein arises an apparent paradox in my interpretation of Gleasonianism for
while emphasising an appreciation o f atomism in ecology (so that large community or
ecosystem wholes are counted as abstracted or constructed entities) there is
nevertheless a willingness to attribute super-structural feedback upon individuals via a
holistic and unitarian-like concept such as ‘emergent properties’. It is my view that an
individualistic conception of ecological communities can co-exist with the concept of
emergent properties. Although ecological communities are justly regarded as
abstractions of the lives o f individuals and their interactions, ecological communities
do possess properties that any individual cannot exhibit on its own. This is to say that
emergent properties are not dependent upon these communities being hard and fast
self-organising and unitary entities. It must also be emphasised, though, and this is a
crucial point, that emergent properties are just as heterogeneous, variable,
self-contradictory, transient, and evasive of generalisations as the associations from
which they emerge; such that patterns o f feedback can only be ascribed very
tentatively in any ecological situation.
lifespan, or they continued to exist with the later-commers. From this point of view, no real interaction is taking
place to create a climax community which we may regard as a united Clementsian superorganism. In fact,
Succession, from this viewpoint, is just the slow establishment of a myriad of species, the slowest of which just
happen to be of interest to humans since they are the longest lived, most economically important, and most
spatially-dominant.
16 The concept of emergent properties finds it way into ecological discourse via the writings of Richmond e t a l
(1975), Fenchel and Christensen (1976), Salt (1979), Edson e t a l (1981), Allen and Starr (1982), Burrows (1990),
and Drake (1990). In most of these works, emergent properties are regarded as the “features of a biological system
which amount to more than the sum of the effects created by its constituent species” (Burrows, 1990:525).
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SYSTEMS ECOLOGY: A REDUCTIONISTIC TYPE OF HOLISM?

Systems ecology claims to be a holistic approach to ecology but any ecological
approach based purely upon the study o f matter and energy is an approach rooted to
reductionism since ecological actors and processes are reduced to physical entities
only. Or to put this another way; much of systems ecology is not ecological, since the
phenomena being explained:
can be evaluated by physical and chemical methods, with total disregard for ecological
ones. (Trojan, 1984:30)

The physicalism o f systems ecology is the main supportive base for the
conception o f the Earth’s living biota existing in a state of unity. However, while the
physicalist approach of systems unitarianism might be an adequate explanation for the
integrated nature of a unitary individual organism—where the transfer of matter and
energy proceed without a hitch according to physico-chemical laws—it is not an
adequate explanation for the activities of an association of distinct individuals; where
the phenomena involved with getting into or out of a position that enables the transfer
of matter and energy are more important in determining ecological structures and
biotic relationships than the mere transfer of matter and energy. Such phenomena (like
predator-prey interactions, competition, mutualism and parasitism) are not reducible
to physical laws. As a demonstration of this consider a forest community. The
ecological structures and natural relationships within a stand of forest trees are not
determined by the physical connection that photosynthesis might be said to effect
between a tree and the physical components of its environment (light, water, air etc.)
but are determined by a great range of factors which involve the tree attempting to
effect such a connection, including, tor example: subsurface water competition,
above-ground competition for light, herbivory evasion, parasite avoidance, and
chance confrontations with ecological disturbance17. None of these processes proceed

17 On the importance of these aspects in the creation of particular ecological settings, the following publications
may be noted. On competition see Richmond e t a l (1975), Tilman (1988), Carney (1989), Yodzis (1989). On
herbivory see Crawley (1983). On parasitism see May and Anderson (1979). On disturbance see Heinselman and
Wright (1973), White (1979), Picket and White (1985).
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according to physico-chemical laws and so they cannot be incorporated as subsystems
into a total systems model of the forest, yet they are far more important when
describing the structure o f the forest stand than the physics and chemistry of
photosynthesis.
We might also find that in adhering to the physicalism of systems ecology, many
relationships that are crucial in determining the emergent (though transient) structures
of the Earth’s ecological communities are ignored because they do not significantly
contribute to the flow o f matter and energy. The most obvious examples are those
relating to sexual interaction such as pollination, seed dispersal, courtship displays and
off-spring care.18

ECOLOGICAL UNITY AND HIERARCHY

The concept of unity is often broken up into layers by Unitarians. The way they
do this is by the use of hierarchical levels (sometimes called ‘levels of organisation’).
Under this schema the various units that make up the whole entire unity of the natural
world are distributed hierarchically on levels. According to Capra:
an outstanding property of all life is the tendency to form multi-levelled structures of
systems within systems. Each of these forms a whole with respect to its parts while at
the same time being a part of a larger whole. Thus, cells combine to form tissues, tissues
to form organs, and organs to form organisms. These in turn exist within social systems
and ecosystems. (Capra 1994:28).

Rollo explains hierarchical levels thus:
[a] hierarchy is a system of organisation in which different levels can be
distinguished or where lower levels are sequentially nested within levels above.

(Rollo, 1995:7).
As Rollo says it is possible to see that he could find an ally in Edward Goldsmith
who lets us know that: “[t]he biosphere is a hierarchical organisation of natural

18In this regard, social scientists might note a parallel between ecosystem ecology and Liberalist and Marxist
sociology. All of these scholarly traditions tend to give little or no cognisance to the sexual aspects involved in the
subjects of their study. The exclusion of sexuality thus presents a deficient interpretation of the localised lives of
most individuals.
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systems” (Goldsmith, 1993: chapter 38 title).
The systems ecologist, George Van Dyne (1995:5) described this hierarchy of
increasingly-complex levels by pointing out its structure as being:
cell<tissue<organ<orgaiiism<population<community<ecosystem.
The ever-present nature of hierarchies in unity theory is of much importance and
will be focused on more than once in this work. My purpose here, however, is just to
draw the readers attention to the tact that unity and hierarchy may be connected
concepts.

THE ORDER OF THINGS

Environmentalists that operate under the ontological reality of the unity of nature
also subscribe to metaphysical companion concepts that prop up and support
unitarianism. Along with unity, nature is held to exist as a naturally stable,
sell-regulating, orderly and harmonious balance. Thus stability, harmony, balance and
self-regulation all exist with and within the unity of nature concept. From within the
science o f ecology these ideas have been attacked. In this section (adapted from
Marshall, 1998) these adjunct concepts of unitarianism are examined one by one and
contrasted against the Gleasonian alternatives. In explicating these alternatives, I am
not just putting forward the case of the comparable heuristic value of the Gleasonian
alternative, I am also stating that the first pair of all the binaries has been a privileged
metaphysical focus within Clementsian, ecosystemic, and Unitarian research.
a) stability versus change:
According to Edward Goldsmith “[stability rather than change is the basic
feature o f the living world” (Goldsmith, 1993:112). The idea that natural communities
are stable entities is manifested in the popular environmental expression: ‘the balance
o f nature7. Although the balance of nature concept has permeated the study of the
natural world since antiquity19 it has become scientised through Clementsian plant
ecology and ecosystem ecology; both o f which perceive that balance and stability are

19See Glacken (1967), Egerton (1973), Botkin (1990), Worster (1994).
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common characteristics o f biological phenomena o f many types and at many levels.
While stability and balance may appear to be prevalent phenomena at various
scales in nature; stability and balance as pervasive explanatory devices are inadequate
when confronted by the many instances of imbalance recorded and experienced by
various observers of nature.20 Even dynamic stability (whereby periodic and episodic
cycles of change proceed within certain parameters) can not necessarily be regarded
as a fundamental characteristic of biotic collections. Indeed, according to Gleasonian
ecologists, stability may only ever be an ephemeral phenomena of but a few
communities21.
In Wiens (1984) it is pointed out that many ecologists presume that stability and
balance as ecological concepts are directly relevant to the study of any particular
ecological community and because o f this presumption they tend to use
methodological techniques that automatically find stability. Connell and Sousa
(1983:794) in turn point out that “natural perturbations are often so frequent that
there is not enough time for a community to achieve a stable equilibrium state”.
Another point of significance was made by Frank (1968) who indicates that humans
tend to infer a state of balance and stability within ecological communities because the
communities are composed of long-lived individuals whose life-span is many times

Specific outbreaks of ecological imbalance at various scales include the following (as compiled by Marshall,
1998):
a) outbreaks of herbivory in which defoliation exceeds 100%, such as the catastrophic changes to fields and corals
caused by population outbreaks of plague caterpillar (Conway, 1976) and the crown of thorns starfish (Cameron
and Endean, 1982), respectively;
b) the lack of stability in North American forests over ecological time (Peterkin and Tubbs, 1965; Botkin and
Sobel, 1975), as well as over geological time (Davis, 1981; Delcourt et al, 1982),
c) global mass extinctions in the Cambrian, the Ordivician, the Penman, the Cretaceous, and throughout the
Eocene can be regarded as cases of ecological imbalance in ecological collections of global and evolutionary
importance. Generalised treatments (including theory proposals) of biotic imbalance in ecological collections can
be found in: Egerton (1973), Connell and Slatyer (1977), White (1979), Connel and Sousa (1983), Wiens (1984),
Picket and White (1985), Chesson and Case (1986), May (1986), Botkin (1990) and Wu and Loucks (1995).
Borrowing a passage from environmental historian, Donald Worster, it might be appropriate to consider that.
“The message in all these papers is consistent: the old ideal ol equilibrium is dead; the
ecosystem has receded in usefulness; and in their place we have the idea of the lowly
‘patch’. Nature should be regarded as a landscape of patches of all sizes, textures, colours,
changing continually through time and space, responding to an unceasing barrage ol
perturbations.” (Worster, 1995:74).
21 See Thistle (1981), Caswell (1982), Connel and Sousa (1983), Harris (1986), Burrows (1990) for examples of
those who adhere to this view.
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that ot a human. A forest or a coral reef only seem stable because humans live such
short lives.
It is important to recognise that the concepts of ecological stability and/or
ecological equilibrium often mean different things to systems ecologists and
community ecologists, respectively. This involves a perceptual difference in scale as
well as a difference in what Connell and Sousa (1983) call the ‘characteristics of
interest7. An ecosystem might be considered by a systems ecologist as being in
energetic or nutrient stability but its species composition and biotic structure may be
changing all around.
With regards to scale, it might be asserted that stability is not a standard feature
at the population or community level of organisation but becomes more prevalent as
one observes at greater and greater scales. In other words; those that do not see
stability and balance are not thinking big enough, either spatially (to take into account
the whole biosphere) or temporally (to take into account evolutionary history).
However, as the examples in the footnotes show, stability at even these grand scales is
not assured.
The prevalence o f stability within the ecological discussions of environmentalism
has at times been contrasted with the prevalence of instability within the discourse of
professional community ecology (see Brennan, 1986; Cahen, 1988; Botkin, 1990;
Worster, 1993; Clements, 1995) yet both environmentalism, in general, and
environmental philosophy, specifically, sometimes seem to be rather slow on the
uptake o f this contrast between environmentalism and ecology,
b ) homeostasis versus unregulated chaos
Not only is nature described as being in a stable and balanced unity; Unitarian
environmentalists and systems ecologists hold that the stability of the unity is a
self-regulated stability. The process o f ‘homeostasis7 which biologists have for along
time pronounced to exist in individual organisms is taken from this narrow biological
level and ascribed to collections o f individual organisms. Ot this homeostasis Capra
says:
The flexibility of an ecosystem is a consequence of its multiple feedback loops,
which tend to bring the system back to into balance whenever there is a
deviation from the norm due to environmental conditions. (Capra, 1996:293).

According to the Deep Ecologist M.O. Hallman (1991:119), ecological science
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emphatically demonstrates that “the entire biosphere is composed of delicate
homeostatic mechanisms which go to make up the balance of nature”. The ‘goodness’
of such self-regulatory homeostasis is encapsulated in the well-known Leopoldian
Land Ethic; which prescribes that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability and beauty o f a natural community and is wrong when it tends to
otherwise (see Callicott, 1989).
Doubts about the existence o f homeostasis beyond the organismal sphere,
however, are rather strong within the science of ecology22. Burrows (1990:466), for
example, states:
Ecosystems are not really homeostatic because the plants and animals of which
they are composed are not capable of the degree of communication, cognition and
organisational foresight which would be required to achieve this.

Even if inter-organismal communication, cognition and foresight were achievable
in a natural collection o f disparate organisms these aspects could not surmount the
incommensurable differences of interest that exist between different species and
individuals.
Whether or not balance, stability or equilibrium exist as fundamental features in
an ecological collection, the mere presence of stability is not, in itself adequate
evidence for the operation of superorganismic homeostasis. As Williams (1992) points
out; just because the input of a particular chemical element is equivalent to the output
of the same element it does not mean that that particular system is maintaining the
balance. In contrast to homeostatic unity, the Gleasonian acknowledgement of biotic
disunity and contradictory feedback patterns in ecological communities would
encourage a view that ecological interactions we see in ecological communities are
unregulated and unrestrained. Homeostatic feedback cycles may exist but they are
spatially and temporally transient and may have little or no relevance to the
compositional character o f communities. Indeed Wu and Loucks (1995:442) admit
that:
[djirect evidence that ecological systems are inherently in equilibrium, however, is
still lacking. Indeed, individual organisms may be the only systems within which
homeostatic mechanisms havebeen demonstrated to operate.

22See, for instance, E ngelberg and Boyarsky (1979), Burrows (1990), Drake (1990).
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c) deterministic maturation versus non-determinism
Systems unitarianism, through its adoption of Clementsian ecological principles,
also has a strongly deterministic stance. Clementsian ecology and ecosystem ecology
both affirm the existence ot ecosystemic or community maturity via the concept o f the
ecological climax. The ecological climax is perceived to be the final teleological
end-state within a succession ot natural communities. However, such ecosystemic
maturity seems, to Gleason and the Gleasonians, more likely to be a human
abstraction. Maturity, like balance, stability and homeostasis, is only ever a
phenomena o f unities and not associations.
The Clementsian theory o f Succession states that an orderly and sequential
development o f an ecological system/community occurs through time (characterised
by increases in biomass, species diversity, community stability, community
self-regulation and control, biotic complexity and productivity) as it proceeds from
pioneer stages through intermediary stages to a mature climax community. However,
that these developmental tendencies actually occur in a majority of ecological settings
is debatable. Correlations between ageing and increases in biomass, diversity, stability,
production etc. are often non-existent in many (maybe most) natural communities.23
For many contemporary ecologists the Succession theory, in one form or another, still
stands but others feel that it has more or less been slain. For them, the term climax
must always risk being a misnomer when applied to particular ecological situations.
There is no Succession, only change.

THE UNITY OF NATURE: A METANARRATIVE OF OVER-ZEALOUS
ECOLOGICAL HOLISM?: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To derive values from the metaphysical outlook of systems ecology may be to

23For example, see Drury and Nisbet (1973), Delcourt (1979), Burrows (1990).
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stumble at the starting blocks of one’s environmental value formulation. Systems
ecology can not direct us towards valuing the very things that most ecologists believe
make up the environment, namely: the individual members of that environment and
the indistinct communities that they compose. Instead the functionalism of systems
ecology tells us to value mere abstractions and the physical make-up of the
environment.
Systems ecology is the result of adapting Clementsian superorganicism to the
trends and traditions of modem science in the middle decades of the Twentieth
century where it was thought (by Raymond Lindeman and Arthur Tansley most
notably) that ecology could only become a powerful scientific field of science by
giving into physics envy.
Both superorganicism in Clements’ time and systems ecology in the latter
Twentieth Century have exhibited similar conceptual drawbacks; namely
over-generalisation, the relegation of the specific, and intrinsic determinism, but now
the physicalist superorganicism of systems ecology may be even worse for it suffers
from an even stronger case of functionalism, reductionlsm, and over-generalisation.
Such functionalism, reductionism and over-generalisation does not bode well for
the value o f ecological communities and the species that make them up since these
things are often not even acknowledged by systems-inspired Unitarian views of
ecology. If environmentalists choose to adopt systems ecology as their primary
metaphysical stance then they may be reducing their worldview to one which is
inimical to valuing important parts of the natural environment that they are committed
to protecting.
In order to reconfigure this lack of concern within superorganicism and systems
ecology for the specific, the unique, the abnormal, and in order to develop the unity of
concept into a metaphysics that can appreciate and value change, indeterminism, and
the nuances of ecological processes it is perhaps necessary to take note of Clements
intellectual adversary, Henry Gleason. Unlike Clements and his systems ecology heirs,
Gleason’s association ecology appreciates these things. This idea, that Gleasonian
ecology, rather than Clementsian ecology, could serve as the ecological site of an
environmental narrative is fully explored in Chapter Eight. However, before then,
other social and philosophical implications of the unity of nature concept are exposed.
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CHAPTER 3
Gaia: The Technocentric Embodiment of the
Unity of Nature

INTRODUCTION: GAIA:
THE ULTIMATE IN ORGANISMS AND THE ULTIMATE IN
ECOSYSTEMS

The story which is recounted in Chapter One indicates that holistic, organic
theories o f nature are inherently ecological, inherently able to offer stories about how
to save the planet from destruction. Gaia theory might be regarded as the Earthly
apex o f such holistic, Unitarian views of nature24. However, the Gaia theory might not
be as environmentally friendly as many of its supporters may think, and in this chapter
it is indicated how Gaia may be a theory as well endowed with ecological fascism as
the superorganismic and systems ecology theories addressed in Chapter Two. This
chapter also erodes the environmental potential of the Gaia theory by suggesting it is
a theory o f high technology, a theory of imperialism, and a theory that is hostile to
socially-aware environmental policy-making.
Gaia theory is a theory initially conceived by James Lovelock in the 1960s and
developed by him and a handful of other scientists, most notably Lynn Margulis,

Indeed this is the reading offered of Gaia by Abram (1985), Abram (1991), Allaby. (1989), Brown
(1996), Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, (1989), Capra (1996), Lovelock (1991), Merchant, ed, (1994),
Roszak, (1991), Sahtouris (1992), Volk, (1998). Such readings of Gaia theory are an order of
magnitude more popular than the one I suggest here as an alternative. Again, it 1 do nothing other
than provide an alternative to the dominant reading of Gaia in this chapter then I can consider my aim
to produce intellectual debate to be achieved.
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throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The theory’s title comes from the ancient Greek
Goddess o f the Earth who goes by the same name.
The Gaia theory states that the whole of the world’s biota constitutes one great
big homeostatic system, a system that is palpably analogous to the system that is a
cell, an organism or an ecosystem. In recent years there has been a concerted effort to
claim that the Gaia theory is the modem incarnation of the superorganismic thesis that
Clements promoted earlier in the century. For instance, the second Oxford University
gathering o f Gaian specialists had as its main theme: ‘the Evolution of the
Superorganism’ (Volk, 1998). Similarly, Lewin (1996) reaffirms the existence of Gaia
under the intellectual framework of the superorganism in an article in the New
Scientist. These acknowledged links between Gaia and superorganicism are of telling
importance and will be examined in this and other sections.
So what is the Gaia theory, exactly? According to Bonsor (1997:26):
[s] imply stated the Gaia hypothesis suggests that life as it exists today on the Earth
does so because in the distant past early life created conditions suitable to itself, and
that since that time life, in concert with some purely chemical and physical processes
of the planet, has been actively maintaining those conditions at optimum values.

Although universal scientific respectability for the theory is not entirely
forthcoming there is nevertheless a lot o f support for Gaia from those scientists with a
penchant for superorganisms and systems thinking. The systems ecologists Eugene
Odum and Pat Klinger, for instance, are on record as supporting the Gaia theory (see
Bunyard and Goldsmith, eds, 1989; Joseph, 1990; and Lewin, 1996). Perhaps more
importantly, however, is the support given to the Gaia theory by numerous
environmentalists. Edward Goldsmith for instance praises the global systems science
of James Lovelock:
whose Gaia thesis l (and a lot of other people) regard as absolutely vital to the
development of an ecological worldview. (Goldsmith, 1993:xviii).

Similarly, David Abram (1985), Michael Allaby (1989) Theodore Roszak (1991),
and Carolyn Merchant (1994) are amongst the many environmentalists who lavish
praise upon the theory for it finally provides scientific proof for what they had known
all along: nature is in unity.
For Edward Goldsmith, Gaia has become the fundamental unit of study in
ecology (“[ejcology studies natural systems in their Gaian context”, says Goldsmith,
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1993:11) as well as the fundamental unit o f study in evolutionary biology (“Gaia, seen
as a total spatio-temporal process, is the unit of evolution” declares Goldsmith,
1993:105). Gaia is not only the fundamental unit in biological study, however. It is,
according to Goldsmith, fundamental in social studies, too, as we shall see later.
One o f the selling points o f Gaia for Lovelock, and many others that write about
the theory, is its presumed non-anthropocentric framework25. Gaia, it is claimed, gets
over anthropocentrism by detailing exactly how the systems networks of the Gaian
organism are not attuned to caring about human aspirations and endeavours. If
humanity hurts and hinders Gaian processes, it will not necessarily be Gaia that suffers
but humanity since Gaia may readjust its systems to exclude humans by altering the
precise ambient conditions o f its physical environment.
Because Gaia is philosophically (and historically) linked with systems science and
superorganicism it suffers from much o f the same scientific problems that these
philosophies suffer from. For instance; just as it is difficult to confirm the stability of
an ecosystem merely because it is in energetic and material equilibrium so it is difficult
to confirm the stability o f the whole planet on the same basis. Likewise the negative
feedback patterns observable to some extent in local ecosystems might be observable
in a global Gaian system but in both cases such feedback may only be associated with
some minor characteristic o f interest. Also, as Brennan (1988:131) points out, such
global feedback patterns may exist but this does not mean they are “of necessity
complex and densely interrelated”.
As well as suffering from familiar scientific problems, Gaia theory also suffers
from the same philosophical/ethical problems that systems ecology suffers from. Gaia
functionalises, de-personalises and de-ecologises the natural entities o f the world,
converting them into typological black boxes that serve as mere conduits of energy
and matter.
The intellectual linkage between Gaianism and the systems thinking of ecosystem
ecology and systems ecology can be quickly summed up by examining the following
sentence written by Lovelock (1988:11): “[bjecause Gaia was seen from outside as a
physiological system, I have called the science of Gaia geophysiology” . Just as

25See, for example, claims of non-anthropocentrism for Gaia in Lovelock (1979), Lovelock (1988), Allaby (1989),
Joseph (1990), Lovelock (1991).
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Clements saw prairie communities as organismal physiological systems and just as the
systems ecologists utilised physiological analogies to describe their ecosystems, so,
too, does Lovelock rely on physiology to define the subject o f his study; the Earth.
The exact analogies are sometimes slippery, Gaia may be compared to the physiology
of a cell (e.g.: Lovelock, 1987), o f an organism (e.g.: Lovelock, 1979, Volk, 199826)
or o f a whole ecosystem (e.g.: Lovelock, 199127; Goldsmith, 1993), but the primacy
of looking at the Earth as a physiological system remains. It is relatively unimportant
(for both Gaian advocates and Gaian detractors) as to what metaphor is used to
explain the functioning o f Gaia since, to Gaians, all these biological entities function in
the same way: as systems. Lovelock, like other Gaians, happily dives in between the
specific analogies when it suits him. He makes this explicit when he graphically
correlates the physiology o f a cell with an organism and with an ecosystem and with
the biosphere (see Myers, 1985, Lovelock, 1991).
This emphasis on global, whole Earth physiology has, as we have just seen, led
Lovelock to label his peculiar brand of science ‘geophysiology7. By assigning his
theory to this new science (and indeed, by assigning Gaia as the fiagbearer of this new
science), Lovelock then proceeds to offer himself up as a ‘planetary physician7
involved in the diagnosis and cure of the Earth’s maladies (see Lovelock, 1991:9).

GAIA AND ECOLOGICAL FUNCTIONALISM

As with the functionalism of systems ecology so, too, the functionalism of Gaian
ecology declares that the whole is of more importance that the parts. In the case of
Gaia, the whole equals the planet: “Gaia theory forces a planetary perspective. It is
the health o f the planet that matters, not that of some individual species of organisms

26Volk’s analogy of the Gaian organism as being like a human body proceeds like this:
“just as the organs occupy unique locations within us, so the biomes [which Volk holds to be
the largest-scale ecosystems! spread across the planet in distinct biogeographical provinces,
tropical rainforests, savannas, deserts, temperate grasslands, temperate forests, boreal forests,
tundra. This dissection of Gaia into parts has immediate appeal because the viscera ot Gaia would
then be visual biological regions.” (Volk, 1998:95).
27L ovelock describes G aia as a “Planetary E cosystem ”, on page 6 o f Lovelock (1991).
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(Lovelock, 1988:xvii).
The importance o f the parts is a derivative of their role in contributing to the
whole, and not all parts are of equal value in Lovelock’s Gaia. Some parts of the
geophysiology of Gaia are declared by Lovelock as essential and some are considered
expendable:
Gaia has vital organs at the core, as well as expendable or redundant ones in the
periphery. What we may do to the planet may depend greatly on where we do it
(Lovelock, 1987:127).

Through this differentiation of importance, some species and ecosystems are
devalued because they do not significantly contribute to the matter and energy flows
that make up the Gaian physiological system. For instance, while coastal wetlands and
tropical forests are identified by Lovelock as being essential to the cycling of matter
and energy in Gaia’s geophysiology, many other types of ecosystems, for instance;
Arctic tundra and benthic ecosystems, are but functionless superfluities which may be
lost without consequence to the Gaian superorganism. This sort of differential value
judging o f the Earth’s ecosystems pervades Lovelock’s work. For instance he also
says:
dense perturbation in the northern temperate regions may be less a perturbation than in
the humid tropics. (Lovelock, 1988:179).

The functionalism inherent within Gaia leads Lovelock to rather startling
conclusions with regard to the destruction of species and of large stretches of the
Earth’s environment. Gaian ecology suggests, for example, that in the event of
massive changes in the taxonomic composition of the Earth’s biota, the identity of
Gaia remains unchanged because the mechanisms involved in the geophysiological
processes o f Gaia (i.e. matter and energy cycling) remain in place. The extinctions of
the Cambrian and during the ice ages could not have impacted upon Gaia s identity, it
is said by Lovelock, since: “[a]n ice age doesn’t really seriously affect the whole Earth
as a living system” (Lovelock, 1994:357) because the matter and energy cycles
recover quickly in the long term scheme of things to become stable again.
This sort o f long-termism and predilection towards grand scales is also present in
Lewin’s recent defence of the importance of the superorganism concept. He states.
|i]n the history of the Earth since complex forms of life evolved 500 million years ago
the biota has collapsed five times in mass extinctions involving the loss oi at least
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50 per cent of species and sometimes as much as 95 percent. After each extinction the
biota bounced back in diversity with different players on the stage, but with the pattern
ot interaction—the pattern oi niches—remaining the same. Reptiles were the major
carnivores before the extinction at the end of the cretaceous 65 million years ago, and
mammals filled that role afterward for instance. (Lewin, 1996:33).

The extinctions Lewin talks about could possibly be interpreted as manifesting
difference (since wholly different types of organisms are given rise to) but they are
not. They are interpreted—via roles and functions—as constituting sameness and
changelessness.
This emphasis on roles and functions rather than those entities that perform them
is a potentially morally-questionable one. If all things are converted to roles, the
concept o f role performance becomes more important than the actual individuals and
species who supposedly perform them. Apart from being ethically dubious—since
individuals become entirely associated with their roles and nothing else—this is also
ecologically dubious. Individual organisms inordinately drift away from their
supposed ecological roles as it best suits them. Brennan (1988:191) alludes to this
phenomenon in his statement about how:
many organisms are ecological opportunists, exploiting what resources they can and
switching their feeding preferences according to the resources available and the
competition they face.

The expression of the essential ecological role of species and organisms is most
manifest in the ecological concept of the ‘niche’; a term that is often translated so as
to mean the ecological profession or job of an individual species or organism. This
concept o f ‘niche’, however, may be a tyrannous one since when using it, the
ecological reality and environmental identity of a species or organism is directly
correlated to its niche. If environmental values are drawn from this, it will lead to a
presumption o f superior value in niche fulfilment rather than the intrinsic value of the
species/organism itself'.
Lovelock both tends towards and extends the tyranny ot the niche by applying
niche roles not just to organisms and species but to entire ecosystems and biomes.
Thus a tropical rainforest is worthy o f preservation, according to Lovelock, not
because it is intrinsically valuable or because it houses intrinsically valuable species
and individuals but because it is functionally important to Gaia:
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we are failing to recognise the true value of the forest, as a self-regulating system that
keeps the climate of the region comfortable for life. (Lovelock, 1991:16).

For many environmentalists the functionalism o f Gaia is a perceived source of
strength for the politics and philosophy of environmentalism since one cannot go
about hurting ecosystems haphazardly since the whole biosphere might collapse into
an undesirable state. However, there is a difference between Gaia’s brand of
functionalism, with its differential ascription o f what is ecologically useful and
un-usefiil, and the ecological lunctionalism o f someone like Rachel Carson who in the
early 1960s promoted a different brand (see Carson, 1962). Firstly Carson was
concentrating on the ecosystemic level of nature and nothing so grand as the whole
planet; and secondly her work suggested that all organisms and communities were
essential. Unlike Lovelock’s Gaianism, this meant humanity had to protect all types of
ecosystems and all species rather than those deemed by humans to be o f essential
function. What’s more, in Rachel Carson’s functionalist ideas we did not know what
the consequences of decimating ecosystems and species would be. Science could not
judge, for example, what may happen if tropical rainforests were cut down.
Compared to Carson’s ideas, Lovelock is much more omniscient. Not only does
he know the processes that go on but he can actively identify those that are
redundant. Whereas Carson would have said ‘don’t chop down the tropical rainforests
and don’t destroy the benthic ecosystems of the world because we don’t know what
the ramifications for the rest of the world will be’, Lovelock would say ‘don’t chop
down the tropical rainforests because that will upset the air conditioning balance of
the world but trawl and despoil benthic ecosystems all you like because they don’t do
anything important’. No new scientific evidence has been found since Carson’s time
for Lovelock to arrive at his conclusions; the difference is merely one o f philosophical
perspective. Lovelock is prepared to declare that weird things happen but science can
sort them out, whereas Carson declares weird things happen but science cannot
follow them and cannot sort them out.
When it comes to addressing those people within ecology who believe that the
world is not nearly as stable and continuous over space and time as his Gaia theory
suggests, Lovelock brings in some telling analogies. Theoretical ecology, Lovelock
says:
is more concerned with sick than healthy ecosystems. The vagaries of weather are more
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interesting than the long-term stability of climate. (Lovelock, 1988:219).

Here the philosophical equivalence between balance and health, and change and
sickness come through. Ecosystems that change are sick according to Lovelock; sick,
abnormal, and not worthy ot generalising from. In this way Lovelock castigates those
things which are inherently changeable as of peripheral concern; as atypical; even ill.
What this means from an environmental philosophical point of view is that what we
should be protecting and striving tor are ecological settings that remain the same.
There is a certain way that things behave; a normal ‘stable7way, and any deviation
from this is abnormal. This also applies in the case of some mainstream environmental
philosophy. For instance, going back to Westra’s concept of integrity: if “integrity
conveys the idea of wholeness and of unbroken functioning” (Westra, 1994:xi), then,
according to Westra7s philosophy, disintegration conveys the idea of dysfunction and
separation. Here we come to see a particular intellectual fixation of unitarianism
emerging. If things are not unified they are broken, disintegrated and probably sick.

GAIA AND PHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM

Lovelock and Margulis7 scientific conception of Gaia theory runs like this;
The Gaia hypothesis states that the surface temperature, composition of the reactive
gases, oxidation state, alkalinity-acidity on today’s Earth are kept homeorrhetically
at values set by the sum of the activities of the current biota. (Margulis and Sagan,
1992:1).

It might be asked how come Lovelock and Margulis find it so easy to jump from
the self-regulation o f the world’s chemistry to thinking of the world as a living
organism? It seems somewhat of a long bow to draw to claim that the biotic control
of the Earth’s ocean and atmospheric chemistry leads to a conclusion that the Earth is
a living organism. Not for, Lovelock and other Gaians, however. For them it is easy,
since, from the start, their view of the Earth’s biota, and of living things, is a
physico-chemical one. Life is directly equated with physico-chemical homeostasis so
that anything displaying physico-chemical homeostasis is alive. That Lovelock, and
other Gaians, are conducting a physico-chemical interpretation ot life is exemplified in
Tyler Volk’s book about Gaia when he declares that the prime directives ot the Gaia
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theory are: 1) “Attend to the cycles of matter”, and 2) “Attend to the cycles of causes
(of the cycles of matter)” (Volk, 1998:23).
Under Gaia theory, the individuals, species and ecological communities first of all
exist as physical entities whose existence is defined by their chemical consumptions
and productions. This is to say that a plant, to Lovelock and Volk, is mainly a
photosynthesis factory; a collection of mitochondria and chloroplasts that fix carbon
dioxide and release oxygen. Like systems ecology, Gaia theory claims to be holistic.
But by reducing life to physical essences it really is reductionist.
If the Earth emerges, through Lovelock and Volk, as a global unity whose parts
are united by the passing of matter and energy between them then it seems as though
a person is at one with nature not because he or she may care for it but because they
transfer matter and energy with it; i.e.: because they eat it and it eats them. As in
systems ecology, production and consumption of food is given over as the basic
interactions of nature. This, in itself, contributes to the tyranny of the niche spoken
about above since species are categorised as being in a particular niche according to
the food they eat. Brennan, in contrast, however, comments that:
if things were entirely what they ate, then the story about the natures of things would be
less complicated than it is. (Brennan, 1988:191).

This objection by Brennan is not the only philosophical objection that can be
made towards the production and consumption fetish of Gaia theory. At the global
scale, according to Gaianism, it seems as though the Earth’s various production and
consumption components may rightly be visualised as unified masses. For instance,
whereas systems ecology converts all plants into singular producers, Gaia theory
would go further and present all the world’s plants as part of the “Global Green
Photon Harvester” (Volk, 1998:127). Such metaphorical choices further drive
Gaianism towards fascist inclinations since the unique behaviour and values of
individual plants are glossed over as they merge together to become faceless
functional components in the great Gaian entity.

GAIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

One might believe that the anti-individualistic philosophical tendencies within

67

Gaianism are hardly about to afreet concrete environmental situations but this may be
a forlorn wish. For one thing, it is clear that Lovelock thinks Gaia can just about take
care of herself and that many environmental programs are in error because they do not
take this into account. Gaia’s ability to regulate itself via intricate feedback
mechanisms means, says Lovelock, that the Earth’s biota is never fully in danger.
True, human activities might produce feedbacks within the global system that produce
a world unpalatable to human concerns but life on Earth as a whole will never be
destroyed says Lovelock28.
At pains to expose what he thinks is an environmental myth, Lovelock presses
forward the view that he in no way considers life to be vulnerable or fragile. To do
this Lovelock first converts ‘life’ (which we may signify with a small T’) into the
concept o f ‘Life’ (which we may signify with a with a big ‘L’). Whereas life is open to
all sorts of meanings and interpretations Lovelock’s Life is always a total view of life,
Life on the Earth as a whole. In this regard Lovelock believes that Life (life on the
Earth as a whole) is hardly vulnerable.
However, it need not be accepted-even within Lovelock’s own
philosophical appraisal—that Life is not vulnerable. Since (according to Lovelock)
Life must in some way adjust conditions of the planet for itself to exist, Life must in
some associated way be considered fastidious (only existing within particular
parameters; albeit parameters that it can control to some degree). If Life is fastidious
then it must be vulnerable to conditions not naturally existing without the presence of
Life and Lite’s homeostatic activities. It might as well be argued that Life could be
considered less vulnerable if it just put up with these naturally
biologically-independent conditions and adapted to them, coping with whatever
physical environmental conditions that are thrown at it.
Regardless of whether the above point is valid or not, if life, or more accurately,
Life, is not vulnerable or fragile, as Gaianism suggests, then it makes the protestations
of environmentalists seem a little strange. Life cannot be destroyed or harmed so what
is the use o f worrying about those things that seem to destroy or harm it? Lovelock
has always announced that he considers environmentalists to be a little skewed when

28See Lovelock (1979), Lovelock (1988), Lovelock (1991).
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voicing their worries since it is hardly Life that suffers from environmental problems,
only humans. In fact
James Lovelock has suggested that the Green movement with its opposition to all
industry and its contempt for science and technology, has been a potent force
preventing the requisite environmental reform. (Gare, 1995:100).

This last statement shows up a key political strand of thought within Lovelock’s
environmental credentials. Firstly; he accepts a brand of environmentalism that most
environmentalists would call ‘technocentrism’. Pepper (1984:241) defines
technocentrism as a type o f environmental thought:
which recognises environmental ‘problems’ but believes either unrestrainedly that
man will always solve them and achieve unlimited growth...or, more cautiously, that by
careful economic and environmental management they can be negotiated...In either
case considerable faith is placed in the ability and usefulness of classical science,
technology, conventional economic reasoning (e.g. cost-benefit analysis), and their
practitioners.

Thus, for Lovelock, scientific know-how and technological growth can be an
intimate part of understanding and protecting Gaia. In tact in The Ages o f Gaia and
Healing Gaia he actively encourages industrial growth since it provides the
intellectual and economic impetus to solve environmental problems. This would stand
in sharp contrast to many environmentalists who see both science and technology and
unrestrained economic growth as major contributory factors in the environmental
crisis29.
Lovelock is also negatively predisposed to the social relevance of environmental
ills. This is evident, for instance, when Joseph recounts an anecdote that he gained
from Lovelock himself. Conversing at a dinner table at an international development
and environment meeting we find both Lovelock and Mother Theresa. According to
Joseph (1990:245) this is the essence of the conversation:
Their differences were clear. Essentially, Lovelock’s message was: take care of the
Earth and humanity’s problems will start to take care of themselves . Mother Theresa
expressed just the opposite: ‘take care of the people, and the Earth s problems will come
round’.

Lovelock’s asocial approach to environmental problems is characterised most

29For instance see Porritt (1984), Pepper (1984), D evall and Sessions (1985).
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saliently with regard to population issues where he chooses to describe human
population increase as a ‘serious planetary malady’ (Lovelock, 1991). If there was
one environmental policy that Lovelock would like to prescribe for the world if he
had the power it would be population control. Befitting someone who confides in
nature’s way o f doing things Lovelock gains his knowledge of population issues not
from the social sciences but from the natural and mathematical sciences as he goes
ahead to compare human population growth with lilies in a lily pond:
To understand what exponential growth is really like, imagine a lily pond on whose
surface a water lily is growing and spreading so as to double its leaf area daily. It has
taken the lily 19 days to cover half of the pond’s surface with its leaves. How long
will it be before the leaf area doubles again so that the pond is entirely covered? Does
the answer come instantly to mind? Not another 19 days, but

one

day” (Lovelock,

1991:155).

Lovelock then goes on to assert that “[w]e humans must be close to that 19 day
period o f lily growth” (Lovelock, 1991:155).
It might be contended, however, that unlike lily ponds, humans tend to reproduce
more when resources are low since there is a lack ot reproductive freedom and a lack
of contraception available to those who tend to reproduce the most (poor rural
women o f the developing world) and also because high reproductive rates are the only
way of insuring that the parents are provided with welfare in old age. Social relations
that lead to these circumstances are hardly to do with the mathematics and biology ot
lilies and their ponds. They are more to do with resource maldistribution amongst men
and women, urban and rural areas, rich and poor and First and Third World nations .
Lovelock’s naturalisation of the problem ot over-population avoids the social
background that leads to over-population. This, in effect, would seem to encourage
the population problem about which Lovelock warns since it deflects any
understanding of how we should solve the problem away from the social
circumstances that must be sorted out in order for the problem to be addressed
properly.
Where Lovelock envisions the population problem to be at its worse is also very
telling. For Lovelock, the worst concentrations of the population problem are in the

30See Cromartie, ed., (1995), D u m in g e t a l (1997), Holm, ed., (1995).
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tropics; in those nations that are home to the tropical rainforests which Lovelock
holds to be the ‘air-conditioning units of Gaia’. Temperate areas, being not so
essential for the Gaian whole, are not so impacted by high population numbers:
“dense population in the northern temperate regions may be less a perturbation than in
the humid tropics” (Lovelock, 1988 :179). If one wants to be cynical about this
approach one could point out that Lovelock seems to want to kill oft' the poor
coloured people of the world in order to save it for a few wealthy white people.
Lovelock dose not say this, of course, but the intimations are there in Healing Gaia
and the The Ages o f Gaia that population control can be distributed with differing
intensities in different regions. This varying distribution of population control might
easily be convertible into unjust population plans by future Gaian practitioners.
The depth of Lovelock’s anti-population feelings are revealed when he says:
“[t]he statement ‘There is no pollution but people’ carries an awful truth” (Lovelock,
1991:155). He goes on to say:
None of the environmental agonies now confronting us--the destruction of the
tropical forests; the degradation of land and seas; the looming threat of global
warming; ozone depletion and acid rain—would be a perceptible problem at a global
population of 50 millions. (Lovelock, 1991:155).

A less technocentric environmentalist might indicate that at any population
human technology and industrialism would reek havoc upon the world’s environment.
This would mean that if humanity somehow did manage to decrease the population of
itself* down to the fifty millions, consumerism and technology and industrialism would
just expand so as to effect the damage that was previously wrought by six billion
people.
Another aspect of environmental policy that emerges from Gaia and in particular
from Lovelock is what most environmentalists would call its ‘softly, softly approach
to pollution. For Lovelock, the ‘poison is the dose’ (Lovelock, 1991:10). What he
means to indicate by referring to this notion is that industrial pollution is only bad
when there is too much of it. This seems to be reasonable enough but if we take his
definition o f ‘too much’ we find that it revolves around the protection of Gaia s
energy and matter cycles which are very easy to protect, Lovelock alludes, even if
high technology, industrialism and pollution is rampant in the world. Thus Lovelock
finds it easy to support uranium mining, nuclear power use, and various forms of
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techno-industrial growth because they hardly, according to him, afreet Gaia’s ability
to operate her self-regulating feedback mechanisms.
If we base the definition of ‘too much’ on less abstract notions than Life, Gaia or
the Global System we find that Lovelock’s acceptable doses are much higher than
those acceptable by local ecological communities. It is of no consequence for Gaia
(and Lovelock) if a nuclear meltdown occurs in the Ukraine or if an oil spill occurs on
the Alaskan coast since, although the local environment is destroyed, the environment
as a global whole carries on in the form of the abstract Gaia. Similarly the lives that
are destroyed in these disasters carry on in the form of Lovelock’s abstract notion of
Life. (Lovelock would also state that the oil and nuclear fuel industries that may have
initiated these local disasters actually operate in the long run to save the environment
by providing economic growth and thus stimulus for technolgical innovation and
scientific know-how which could be used to fight further environmental problems).
All this said, many might still argue that Gaia has at least enabled us to see the
interconnections between concrete living systems. However, there was a long enough
tradition in ecology for this to be the case without Gaia being around31. Another
related argument would point out that Gaia theory, as a philosophy, makes us aware
and conscious of vital processes that must be protected. But as Andrew Brennan
points out:
We do not need to imagine Gaia to be a unified superorgamsm to appreciate the
importance of regulating the salinity of the sea, the oxygen content of the atmosphere,
the volume of the ozone layer and so on (Brennan, 1988:131).

THE SELLING OF GAIA AS SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

That the Earth has planetary-wide physical and geo-chemical cycles is, of course,
an old idea. Alfred Lotka in the early decades of the Twentieth Century, for instance,
viewed the Earth as a single system linked by exchanges of chemical elements and
driven by solar energy. (Golley, 1993:58).

Hagen also finds that:

31As has been explored in Chapter Two.
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|tjhe idea that the chemistry of aquatic ecosystems is regulated by organic activities
had also been briefly discussed by the biological oceanographer All'ner Redfield
during the late 1950s. (Hagen, 1992:191)

Lovelock, himself, also delights in drawing attention to James Hutton's
superficial ruminations o f the Earth as a living being. This Lovelock does to present
himself as amongst distinguished scientific company (see Lovelock, 1991:27).
If there are all these progenitors to Gaia why did they not attach metaphysical
importance to it like Lovelock? In short, they did. Hutton fitted his geo-organism in
with the metaphysics o f the geological uniformitarianism of the day32. Lotka fitted his
physically-unified Earth within the quantitative predilections of his tradition of
quantitative biology33. Lovelock, likewise, was operating within the metaphysics of
mid to late Twentieth Century systems theory but he was able to jump on the political
acceptability associated with the currently fashionable penchant towards holistic
ecology in order to sell his theory both within science and outside of it.
We may still ask, however, why Gaia has become so popular as a philosophy in
public circles and not, say, Clements’ superorganism. Apart from Lovelock’s obvious
predilection toward popularising his ideas34 we might indicate here a preoccupation in
the late Twentieth Century public for ‘worldism’. The icon that most
environmentalists often refer to and revere is not the forest, the lake or the mountain
but the Earth as a whole. This reverence is best encapsulated within the iconographic
photographs of the planet Earth as taken from space. This abstract image acts as an
all-encompassing symbol of the environmental movement. It not only symbolises the
fragility and loneliness of the Earth but it also symbolises everything which is at stake
since the Earth contains everything. The Earth image thus reflects a holistic mindset
which must be tended to in order for the Earth to be preserved. The Earth image
becomes the ultimate embodiment o f holist thought since it is the greatest holistic
perspective that can be taken when dealing with environmental issues. This is where
Gaia may gain a lot of its selling power.

32See Gould (1988).
33See Kingsland (1985) and Kingsland (1994).
34To date Lovelock has released three books and more than thirty articles publicising his theory for wide
audiences. This is, incidently, far more than the amount of scientific peer-reviewed articles that Lovelock has had
published on Gaia.
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That such mixtures o f philosophy and science pervade the critique of Gaia should
not be too much of a surprise since Lovelock, Margulis and other scientific Gaians are
themselves involved in selling Gaia not just through science but through philosophical
premises as well. What could be more imbued with natural philosophical meaning, for
example, than the following passages:
We inhabit a global metabolism with a four-billion year pedigree. In just the past tew
decades, we have awakened to an awareness of damage we ourselves are inflicting on
this metabolism with our blind urges to procreate and appropriate. Perhaps in the
fantasies of many, the "taxi outta here’ would be a time machine. Just tell the time-taxi
to stop at nature a thousand or more years ago. But because most of us would want to
keep the postal service, the Internet, MR1 scans, and an abundance of items in stock
at the local supermarket, we must proceed with the world as it is, and that requires
knowing how the foundational processes of nature work. 1 am convinced that such
knowledge, if widely held, will contribute to shaping the future of G aia-a future in
which we, as a new biochemical guild, will necessarily be integrated into the global
metabolism, for better or for worse. (Volk, 1998:xiii-xiv).

The essence of living green, of being a citizen of Gaia, is not fretful puritanism. If we
can think of ourselves as part of a giant living organism and perhaps even a cause of its
indigestion, then we may be guided to live within Gaia in a way that is seemly and
healthy. Even thinking this way is an antidote to the fatalism of accepting the Earth as
dead with life as just a passenger. (Lovelock, 1991:20).

While employing natural philosophy to sell the Gaia theory, Lovelock, Margulis,
Volk and the other scientific Gaians go to great lengths to spell out that their theory is
a theory embedded in science. For example Lovelock (1991:6) declares that Gaia is
not just a metaphor but is hard-core science: “I insist that Gaia theory itselt is proper
science”. If Gaia is a natural philosophy or a metaphysical viewpoint it is one that is,
according to Lovelock, Margulis and Volk, intensely devoted to scientific ideals.
Those that adopt the natural philosophy of Gaia without its science have been known
to offend the scientific Gaians. This is most evident when Lovelock and Margulis
Gaia is usurped by the philosophy o f certain environmental and spiritual movements.
This is where Gaia and the environmental movement...part company. (Lovelock,
1988:xvii).
The religious overtones of Gaia make me sick. (Margulis quoted in Joseph, 1990.70).
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Neither Lovelock nor Margulis indicate to which facets of the environmental
movement and Gaian spiritualism they direct these comments, but the
characterisations that Lovelock has expressed about ‘Environmentalists’ as a group
(including those within Lovelock, 1987 and Lovelock, 1991, discussed earlier)
indicate that, to him, environmentalists are anti-science, anti-technology and
anti-industry; all philosophical stances to which Lovelock just cannot abide.
This enthusiasm for their own philosophising and intolerance of philosophising
that they do not like has been a characteristic of Lovelock and Margulis as they
continue to sell Gaia. We also find that when the Gaia theory is criticised from a
scientific viewpoint, Lovelock and Margulis often resort to philosophical premises to
gain ground and when they are attacked from a philosophical point of view they
retreat to the authority o f science in order to bolster their defences from within its
walls. For instance, when certain ethical implications of the Gaia theory, not unlike
those that you are now reading, were presented to Margulis in Marshall (1997),
Margulis indicated in her referee review that the paper was not at all scientific and so
by connotation not worth publishing. This is despite Margulis’ own predilections
towards publishing metaphysically-involved works (see, for example, Margulis and
Sagan, 1995). Lovelock and Margulis claim to have been subjected to virulent and
unwarranted intellectual attack and abuse from orthodox science as they sought to
disseminate their ideas on Gaia (see Lovelock, 1991:6-7) but they are equally
vindictive o f alternative ideas that express unorthodox readings of the Gaia theory.
What can be observed to be happening in all this discursive articulation between
natural philosophy and science is the constant self-positioning o f Gaian scientists
within the higher bastions o f human knowledge. Both Lovelock and Margulis are
aware o f the great prestige and status o f science and both are aware that they have to
operate within it when making generalisations of the nature of the planet. They are
also patently aware, however, that Gaia is being heavily criticised from within science
and they have adopted a number o f strategies to deal with this. Firstly, they may try
and enter into a ‘scientific’ debate with the critique. But they only do this it they
consider the critique worthy enough to rebuke. Or, perhaps more accurately, they
only do thus when the criticism can be rebuked within the scientific background
presupposed by Gaia theory (for instance, Lovelock’s creation of the Daisy World
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model35 arose out of his acceptance o f the anti-teleological arguments o f some Gaians
critics).
Secondly, they may revise their science in ditferent philosophical terms so as to
get their message across in a different way (for example, Lovelock defends his ideas
that the Earth is alive by variously referring to living trees36, self-regulating machines37
and cybernetic processes38). This second strategy might be thought of as a main
conduit by which natural philosophy enters Gaian discourse.
However, there is another strategy that Lovelock and Margulis take in the face of
scientific criticism. They may claim that such criticism is, itself, unscientific. For
instance when addressing the criticism that Gaia theory is unscientific Lovelock claims
that those who level such criticisms are themselves unscientific. This is evident in the
following paragraph:
creative science is the province of working scientists, and tew of these are found
among our critics. Those who condemn Gaia as unscientific are, for the most part,
science writers and professional science critics. Creative suggest
experiments. This is something that science writers and critics rarely wish to
know, tor it would make the telling of the stories so much more difficult. (Lovelock, 1991:7).

Here Lovelock makes the declaration that if you claim Gaia as unscientific you,
yourself* are not scientific and so, conversely, he is making the claim that the only
scientific approach to take is to believe in Gaia.

35The Daisy World model served as an answer to the scientific criticism that came from Richard Dawkins and W.
Ford Doolittle who criticised the Gaia theory on the grounds “that there is no way that diverse living organisms of
the Earth could act in symbiosis...to regulate the planetary environment” (Lovelock (1991:62). Lovelock s Daisy
World model answered such criticism by stating:
“Welcome to planet Daisyworld: a computer model planet like the earth, orbiting a star like the sun,
but on which the only species are light and dark daisies, in the distant past, when the star was less
luminous, only the equatorial region would have been warm enough to permit the growth of
daisies and the dark daisies would have flourished, because they absorb more warmth from the
sunlight, and by absorbing heat began to warm the environment. However, as the star s luminosity
increased the lighter daisies would have been favoured instead, due to their natural ability to keep
themselves land the planet] cool by reflecting sunlight.” (Lovelock, 1991:67).
36See Lovelock (1991:31)
37See Lovelock (1991:60)
38Like that of animal homeostasis or automatic piloting (see Lovelock, 1991:88)
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GAIA AND NON-ANTHROPOCENTRISM

James Lovelock makes much o f the non-anthropocentric focus of Gaianism. He
states that Gaia is not a human-centred environmental view because it cares more
about the health o f the Earth than it does about the health of people and in doing this
it differs radically from most conventional environmentalisms. For instance in Healing
Gaia he states:
Environmentalists, churches, politicians, and science, all are concerned about the
damage to the environment. But their concern is for the good of humankind. So deep is
this introspection that even now few apart from eccentrics really care about other
living organisms. The oft-stated objection to the rape of the forests is that they might
include within them some rare plant that bears the cure for cancer, or that the trees fix
carbon dioxide, so that if they are cut down we may no longer enjoy our privilege of
private transport. (Lovelock, 1991:16).

He repeats himself'on page 158 when he states:
Scientists and campaigners in the First World and in the tropics still try to plead for
the preservation of these forests on the feeble and human-centred grounds that they are
home to rare species of animals and plants, and especially to plants containing drugs
that could cure cancer and other frightening human diseases. (Lovelock, 1991:158).

This is a line he peddles in all of his three major Gaia books; from Gaia:A New
Look o f Life on Earth, through The Ages o f Gaia, to Healing Gaia. One notable
thing about these statements is the profound ignorance Lovelock seems to exhibit
with regards to the non-anthropocentric nature of most contemporary streams of
environmentalism. Deep Ecology, Third World Ecology, Ecofeminism, Ecosocialism,
Bioregionalism and Social Ecology (let alone those environmentalists involved in the
scholarly fields of environmental ethics and environmental philosophy) have all
entered into a debate with anthropocentrism which is considerably more sophisticated
than the ‘preserve nature for humans’ line that Lovelock thinks environmentalists
uniformly adopt39. In just about any type of recent (i.e. post-1975) environmentalist
book this ‘preserve nature for humans’ anthropocentrism has been thoroughly
questioned if*not rejected and the protection of non-human species and non-human

39See, for instance, Devall and Sessions (1985), Brennan (1988), Callicot (1989), Naess (1989), Bookchin (1990),
Armstrong and Botzler, eds, (1993, Westra (1994), Zimmerman (1994), Brennan, ed, (1995), Elliot, ed (1995).
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environments is now commonly advocated upon the intrinsic value of these species
and environments.
What can be demonstrated also is that Lovelock, himself —despite warning
against human-centeredness and accusing environmentalists of it—surely does not
adhere to the anti-anthropocentric ideas that he suggests his readers might support.
This can be starkly demonstrated by quoting the sentences made by Lovelock that
appear in Healing Gaia immediately after the passages quoted above:
... other frightening diseases. They may be so but they offer so much more than this.
Through their capacity to evaporate vast volumes of water vapour the forests serve to
keep their regions cool and moist, by wearing a white sunshade of reflecting clouds and
bringing rain that sustains them. More even than this, the great forests of the tropics are
part of the cooling and air-conditioning system of the whole earth. (Lovelock,
1991:158).

..our privilege of private transport. None of this is bad only stupid, We are tailing to
recognise the true value of the forest, as a self-regulating system that keeps the climate
of the region suitable for life. (Lovelock, 1991:16).

Here we see Lovelock is just as unable to recognise the intrinsic value of the
animals and plants of the forests as the human-centred environmentalists he refers to,
and he can only value them from a perspective of functionalism.
As well as accusing most environmentalists of an anthropocentrism they do not
have, Lovelock extols the Gaia theory as the very epitome ot non-anthropocentrism
for it is not the concern o f Gaia to worry about humans. However, the crucial point
here is that Lovelock does not need to extol the value of protecting the Earth for
humans since his Gaia theory does that already. Gaia possesses an implicit kind of
anthropocentrism that naturalises Lovelock’s own personal political attitudes towards
population growth, economic growth and high-technology within the form ot Gaia.
You do not need to promote an anthropocentric value system it your Goddess so
willingly operates her laws to look after human interests. Gaia theory thus possesses a
hidden type o f anthropocentrism, an anthropocentrism that operates under the guise
o f Gaia but actually is just an incarnation of Lovelock’s interests and philosophies.
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THE REPRODUCTION OF GAIA: LOVELOCK’S TECHNOCENTRIC.
IMPERIALIST ORGANISM

According to Lynn Margulis, Dorian Sagan and Gregory Hinkle, the Gaia
concept emerged from James Lovelock’s fertile imagination and the United States
space program (Sagan and Margulis, 1988; Margulis and Hinkle, 1991). There is
certainly a strong connection between space exploration and Gaia. Some of the most
prominent Gaians are interested in spaceflight. For instance; James Lovelock has been
involved in the planetary program of NASA and has written a book about colonising
Mars40, Lynn Margulis is involved in NASA’s Planetary Biology program and has also
written about colonising Mars (Margulis and Sagan 1992), Margulis’ son, Dorian
Sagan (also son of the late astronomer Carl Sagan) has also been known to write
about space expansion (Sagan and Margulis, 1988; Margulis and Sagan, 1992), while
Lewis Thomas, Freeman Dyson and Tyler Volk have also written popular articles or
books about both Gaia and spaceflight. Thomas has been involved in NASA’s
Planetary Biology program while Dyson is well-known for his sometimes grandiose
space plans, while Volk has been involved in research about expanding terrestrial
ecosystems into space. It might also be noted that Rusty Schwieckert, an Apollo
astronaut has also found Gaia Theory of significant importance in his philosophical
writings about spaceflight (Schwieckart, 1987).
For Lovelock specifically, the connection between spaceflight and Gaia theory is
very strong since he acknowledges it as a prime factor in the theory’s origin:
For me, the personal revelation of Gaia came quite suddenly-like a flash of
enlightenment. 1 was in a small room on top ot a building at [NASA sj Jet Propulsion
Laboratory in Pasadena, California. It was the Autumn of 1965, the room was an office
of the Biosciences Division, and 1 was talking with a colleague, Dian Hitchcock, about
a paper we were preparing on a method for remote detection of life on a planet.
(Lovelock, 1991:21).

The planet about which Lovelock speaks is Mars and he goes on to explain that

40See Lovelock and Allaby (1985).
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when he w'as working for NASA to investigate the possibility of life on Mars it
suddenly dawned on him and his colleague that life on a planet could be detected
remotely just by analysing the atmospheric composition from alar since an atmosphere
created by a living planet would differ from the atmosphere of a dead planet Thus if
Mars was living it would have an atmosphere somewhat similar to the Earth’s:
Now the air of a dead planet would be expected to have a composition close to what is
called the chemical equilibrium state. That is to say, all possible chemical reactions
among the gases would have taken place and the atmosphere would be like the
exhaust gas from escaping from a car or a factory chimney; a mixture from which no
more energy could be extracted. A planet that bore life would have a very different
atmosphere because living organisms are obliged to use the air as a source or raw
materials and as a depository for their waste products. Both of these uses would
change the atmosphere away from the chemical equilibrium state, if the observed
degree of disequilibrium among the gases of a planetary atmosphere was great, it
would suggest the presence of life. (Lovelock, 1991:21).

In this regard Lovelock believed that the Martian atmosphere was in a state of
chemical equilibrium^, and so Mars was, and is, accoxuing tu L<uvciuv/k, quite u6au.
This connection between space activities and Gaia takes an interesting turn when
we note that James Lovelock and the other above-named Gaians are seeking to
expand Earth life onto other ‘dead’ planets such as Mars. Such expansion, to them,
will be the manifest reproduction of Gaia. The onward advance of humans into space
is seen by these Gaians as indicative of the reproductive tendencies of the organism
that is Gaia. Being an organism, Gaia is biologically inclined to reproduce. For
instance, w'hen summarising the Gaia theory for a space industry audience Marguhs
says:
The Gaia hypothesis states that the surface temperature, composition of the reactive
gases, oxidation state, alkalinity-acidity on today’s Earth are kept homeorrhetically at
values set by the sum of the activities of the current biota. Life, in other words, is a
planetary phenomenon. Since the natural tendency of all life is to grow exponentially
to fill a proximal volume, a question for the Nineties is ’Can life expand to Mars?’, that
is, ‘Can Gaia reproduce?’ (Margulis and Sagan, 1992:1).

Martin-Smith, an advocate for human space expansion into the Solar System van

41Which should not be confused with the ecological equilibrium of ecosystem ecoiogists which is a dinerent
phenomena altogether.
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similarly justify his aspirations through Gaia theory:
The Gaia Theory has shown us how life and Earth have developed in lockstep, with
life adapting Earth to suit its needs, via chemical homeostasis. This has provided a
fruitful inspiration lor the new devotees of the ancient Earth goddess, the
environmentalists. Such a view, although poetic, is incomplete, since the prime role
of Mothers is procreation! Slowly, the closed ‘Spaceship Earth’ ecological
worldview is being challenged by a new paradigm—the fact that human ecology is
Solar System-wide, and that our survival depends on extending our reach to match.
(Martin-Smith, 1997:31).

Rusty Schweickart, ex-NASA astronaut, makes a similar argument for space
expansion with regard to the Gaian organism:
that humanity’s accelerating growth rate and demands for resources and waste
processing are the same kind of burgeoning needs that tax a mother’s ability to
nurture a growing foetus. (Schwiekart quoted in Joseph, 1990:63).

It is important to note that humans have a special role in this reproduction. They
are either the midwives to the birth (as Martin-Smith, 1997, and Sagan and Margulis,
1988, would state) or they are perceived as the seeds or spores of Gaia (as Allaby,
1989, would state) rightly acting to spread a representative biota of Earth to abiotic
worlds. These analogies (‘Gaia giving birth’, ‘humans as seeds’) are analogies that
seek to evade the social and political nature of human expansion into space. Those
entities taking part in space expansion, like nations, space agencies and aerospace
companies, are social entities operating according to social, political and historical
contingencies and forces. Gaia is an attempt to naturalise the social, political and
economic forces that lead to space expansion42.
Michael Allaby (1989) states that “[hjumans might not be the seeds of the Earth,
but we are behaving as though we were, so it comes down to the same thing in the
end” . In this admission we see the strength of biological metaphors for Gaian space
expansion. This acknowledgement that humans are not the evolutionary derived
biological dispersal agents o f the Gaian superorganism but have asserted their role to
act as such exposes the Gaia theory as an active instrument in the legitimisation ot
human space expansion.

42For investigations into the exact social, political and economic nature of Gaian-type Solar System colonising
plans see Marshall (1995).
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It might be pertinent to ask: ‘who voted humans to be the reproductive
representatives o f the Earth?7. O f course, humans did. The other members of Gaia had
no say in the matter. According to the Gaia concept, however, it is easy to convince
ourselves that it is right and proper to act in an imperialistic manner throughout the
cosmos and then disguise such self-interest under a veil of ‘just doing what comes
naturally7.
Nigel Clark (1988) has intimated that Gaia theory is part of a New Age
philosophy that purports to be able to change the world by becoming personally more
attached to it, much o f the time through the continued development of benevolent
technology. Gaia’s association with space development would tend to concur with
this view. James Lovelock’s Gaia is a technocentric Gaia who utilises high technology
to advance her natural right to reproduce and colonise other worlds. Many
environmentalist Gaians would certainly not like to be associated with such
technocentric grandeur and arrogance but they might have trouble in avoiding it if
they accept Lovelock’s version of Gaianism.
The charge o f grandeur and arrogance might be seen as solid but how can Gaia
be criticised as imperialist given that there are no indigenous cultures in space? No
indigenous cultures, may be, but indigenous life? That is another matter—especially for
the favourite candidate planet for Gaian reproduction; Mars. If Gaians want to
maintain their facade of non-anthropocentrism they have to admit that endangering
the life o f Martians—even if they are mere microbes—must in some way be ethically
troublesome (as argued in Marshall, 1993). The probability of the existence of native
species upon Mars is small but it is real and the effects of a Gaian expansion on such
life-forms would probably be devastating. If Gaian invasion does not alter the
environment o f the native life-forms irrevocably they may still be condemned to
extinction by the action o f invasive terrestrial microbes (Marshall, 1997a).
As intimated above the primary candidate planet for Gaia’s progeny is Mars.
Allaby (1989) comments that in the 1970s “the Viking landers confirmed Mars to be
lifeless”, and therefore there can be no objection to human interference with, and
colonisation of, Mars. Margulis and Sagan (1992:1) agree:
The Viking missions complemented ground-based astronomical observations and
yielded definitive evidence for the lack of life on the red planet.

Lovelock also agrees (see Lovelock, 1988, and Lovelock, 1991). To declare that
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the Viking Landers did this is hardly appropriate, however. Even within the scientific
community this subject is heavily debated, especially within the context of the 1996
Allen Hills Martian meteorite discoveries (see Digregario et al, 1997, and D.
Goldsmith, 1998).
Gaians might tend to elevate the Viking results above all remaining doubts
because a negative result (regarding life on Mars) contributes to their own scientific
and metaphysical commitments. That Viking landers found no life is not clear for a lot
of scientists researching the matter. All they can say is that it seems is the Viking
landers were unable to find life in the few inches of dust that they tested at two
particular landing sites investigated. As Viking Project biochemist, Klaus Biemann,
makes clear with regard to the Viking results: “to say there is no life on Mars would
not be a scientific conclusion” (Biemann, 1978:32).
We may be able to forgive Lovelock’s, Margulis’ and Allaby’s assertions of a
lifeless Mars since, as Gaian advocates, they find it impossible to believe that extant
life on Mars could exist because according to the Gaian concept, life exists as a
planetary-wide, global phenomenon. If there is life on Mars it must exist in an easily
detectable and geographically extensive form that possesses robust planetary-scale
homeostatic abilities.
It is o f little consequence if' scientists are willing to risk their professional
credibility on the correctness of a theory suggesting life on Mars is impossible but it is
intolerable arrogance that these scientists risk the extinction of another life-form on
the basis o f a yet to be proved theory which suggests that expansion to Mars can
proceed with impunity43.
If life on any planet is only able to be present in a geographically extensive form
and if it is the program of Gaians to give rise to the natural reproduction of Gaia then
what we find in the space exploration plans of Gaians is not some piecemeal flags and

43Both Margulis and Lovelock continually talk about speaking for, representing and defending microbes. Lovelock
says that he and Margulis are not directly interested in the fate of humans but instead are interested in the.
"much maligned microbes with which the Gaian system originated and which continue to do its
basic work” (Lovelock, 1991: 101)
This is somewhat ironic, however, if we consider how they adopt an attitude that positively endangers the lives of
whole species of microbes on other planets.
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footsteps approach to space endeavours but wholesale planetary-wide colonialism and
engineering. The plan is not to land humans on Mars and scatter a few laboratories
about (as is, for instance, presently the case in Antarctica) but to colonise and
engineer the planet with Earth-life and human technologies in order to create a
self-regulating biosphere like that o f the Earth’s. This is a “process known by tradition
in science fiction as ‘terraforming’” (Bonsor, 1997:27) but which we are now
encouraged to regard as “Gaiaforming”. Gaiaforming, Bonsor (1997:26) tells us, is
the controlled modification by scientific and technical means of a planetary
environment, including its surface and in particular its atmosphere, to establish a
self-sustaining biological life-support system regulated by negative feedback loops.

Lovelock and Allaby describe this process for a general audience in some detail within
a fictional account o f Martian colonisation entitled The Greening o f Mars.
What is rather interesting in the writings of would-be terraformers and
Gaiaformers such as Lovelock and Allaby is their particular conceptions about how
life might develop. Plans for terraforming generally start with the seeding of lifeless
planets with ‘primitive’ microscopic Earth organisms before more complex life-forms
are introduced (see for instance Lovelock and Allaby, 1985; Carl Sagan, 1981 and
Clarke, 1992). As outlined in Marshall (1997a: 3 8):
it is commonly perceived that the development of life on a candidate planet from a
microbial to macrobial communities can be achieved by letting the processes of
ecology run naturally along.

The natural processes of ecology assumed by terraformers to be capable of
giving rise to earth-like ecosystems upon other planets (and about which the above
sentence refers) is that contained within the familiar Clementsian concept of
Succession. Terraformers like Clarke, Carl Sagan, Lovelock and Allaby seem to be of
the opinion that through ecological succession simple human transplanted species will
prepare the environment o f other planets for the successful transplantation of more
complex ecological communities and ecosystems. As is indicated in Marshall (1997a).
Arthur C. Clarke, for instance, adheres to this view in his book on terraforming by
imagining the successive colonisation of a Martian landscape by lichens, then pines,
then oak trees. (Marshall, 1997a:39).

As discussed in Chapter Two, however, the dubious validity of Succession
theory might cast doubt upon the efficacy of any human sponsored program of
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ecological Succession on this planet let alone one to which terrestrial microbes and
macrobes are not use to. And so:
because Succession theory has been slain, terraforming ecologists may be left with
alternative models of community change that suggest that Succession from simple
pioneering species to complex ecosystems is unlikely. Despite supplying a
continuous rain of seeds of the desired species, terraformers could find themselves
unable to develop their chosen ideal ecosystem. Instead of creating planets filled
with enchanting forests and lakes reminiscent of the Earth’s great terrestrial
ecosystems, humans may create nothing but millions of square kilometres of pungent
microbial bogs more redolent of Earth’s polluted industrial waste sites. (Marshall,
1997a:38).

Like many others who are fascinated by space exploration Lovelock, Allaby,
Sagan and Margulis champion space activities as an ecological endeavour since it
allows for new ways of looking at the Earth. Indeed for them, and for many others,
the very unity of nature can be best understood and appreciated via the space
photographs and images o f the Earth in space. Included in a list ot writers who posit
the environmental nature of the Earth image would be Capra (1996), Martin-Smith
(1997), Bonsor (1997), and Sagan (1981). The irony of the whole Earth photograph
as an environmental icon has also struck some environmental writers. For instance in
Zimmerman (1994:75) and Marshall (1997a:51), respectively, these comments are
found:
In such photos, we see Earth reflected in the rear-view mirror of the spaceship taking us
tar away from home in order to conquer the universe.
The whole Earth image does not only symbolise the beauty, fragility and unity of the
world we inhabit. It also symbolises the feats of technology that industrialism has
ottered that world. Space enthusiasts continue to explicate the environmentalist nature
of space exploration but the irony of the whole Earth image escapes them. Only by
conquering the terrestrial environment and making nature the dutiful servant of
technology, has humanity managed to propel itself space-wards. The space photographs
that capture the earth image stand as testimony to this all-conquering victory over the
natural world.

CONCLUSJONS: GAIA: AN ENVIRONMENTAL GODDESS?
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If Lovelock has his way the appreciation of the unity of nature would manifest
itself in a hierarchically-arranged, global systems-view of the world. According to
Lovelock, if such a view was explored scientifically to its completion we would be
able to unlock all the various physically-interconnected pathways that exist in nature
so that we do not disturb them. According to Lovelock, and more importantly his
many environmental supporters (like Joseph, 1990; Goldsmith, 1993 and Nicholson,
1992), if such a view was explored philosophically to its completion, according to
Lovelock, we would appreciate the united aspects and come to realise the organic
nature o f all things. This chapter has attempted to show that even if we do this the
environmental crisis will still continue since the unity represented by systems science
and Gaian ecology fails to capture the values o f the living members of the Earth that
are being overwhelmed by that crisis. The unity concept, especially as manifested
through Lovelock’s Gaianism, would also mislocate the causes of environmental
destruction in asocial ‘natural’ processes such as over-population. What these faults,
taken together, might suggest is the that Gaia is the global philosophical apex of
systems ecology and as such it is hardly in the position to offer sound environmental
narratives about the world. Not only that, but Gaia’s technocentrism advocates a
programme o f space imperialism which might also endanger the environments of other
worlds.
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CHAPTER 4
The Unity o f Nature: a Metanarrative of
Social Conservatism?

INTRODUCTION: UNITY BETWEEN ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY

If we claim that unity as manifested through systems ecology and Gaia theory is
holistically over-zealous and if it is acknowledged (by Unitarians, amongst others) that
there is unity between ecology and society—between nature and humanity-then might
not the same sort of critiques of over-zealous holist tendencies apply in the social
realm? The obvious thing to want to find out in answering this question is how exactly
do Unitarians see the unity relationship between ecology and society; between
humanity and nature? This question is important since there may be different ways
that humanity and nature can be said to be united. Some of them benign, some of
them not
Some, like Goldsmith (1993), see the humanity-nature relationship very strongly.
Goldsmith would say that there are values in the biosphere, that ecological knowledge
reflects those values and those values must be adopted in order that both humanity
and nature survive as we would like.44

44Note, for instance, the following comments of Goldsmith’s: “Ecology reflects the values of the biosphere
(Goldsmith, 1993:82). “There is no fundamental barrier separating man and other living things (Goldsmith, title
of chapter 37); “the biosphere displays a...single set of laws whose generalities apply equally well to biological
organisms, communities, societies and ecosystems and to Gaia herself’ (Goldsmith, 1993:186) and:
{tjhere is no fundamental difference between the structure and behaviour of vernacular

87

One o f the most common ways o f identifying nature with society is by classing
them both in economic terms. Environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott does this
for instance when he says:
The various parts of the ‘biotic community’ (individual animals and plants) depend on
one another e c o n o m ic a lly so that the system as such acquires characteristics of its own.
Just as it is possible to characterise and define collectively peasant societies, agrarian
communities, industrial complex, capitalist, communist and socialist economic systems,
and so on, ecology characterises and defines various biomes as desert, savannah,
wetland and tundra, woodland and other communities, each with its particular
‘professions’, or ‘niches.’ (Callicott, 1995:41).

Here again we see, even if only using an over-generalised example, the issue of
lunctionalism emerging since it is perceived by Callicott that functions are analogous
across the humanity-nature barrier. This emphasis in the analogy on functions has a
long heritage in the history o f biology and economics (see Mirowski, ed, 1994) but it
is not a phenomenon confined just to long-gone history. In 1994, for instance, Ayres
philosophised about the similarities o f economics and biological analogies in terms of
functions:
For an economic system, the analogues of cells are individuals, the analogues of
specialised organs are firms and industries; and the products of industry are analogous
to the minerals, amino acids, sugars, and lipids as well as the more specialised vitamins
that circulate through the organisms and are metabolised for energy and/or incorporated
into biomass. (Ayres, 1994:186).

Similarly, as Golley (1993) points out, Eugene Odum, the greatest campaigner
for ecosystem ecology in the 1950s and 60s, was never afraid to analogise with
economic references; interchanging, as he did, money for energy and jobs for niches
when he attempted to diagrammatically represent the ecology ot certain regions (see
Odum, 1971).

UNITY VIA THE SYSTEM

Ayres does not only believe that a vague functional perspective offers appropriate
analogies between the economic world and the natural world, he goes on to list three
[i.e. traditional] man and that of other living things. Both are governed by the same laws
that govern the natural systems which make up the Oaian hierarchy. (Goldsmith, 1993.209).
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basic ways that they are related:
An economic system is, in three important respects, a kind of living system...firstly...an
economic system is similar to biological systems...in exhibiting
self-organisation...secondly... [both havej the need for continuous inputs of useful
energy...thirdly...[aJ strong similarity between economic systems and living systems is
their ability to grow and evolve. (Ayres 1993 186-187).

We can see in Ayres’ passage the ease to which simple analogies become
complex when filtered through the lens of systems theory. Instead of comparing
‘nature7 and ‘economics7 as Callicott does, Ayres compares ‘living7 and ‘economic7
systems. Systems theory enables similarities to become far more transparent. Once
the systemic nature o f something or other is identified it is very easy to find the way it
resembles the properties o f completely different things which have also been
systematised.
This description o f various things as systems and their comparison with other
things is an avowed goal o f systems science and always has been. The search for
parallel principles in diverse phenomena is neatly summed up, complete with technical
names, by one of the progenitors of systems science; Ludwig von Bertalanfly, who
describes the presence o f similar principles in different areas of study as ‘isomorphy7:
“[t]he search for such isomorphies is a major pursuit o f systems science77 (Bertalanfly,
1967:117). Bertalanfly then goes on to summarise what isomorphy is:
isomorphy... is a consequence of the fact that in certain aspects, corresponding
abstractions and conceptual models can be applied to different phenomena. It is in
view of these aspects that system laws will apply. (Bertalanfly, 1967:118).

Speaking about Bertalanfly from a historical point of view Hagen summarises his
program o f systems science and cybernetics like this:
cyberneticians were attempting to construct an overarching mathematical theory to
explain the behaviour of organisms, machines and other complex systems. In fact, from
the perspective of cybernetic analysis, distinctions between machines, organisms and
even societies seemed to evaporate; all were treated mathematically as ‘systems .
(Hagen, 1992:69).

In 1967, Bertalanfly made friendly warnings about the supposed closeness ol
systems analogies. Just because analogies are made between certain conceptual
models:
[tjhis does not mean that physical systems, organisms and societies are all the same.
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In principle, it is the same as the situation as when the law of gravitation applies to
Newton’s apple, the planetary system, and the phenomenon of tides. This means
that in view of some rather limited aspects a certain theoretical system, that of
mechanics, holds true; it does not mean that there is also a particular resemblance
between apples, planets and oceans in a great many other respects. (Bertalanfly,
1967:118).

It is interesting that Bertalanfly has to explain the relationship of systems
analogies by using an analogy but his warning nevertheless seems to be that systems
analogies are functional, not structural. The apple, the planets and the oceans are
structurally dissimilar but they function in relation to gravity in the same way.
However, we may be sceptical of Bertalanfly’s assurance that function is all that
matters in systems science in its job to find isomorphies and that there are no
structural similarities between the components of one system and the next. At least in
the abstract, systems scientists are quite capable of assuming that systems across
different disciplines/subjects/worlds are in fact as similar in structure as they are in
function. One way they do this is through the use of hierarchically arranged levels. For
example, Ayres tells us that there is:
the obvious and close analogy between an economic system and the food web
of an ecological system or community. In the latter case one can consider each
species as a node. The energy inputs to any node are derived from other species from a
lower trophic level, except in the case of the lowest level (vegetation), which derives
its energy from photosynthesis. The node and flow structure can be defined
in diagrammatic form land when we do so we find] not surprisingly, essentially the
same diagram applies to the economic case. (Ayresl994:209).

Ayres says on the same page that the economic and ecological systems that exist
on the dipole o f his analogy are so close that “the corresponding mathematics is
almost identical if one conceptually substitutes money flow for energy flow .
When Ayres talks about the identical structure and functions of various processes
in ecology and economics he might be considered to be finding isomorphies, actually
existing objective similarities between one worldly frame of reference and another.
This was Bertallanfy’s plan; not to create analogies based on metaphors of similarity
taken from one tradition to another but to discover real similarities.
That the ecology-economy relationship is merely a metaphor is presented in a
more transparent way in Callicott’s above statements since when Callicott talks about
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the identical structures o f economic and ecological settings he knows he is taking the
language o f one discipline and applying it to another. From Callicott’s point of view
this does not make his own economy-ecology associations weak since his use of the
particular metaphor assumes that there is sufficient resemblance between economics
and ecology for the metaphor to work in a sustained way. While Callicott can accept
that he is comparing what humans say about various things as being applicable in
different situations, Ayres—via systems science—is convinced that the comparisons are
reflections o f human-independent isomorphies.
Whether or not economic/ecological metaphor users admit to their comparisons
as being metaphorical it often seems that in situations such as this the appropriate
thing to do is to identify from where the metaphor comes and having found it, expose
it as mere metaphor and thus undermine its truth-hood. If we abide by this idea (which
has its problems45) we then might go on to ask where the original referent lies in the
ecology/economics analogy.
If ecology is interpreted as being fundamentally like economics by Callicott, and
alternatively, if economics can be fundamentally based on ecological principles, as for
instance Ayres sometimes says, then which one is the original referent? Which one
should we expose as the masked metaphor that must be revealed as such? Was it
ecology that supplied economics with a grounded base from which to analogise from
or vice versa. The answer seems to be that it is impossible to state which subject
served as the referent and which one was being the metaphor. It is not that ecology
gave Ayres economical principles or that economic principles gave Callicott the
principles o f ecology. Both economics and ecology have had such a long and tortuous
history of cross-fertilisation that principles in one feed from the other and then
feedback to the ‘original’. We may call these types of narratives ‘reprojective spiral
narratives’ after some of the terms that Mirowski (1994) is driven to use when
examining the nuances o f the history o f natural images in economics.
The relevance o f these reprojective spiral narratives to this work is in directing us
away from just trying to stick to an approach of identifying from whence the original
metaphor came so as to expose them as mere metaphors. For instance in trying to

45As has been outlined in Chapter Two with reference to Miller (1982) and Miller (1983); and as will be outlined
in Chapters Five and Six with reference to Nietzsche (1979), Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Mirowski, ed, (1994).
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work out why nature is considered in unity with society we have to explore the use of
metaphors taken from social science and natural science that say it is so. But I suggest
that we will get nowhere if we permanently look for the original metaphor because
both social science and the natural sciences have been feeding oft' o f each other for so
long46. Following the twisting past of metaphors, however, might open up some of the
intellectual heritage of the unity o f nature concept (and this is what is attempted in the
Chapters Four and Five).

UNITY AND SOCIAL HOLISM

If humanity and nature are united so that they obey at least some ot the same
rules (as the systems thinkers suggest) then what sort of society do these rules create?
Might they not suffer from the same problems as united and systematised ecologies?
Will they suffer from being functionalist and thereby ignore the individual? Will they
suffer from lack of acknowledgement o f change and thus from conservatism ot a
social type? These questions form the basis of the next few sections of this chapter.
One o f the most obvious points to note about ecological theory with a penchant
for unity (i.e. systems ecology) is its closeness o f approach to the sociological
tradition known as ‘structural functionalism’. Both systems ecology and structural
lunctionalism draw on a common historical and theoretical affinity associated with
holism and systems theory. The orthodox way for recounting the history of structural
functionalism is by saying something like:
Functionalism uses an organismic model of systems as the basic reality,
draws on concepts of structure and function from physiology and stresses
adjustment or adaptation as a goal for organisms, social groups or whatever.
(Young, 1992:167).

O f these intrusions o f biology into sociology, Benton writes.
Overwhelmingly, biological intrusions into the domain of the human sciences have

^1 am by no means the first to suggest this. See, for instance, Young (1985) and Mirowski, ed, (1994).
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been politically conservative, and this is especially true of their widespread
popular diffusion. (Benton, 1991:15)

From the perspective o f this work, however, it is not so much a biological
intrusion as it is two way traffic between the biological and social. Organicism in
nature supports organicism in sociology and vice versa. Sometimes it is impossible to
tell whether the original application was one way or the other. Even in the writings of
particular people it is not clear whether the terminology is taken to be primarily social
or natural and then reapplied.47
Although social functionalists are dedicated to the study of social situations, in
many cases distinct analogies/metaphors are drawn from the biological world. In other
cases analogies to the biological world are avoided by social functionalists but
analogies to the work of systems thinkers who themselves talk about the biological
and social applicability o f their work is strong. Thus a structural functionalist social
scientist may be able to superficially de-link his or her work from organicism and
biology (and ecology) but this does not negate both philosophical and historical
linkages.
In the case of others the association is more distant (to the point that some
structural functionalists and some ecosystems workers have probably never cited a
writer relevant to both). Talcott Parsons--the most famous advocate of structural
functionalism—for instance, never attributed any of his version of systems thinking to
the systems thinking of those that have become known as the principle ‘fathers of
systems theory (such as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Norbert Wiener and John von
Neumann) whereas Eugene Odum, Robert Ayres and Fritjof Capra make this

47We ran illustrate this coarsely by noting the influences upon one of today s foremost unitanans, Edward
Goldsmith. Goldsmith says that both human communities and ecological communities function like systems.
Goldsmith himself claims to have been influenced by sociologist Talcott Parsons, physical scientist James Lovelock
and ecologist Eugene Odum when coming to this conclusion. But Parsons was influenced by social thinkers that
themselves were holist-inspired ex-biologists, people like Walter Cannon and Lawrence Henderson. Parsons was
also influenced by people who themselves were directly influenced by biological ideas of holism, people like Emile
Durkheim, Herbert Spencer and Vilffedo Pareto (see Lilienfeld, 1988; Heims, 1991, Richardson, 1992, Heyl,
1998). Goldsmith’s other influences, Lovelock and Odum, on the other hand, were influenced by people like the
biologist Bertalanffy and the systems engineers John von Neumann and Noibert Wiener (see Hagen, 1992,
Goldsmith, 1993; Golley, 1993; Capra, 1996). But Bertallanfy, von Neumann and Wiener themselves were
influenced by people like Cannon, Henderson, Parsons and other social holist theorists (see Wiener, 1961.
Davidson, 1983; Capra, 1996), who-as we have just seen-were influenced by holist biologists. Out of this
inter-articulation of influences comes a morass of dead and dying metaphors which Edward Goldsmith (an
others) have forgotten are metaphors.
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attribution for their own work quite enthusiastically. However, the same people that
influence Parsons, people like Lawrence Henderson and Walter Cannon, influenced
Bertalanfiy, Wiener and Neumann (see Lilienfeld, 1978, Heims, 1991, Heyl, 1998).
Despite this, it can be claimed, as Lilienfeld does, that the ideas are so strongly
affiliated between biological systems analysts and social systems analysts that they
may be placed upon the same ‘analytic operating table’:
Parson’s ’system’ may be classified as belonging to systems thinking; certainly its
philosophical categories and its metaphysics are the same. (Lilienfeld 1978:199)

If this is true, any critique o f the unity o f nature concept and of ecosystems
philosophy must also make forays into social systems theory. Where ecosystem
ecologists honour the ecosystem in ecology as the basic unit, so structural
fonctionalists honour the social system as the basic unit in sociological study. Let us
see how these two approaches draw from these common thematic premises and so
give rise to common problems. That will enable us to come back to the larger problem
of the existence of conservative and anti-individualistic impulses within unitarianism.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND CHANGE

As in the analysis o f ecological systems, social systems analysts tend to
emphasise stability over change: “[a]ny system that does not have some ability to
resist perturbation tends to cease to exist as a system” (Clayton, 1993:159). Within
social science this metaphysical or methodological commitment to stability has often
lead to systems-inclined sociologists being labelled by non-systems-inclined
sociologists as politically conservative since the former are involved in legitimising the
predominating social order. This is most evident in the case ot the structural
functionalist tradition which was the dominant Western sociological tradition in the
mid-Twentieth Century. The primary flag-bearer for this tradition was Talcott
Parsons. For many sociologists writing during the decline ot structural functionalism
in the 1960s, Parsonianism was thought of as “a celebration and affirmation ot the
status q u o ” (Darhendorf in Farganis, 1993:222). Today a non-functionalist sociologist
might sum up the principle ideas o f structural iunctionalism in this way.
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Parsons is essentially a conservative thinker who ignores the exploitative and
unequal character of capitalism, along with the resulting division and disharmony.
(Layder, 1994:23).

If we place this sort of criticism within its historical context it becomes clear just what
sort of status quo and what sort of stability Parsons, and most of the other structural
functionalists, were aiming for:
it is important to understand Parsons work as an attempt to defend capitalist society
against the criticism contained in Marxist analysis. Although both Marx and Parsons
see capitalism as a ‘social system’, their assessments of it are very different. Marx
envisioned capitalist society as basically exploitative (of the working classes),
conflict-ridden, and governed primarily by the profit motiveinherent in the economic
system. On the other hand Parsons recognised that capitalism was still
striving towards its ideal form, he saw it as a basically fair and meritocratic system.
(Layder 1994:14).

Marxists might be keen to add to this conceptualisation of Marxism that :
with its emphasis on dialectics, permanent upheaval and irresolvable conflicts between
classes, Marxism would seem incapable of adopting an organismic view of society, one
which is in essential balance. (Dickens 1992:44).

Although, historically, structural functionalism was a way to show how capitalist
society was a wonderful, self-adjusting system that was incapable of being perturbed
greatly from within, the concept of the social system that Parsons advanced might be
utilised to show how any particular preferred social system might operate. Goldsmith
does this very thing with his ongoing celebration of traditional societies which are, to
him, the only truly Parsons-like self-regulating societies that exist. Just as change in
the social system for many—if not most—structural functionalists is something either
strange or undesirable so it is for Goldsmith.
If “[stability rather than change is the basic feature of the living world”
(Goldsmith, 1993:112) and if human communities and ecological communities are of
the same structure, then stability is the basic feature in the human world too. This is
the line that Goldsmith takes in The Way, he merely maintains that modem societies
do not adhere to such natural stability while traditional societies did. So what did
traditional societies do in order to operate in a way that was as stable as ecosystems
are? Well, they basically did the same things that Parsons said people do to keep the
American social system stable:
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-the members ot the community have a common belief system and common
values and those that do not adhere to these values are ejected or
re-educated/rehabilitated.
-the members fulfil their role within the community decided upon by these
common beliefs and values. Those that do not are ejected from the system or
re-educated/rehabilitated.
Because Goldsmith presents his traditional societies as operating in this
Parsons-like way, they may be adjudged as being incapable of tolerating dissent and
difterences o f opinion and lifestyle. Such a judgement would fall heavily upon
Parson’s 1950s America and it may well do so on Goldsmith’s traditional societies.
Although their ideal societies are very different, the Parsons and Goldsmith
variants o f stable societies had much in common. Parsons (1967) emphasised common
values, as does Goldsmith (1993). Parsons (1967) emphasised the essential role of the
family, as does Goldsmith (1993). And Parsons (1967) emphasised the tightness of
traditions, as does Goldsmith (1993).
Parsons, like Goldsmith, also had a hierarchy o f systems within systems that
resembled the levels of organization posited by modem day proponents of systems
theory. Just like the levels o f biological organisation presupposed by systems
ecologists (and by Goldsmith) Parsons’ levels worked in the same way; by ‘backward
causation’ or ‘negative feedback’. Just as Goldsmith (as well as Capra, and Davies,
and Lovelock) would present the interaction between cellular systems organismal
systems, ecosystems and the global Gaian system so that the lower levels contribute
to the higher levels which then act to extend influence back upon lower levels, so
Parsons invented a four-level system o f systems in which 1) the body system, 2) the
psychology system, 3) the social system and 4) the cultural system were all nestled
within each other so that lower systems gave rise to higher systems which in turn
extended influences on the lower systems once more.
So if the principles that run and stabilise and harmonise Goldsmith s and Parsons
social systems are the same, how can they give rise to such varying social visions, in
Parsons’ case, mid-Twentieth Century Western capitalist-industrialism; and in
Goldsmith’s case ecologically-benevolent traditional societies? This is a relatively
unimportant question for this work since it is by no means proven that Parsons social
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systems were operating to produce his beloved America or that Goldsmith’s social
systems were operating in traditional societies to give rise to his beloved eco-friendly
communities. What is o f interest is the way that they both use changelessness and
stability—and hence intrinsically conservative regimes~to legitimise the societies they
variously desire.
Goldsmith does not have much time for Parsons’ affirmation o f capitalism but he
does share Parsons’ love o f systems. The great difference between the two, says
Goldsmith, is that modem society is not stable while traditional society is. Because
traditional societies are living in stability within their own ecological setting and so are
not damaging either Gaia or the ecosystems that make her up, says Goldsmith (1993),
then it is to traditional societies that modem society should aim.
According to Dickens (1992) Parsons saw traditional societies not as
ecologically-friendly and socially-benevolent (in the vein of Goldsmith) but as
primitive, undeveloped and undifferentiated societies subject to perturbation. Modem
systems, on the other hand, were, to Parsons, classifiable as complex and
self-regulating. This varying evaluation of traditionality exemplifies two extreme
approaches to pre-modem societies. Traditional societies were noble and enlightened
according to Goldsmith, while being savage and uncivilised according to Parsons.
Both versions sit within the extremes of western myth-making. Whether a social
thinker is prejudiced toward the view that all traditional societies were harmonious
with their environment and a joy to live in or prejudiced toward thinking they were all
savage, undifferentiated and undeveloped societies, these views by themselves tend be
homogenous views of vastly-differing societies that are actually incredibly diverse,
even if only along a single characteristic o f interest such as ecological-friendliness or
internal complexity. Some traditional societies may be ecological friendly and
socially-benevolent as Goldsmith suggests, but not all. And some traditional societies
may be internally simple and undifferentiated as Parsons suggests but, again, not all.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS

The major relationship between Goldsmith’s traditional societies and Parsons
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1950s American society is in their parallel appreciation of the relationship o f the
whole society to their respective individual parts. Just as Parsons’ social parts
(individuals, families, institutions etc.) were arranged to contribute to the stability of
the whole society, so Goldsmith picks his social theories straight from Parsonianism
to suppose that traditional societies are arranged so that the parts contribute to
maintaining the whole. Here, the parts are--like the parts in an ecosystem—ascribed a
role or a function. Individuals, families and institutions are occupiers of a particular
social niche which is implanted within the whole via common values in order to
maintain the whole society. This emphasis on society being a iunctional system is
common to both Parsons and Goldsmith.
Lyotard would explain the Parsonian version like this:
It] he decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to
input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are
commensurable and that the whole is determinable. (Lyotard, 1984:xxiv).

Whilst Bauman might explain Parsons’ version like this:
Constantly lurking behind the scene in the orthodox vision of social reality was the
powerful image oft he social system-this synonym of an ordered, structured space of
interaction, in which probable actions have been, so to speak, pre-selected by the
mechanisms of domination and value sharing. It was a ‘...co-ordinated space...’, one
inside of which the cultural, the political and the economic levels of supra-individual
organisation were all reservant with each other and functionally complimentary.
(Bauman, 1992:39).^84
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As critics of structural functionalism have noted, in such a system even change (and the desire for
change) is co-opted to give rise to stability:
“in countries with liberal or advanced management, the struggles and their instruments have been
transformed into regulators of the system” (Lyotard: 1984:13).
“Within the structural functionalist school...[hjere conflict is often seen as leading to ultimate
harmony and stability.” (Demerath (1967:501).
“Deviant behaviour is regarded as a temporary aberration, a failure ol the socialisation process
rather than an expression of difference or dissent”. (Farganis, 1993:364).
If even conflict against the system can be functionalised within the system to contribute to stability, then
one may wonder what social phenomena cannot possibly be incorporated into the social system. This is the main
problem with the Parsonian social system; at least according to it one ol its prime attackers Rail Dahrendorf. For
example, Farganis (1993:222) paraphrases Dahrendorf as saying that within a Parsonian social system:
“Everything is too neatly laid o u t; the family performs the reproductive function
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My point here is that the same descriptions apply to Goldsmith’s social systems
since he posits that traditional societies have commensurable, co-ordinated parts that
are complimentary in their functionality so that an ordered whole is the result.
One o f the functional parts common to both Goldsmith and Parsons is the family.
Goldsmith, writing in 1993, approves o f ‘traditional’ families and looks distastefully
on ‘modem’ single-parent families since:
a single parent family [isj a highly unstable entity that does not provide a satisfactory
environment for the children’s upbringing, and which is likely to break down further,
leading to abandonment of the children as is happening on such a scale in the slums of
South America. (Goldsmith, 1993:216).

For both Goldsmith and Parson families are an essential level in the make up of
social systems. They enable education, reproduction, value instalment and appropriate
resource partitioning within society. For both of them the death of the family would
be the death o f the social system, (and thereby the death of the ultimate system; Gaia
in Goldsmith’s case, and America in Parson’s case). However, Goldsmith’s restrictive
definition o f what it is that constitutes a family would strike many as being highly
exclusionist. Just as in Parson’s conservative 1950s America, where the ideology of
the family excluded many who did not come up to Parson’s version of family, so we
might suspect the same if Goldsmith’s traditional society eventuates.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Social systems, and the organic unities that they are said to reflect, have
sometimes been criticised for being anti-individualistic. We might, for instance, note
the following description o f an organic view of nature:
Connectedness involves regulatory feedback that controls component dynamics to
meet the best needs of the organisation itself, not necessarily the best needs of the
components (e.g. programmed cell death during embryogenesis or ejection of drones
from beehives are detrimental to the components but benefit the organisation as a
whole). (Rollo, 19995:28).
and replenishes society with fresh births; the educational system secures conformity and
adherence to the rules of thought, its function as an agent of socialisation, and the division
of labour allocates different roles that people must play in a complex economic system.”
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If an organic view o f nature is to be read as Rollo reads it, then might not an
organic view o f society based upon such a view o f nature be ani-individual? This is a
worry that has permeated environmental philosophy for all of its history and some
environmental holists have grown annoyed at it. According to the holists, new
socially-aware anti-umtarian critiques o f environmentally-guided holist ideas:
are only the latest in a long line of indignant but vastly predictable accusations that
continue to be reacted monotonously. Detailed responses to these criticism have been
offered for years for instance by Callicott and Rolston. (Westra, 1994:126).

Westra goes on to inform us that although some major thinkers have provided
carefully argued counter-claims, it appears that “no argument so far has succeeded in
silencing the critics” and their “lack o f open-mindedness or interest” (Westra,
1994:127).
We can interpret Westra charitably to mean that she sees that holists have trouble
getting their point across to those who choose to remain ignorant of the arguments of
environmental holists or we can choose to interpret Westra’s statement uncharitably
to mean that it is her intention to close down the ongoing debate about holism,
conservatism and anti-individualism. In this section and the next the debate is touched
upon so that it might be developed in later chapters.
The arguments o f the “anti-holists” declare that—at least in the
abstract—individuals are relegated to secondary importance compared to the value of
the whole. Despite Westra and others’ protestations that environmental holism does
not lead to social holism there are explicit examples within the environmental thought
that seem show that it is possible. At the forefront is Edward Goldsmith who declares
that:“[t]o keep to the Way, society must be able to correct any divergence from it”,
(Goldsmith, 1993:369). The ‘Way’, Goldsmith makes clear, is the specific and general
rules that run and maintain the holist entity that is Gaia. These rules are, to Goldsmith,
at once social and biological.
Divergence from these rules can be normally handled, says Goldsmith, via the
various self-regulating processes within the various systems of Gaia, be that system of
a social nature or of an ecological nature:
[ijf the Gaian hierarchy is to maintain its stability, all individual living things that
compose it must obey a veritable hierarchy ol laws, which together constitute the laws
of nature. (Goldsmith, 1993:8).
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These rules thus impose some sort of boundaries, parameters and self-discipline
upon the individual. Both humans and non-humans live in a way commensurate not
only with their immediate social and ecological system but with the greatest system of
all; Gaia. In stronger words, this might be translated to mean that the freedoms,
lifestyles and behaviour o f individuals are sacrificed and curtailed for the good of the
whole.
This idea o f individual restraint and sacrifice in the face of a larger organic whole
is also made by J. Baird Callicott when he says:
Our organic health and well-being, for example, requires vigorous exercise and
metabolic stimulation which cause stress and often pain to various parts of the body
and more rapid turnover in the life-cycle of our individual cells. For the sake of the
person taken as a whole, some parts may be, as it were, unfairly sacrificed. On the level
of social organisation, the interests of society may not always coincide with the sum
of the interests of its parts. Discipline, sacrifice, and individual restraint are often
necessary in the social sphere to maintain social integrity as within the bodily
organism. (Callicott, 1995:42).

Another holist environmental writer says the same thing in a different way:
The life force...is calling humanity to a new organisation of human societies. Here is
where the integration is most urgently needed. Here is where integration is most
incomplete and inadequate. (Birch, 1990:108).

Charles Birch goes on to identify how exactly we may characterise any
predilections toward not serving integration: they are instances of evil:
Evil is always the assertion of some self-interest without regard to the whole, whether
the whole is conceived as the immediate community, the total community, or the total
order of the universe. (Birch, 1990:15).

These flirtations with the supremacy of the organic integrated whole are indeed a
problem for other investigators of the environmental and ecological theory. Most
notably it has given rise to the charge of social fascism. Janet Biehl, in particular,
makes strong connections between ecological holism and the social fascism
exemplified by Nazism (Biehl, 1994; Biehl and Staudenmeier, 1995). Whether or not
Gaian metaphysics can and will feed into the support for political and social fascism is
yet to be determined but Biehl points out, with regard to the organic eco-spirituality
ideas that have permeated the modem German ultra-right, that a real danger may be
evident. She indicates that within this ultra-right Rudolph Bahro’s return to the
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Völkisch Spiritualism is actually a philosophical alignment to Nazism. Biehl goes on
to quote Bahro’s calls for a Green Adolph when Bahro talks o f the need for “[a] new
tiihrer to drive the German people towards environmental friendliness” (Bahro,
1994:152). Rudolph Bahro is an acknowledged leader of the German Green
movement and his writings have~as Biehl points out-become riddled with statements
like the following:
the most important thing is that ...IpeopleJ take the path ‘back’ and align themselves
with the Great Equilibrium, in the harmony between human order and the Tao of life.

This sort of sentence also pervades Goldsmith (1993) and Capra (1996) but I am
not yet willing to name them as Nazi intellectuals. However, Biehl probably would be
inclined to make the comparison since the cosmology of Goldsmith and Capra
sometimes appeal to cosmologies about which Biehl would point out that:
to establish their totalitarian regime and implement genocide, the Nazi’s easily drew
on the common ideology of the Volk mediated between individual and cosmos,
rendering the individuals mainly a member of the whole, the ‘Volk Whole’ or ‘Volk
Community (where Volk equals ethnically and culturally united individuals and
their common essences). (Biehl, 1994:160).

Michael Zimmerman echoes Biehl’s concerns over unity and harmony ideals
when he says:
The fact that National Socialism was a perverted expression of the desire for social
harmony does not make such desire illegitimate, but does require that critics of
Modernity-including counter-culturalists and radical ecologists-proceed carefully in
calling for alternatives. (Zimmerman, 1994:59)

Biehl’s concern about the re-emergence of holist ecological ideas and
neo-Nazism might be a little extreme but if we adjust them to say that if holist
environmental concepts are manifested strongly in social situations—as for instance in
Goldsmith’s social systems—then elements of fascism do become apparent.
Blaming Nazism as a derivative o f nothing else but organic views of nature and
society is a far too clumsy and simplified view to take. It is doubtful to many social
thinkers that culturally emergent paradigms of natural philosophical thought have a
sole determining affect on the character of social operations and relations . Although

49Examples of scholars that have dealt with the interactions of natural philosophy and social practices but have
also maintained that these interactions are never played out so that a natural philosophy maps exactly on to a soci

*
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such natural philosophical thought might serve as an aid in the legitimisation of what
is feasible or desirable for either the political elite, the politically-aspiring or their
audience during a particular historical setting. Whether this legitimisation is absolutely
necessary, or o f partial importance, or of no relevance at all to the social situations
that the natural philosophy is supposedly connected with, is, of course, a subject
unresolved. However, we can at least note here that there are some situations in
which cultural paradigms do at least oifer profound legitimising schemes for particular
political viewpoints and actions*50 and that it is wholly feasible to regard it as possible
that a Unitarian natural philosophy can act as a stimulus to an ongoing social theory
and practice that might possess fascist tendencies.
However, the point that I want to press, here, is that my position in all of this is
slightly different from those like Biehl who claim that Unitarian thought can lead to
fascist political and social situations. My view is that we do not have to wait for a
Nazism-like social situation for unitarianism to rear its head in conservative ways. The
living spectre of the system is not something only inherent in Nazism and other such
social unities, it is a spectre that is alive and well in the liberal democratic society of
the modem world and as such can be noted to serve the rationalising purposes that
unitarianism is said by Biehl to achieve for Nazism.
All this means that although theoretical caution may salvage environmental
holism from moving towards policies of a Nazi-comparable nature, the greatest
ideological danger of unitarianism may be its operation through the more politically
acceptable medium o f the ‘system7 concept. This important point is where the next
chapter starts oft'.

practice include: Bloor (1976), Greene (1981), Young (1985), Barnes and Shapin, eds, (1979), Kempton e t a l
(1995).
50For example, the writers cited in the note above provide details of such legitimising schemes in the works cited.
It is important to note that the exact ways that legitimising schemes of natural philosophy have affected social
situations is different in all of these works since the authors are dealing with differing social and historical settings.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
THE UNITY OF NATURE: A METANARRATIVE OF SOCIAL
CONSERVATISM?

According to many modem day natural philosophers and environmental thinkers
humanity must leam to appreciate unity in the natural world (what Capra, 1996, calls
‘The Web o f Life’ and Lovelock, 1991, calls ‘Gaia’) and also behave as though this
appreciation was important (and act according to what Goldsmith, 1991, calls ‘The
Way5). One o f the ways o f appreciating this unity~and of acting consistently with The
Way, according to Goldsmith—is to accept the continuity between nature and
humanity, between natural systems and social systems.
If Goldsmith had his way humans would all mega-mutate towards The Way,
towards Gaian ethics. Society would become traditional, less modem, and in doing so
would fulfil Gaian order and become less destructive towards nature. In the process
they would also become entrenched with ethics of hierarchy, unity and functionalism
such that in a society like the one Goldsmith has planned, the individual needs,
dissension and difference may very well be devalued. Such neglect of individual
differences and dissension is evident, according to many social commentators
(including Layder and Bauman) in the social theory of those from whom Goldsmith
draws his theories, i.e.: structural functionalists like Talcott Parsons. Both Goldsmith
and Parsons draw a lot o f their inspiration from holist biological ideas, and just as
these ideas are anti-individualistic and intolerant o f difference and change in the
biological world (as has been shown in Chapter Two), so they are anti-individualistic
and intolerant of difference and change in the social world.
At this point it I conclude that it might serve environmentalists well to agree
with Goldsmith that his traditional societies might be less ecologically destructive than
modem societies but this has nothing to do with Gaian holism, social hierarchy and
social functionalism as Goldsmith would submit. It is due to the less destructive
material potential o f such societies. Such societies would be less likely, as small
scale/needs-based societies, to reify technological and economic gain and this in itselt
would confer upon them a greater degree of eco-friendliness. A non-stratified,
non-hierarchical, non-holistic, anarchic society of the scale Goldsmith posits for his
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planned ecological societies would be just as light on the environment as those replete
with the hierarchy and holism o f Gaian ethics.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE UNITY OF NATURE: UNITING THE
ECONOM Y WITH THE ECOSYSTEM?

INTRODUCTION. THE RISE OF CYBERNETICS

As alluded to in the last chapter, in the middle of the Twentieth Century the unity
of nature was being reinterpreted using the concept o f the ‘system’. Nature, viewed as
a system, was thought to be a vast interlocking web of entities, energies, actions, and
purposes and to this web o f interacting components humanity, in some way or
another, belonged.
This notion of the interacting, interlocking system is at the forefront of modem
day manifestations of the unity concept, so much so that expressions of the unity of
nature nowadays can very rarely escape the ideas and terminological practice of
systems theory. For instance when we examine the natural philosophy of just about
any late Twentieth Century holist-friendly environmentalist who, unlike most of the
intellectuals examined in this work, have no real interest in systems ideas we still see
within them the influence o f systems thinking. For instance, when explaining Deep
Ecology’s conviction toward ecological unity, Arne Naess (1994:122) characterises
ecological unity like: “a multiplicity of more or less lawful, interacting factors may
operate together to form a unity, a system”. This cornering of the unity of nature
market by systems theory is not total but it is hard to understate. For this reason
systems theory is often regarded as the science of unity.
One o f the obvious ways to note the relationship of contemporary systems theory
to conceptions o f natural unity involves the very words ‘system’ and ‘unity’. The
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closeness ot the word system to the conceptual character ol unity can be explored by
perusing the definitions o f those that first scientised it. Bertalanfiy, for instance,
defined systems as “Complexes of elements standing in interaction” (Bertalanfiy,
1967:117). Thus when we are talking about those that first formulated scientific
theories about systems, and Bertalanfiy is adjudged by most systems theorists of
today to have had a prominent role, then the idea of unity was a lull-time metaphysical
commitment when systems theories were first outlined.
Given this history o f the interaction between unity and systems—whose details
will be entered into in the sections that tollow -it is of little surprise to find that just
like Unitarians, (who cannot divorce themselves from systems thinking) systems
thinkers can not divorce themselves from unity notions when defining systems. For
instance Schulze and Zwolfer define a system thus:
laj system may be defined as an integrated entity whose overall properties are
different from the properties of its elements ( Schulze and Zwolter, 1987:1).

This definition lies very close to the holistic definitions of unity employed by
Unitarians (like Naess, above) who do not directly employ systems theory.
We need not rely upon the testimony of systems experts and Unitarians, however,
when finding links between unity and systems. Any dictionary may be consulted to
give similar indications o f the link. The Burlington Universal Dictionary tor example
defines a system as being “an assemblage of things forming a connected whole”.
Similarly, unity is defined in a similar way; the “oneness” that comes from a
“harmonious association” within a “connected whole”. Such connection doesn’t
necessarily designate a direct equation between those who hold that the world is a
system and those who hold it acts in unity but it does at least bring to the fore the idea
that there is the possibility o f a cultural or philosophical connection between the two
since the language used by supposedly disinterested dictionary editors to define
‘system’ is common to the language used to describe a ‘unity’.
These definitions of what it takes to be a system are, of course, rather open and
vague; so much so that the system concept might be thought ot as encapsulating just
about any object, any process, any thing that exists in space and time. The description
of a thing as a system and the description of a thing as not a system is thus a process
with an implicit arbitrariness within it.
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This ability to vaguely define systems, to draw upon the open-endedness of the
system concept is actually a great source of strength for systems advocates. They may
happily apply their concept-and its attendant metaphysical/mathematieal rules and
principles—to all manner o f things and processes without much disagreement coming
from within science that they cannot do this because their is no scientific, grounded
definition o f what a system can and cannot be. Any previously imagined unity (such as
a society, forest, nation, household) can now become a system and be submitted to a
systems analysis.
Here it is possible to spot some sort of paradox between systems theory’s veneer
and its substance. Systems science has gained a lot of its adherents, support, funds,
and popularity because it was perceived to be ultra-modem and ultra-scientific, yet it
is actually not very scientific at all, merely a play towards certain metaphysical biases.
Although it is a discipline that uses and produces a lot of numbers, a lot of
mathematics, a lot o f diagrams and a lot of sophisticated terms, systems science
nevertheless is a science indissolubly welded to metaphysics. It merely hides this
metaphysics under mathematical equations, flow diagrams and jargon.51
The major importance o f the system concept to the unity of nature idea lies in its
claim towards scientificity. This claim is brought about by systems theory’s supposed
discovery and elaboration of a universal principle. This is to say systems science
claims to provide the mechanism that shows exactly how nature is united. This
mechanism—this glue that unites everything—is called ‘feedback’. Systems are
systems, according to the systems theorists, because of the operation of feedback
between the systems various constituents. Feedback may be defined as the circular
process in which the activity o f a thing contributes to the activity of another thing
which then feeds back to contribute the activity o f the first thing. In the case of
Lovelock’s Gaia theory, feedback is the process whereby the geobiological
components o f the Earth interact to keep the atmosphere or the seas at thermal and
chemical constancy.
Lovelock, however, was not the first who aspired to bring in feedback concepts
into the ecological realm. Drawing his insights from Norbert Wiener s mathematics of

51For more about this with specific relevance to systems theory see Lilienfeld (1988) and with general reference to
mathematics see Assouni (1994).

108

feedback, Evelyn Hutchinson52 was one o f the first ecologists to emphasise the role of
systems feedback in ecological situations. Hutchinson’s unit of feedback was not the
whole earth, as in Lovelock’s case, but the ecosystem:
it is well known from mathematical theory that circular paths often exist which tend to
be self-correcting within certain limits, but which breakdown, producing violent
oscillations, when some variable in the system...transgresses limiting values. It is
therefore, usual to find in nature’s systems various mechanisms acting to damp
oscillations. (Hutchinson, quoted in Kwa, 1993.223-224).

Such announcements o f the reality of ecologically-related feedback processes
continues in modem day ecosystem ecology and its inescapable importance as an
ecological concept is exhorted by Edward Goldsmith too:
the operation of all sorts of internally-generated negative feedback mechanisms
(Eugene Odum’s environmental hormones) which inhibit the growth of species that
are displaced in the succession towards a climax is clearly visible to all but the most
prejudiced eye. (Goldsmith, 1993:262).

It might be alleged that systems science is far more than just finding worldly
examples o f feedback and that systems ecology is more than just finding ecological
examples o f feedback but although these allegations may be sound enough it is also
true to say that both systems theory in general and systems ecology specifically can
hardly exist without the concept of feedback.
If we trust a systems theorist to elaborate upon the history of their subject they
would surely relate it to the rise of the discipline known as ‘cybernetics’. Cybernetics,
they would point out, first self-organised itself into an intellectual system of thought
within a military background during wartime and post-war USA. Hagen, who is not
an avowed systems theorist, expresses this history in a concise way thus: “cybernetics
had developed largely out o f the wartime problem of designing an automatic control
system for anti-aircraft guns” (Hagen, 1992:71).
As is alluded to in the statement above the leading figures of cybernetics, such as
von Neumann and Norbert Wiener, were both involved in the military development of
cybernetic machines during and immediately after the Second World War, although,
[wjhereas von Neumann remained a military consultant throughout his career,
specialising in the application of computers to weapons systems, Wiener ended his

52See H utchinson (1957).
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military work shortly after the first Macy meeting. (Capra, 1996:54).

The Macy meetings about which Capra speaks were a short series of conferences
convened by early systems theorists to discuss the emerging problems and ideas of
their field. About these conferences, which both von Neumann and Wiener attended,
Fritjof Capra writes:
The conceptual framework of cybernetics was developed in a series of legendary
meetings in New York city, known as the Macy Conferences. These
meetings—especially the first one in 1946—were extremely stimulating.
(Capra, 1996:54).53

Capra has enormous respect for von Neumann and Wiener and strongly
advocates them as truly influencing the development of systems unity in both
biological and ecological thought. Certainly, within the science of ecology,
cybernetics is richly represented in ecosystems studies and in systems ecology.
Although Wiener said nothing about ecology many ecological ideas within systems
ecology, including James Lovelock’s Gaia were developed as variants based upon the
cybernetics of Wiener. Von Neumann himself also said little or nothing about ecology
directly but he was given over to philosophising about general systems in “biology and
appreciated the richness o f natural, living systems” (Capra, 1996:54). Von Neumann’s
work, too, is said by Capra to have been a direct influence upon later systems
ecologists like for instance Eugene Odum, Howard Odum and James Lovelock.
Indeed it might be pointed out that the Odums and Lovelock owe more to cybernetics
theory than to any traditional approach in ecology. This is evident (and, incidentally,
approvingly acknowledged by Edward Goldsmith) when Odum declares:
ecosystems can be considered cybernetic in nature, but control functions are internal and
diffuse rather than external and specified as in human engineered cybernetic devices. (E.

53We might like to compare this statement of Capra’s with Hagen’s records of some biologists who went to these
conferences and who actually found them pointless (see Hagen, 1992). Incidentally, within Capra s hagiographie
treatment of systems science he thinks, for some reason, that we should pay attention to early systems theory
because it emerged from people with fast brains. About von Neumann, for example he says:
“John von Neumann was...a mathematical genius, he had written a classic treatise on quantum
theory, was the originator of the theory of games, and became world famous as the inventor of the
digital computer. Von Neumann had a powerful memory and his mind worked with enormous speed.
It was said of him that he could understand the essence of a mathematical problem almost instantly
and that he would analyse any problem, mathematical or practical, so clearly and exhaustively that
no further discussion was necessary.” (Capra: 1996: 118).
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Odum in Goldsmith, 1993:130)

Similarly Lovelock states “Gaia has been...the hard science view o f a physical
chemist with an interest in control theory” (Lovelock 1995:280); ‘control theory’
being another name for those principles that describe feedback tendencies in
cybernetic systems. Admissions like this permeate Lovelock’s work so that we must
judge that Gaia is not merely imbued with feedback/control theory but is a product of
the intellectual heritage that is cybernetics and systems science.
When looking at the systems ecology o f Eugene and Howard Odum we find that
they have articulated feedback processes tor the chemical transfer patterns in the
physical environment o f an ecosystem. The Odums protracted elaboration of carbon
cycles, nitrogen cycles and phosphate cycles are examples of such chemical feedback
and transfer patterns. In Lovelock’s Gaia theory the feedback processes that he has
discovered also include these things but the cycles are postulated on a global scale.
Capra, too, makes much o f the ecological and philosophical importance of negative
feedback cycles involving carbon, nitrogen, phosphate etc. He then goes on to
compare the prevalence o f negative feedback to positive feedback in ecology:
indeed, purely self-reinforcing phenomena are rare in nature, as they are usually
balanced by negative feedback loops constraining their runaway tendencies...In an
ecosystem, for example, every species has the potential of undergoing an exponential
population growth, but these tendencies are kept in check by various balancing
interactions within the system. (Capra, 1996:63).

This example, incidentally, is one o f the favourites for those with an interest in
both ecology and systems theory for not only does it give a easily understandable
example o f the presence o f negative feedback it also does other important things for
cybernetics. Firstly it links cybernetics not just with any old science but with the
politically attuned science o f ecology; thus promoting cybernetics as a politically
agreeable and socially responsible science. Having positioned itself within that
science, systems theory can easily lose its somewhat politically-disagreeable
connection with weapons o f war. Systems theory—via systems ecology—then goes on
to make very acceptable claims about the reality of ecological situations (i.e. nature is
in unity, nature is in balance). These claims are acceptable because they appear to
restate what has been known for so long.

I ll

SYSTEMS ECOLOGY AS MANAGEMENT ECOLOGY

If systems ecology can be characterised as ‘cybernetics meets ecology’ then the
two men that encouraged that meeting most, and derived most from it, were the
Odum brothers. The Odum brothers comprised Eugene, who obtained his Ph.D. not
in ecology, but physiology, and Howard, who obtained his postgraduate training in
meteorology. The Odums were able to gain support for systems ecology for two
reasons. Firstly, the United States Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] wanted to
know what affects radiation had on human health and the health o f human
environments. Eugene Odum was the first scientist to impress upon the AEC that
systems studies o f ecological settings were the best way to do this and so he went on
to prosper in the funding stakes.
Up until then the sporadic fimding of ecosystem analysis was via the university
system. Before the patronage of the AEC towards the work o f Eugene Odum,
ecology—whether of a community, ecosystem or population bent--was only funded by
university-level grants. As Kwa (1993:247) points out: “in this context the importance
o f the AEC as a patron o f ‘big ecology’ must be understood”.
The second reason for support of Odumian systems ecology in the 1950s and 60s was its
perceived relevance to environmental and ecological management. This idea has been
developed by Kwa in a number of papers54.

Kwa explains that systems ecological concepts had “fallen on fertile ground
because o f their management applicability” (Kwa, 1993:248). As Kwa would explain
it; systems ecology was not only new and quantitative (and produced numbers that
management could use in planning) it also boasted the language and the rationality
that managers (and their overseers) liked. Not only that but its results were presented
in forms very much the same as management studies were presented. Ecosystem flow
charts resembled the flow charts o f 1950s management techniques so much so that
one could just plug the ecological results into resource management strategies without
fear o f rejection. In this way systems ecology became management ecology. Biggins
(1976) found these links so remarkable that he was compelled to comment that the

54

See Kwa (1987) and Kwa (1993)
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central metaphors o f modem ecological theory-i.e.: control, regulation, interaction,
feedback, flows et cetera-derive from post-Keynesian capitalist management
techniques and computing55.
This idea that systems ecology was management ecology was not repelled but
positively fostered by the Odums and other ecosystem scientists. Eugene Odum, for
instance, is said by Golley (1993:108) as having believed that ecosystem science could
provide a “pure science basis for landscape planning in the future.”
As with the management o f human-related systems the management of nature
was, as Golley would put it, ‘fundamentally economical’. Nature, like society, could
be converted into an economic entity. It was hardly any trouble at all to configure the
carbon cycle or the nitrogen cycle in to the economy. Indeed this is what the Odums
have continuously sought to do56.
As Kwa points out:
The development of systems ecology was a manifestation of great technological
optimism with regard to the possibility of the management of natural systems. (Kwa,
1993:249).

This optimism was developing in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the perceived
applicability o f systems analysis to every form of human endeavour but it can hardly
be periodised to being just a phenomena of the 50s and 60s. Nowadays the ‘systems
ecology equals management ecology’ ethos is alive and well in the form of
‘environmental integration management’.
Within this brand of environmental management it is often thought that only an
integrated systems approach can solve problems in the environment yet it merely

53Twenty years later a similar, though less obvious, influence upon ecological metaphors via management concepts
nan be found in Fritjof Capra’s The Web o f L ife. Where, for twenty odd years the system was Capra s prime
metaphorical device (see Capra, 1975, Capra, 1982, Capra, 1988) to explain the nature of all existence now he is
beginning to swap the ‘system’ for the ‘network’. On occasion we can see Capra use network in exactly the same
way he has used ‘system’. Where Capra’s systems were ‘dynamic, integrated unities of parts’, so his networks are
‘dynamic, integrated unities of parts’. Thus Capra now says: “during the second half of the century the network
concept has been the key to recent scientific understanding not only of ecosystems but the very nature of life
(Capra, 1996:35) where he would have said the exact same thing for systems in his earlier publications. This could
easily lead one to ponder—in the vein of Biggins’ (1976) assertion—whether or not Capra s new emphasis on
networks are the result of the continued growth of networks and network analysis in both management and
computing and especially with regards to the Internet (It should be acknowledged that this transition from the
system metaphor to the network metaphor is not complete within Capara’s writing and much explanation within
his latest works still affords reference to systems.)
56See Odum (1971),
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reduces these problems to something that looks like it can be solved. Just as systems
ecologists often castigated small-scale approaches as being fragmentary approaches to
environmental management in the 1960s, so 1990s environmental managers castigate
less than total perspectives in today’s management of the environment37. Calling for a
total ecological appraisal, or worse claiming that such an appraisal exists and then
using it as such, is still part of the tradition that mistakes systems in the natural world
for the whole of the natural world. This is not to say systems approaches are in no
way useful when they focus upon the subjects of interest to them (i.e. energy flows,
material pollution) but it does suggest that the items of interest to systems managers
are not always the items that should be of interest in environmental protection (such
as the well-being of individual species and the communities they make up).
Without doubt one o f the greatest affiliates to the optimistic and managerial point
of view o f the systems ecology is James Lovelock. His Gaia theory might in fact be
interpreted as the epitome of such views and this, indeed, is the charge Bill Devall, a
well-known American environmentalist, makes at Gaia theory. Bill Devall has
described the Gaia theory as an updated version of Gifford Pinchot’s ‘scientific
management’ o f national forests (see Zimmerman, 1994). Gaia is thus, according to
Devall’s line o f criticism, a theory that offers humanity a chance to identify—via
feedback/control theory—the global cycles essential for humanity to preserve itself.
Once these cycles have been identified it seems that humanity only needs a
management practice in place that preserves them to set the world’s ecological
problems in order. The question that remains, however, is: ‘are these cycles in any
way indicative of the presence or absence of the very animals and plants that humans
wish to save?’
Although the success of ecosystems analysis was debated within the ecology
profession itself5
758, many non-ecological scientists, including biologists, did not doubt
its efficacy and applicability and also its scientific hardness. This is most evidently the

570ne of the best places to witness this phenomena is within the programmatic statements within the promotional
publications of applied environmental research bodies and institutes, like the USFS (United States Forest Service),
the Department of Conservation (New Zealand) or the Institute of Sustainable Futures, (Australia). For instance
the ISF declares that its task is to: “instigate an integrated approach to the study and management of A u stria s
ecology so that the environment is understood and managed in its entirety rather than piece-meal (ISF, 1 ).
58See M cIntosh (1985), K w a (1987), K wa (1993), H agen (1992) and Golley (1993) for the history o f these debates.
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case if we consider that from a pedagogical point o f view, ecosystem concepts and
analysis still maintain a great degree of coverage in general science syllabi when they
address ecological issues. Ecosystems and ecosystem analyses have thus become a
potent, if not dominant, way o f looking at nature; this dominance being at least partly
encouraged by its links to managerial issues.
Another interesting twist o f the ‘systems ecology equals management ecology’
equation is also worth mentioning. According to Golley, the systems ecologist that led
a section o f the grandiose 1968-72 International Biological Program; George van
Dyne, ran his Grasslands Ecosystem project within this Program like a typical systems
manager. Like a “dogmatic” king overlooking his hierarchically-organised domain,
van Dyne “fiercely...drove his colleagues, co-workers and graduate students hard”
towards maximum project efficiency.59 If nothing else this tells us about the similarity
o f ecosystems management to the management ideas o f the time but it also hints at
much more. It exposes the ease to which a metaphysical viewpoint may totally
dominate the thoughts o f its practitioners so that nothing in the world can be
conceived or practised without regard to it.
One other question that seems reasonable to ask with regards to the history of
systems ecology is about the origins of cybernetics and the impact of this on
cybernetics as a whole. By this I mean to inquire if it might be plausible to assume that
there is a connection between cybernetics and the conservative side of Western
politics since both Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann pioneered cybernetics as
part o f the development o f military hardware. Thus, if Wiener and von Neumann are
the type o f people to entertain thoughts about the necessity of the defence of their
nation, is it not reasonable for us to entertain thoughts that they were supportive of
the USA as a good and free entity worthy of preservation? The fact that you work for
a government military institution might mean that you are less likely to be a political
radical but it does not mean you will necessarily use your techniques of the job to

39Auerbach (1995:xxix-xxx), from whom these quotes are taken, also had this to say about George van Dyne s
management style:
To say that he was somewhat dogmatic is a bit of an understatement. When he was manager of
the program, his forcefulness more than occasionally resulted in controversy with other scientists,
especially those with similar traits. He firmly believed that his approach to ecosystem research
in the grasslands was the appropriate model or paradigm for all the biome programs.
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justify that conservatism outside the job-place. However, von Neumann is well-known
as a developer and promoter o f Games theory, whose intersections with American
liberalist capitalism has been exposed a number o f times60. Might there not also be a
connection between systems science and liberal capitalism?

ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: THE NEW SCIENCES

For many systems theorists in this turn of the millennium period, systems theory
is being superseded by something new. This something new is ‘complex systems
theory’. No more do systems theorists deal with simplified things or believe that
things are simple. They have matured in their way o f thinking to believe that
everything is complex, even the simple things.
This might make an outsider believe that systems scientists have admitted, at last,
to being unable to model and explain all things in nature using only one
methodological framework but that is not necessarily the case. In fact armed with
complex systems theory, some scientists now believe that they may be able to explain
and model just about anything in nature.
This new complex systems theory is, of course, a derivative o f systems theory; so
much so that it is sometimes impossible to tell the difference between the two. And
each has evoked an over-excitement within the writings of its advocates. Just as
systems theorists during the post-War period spoke o f their discipline in revolutionary
terms61 so complex systems theorists sometimes speak of complex system theory in
revolutionary terms62.

60See for example Martin (1978), Lilienfeld (1988), Mainzer (1994).
61For example, we may quote the systems theorist Rosen (1972:233) who said:
The developing family of ideas and concepts which fall roughly under the rubric of systems
theory amounts to a profound revolution in science—a revolution which will transform human
thought as deeply as did the earlier ones of Galileo and Newton.
62 For instance consider the proclamations about complex systems theory of Krohn e t a l (1990.1) who are
“[ojbserving a present day scientific revolution”, and Kuppers (1990:51) who says we are experiencing a singular
phenomenon in the development of science, for which I can think of no better description than fundamental and
Fabel (1994:304) who believes that “the current ferment in science is potentially more than another Copemican
revolution.”
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Complex systems theory goes by various names. It is, perhaps, more familiarly
known by its constituent parts; Complexity theory and Chaos theory. Added to these
two core theoretical nodes might be number of others, like the Self-organisation
theories o f Maturana, Varela, Prigogine and Jantsch63 and also Lovelock’s Gaia
theory. All these four bodies o f theory are all in some way related, having in common,
according to Capra (1996:x) key concepts such as: “chaotic attractors, fractals,
dissipative structures, self-organisation, and autopoietic networks”64. All of these
sciences together; Complexity, Chaos, Self-organisation and Gaia, are dubbed the
‘New Sciences’ by Paul Davies and some others and to save time that is what I shall
call them too.
To sum them up we might say that the theories contained within the New
Sciences advocate an evolutionary dynamic systems view of the cosmos that elevates
processes over substances and recognises the ever-present operation of
self-organising order emerging from chaos. Or as Davies puts it, the New Sciences
tell:
the story of the universe [as] one of increasing complexity and organisation emerging
spontaneously from primordial simplicity and uniformity. The self-organising and
self-complexifying power of the laws of physics which are only now being studied,
constitute a second remarkable property. (Davies, 1996:6).

True to the intellectual marketing zeal of those who promote complex systems
theory, both Chaos theory and Complexity theory have independently been hailed as
revolutionary sciences. Capra, for instance, says of Complexity theory.
[t]he discovery of this new mathematics of Complexity is increasingly being recognised
as one of the most important events in 20th century science. (Capra, 1996:112).

And likewise, o f Chaos theory, Hayles declares:
it is already apparent that Chaos theory is part of a paradigm shift of remarkable scope
and significance.

The word ‘chaos’ would seem to conjure up things anarchic, things sporadic,
things random, yet the chaos in Chaos theory is not really like this. As various
advocates o f Chaos theory put it :

63See Maturana and Varela (1980), Jantsch (1980) and Prigogine and Stengers (1984).
64These key concepts«do not fear-will be explained and examined throughout the rest of this chapter.
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Although chaotic behaviour is, by definition, dauntingly difficult to model, there is
still some underlying order in its manifestation. (Davies, 1987:51). In chaos theory the
term chaos has acquired a new technical meaning. The behaviour of chaotic systems
is not merely random but shows a deeper level of patterned order. (Capra, 1996:122).

Disorder can play a critical role in giving birth to new, higher forms of order.
(Wheatley, 1992:11).

Out of chaos comes forth the fertile variety of forms of existence and life in the universe.
Chaos is the father of innovation. (Merry, 1995:13).

This order that is hidden in, and emerges from, chaos is not of a simple kind but
is, according to Chaoticians, extraordinarily complex. Hence the name of the theory
that explores this type o f order is Complexity theory.
The process whereby complex order emerges from chaos is often given the title
‘self-organisation7, the maintenance o f which is termed ‘self-regulation7; two terms
that we have occasionally come across in previous chapters. Within the New
Sciences, the study of such ordering and regulation becomes so intense it is often
described as constituting a particular theoretical node: Self-organisation theory.
Chaos theory and Self-organisation theory are intimately linked (so say the New
Scientists), since “[c]haos is the basis of the ability of living matter to self-organise
itself7 (Merry: 1995:13). Self-organisation, too, is also presented in
paradigm-changing terms by certain New Scientists:
I have taken some time to outline the emerging theory of self-organising systems
because it is today the broadest scientific formulation of the ecological paradigm with
the most wide-ranging implications. (Capra, 1994:340).

Life itself, we are told by Capra, is a system defined by its spontaneous
self-organising properties: “[a] living system is defined as a self-organising system
(Capra: 1994). By living systems Capra means not only individual organisms but living
systems at higher levels:
[l]ike individual organisms, ecosystems are self-organising and self-regulating
systems (Capra, 1992:301).

Chaos theory, Complexity theory and Self-organisation theory have also been
intimately linked to the unity o f nature. Complexity theory, for instance, has often
been intellectually tied with the unity o f nature in general and with the Gaia theory in
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particular. Witness this statement from Lewin as an example:
[t]oday, researchers are viewing Gaia and the whole notion of the
superorganism in light of the modem mathematical theory of complexity.
(Lewin, 1996:28).

Paul Davies, too, finds that:
Gaia provides a nice illustration of how a highly complex feedback system can display
stable modes of activity in the face of drastic external perturbations. We see again how
individual components and sub-processes are guided by the system as a whole to
conform to a coherent pattern of behaviour...The fact that life acted in such a way as to
maintain the conditions for its own survival and progress is a beautiful example of
self-regulation. It has a pleasing teleological quality to it. (Davies: 1987:132).

Similarly, Fritjof Capra is also impressed by the relationship of Gaia theory to
Self-organisation theory:
James Lovelock had an illuminating insight that led him to formulate a model that is
perhaps the most surprising and beautiful expression of self-organisation—the idea that
the planet Earth as a whole is a living, self-organising system. (Capra, 1996:100).

As well as Lewin, Davies and Capra, two o f the loudest spokespeople for Chaos
theory, Cohen and Stewert, also admit to appreciating Gaianism by saying:
Gaia, as an integrated dynamical system, replete with feedback loops and stabilising
subsystems, is an entirely respectable concept. (Cohen and Stewert, 1994:387).

Whether or not it is actively linked to Gaia theory the complex systems view in
the New Sciences still advocates a united conception of life and the universe:
Chaos in a certain sense reveals the unity of the universe and the hidden tie between
one thing and another. (Merry, 1995:30).

Merry (1995:61) goes on to write that “[a] basic characteristic of complex
systems is connectivity. In a world of complex systems everything is connected to
everything else.” Similarly Fraser Clarke says of Chaos theory that it is:
unification science, interrelation science, whole science. It shows you that there is a
connection between everything (Fraser Clarke quoted in Wright, 1996:227).

Although Chaoticians approve o f the Gaia theory and think it quite workable as a
part o f the New Sciences, James Lovelock himself, is not entirely supportive of Chaos
theory. Lovelock does not want to praise any science that might offer support for a
theoretical ecology that disagrees with his own emphasis on stability. Chaos theory
hardly does this since its affinity to the chaotic is only to find hidden order but James
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Lovelock, like many others, has not realised this yet. Unlike the Chaoticians who
admire Gaia, Lovelock does not return the admiration for Chaos theory. Instead he
sees Chaos theory as part o f traditional science that continuously exhibits a fascination
with sickness and atypicality (see Lovelock, 1988).

THE NEW SCIENCES AND ECOLOGY

Fritjof Capra (1994:340) indicates that one o f the reasons he finds:
the theory of self organising systems so important is that it seems to provide the
ideal scientific framework for an ecologically oriented worldview.

We might like to ask what the connection between the New Sciences and
ecology and environmentalism actually is. Although Capra (1996), Birch (1990),
Zohar and Marshall (1993), Gare (1995) and others talk about the New Sciences as
prompting a paradigm change to an ‘ecological’ and ‘environmentally-fiiendly’
worldview, who amongst these writers actually talks about ecology or the
environment in their new worldview? On reading those texts deemed to be
descriptions o f this new worldview it appears that the answer to this question comes
out like this: not Capra, not Birch and not Zohar and Marshall. Out of these people
only Gare makes a commitment into entering mainstream environmental/ecological
discourse65. If the others do somehow stumble on ecological issues it is either via
Gaian ecology or ecosystemic unity and if they stumble upon environmentalism they
just repeat the fact that the Earth is dying and we need to change our worldview as

65Arran Gare’s environmental investigations in his 1995 book are devoted to exploring the postmodern condition
(a term described by Lyotard, 1984, and Harvey, 1990) and its interactions with and influences upon the
environmental crisis. Since, according to Gare, both postmodernism and environmentalism have intellectual
programmes designed to understand the culture of modem society and how it has come to its present state, and
since those attempting to understand postmodemity and the environmental crisis both see Western society as
oppressive, and are striving to develop novel or resurrect traditional pathways of experiencing, understanding,
acting and living, then it is arguable that the postmodern condition, associated as it is with a loss of faith m
modernity, progress and rationality, reflects people's growing awareness that it is just these cultural forms which
are propelling humanity to self-destruction. Although Gare acknowledges this link between postmodernism and
environmentalism he also asserts that they have never been significantly brought together in an intellectual way.
The way Gare does this, is by invoking Marxist critiques of capitalism, then utilising poststructural poltical
messages (both of which he is critical of but sympathetic with) before ariving at a postmodern cosmology (tosed
upon the New Sciences of people like Davies) that he believes represents a worldview fully comensurable with a
variety of ecological politics, environmental philosophies, and Green economics.
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part o f the process o f stopping this. Any sustained attempt to enter into ecology and
environmental issues is non-existent in the writings o f these thinkers. As an example
consider Capra. In his latest monograph, The Web o f Life, Capra tries hard to attach
himself not only to ecological science in general, via references to ecosystem ecology,
but to Deep Ecology specifically, a popular environmental movement:
The sense in which I use the term ‘ecological’ is associated with a specific
philosophical school, and, moreover, with a global grassroots movement, known as
‘deep ecology’ which is rapidly gaining in prominence. (Capra, 1996:7).

Now Deep Ecologists, themselves might be puzzled at Capra’s attempt to align
his ‘ecological’ approach in The Web o f Life with Deep Ecology philosophy, since it
is a book on the philosophy of complex systems theory and not one which seeks to
explore environmental problems in relation to any o f the precepts o f Deep Ecology66.
Capra’s retort to this would o f course go something like this: ‘the cause of the
environmental crisis is our modem worldview and what we need to stop it is a new
worldview which posits the unity of all things’. Herein lies a very shallow and
superficial resemblance to Deep Ecology in that both Capra and very many Deep
Ecologists have a metaphysical commitment to unity but that is where the

66The precepts of Deep Ecology are expressed in the well-known Deep Ecology eight point platform. It reads like
this:
1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves
(synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the
non-human world for human purposes.
2) Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to the realisation of these values and are also values in
themselves.
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy basic needs.
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human
population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
. . .
.
5) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly
worsening.
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and
ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent
value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound
awareness of the difference between big and great.
8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to
implement the necessary changes.
This platform is announced in various publications, including: Naess (1973), Devall and Sessions (1985) and
Naess (1989).This specific formulation of it was taken from Naess (1995). It should be noted that Capra does not
talk about any of these things in The W eb o f N a tu re , despite saying his is a cosmological manifesto for Deep
Ecology.
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resemblance ends. Although he declares at the beginning of his book that he is a Deep
Ecologist, nowhere else in his book does he take up any of the debates raised by Deep
Ecology, nor does he enter into the value premises and focal arguments (such as
biospheric egalitarianism, anti-classism, population and pollution control) of the Deep
Ecologists (see for example Devall and Sessions, 1985; Naess, 1989; Sessions, 1994;
and Naess, 1994). In fact Capra does not even go anywhere near the literature o f this
‘world-wide grassroots environmental movement’ he professes to be a part of. Given
this, the overtures he makes to Deep Ecology must be interpreted as a play for
political legitimacy within the environmental movement. His ideas, so Capra thinks,
must be given cognisance by environmentalists, if for no other reason, than he is
expressing their natural philosophy.
Another point to make about the New Sciences and their connections to ecology
revolves around the possible attachment of ecology to Chaos theory. Dealing with
chaotic phenomena as it proclaims, Chaos theory, if applied directly to ecology, might
be thought somewhat more compatible to the changing dynamics of forest ecologies
as theorised by Gleason and his disciples than the superorganicism of Clements.
However, this is not the case. Chaos theory, as Capra, Davies, Lewin and others
indicate, is actually more in tune with Clementsian ecology. Clements’ climax
communities, Chaoticians and other New Scientists would say, is an example of a
self-organising order emerging from chaos.
One o f the claims o f those who support Chaos theory and Complexity theory is
that they give birth to views o f nature that epistemologically liberate nature’s
constituents. Thus we have people like E.C. White saying:
The role ascribed to stochastic self-organisation in this view of natural history is an
emancipatory one. As the stochastic leaps toward the unprecedented liberates nature
from determinism; so the emergence of order out of chaos overcomes entropic
degradation. Nature is both ‘free’ and ‘progressive.’ (White, 1991:264).

But if Chaos theory and Complexity theory are more linkable (or linked) to
Clements than Gleason, this claim for ‘freedom’ seems to come under some doubt
since Clements superorganism tends to act as an imprisoning metaphysical framework
as far as the species in a community are concerned. What’s more, if Clements
superorganism is an example o f the New Sciences of Self-organisation, Chaos and
Complexity at work, then so must Odum’s ecosystems and Lovelock s Gaia since all
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three (Clements’ Climax communities, Odum’s Ecosystems and Lovelock’s Gaia)
have been shown to be philosophically related. Therefore, far from having a role of
emancipation as depicted in the above passage by White, Self-organisation theory and
Chaos theory would impose a metaphysical schema of systems determinism,
over-generalisation and uniformity upon nature’s supposedly ‘free’ members. Just as
Clementsianism, Gaianism and systems ecology imprison living beings within an
over-lording holism which goes on to trap them in levels and tyrannous niches, so the
New Sciences of Chaos theory and Self-organisation may do the same.
It should be noted that the complex systems theory of the New Sciences does not
break from unitarianising natural history in a way that is any different from ‘normal’
systems theory. All o f its basic assumptions are still there: systems, unity, holism,
determinism, as well as levels and hierarchy, as we shall soon see.
Another possible relationship between ecology and the New Sciences is
introduced by Worster (1993). Worster explains that the continued growth of
Gleasonian-type ecological views in science—which talk o f individualism and chaos in
ecological settings—mirrors the accent on chaos that the New Sciences supposedly
epitomise and that both o f these disciplines together (i.e. Gleasonian ecology and
Chaos theory) mirror the prevalence o f individualistic and chaotic situations in
modem day liberal industrial society. “It is hard to exaggerate...” says Worster
(1993:178):
...how far industrialism has gone in breaking down all the old notions of stability,
community and order. Our entire world-view has been transformed profoundly by this
force.

Even if one accepts the thesis that general social conditions, and their popular
appreciation, may give rise to cogent worldviews (such as the one of chaos and
individualism that Worster speaks) it is very difficult to accept Worster’s périodisation
of this relationship that he draws between Gleasonian ecology, Chaos theory and
modem day industrialism. If modem industrialism and liberalism have in some way
imposed a worldview upon people by their manufacture of social chaos and
individualism, then why did not Gleasonian-type individualistic/chaotic ecological
ideas and the metaphysics of Chaos theory emerge at the beginning of the nineteenth
century rather than in the mid/late Twentieth Century as was the case?
As has been outlined above, the link between Chaos theory and Gleasonianism
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(as explicated by Worster, 1993) is hardly justified since Chaos theory and
Gleasonianism give rise to conflicting interpretations o f the reality o f ecological
situations- Chaos theory says that although things might appear to be chaotic, this is
but a prelude to observable orders such as climax communities and stable ecosystems,
whereas Gleasonianism would indicate that ecological settings are in a state of chaos
without any hope o f order emerging. Having said this, however, there maybe a link
between chaos theory and the appreciation o f chaos in modem liberal societies and
this link is explored in the next section.

CHAOS. SELF-ORGANISATION AND CAPITALISM

‘Chaos frees the universe!7. This is the claim o f the those who champion the New
Sciences67. The chaos in Chaos theory supposedly frees the constituents of the
universe from being trapped in the prison of Newtonian determinism:
In classical Newtonian mechanics, once the initial conditions and the force laws are
given, everything is calculable for ever before and after. The system is governed
completely by the laws of mechanics and of conservation of energy. It is totally
determined. It has no freedom. (Birch, 1991:ix)

Now, however, we are said to be entering a new paradigm that says:
the cosmos is a self-organising and quasi-sacred process that is developing greater
complexity and greater freedom. (Zimmerman, 1994:14).

Under the metaphysical framework o f the New Sciences we now live in a
universe that has the potential to evolve. The traditional scientific outlook which
holds that the universe is a pre-designed clockwork mechanism slowly grinding
towards thermodynamic decay is an outlook that is said to be, itself, grinding towards
decay in modem day culture. Instead, we have an organic model of the universe; a
universe that evolves towards greater complexity and a universe whose constituents
are not predetermined in their behaviour.
According to many New Scientists this new, emerging paradigm~of evolution
instead o f decay and indeterminacy instead o f determimsm—is an answer to the

67‘Chaos Frees the Universe! ’ was the title of an article in N ew

S c ie n tist

by Paul Davies. See Davies (1990).
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age-old problem o f reconciling order and freedom since the various constituents of
the universe are free from predetermined actions o f a central designer but the actions
they do undertake nevertheless contribute to an overall order. In this scheme of
things:
[t]he two forces that we have always placed in opposition to one another-freedom and
order—turn out to be partners generating viable, well-ordered, autonomous systems.
(Wheatley, 1992:13).

If we are to treat the ‘order from chaos5 idea with the respect that many New
Scientists think it deserves then we must remember that the order from chaos idea is
not just a phenomena o f physics or o f biology but is a phenomena associated with all
sorts o f things. Capra (1982:310) for instance believes that the science o f ‘order from
chaos5:
makes it possible to begin to understand biological, social, cultural and cosmic
evolution in terms of the same pattern of systems dynamics, even though the different
kinds of evolution involve different mechanisms.

In Ayres5Information, Energy and Progress (1994), in Davies5 The Cosmic
Blueprint (1987), in Merry’s Coping With Uncertainty (1995), in Capra’s The Web o f
Life (1996), in Mainzer’s Thinking In Complexity (1994) and in a host of other
books, this universal process of order from chaos is laid out chapter by chapter in the
different disciplines and subjects of study that Capra mentions in the above quote. For
instance after explaining how the universe emerged as order from chaos, and after
explaining how the planet Earth and its geological and biological components ordered
themselves from chaos, Ayres (1994) goes on to devote consecutive chapters
explaining how order from chaos gave rise to advanced life, ecological systems, social
systems, and economic systems. A similar pattern unfolds in the other books listed
above as well as many other books and articles68.
Now, the attempt by Chaoticians to free the universe may not be novel. Nor are
their self-declared aims to reconcile order, chaos and freedom. In the Eighteenth

68A short list of such books and articles might include: Gleick (1987), Peat (1987), Dyke (1988), Bnggs and Peat
(1991), Yates (1989), Krohn e t a l (1990), Küppers (1990), Roth and Schwegler (1990),
Krippner (1991). Scott (1991). Davies (1993), Goener (1993), Waldrop (1993), Abraham (1994), Cash (
X
Probst (1994), Cohen and Stewert (1994), Russell (1994), Babich e t a l (1995), Kauffman ( 19 9 5 ), Mmgers(1995),
Volk (1995), Hall (1997), Bossomaier and Green (1998). The length of this short list gives an indication o e
extensive and intensive investigation and promotion of the New Sciences in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Century Samuel Clarke, David Hume, Christian August Crusius, Leonard Euler, Colin
Maclaurin and others attempted the same thing. According to the historian of science,
Otto Mayr (1986) they sometimes found their inspiration in the machines o f the age.
It is too much for Mayr to think that the development of this liberal metaphysic (that
tried to merge order and freedom) and the development o f the steam engine happened
at the same time without any connection. Because o f this Mayr (1986) embarks on the
following story that explains how they might be connected.
As part of the political necessity to legitimise and promote the ideas of liberalism
what liberals really liked, so says Mayr, were metaphors derived from situations in
which there was no obvious authoritative or autocratic control o f individual entities
(and their activities) yet the situation as a whole did not actually slide into chaotic
disorder. How could these values, order and freedom, be reconciled? The metaphors
o f the old age would not do, says Mayr. Clocks, which indicated an autocratic
watchmaker and an intervening winder, were only ever used in political and
philosophical writings as metaphors o f authority and autocracy.
For those who needed new metaphors nature provided many examples but so did
some artefacts. For those with philosophical interest in Europe’s burgeoning
technology there was also often a parallel interest in the philosophy of the new politics
and the philosophy of the new economics that we today know as liberalism. Mayr
notes that these philosophical investigations into various subjects often reinvigorated
one another. In the example of interest to us, we see that whereas the clock was a
metaphor for authoritarianism, certain other machines capable o f regulating
themselves without intervention were used as metaphors tor liberalism.
Mayr cites some examples o f the metaphorical use of the clock and of
self-regulating machines to support his argument and then goes on to boldly claim that
the importance o f the prominent metaphor is manifestly observable when considering
the earlier rise o f both self-regulating machines and liberalism in the British Isles
compared to the rest o f the Europe. In this regard, Mayr charts the development ot a
Liberal metaphysics o f freedom and order in late Eighteenth Century England with the
parallel development o f self-correcting machines and their philosophical evaluation:
The notion of the se lf-re g u la tin g s y ste m , applicable to the most diverse fields,
splendidly matched the needs of the liberal concept of order and was well on its way
to broad popular acceptance in Britain by the mid-Eighteenth Century.
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(Mayr,1986:139).

The most well established and well-known self-regulating machine of the time
was, o f course, the steam engine. Here was a device that could adjust to internal and
external variations and make appropriate corrections without the need of intervention.
At this time the Steam Engine was hardly put forward by Watt or any other of its
inventors as a masterly example o f self-regulation and the inherent compatibility of
order and freedom. But tor those with a metaphysical bent it was a tangible example
o f the operation of self-regulation.
Mayr goes on to describe Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’ as the apex o f the
philosophical tussles about order and freedom. This he makes out, can thereby be
regarded as the concrétisation o f the Liberal metaphysic. He states.
The grand conclusion of the interdependent, almost symbiotic evolution of the
concepts of self-regulation and the liberal system of economics was reached in Adam
Smith’s classic book "The Wealth of Nations’. (Mayr, 1986:172)

In this book Adam Smith believed he:
explained how the self-balancing mechanism of the tree-market regulated the economy
better than the most benevolent, omniscient central authority. (Mayr, 1986:165).

For Mayr, Smith’s Invisible Hand “is nothing other than the quality of
self-regulation” (Mayr, 1986:175). Mayr believes that Adam Smith’s analysis of
feedback in the economy is presented:
in language so clear and is conceptualised so generally that it can be translated into
the notation of

modem systems theory without the need tor any additional

modification. (Mayr, 1986:176).

Just as in ecological theory where self-regulation has been a concept that enables
the manufacture o f theories and metaphysics of nature in unity, so too does
self-regulation in economics give rise to notions of unity:
it was the notion of the Invisible Hand that enabled Smith to develop the first
comprehensive theory of the economy as an interrelated system. (Vaughn, 1987.168).

It is not only Mayr that delights in the contemporaneous development of
self-regulating machines and the rise of liberalist economics. Advocates of the New
Sciences have also been known to endorse the relationship too. Krohn (1990) and
Mainzer (1994) for example state:
The specific regulating mechanism of the feedback that Smith had propounded may be
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found in the new power machines that had a great impact on further development...The
temporal simultaneity in articulating the idea of self-organisation in nature, economy
and technology is astounding. (Krohn, 1990:2).

From a qualitative point of view, Adam Smith’s model of a free market can already be
explained by self organisation. (Mainzer, 1994:11).

Now, whether Adam Smith is in anyway a progenitor of Self-organisation
theory—as Mayr, Krohn or Mainzer might suggest—is not really as important for us as
the Twentieth Century renderings of his theories as being compatible to the
self-organisation ideas contained within the modem day New Sciences.
The economic equilibrium of the Invisible Hand has passed through various
theories and ideas since Smith. It is, however, still a central concept in much applied
economic analysis. Often historians of science have linked this concept to the
appropriation and misappropriation of physical science theories and Newtonian-linked
metaphors (for example see McClosky, 1985; Mirowski, 1988; Mirowski, 1989). The
merit of these approaches by McClosky and Mirowski is not questioned but in the
final years Twentieth Century liberalist/capitalist economics may be more likely to find
metaphysical/scientific support from systems theory and systems biology than it is
from Newtonian-type physics.

THE ECOSYSTEM AND THE ECONOMY: ARE THEY BIRDS OF A
FEATHER?

Adam Smith’s metaphysical musings about political economics were not merely
specific intellectual tools for use in economic analysis. His notion ot self-regulating
order emerging from unconscious and chaotic actions was a lull blown metaphysical
outlook. Adam Smith, like Edward Goldsmith, Paul Davies and Fritjot Capra today,
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applied his metaphysic broadly; to economics, demographics, social theory, justice
theory and the social differentiation o f labour69.
Like Smith in the Eighteenth Century, those who have tried to reconcile order
and chaos in the late Twentieth Century espouse them as near universal metaphysical
constants. As well as being applicable to societies, machines, the cosmos et cetera, the
universal principle o f order from chaos is also held by systems-linked metaphysicians
to be observable in that bastion of ecological and environmental existence; the
ecosystem. According to those who champion the chaos from order idea the
ecosystem is yet another example of a self-regulating order that emerges out of
jumbled chaos. Davies (1987), Capra (1996) and Birch (1990) for instance adhere to
this view.
Some metaphysicists of the New Science bent, however, give the ‘economy as
ecosystem7 analogy an extra twist. It is not that just any old economy is analogous to
just any old ecosystem, it is that frilly matured and self-regulating ecosystems show
the same properties o f organisation, process and complexification as capitalist
free-market economies. For instance in his book about the ‘New Evolutionary
Paradigm7 o f self regulation and complexity, Robert Ayres (1994:134) says:
There can be no question that the operation of a money-based, free competitive market
generates a kind of coherence, or long range order, somewhat analogous to so called
co-operative phenomena.

Ayres goes on to conclude that the modernist foe of capitalism is not of this type
o f self-regulating complexity since socialism requires administration by intervention
and planning by an overlooking orderer. Mainzer, another New Scientist, also reflects
this attitude when he firstly celebrates the Free Market of Smithian economics as an
example o f self-regulation only to go on to announce that planned economies do not
possess the natural regulatory benefits of market economies:
Smith underlined that the good or bad intentions oi individuals are not essential. In
contrast to a centralised economical system, the equilibrium of supply and demand is
not directed by a program-controlled central processor, but is the effect of an invisible
hand, i.e. nothing but the non-linear interactions of consumers and producers.
(Mainzer, 1994:11).

69See Barry (1982),and Muller (1993).
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The reversible metaphor between the ecosystem and free-market economies is
brought into new emphasis by Michael Rothschild in his book entitled Bionomics: the
Inevitability o f Capitalism. Rothschild believes he shows that all of life is:
a self-organising phenomenon. From the interplay of hormones in the body to the
expansions and contractions of the great Arctic caribou herds, nature’s intricately
linked feedback loops automatically maintain a delicate, robust balance. Markets
perform the same function in the economy. Without central planning, buyers and
sellers constantly adjust to changing prices for commodities, capital and labour.
A flexible economic order emerges spontaneously from the chaos of the free market
(Rothschild, 1990:xiv).

Believing that “[a] capitalist economy can best be comprehended as a living
ecosystem” (1990:xi) Rothschild then goes on to declare that because ecosystems do
not need to be planned to function well, and because economies are like ecosystems if
allowed to run free, then planning in economies will only ever lead to trouble:
Capitalism was not planned. Like life on Earth it did not need to be. Capitalism
just happened, and it will keep on happening. Quite spontaneously. Capitalism
flourishes whenever it is not suppressed, because it is a naturally occurring
phenomenon. It is the way human society organises itself for survival in a world of
limited resources. (Rothschild 1990:xi)70.

Rothschild’s book is an exercise in the naturalisation of capitalism, and he admits
as much, stating that he regards capitalism “as an inevitable, natural state ot human
economic affairs. Being for or against a natural phenomenon is a waste of time and
mental energy” (Rothschild, 1990:xv).
What we see from looking at Rothschild’s work is that he first assumes an
economics based on biology, (something which is largely done for him by numerous
predecessors) then he applies this economics back to biology (by using
‘bionomics’--‘the study o f the economic relations ot organisms and their environment
1990:xiv) and then he brings this bionomics back to the social realm and sees in it
economics again. This is a prime example of a reprojective spiral metaphor that has
consistently accompanied nature/culture analogies, both within and without the unity

70Incidentally Rothschild obligingly outlines those things that upset the natural balance of the natural economy {a
la Lovelock’s identification of those things that upset the natural balance of Gaia). These are nationalisation of
industries, income taxes, profit taxes, looking after the unemployed, and helping bankrupts. An obvious alignment
between Rothschild economic thinking and rationalist economics appears to be present
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o f nature idea71. It shows in Rothschild’s case, also, that there is no original grounded
base from whence the original metaphor flowed.
Now, ecological/environmental advocates of the New Sciences would probably
like to disown anything that Rothschild might have to say but he is only deriving his
metaphysics from the same place as they are; i.e. the Liberal metaphysics of order and
freedom as interpreted by the self-organisation ideas of the New Sciences and mixed
with popular ecological concepts. Although ecologically minded New Science
advocates like Charles Birch, Arran Gare and Fritjof Capra often rely on the New
Sciences to bolster the scientific credibility of their political aims and environmental
evaluations, they would be aghast to learn of the links that New Science has with
modem industrial capitalism.
The links, both present and potential, might be further exposed if we note that it
seems as though one o f New Science’s loudest spokespersons tacitly shares
Rothschild’s commitment to the metaphysics o f capitalism. Paul Davies (1992) wrote
in an article for 21st Century magazine that the model of the worlds economy as a
ship captained by a steersmen should be dropped for a model of the economy as a
self-organising ecosystem. This is also something Davies was prepared to declare as a
fellow o f the World Economic Forum (see Davies, 1998).
More explicit about the connection between the New Sciences and -neo-classical
economic ideas is the complexity theorist Klaus Mainzer who states that: “From a
qualitative point of view, Adam Smith’s model of a free market can already be
explained by self-organisation”.
In contrast to Paul Davies and Klaus Mainzer, who might be regarded as closet
metaphysical capitalists that passively use the ideas of New Sciences to promote a
worldview amicable to their economic commitments, there are some committed
metaphysical capitalists who actively tie the ideas o f the New Sciences to the
operation o f Free Market economies. Rothschild does this implicitly but we may also
note in this regard how More (1991) enlists theories o f self-generating order that
come from the New Science to ‘prove’ the symbiosis of order and chaos in capitalism.
In presenting order and chaos as symbiotic, in the way that More and many

71For explorations of reprojective spiral narratives external to the unity of nature idea see Young (1974), Schweber
(1980), Young (1985), Mirowski (1989), Porter (1990), Cohen (1994), Limoges and Menard (1994)
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others do, precise definitions o f order and chaos have to be arranged. For More this
means that order equates to economic equilibrium and progress, and chaos equates to
individualistic actions that are not interfered with from above
Advocates of New Science and holistic philosophy may be quite willing to press
ahead in their elaboration o f a new paradigm even if they did know that the new
emerging paradigm was being usurped by various natural philosophers with Free
Market sympathies since it is still a metaphysic which is, in other ways, beneficial for
the world. However there are some thinkers who operate entirely within the
professional circles o f capitalist economics who themselves have cottoned on to the
rhetorical appeal of self-organisation.
For instance, a captain o f industry that shares Davies’ view about the equivalency
o f ecosystems and economies is Tachi Kiuchi, managing director o f the Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation in the United States. Kiuchi believes that to really get going and
gain maximum efficiency players in the economy have to learn from (self-regulating)
ecosystems; adjusting and adapting, as the components of ecosystems have, to
feedback processes, niche competition, and new environmental conditions (Neville,
1998
More theoretical than Kiuchi are the economists Parker and Stacey (1995) who
refer to the connection between the New Sciences and liberal capitalism by indicating
that Chaos theory shows us that economies are best able to adapt and seli-organise
(and thus provide for the needs o f the economy’s members) when they are unplanned
and unregulated:
Chaos theory adds an important dimension to the study of economics. It helps explain
why...an economic system is required which encourages adaptability...and...
enterprise. Competitive markets have an important role to play in this process.
Unlike planned systems, they provide for spontaneous adaptation. (Parker and
Stacey, 1995: 76).

A very well-known celebrant of capitalist economics from within the profession
of academic economics also shares similar views is Frederick Hayek. Hayek is one ol
the foremost champions for Twentieth Century capitalism that there has ever been.
Hayek always embraced the order from chaos metaphysic ot liberalism and often set
about to detail some o f its workings (see, for example, Hayek, 1967). Spontaneous
orders, as he called them, are the results ot the actions of individual entities but not ot
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conscious planning by these entities. Humans act, so thought Hayek, individually and
rationally upon de-centralised information flows, most notably price levels, to
contribute to a spontaneous economic order.
It Hayek saw the emergence ot order from chaos as a pretty-well universal
phenomenon in nature and society then might there not be a link between this
viewpoint o f his and his celebration o f capitalism. As we shall soon see, according to
one o f his intellectual historians, Robert Kley, there very possibly is such a link (Kley,
1992). We can then develop Kley’s ideas to show how Hayek’s work is clearly, at the
metaphysical level, intellectually attached to the New Sciences and Self-organisation
theory.
Where Adam Smith saw order from chaos in economics and social theory, where
Von Neumann saw it in machines and cell biology, where Davies today sees it in
ecosystems and solar systems, Hayek also saw spontaneous order in a myriad of
places; from crystals to organisms to animal societies and galaxies. His favourite place
to observe the machinations o f self-ordering complexity, however, was, of course, the
Free Market: “[s] spontaneous social orders are ‘the result of human actions but not of
human design’, the unintended consequence o f the independent decisions and actions
o f many individuals.” (Hayek in Kley, 1994:102)72
Although he used his own language and terminology when explicating the
formation o f spontaneous orders Hayek did see that the processes he had identified
were compatible to that found by the cyberneticians in their developing
self-organisation ideas. As Kley indicates, for Hayek, models of order from chaos in
economic situations could be explained in terms of information flow, feedback
mechanisms and self-generation. Writing in the 1970s—a time that is often interpreted
as the historical cusp between the systems theory of cybernetics and the complex
systems theory of the New Sciences—Hayek became interested in complexity and
organisation. He wrote “with spontaneous orders...[tjheir unplanned emergence must
arouse some curiosity and warrants the establishment ot a distinct body ot theory” (in
Kley, 1994:38). This distinct body o f theory would no doubt be claimed as being the

72As Kley (1992) explains, although Frederick Hayek saw spontaneous orders in all sorts of places, his favourite
subject of examination was the economy. Order from chaos in this realm meant the economic equilibrium and
economic progress emerged from the actions of chaotic individuals as they played and acted in the Market Place,
haphazardly buying and selling to push and pull supply and demand.
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preserve and pursuit o f the New Sciences by its scholars. Where Hayek in the 1970s
looked forward to a “theory o f complex phenomena”. Davies announced in the 1980s
that:
There exists something like a law of complexity. But the study of complexity is still
very much in its infancy. The hope is that by studying complex systems in many
different disciplines, new universal principles will be discovered that might cast
light on the way that complexity grows with time.(Davies 1987:21).

Thus it is easy to conclude that Hayek would have approved of the emerging
disciplines o f self-organisation theory and complexity theory that New Scientists have
become so intensely fond of.
Following Kley’s (1994) work on Hayek it is also possible to see the parallel
between Hayek7s excitement in his discovery o f complexity with the current
excitement exhibited by New Scientists over their discovery of the same phenomena.
Hayek wanted to supersede the simple causal physics/metaphysics of Newtonianism
with a more complex science. Something that Davies, and Capra also talk about a lot.
Kley summarises these ideas of Hayek by saying:
To bring out the features of complex phenomena Hayek contrasts them with ‘simple
phenomena’. The number of elements constituting the order of simple phenomenon is
small. The orderly structure of its elements is the effect of a few one-way causal
relations, and these relations are captured by the basic laws of physics. Finally, its
environment does not influence the formation of a simple order. A complex order on
the other hand, consists of a large number of elements and is the result of manifold
exchange processes among the elements and between them and their surroundings.
(Kley, 1994:41).

Without knowing it Hayek, in expressing the above ideas, could have been
setting up the program o f research that has become Complexity theory.
One well-known modern-day ecologist (who would call himself not a systems
ecologist after systems theory, but a complex ecologist, after Complexity theory) sees
in his own field of work how appropriate Hayek7s ideas are. Donald deAngelis states
that it is reasonable to think of a complex ecosystem in the same way that Hayek
thinks o f the market. Just as the market exists as a spontaneous order from the chaotic
actions o f individuals, so the ecosystem exists as the self-ordered product of the
species and populations within it. DeAngelis (1995:463) makes clear that he is not the
only ‘complex ecologist7 to proffer such views:
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rhis view of the ecosystem as arising from the selfish interactions of species
populations has been emphasised by some ecosystem theorists (tor example O’Neill
and Reichle).

It may be thought by new paradigmers like Fritjof Capra and Edward Goldsmith
that there is at least one striking difference between what Hayek says about
spontaneous order and what they, themselves, say about it. Hayek as a capitalist must
have surely required competition and struggle to be a prime factor in the ordering of
chaos. Environmentally conscious philosophers and metaphysicists often see their
worldviews as having no central place for competition and struggle. But, according to
Kley (1992:82), Frederick Hayek repeatedly and emphatically denied that
spontaneous order depended on competition. In fact Hayek emphasised the idea that
individuals freely co-operated when forming associations and transacting in the
market place.
Although Hayek’s philosophical affinity to the metaphysics of the New Sciences
might be considered scary enough for those contemplating the social and ecological
relevance o f the New Sciences, there are some even more disturbing developments for
the likes o f Capra, Gare, Birch, Fabel and Ferre. In an interesting use of the
self-organisation concept and the ecosystems thought of systems ecology, two
environmental economists, Maley (1994) and DiZerega (1993), have separately
claimed that the science o f ecosystems justifies not protecting ecosystems. Both these
writers believe that as the ecosystem is a prime example of a self-regulating order, the
best thing we could do to save ecosystems is to run our economies like them. Thus,
Maley goes on to suggest, environmental protection must be left to the workings of
the market, the only economic system that obeys the self-ordering processes of
ecosystems, and ecosystems will actually be protected. Interfere in the machinery of
the Market by implementing artificial regulatory regimes such as public reserves,
environmental regulation and eco-taxes and the economy will collapse from being
self-ordering and the ecosystems will not survive:
It is the preoccupation with achieving ends quickly, by fiat rather than
adaptive process, which characterises political thinking and command and
control makeshift. (Maley, 1994:92).

From this perspective, the ecosystem is held to act in accordance with its own
processes only when the social derivation of those processes—that is unfettered
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capitalism~is allowed to act. While environmentalists such as Capra, Birch,
Goldsmith and Gare, might regard unfettered capitalism as a major factor in the
destruction o f ecosystems73, they unwittingly contribute to a metaphysics that
suggests that environmentalism should be based on not directly protecting
ecosystems.

ARE SELF-REGULATING ECONOMIES AS FREE AS THEY ARE MADE
OUT TO BE?

Having been inspired by the complex systems theory and its relevance to global
order Artigiani (1991:159) writes:
Only highly autonomous individuals, empowered to monitor and regulate their own
experience, can collect and communicate the information necessary to preserve social
structure in technologically advanced environments.

If we are convinced, as is Artigiani, that the New Sciences are compatible with
liberal capitalism and if we know that order emerges from chaos and that chaos gives
rise to order, then all we need to do to gain order in the economy is to allow chaos to
reign. Remember that for Hayekian influenced New Scientists such as More, Ayres,
Rothschild, Mainzer, Maley and DiZerega, ‘order7 is defined as economic
equilibrium/progress and ‘chaos7 as the uninterrupted actions of unregulated
individuals. Therefore to achieve order we must allow chaos. Even though one might
disagree with the proposition that such order emerges out of such chaos it might
reasonably be assumed that actually allowing for this type of chaos would be a pretty
easy thing to do; you just let people do what they want to do. However, for the
person that has continuously inspired the thinking of the above named metaphysical
capitalists, Frederick Hayek, it was never that easy:
Spontaneous order, he [Hayekj claims arises out of the general observance of certain
behavioural rules and the individual adjustment to local circumstances. As he puts it
elsewhere: ‘the formation of spontaneous orders is the result ot their elements

73For instance see Devall and Sessions (1985), McLaughlin (1990) Gowdy (1994a), Loy (1997) and the references
contained therein.
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following certain rales in their responses to their immediate environment'...The
individual responses to particular circumstances will result in an over-all order only
if the individuals obey such rales as will produce an order. ’ Even a very limited
similarity in their behaviour may be sufficient if the rules which they obey are
sufficient to produce an order. (Kiev. 1994:28).

So here it seems we are only promised order if the chaos that gives rise to it is
somehow law-abiding. The promised freedom that Chaos theory supposedly delivers
seems to be ejected, at least in the realm of the economic. Individual agents of chaos
in the economy are not free non-determined agents whose actions give rise to order,
as is presented by More, Ayres, Parker, Stacey, Artigiam and Rothschild, they are rule
obeying units whose predilection to order submits them to rule observance.
This ambiguity does not just plague the application of the ideas o f the New
Sciences to economics but also its application to other social realms. For instance
Wheatley has tried to impress upon her readers the relevance of the New Sciences and
the order from chaos idea in the area o f organisation and management. The
management or organisational system, she says,
has infinite possibilities, wandering wherever it pleases, sampling new
configurations of itself. But its wandering and experimentation respect a
boundary. (Wheatley, 1992:123)

Wheatley, elsewhere, also says:
If we allow autonomy at the local level, letting individuals or units be directed in
their decision by guideposts for organisational self-reference, we can achieve
coherence and continuity. (Wheatley, 1992:95).

‘Guideposts’, ‘boundaries’; these are hardly the terms reminiscent of the freedom
that Davies, Ayres, Rothschild and others have spoken about with regards to order
from chaos. They may be softer words than the ‘control’ used in Bertallanfy, Wiener
and Lovelock’s systems theory, but they amount to the same thing. Indeed; ‘boundary
observance’ and ‘guideposted decision-making’ are the rhetorical manifestation of a
theory that attempts to align itself with freedom by merely softening words like
‘control’ and ‘rules’. This is patently the case if we examine the arbitrariness of the
terms guidepost and boundary in Wheatley’s case.
The guideposts and boundaries o f Wheatley are not those democratically arrived
at via worker votes but are those ascribed by the profit endeavours o f the organisation
to which the ‘supposedly’ autonomous agents belong. No revolutionary progress in
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organisation studies has been made by inserting the New Sciences into management
theory simply because the ‘boundaries’ and ‘guideposts’-once ‘orders’ and
‘task-settings’—still come from the organisation’s hierarchically privileged members.
If Lyotard was to assess the situation as described by Wheatley he would have
something like this to say:
The decisions do not have to respect the individual’s aspirations: the aspirations
have to aspire to the decisions, or at least to their effects. Administrative procedures
should make individuals ‘want’ what the system needs in order to perform well.
(Lyotard, 1984:62).

We might also note that in Hayek’s case, the rule-observance that individuals
must obey to find overall economic order are not matters of irrefutable fact accepted
by each and every member o f an economy but arbitrary rules that emerge out of
power invested members in that economy74. That the rules of the economy seem to be
somehow skewed to the advantage of those making them exposes the arbitrary nature
o f the rules. The chaotic individualism that is claimed to exist in economies is thus
exposed as a confidence trick. Each and every player in the economy or in the
organisation must play within the rules and adapt themselves to it if they are to
succeed/survive. They are hardly operating in some independent manner as Wheatley
and Artigiani describe.
Thus an important issue never confronted when examining ‘order from chaos’ in
social and economic settings is that of the nature of the boundaries and guideposts.
There is the possibility that they are just as enslaving and imprisoning as the of state
control whose necessity Wheatley and Hayek think they have demolished.
Having argued that this is the case when the New Sciences find their way into the
social realm, we will now see that similar consequences emerge when they are applied
in the non-human world. When Davies speaks of freedom in the post-Newtonian
world it is a freedom that respects boundaries. When Capra talks about the
indeterminism o f ecosystems it is an indeterminism that is guided by rules. And when
populations of organisms are freed from the bonds of mechanist, thinking as Birch

74For instance one of Hayek’s rules is that there should be a culture of economic freedom and that the state should
enforce such a culture. Political sociologists have, for years, been at pains to expose this as an ideological
component within Hayek’s thought since it suggests all should submit to the liberal capitalist agenda in their daily
social and economic lives. See, for example, Bottomore (1985).
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would like us to think, they only achieve that freedom within certain limits. One of
those boundaries, and a persistent theme in unitarianism of any sort, is the boundary
of hierarchy.

THE RELIANCE UPON HIERARCHY WITHIN SELF-REGULATING
SYSTEMS

David Abram declares that:
if...we assume that matter is animate (or 'self-organising’) from the get-go, then
hierarchies vanish, and we are left with a diversely differentiated field of animate
beings, each of which has its own gifts relative to others (Abram, 1997:10)

But is this so? Another idea that is apparent in the New Sciences and especially
that of the science of self-organisation is hierarchy. In every type o f self-organising
system the system is said to work by use of hierarchical structuring:
The tendency of living systems to form multileveled structures whose levels differ
in their complexity is all pervasive throughout nature and has to be seen as a basic
principle of self-organisation. (Capra, 1982:303).

A key criterion of this type of systems thinking, according to Capra:
is the ability to shift one’s attention back and forth between systems levels.
Throughout the living world, we find systems nesting within other systems, and by
applying the same concepts to different systems levels-e.g. the concept of stress
to an organism, city, or an economy—we often gain important insights. (Capra,
1996:36).

O f course, Capra, and all other New Scientists for that matter, include a whole
host of entities under the title of living systems: cells, orgamsmal bodies, ecosystems,
Gaia, nations, societies. About the universality of hierarchy, Rollo (1995.8) says.
The widespread existence of hierarchies is not trivial but probably represents a
necessary conformation for organisations of great complexity.

Hierarchies, according to systems thinkers, allow quick processing of
information, rapid decisions to be made and ensure the efficiency of the system as a
whole (see, for instance, Wiener, 1961; Bertalanffy, 1968; Laszlo, 1972). These
thoughts stray happily into complex systems theory as can be seen in the writings of
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self-organisationists (see, for instance, Ayres, 1994, Merry, 1995, Capra, 1996).
When detailing the relationship between hierarchy and self-organisation Ayres
graphically draws some models ot particular socio-political structures. He contrasts
simple hierarchical structures like kingdoms, armies and the communist party, with the
feedback hierarchy o f the United States tripartite governmental system. The U.S.
hierarchical political system is thought of, by Ayres, as a self-organising feedback
dependent hierarchy, much the same as a self-organising cell or ecosystem. For Ayres,
the ballot box is the crucial feedback process that serves as the link between different
hierarchical levels (Ayres, 1994:208). Joseph, an advocate of Gaianism, does this too
when he happily compares Gaian feedback with:
One of the greatest and most complex negative feedback systems operating in the
world today is the American system of checks and balances, as set up in the U.S
constitution. (Joseph, 1990:114)

Under the blanket o f Joseph’s and Ayres’ thinking the Communist Party is not a
self-organising system. It is, rather, an imposed static structure without feedback. The
fact that communist member leaders are voted for and the judicial section of the
American tri-partite system is not, does not stop Joseph and Ayres from advancing
their metaphysical legitimisation o f American politics.
Herein lies a telling point about the application of seli-regulation in social realms.
Whether or not the analogies are at all accurate, self-organisation is used as
justification of the rightness of both Western societies (in particular Western
capitalism and Western democracy)and the rightness o f hierarchy within these
societies. A more bourgeois, conservative and ethnocentric natural philosophy would
be hard to find. Not only is Western democracy and Western capitalism sanctioned by
natural laws but so is hierarchy which is a natural necessity for the efficient running of
complex systems like the state75.

FRACTALS. BLOBS AND BOUNDARIES

75This bears analogy with the findings of social historians of science like Young (1985) and Schweber (1980) who
see similar interplays between Darwinsim, Social Darwinism and social theory in the nineteenth century.

140

There is within Chaos theory a discipline known as ‘fractal geometry’76. Fractal
geometry is o f interest to us in its relation to reductionism and hierarchical
organisation. This in itself would be considered a bit odd by New Scientists since
fractal geometry is o f interest to them due to its supposed holistic, chaotic and
complex character.
Fractal geometry had its heyday with the widely circulated Mandelbrot blobs that
were seen adorning all manner o f professional and popular texts77. These blobs are
characterised as being self-organising, complex and chaotic. Their relationship to the
unity o f nature has so impressed Fritjof Capra that he placed an example of one on the
cover o f his book The Web o f Life as though it were a magical graphic whose
mathematics underpinned the unity of all nature.
What impresses New Scientists so much is the way Mandelbrot blobs exhibit
what is named ‘self-similarity’:
The most striking property of these ‘fractal’ shapes is that their characteristic
patterns are found repeatedly as descending scales, so that their parts, at any scale
are similar to the whole. (Capra, 1996:125).

Numerous examples o f this self-similarity are given by those who are impressed
by it. For instance, as Zimmerman and Capra explain:
there is a universal pattern in the relation between large and small-scale features.
The best known example of this relation is that of coastlines, which repeat the same
ragged features at every scale of measurement. (Zimmerman, 1994:348).

Mandelbrot illustrates the property of ‘self-similarity’ by breaking a piece out of
a cauliflower. He repeats this demonstration by dividing the part further, taking
out another piece, which again looks like a very small cauliflower. Thus every part
looks like the whole vegetable. The shape of the whole is similar to itself at all
levels of scale. (Capra, 1996:137).

Capra carries on in this vein to declare:
There are many other examples of self-similarity in nature. Rocks on mountains

76See Mandelbrot (1982), Gleick (1987), Lauwerier (1991) and Capra (19%) as examples of those elucidating and
promoting the virtues of Fractal geometry.
^Including the pages of the publications cited immediately above as well as: Davies (1987), Gleick (1987), Parker
and Stacey (1995), Briggs and Peat (1991), Yates (1989), Kauffinan (1993), Scott (1991), Wheatley (1992)>
Davies (1993), Goener (1993), Waldrop (1993), Abraham (1994), Cohen and Stewert (1994), Kauffinan (1995),
Hall (1997), Prigogine (1997), Bossomaier and Green (1998).
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look like small mountains, branches of lightning, or borders of clouds, repeat the same
pattern again and again; coastlines divide into smaller and smaller portions, each
showing similar arrangements of beaches and headlands. Photographs of a river
delta, the ramifications of a tree, or the repeated branchings of blood vessels may
show patterns of such striking similarity that we are unable to tell which is which.
(Capra, 1996:137).

This self-similarity is also taken to be evident in biological organisation; cells;
organisms; ecosystems et cetera, exhibit the same patterns at different scales. Each
level is a repetition o f the level above it and below it since these levels, too, are
self-organising and self-regulating unities. Thus, for the New Scientists fractal
geometry graphically and mathematically proves the concrete existence of the levels
of biological organisation. Indeed the notion of a hierarchy of levels o f biological
organisation is a manifestation of self-similarity.
Wheatley, in her attempts to have the New Sciences guide the field of
organisational management, speaks fondly of fractals. She indicates that a fractal
organisation is one in which self- “similar behaviours show up at every level in the
organisation because those behaviours were patterned into organising principles from
the very start” (Wheatley, 1992:132). Wheatley attempts to tie fractals in with the
autonomy o f individuals and the order from chaos idea by saying:
Itjhe potent force that shapes behaviour in these fractal organisations, as in all
systems, is the combination of simply expressed expectations of acceptable behaviour
and the freedom available to individuals to assert themselves in non-deterministic
ways. Fractal organisations, though they may have never heard the word fractal,
have learned to trust in natural organising phenomena. (Wheatley, 1992:132).

Again, the important thing, and what is always left undefined by New Science
advocates, is the nature o f the acceptable behaviours and the nature of freedom. If an
individual is free to act within acceptable boundaries there is hardly any recourse for
that individual if he or she believes these boundaries are not sufficiently open to fully
enable his or her freedom.
This argument does not apply just to Wheatley’s organisations but to geometrical
fractals generally. For instance when Capra says:
another important link between Chaos theory and fractal geometry is the shift
from quantity to quality. As we have seen, it is impossible to predict the values
of the variables of a chaotic system at a particular

time, but we can predict the
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qualitative features of the system’s behaviour, way. (Capra, 1996:137).

We see, here, that bounds and boundaries still affect the scope of what is
measured. An organism can thus wander around within its role but it can never leave
it, an ecosystem can fluctuate according to some measured parameter but it can never
become unstable.
Although the emphasis has sometimes been put on the qualitative and visual
nature ot fractals this does nothing to quell claims of reductionism. Instead of
reducing things to genes or physical factors of matter and energy, they are saying
things have a fractal pattern which is their essence. Discovering this fractal pattern
will some how give us a clue to the phenomena. Thus if fractal geometry becomes a
programme o f science it is a programme grounded in reductionism since all
phenomena are reduced to the essences contained within their fractal blobs.

SELF-ORGANISATION AND GOD

As well as being supportive evidence for the naturalness and efficiency of the
Free Market and for the existence of levels of biological organisation, a few New
Scientists have held Chaos, Complexity and Self-organisation in the universe to be
manifestations o f God. Davies is one that leads this charge:
that the universe has organised its own self-awareness is for me powerful evidence
that there is something happening behind it all. The impression of design is
overwhelming. Science maybe able to explain all the processes whereby the universe
evolves its own destiny, but that still leaves room for there to be a meaning behind
existence. (Davies, 1987:203).

Both Davies (1983) and Capra (1982) paraphrase Reich Jantsch (1980) to
summarise this state o f affairs: ‘God is not the creator, but the mind ot the universe.’
What is more, God is now, once more, fond of humans since we humans “have
been written into the laws of nature in a deep and, I believe, meaningful way” (Davies,
1993:196). In this view:
the deity is, of course, neither male nor female, nor manifest in any personal form, but
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represents the self-organising dynamics of the entire cosmos. (Capra, 1982).

This situation strongly parallels the situation identified by Robert Young within
Victorian science where God changed from an entity-being that made the harmony in
nature and society that humans observed to a deity identified with self-acting natural
laws. At this time “Science did not replace God. God became identified with the laws
of nature” (Young, 1992). As much has happened in the work o f the New Sciences
when Davies states:
The word God means so many different things to different people that I am loathe to
use it. When 1 do, it is in the sense of the rational ground that underpins physical
reality. Used in this way, God is not a person, but a timeless abstract principle
that implies something like meaning or purpose behind physical existence. (Davies,
1993:21).

For Davies, this abstract principle is ‘self-organisation’. Hence we come to a
conclusion which Davies would, himself, honour: God is self-organisation.
The equation: self-organisation equals God, has in itself' all sorts of connotations
apart from providing evidence for the existence of God. For one thing, it suggests
scientists as the priests o f the universe searching for the ultimate truths just as the
clergy have done in the past. This undoubtedly adds to the authority of scientists
when prescriptions are made for social change towards a supposedly environmental
way o f being.
Another implication that flows from the desire to acknowledge the Godliness of
self-organisation is the chance that we stand of deifying all those things that have so
far been said to be operating in a self-organising fashion. Goldsmith and Lovelock
suggest we should actually do this in the case of Gaia but more alarming, perhaps,
people like Rothschild, Ayres and Hayek say we should do this for capitalist Free
Market economies. Free Markets thus become not only essential natural processes—as
promoted by Rothschild and other capitalist New Science advocates—they also
become sacred processes. The Free Market is thus the social and economic
manifestation o f the timeless abstract principle that Davies holds as God. If this is true
then the Free Market is sure to be classed by some as a sacred untouchable divine
entity worthy o f reverence. The Free Market is not only natural and essential and
unchanging, but omniscient, holy and transcendental. If this is so then it is fairly
obvious that the Free Market should be treated with respect and that it should not
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tampered with.78

THE 'SELF’ IN SELF-REGULATION

If we disagree with the New Scientists and the systems theorists and announce
that there is not necessarily any sustained self-regulation in ecosystems which goes
towards maintaining a definite spatio-temporal structure then we might soon arrive at
a more generalised suggestion with regards to self-regulation in ecology; the
ecosystem is not a ‘self (which common agreement would take to mean a united
entity) but merely a non-uniform mixture of separate entities that together are hardly
even maintaining their own collective state o f existence (since this is forever
changing). This is the conclusion of Gleason, and of Gleasonian-type ecology
generally, and such Gleasonian deconstruction of the ecosystem must render the ‘self
in ‘self-regulation o f ecosystems a mere abstraction.
This doubting o f the self-hood of ecosystems does not necessarily mean we have
to doubt the self in the self-regulation of all the other supposedly self-regulating
phenomena o f the universe but it does direct suspicion towards some of them.
Capitalists, for example, cannot rely on the economy running like an ecosystem
because the grounded object from which they draw their analogy is not a coherent
identifiable self undergoing self-regulation but a tossing and turning collection of
disunited plants and creatures.

78Many critics of the Free Market would probably comment here that such deification of the Market has already
permeated culture via the growth of economic rationalism and monetarism and the resurgence in ‘neo-classical
liberal economics. If we acknowledge (in line with Robertson, 1993:220) that Hayek, and his economic philosophy
of self-regulating order emerging from chaos, was “largely ignored by economists and politicians for most of his
career” (which spanned from the 1930s till his death in 1992) but “became extremely influential in the 1970s and
1980s, when his ideas found favour with the Reagan administration in the USA and, above all, with the
Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party” and we also note the contemporaneous rise of self-regulation as a
scientific idea, then we can see just how much monetarism might be the practical result of the metaphysical entity
that is self-regulation. If the deified soul of economic rationalism is exposed to be ‘self-regulation then the
importance of self-regulation as the primary metaphysical commitment of 1980s and 1990s Western culture might
be hinted at. While I like to think that this chapter has opened up the possibility of such an exposition; that
self-regulation is the society-wide cultural myth of the 1990s is a thesis which must remain as a project for a
future work. My purpose in this work is just to expose the mythic potential of self-regulation only within
environmentalism, science and natural philosophy.
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Now suppose we have successiully cracked and fractured the metaphysical
character o f the ecosystem into non-existence, what does this mean for other levels of
biological organisation that have, according to Capra and Davies and many others,
self-organised themselves from lower self-organised levels? It means that we might
still be able to say that cells self-organise into organisms and organisms into
populations. After this, however, we are in trouble, for populations do not
self-organise into ecosystems because ecosystems do not exhibit the unity of a self
that must exist to enable the process of self-organisation. What we find is that the
grand hierarchy of levels o f biological organisation is fractured and disrupted at one
point. Lower levels have seemingly self-organised into higher and higher wholes until,
above the population level, we find that everything is a bit of a mess. Similarly, the
biosphere—which Lovelock, Goldsmith and other globally-attuned thinkers believe is
the highest level of biological organisation—is not a self-organised entity that
self-organised itself from the lower level of agglomerated self-organised ecosystems,
but is an entity that—if self-organised at all—did so without the help of ecosystems.
New Scientists, and Unitarians in general, are often given over to a metaphysical
interpretation whereby what applies to one level o f biological organisation applies to
them all.(this is reinforced now, as has been noted, by the idea of self-similarity). The
ecosystem concept is held to be such a strong link in this process o f self-similarity and
hiérarchisation that it has often served as the referent from which to make new
analogies from79. However if the ecosystem level is destroyed then Unitarians might
wonder about the capacity for other levels to be named ‘selves’ and thereby be
elaborated in terms self-organisation and self-regulation.

79Two examples whereby the ecosystem has become the fundamental example of self-regulation (and the basis of
metaphorical ascription) include the following statements:
“the ecology of galaxies with matter recycling between dying and new bom star system” (Martin-Smith,
1997:30),
“Dr. James Lovelock...can perceive the specifications of a globally interconnected ecological system and the basis of the parameters for these specifications are alive - for the nature which is being studied is
best described as an ecosystem.” (Brown, 1996:Chapt. 1)
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Chaos theory believes it sanctions freedom. Chaoticians and other New Scientists
thus value freedom, you might think. This may be so but just as likely is the idea that
New Scientists know freedom has enormous political and philosophical clout and they
attach themselves to its ideals via some (dubious) association between freedom and
indeterminacy.
Chaos theorists also value order. Without it their beloved science cannot see or
do anything. What they need to do, then, in order to maximise their rhetorical appeal
to various political discourses, is to entangle both freedom and order together.
Liberal Capitalists also value freedom and order. The freedom of the individual
and the order o f the Free Market economy. Order can only exist with such freedom,
and freedom can only exist if there is such order. Again Liberal Capitalists can
maximise their rhetorical appeal by somehow entangling order and freedom together
into one.
What is interesting is that both New Scientists and Liberal Capitalists do this
entangling in a very similar way, and what is more, they both appeal to the same
historical and intellectual parentage when doing it. So much so that the language of
the order from chaos idea represented in 18th Century philosophical ideas is,
according to Mayr (1986), understood by both modem day Liberal Capitalists and
modem day New Scientists. It is also apparent that examples of self-organisation of
order from chaos outlined by New Scientists (for example; Paul Davies) can help
Liberal Capitalists further their cause (to naturalise and deify economic applications of
order from chaos) and the examples o f self-regulation outlined by liberalists (for
example F. A. Hayek) can be utilised by New Scientists to help further their cause (to
arrive at universally true principles of the operation of the cosmos).
This is not just a possibility: it is actually happening and can be observed in the
writings o f people like Ayres, Maley, Mainzer and Rothschild who not only possess
the desire to present universal principles but also have an obvious pro-Liberal
Capitalist agenda.
While this chapter might seem to advocate getting rid of the ecosystem concept
(or, at least, some of the intellectual security it enjoys) because of the ease to which it
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becomes an ideological tool, Chapter Two indicated that we might get rid o f the
ecosystem concept because it fosters bad ecological practice. Both o f these chapters
together, however, suggest also, that the reality of the self-regulating ecosystem
should be doubted. That the New Scientists can postulate self-organisation in ecology
so readily, where Gleasonian ecologists, can only doubt it, is unwittingly explained by
an advocate o f universal self-organisation, Max More:
The abstractness of the S.O.’s [self-organisations] make them particularly difficult for
the untutored mind to recognise. You can’t simply look at an S.O. and spot it.
You need to apply a theory. (More, 1991:22).

Although More is a firm supporter o f the existence of self-organisations in
economics, physics and biology (and especially in the Free Market) he nevertheless
knocks the nail right on the head with his admission of the abstract nature of
self-organisation. In the case of self-organisation theory it may only be a short step
from admitting the abstrcat nature o f self-organisation to admitting that a
self-organisation phenomenon can be conjured up anywhere and in virtually any
situation because the theory in question posits such simple processes and lives within
such vague parameters. First, you take the metaphysics of unity, second, add a
preoccupation with systems, third, add feedback loops, fourth, characterise the
process using a flow diagram and there you have it; a self-organising phenomena.
Thus it is not hard for any theorist to postulate self-organisations all over the place.
As indicated, a way to destroy this line of abstract universalism is to derail the
integrity o f the ‘self in self-organisation. We might note, for instance, that
ecosystems succumb to such a derailment for it can be suggested using a wide variety
of counter-evidence and argument, that they may very well be unregulated and
un-regulating collections of entities that hardly fulfil what it is to be a self. Economies,
too, might succumb to this derailment since they are hardly Unitarian phenomena but
consist o f all sorts of conflicting and varying processes, behaviours, events and
agents.80

.

New Scientists, and environmental writers who support the New Sciences (like

80 As has been suggested throughout the Twentieth Century by many Marxist, Feminist and Anarchist economic
and social theorists whose recent disciples might include: Feenberg (1979), Trainer (1985), Dunlap and Momson
(1986), Diyzak (1987), Eckersley (1989), McLaughlin (1990). Within these writings there is the acknowledgement
of class, gender, ethnic, and geographical tensions, divisions and dissension in any real or advocated economy.
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Abram, Gare, Fabel, Ferre) would, o f course, advise against getting rid of the concept
o f self-organisation since it has manifestly shown itself to be useiul in explaining and
exploring the myriad wonders o f the world through a new perspective which suggest
that the world is alive, free and organic. Self-organisation, and the other theories of
the New Sciences, are thus useful in ecopolitical discourse since it dramatically
advocates the aliveness o f the Earth and many of the Earth’s processes. This
aliveness, Abram, Gare, Fabel and Ferre, would feel, surely asks more of us when it
comes to protecting the Earth and its environmental processes.
However, this is not the only thing the New Sciences are useiul for. They may
also be useful in resurrecting an embattled God, useiul in resurrecting scientists as the
priests and arbiters of the nature o f reality, useiul in delegitimising any economics not
based on Western Free Market principles, useful in reinvigorating systems science as a
universal discipline, useful in legitimising hierarchy in modem society, and useful in
limiting environmental evaluation to specific scientific and scientistic management
practice. These uses can be considered to be contradictory to the programme of
environmental consciousness that the above-named writers are seeking to forge.

*
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Part C.
I t’s all a Postmodern
Plot(lessness)!

INTRODUCTION TO PART C
Part C focuses around a particular theme: that the unity of nature metanarrative
is a cultural construction o f various breeds of postmodernism. These breeds of
postmodernism attempt to locate themselves in opposition to what they term
Modernism. Part C, therefore, is devoted to an investigation of postmodern ideas that
may lay within, or contribute to, the late Twentieth Century enunciation o f the unity
o f nature. It examines the claim that if we postmodemise science-making it reject the
Modernist ideals that stem from the onset of Modernity in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth centuries—then we can produce a ‘Postmodern Science’ that offers a
post-mechanistic, post-reductionistic, post-atomistic, post-fragmentary worldview.
Such a desire has obvious relations to the New Paradigm whose historical narrative I
outlined in Chapter One; and indeed the New Paradigmers and the Postmodern
Science supporters are the same people much of the time. What I have tound,
however, is that Postmodern Science is also contiguous with systems theory and the
New Sciences. (The name o f these theoretical nodes of thought change, but much ot
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the underlying metaphysical thematics is the same). If this is so, and if systems theory
and the New Sciences can be shown to be replete with the Modernist predilections
towards reductionism, mechanicism, hierarchy, and also universalist metatheory, then
Postmodern Science might be so attached to Modernist ways of doing science that it
actually is not postmodern at all.
After desconstructing Postmodern Science, Part C enters into a critique of one of
the metaphysical dichotomies which is being played out within the stories of the New
Paradigm, the New Sciences and Postmodern Science; that is the story of
mechanicism versus organicism. Postmodern Science supporters generally want to
uphold the organicism versus mechanicism dichotomy; placing themselves distinctly
within the organic dipole for this gives them what they believe is an inherently
postmodern perspective on nature. My argument is that the mechanicism versus
organicism division is hardly o f the nature that Postmodern Scientists make out.
Advancing yourself as an organicist, as opposed to a mechanist, is a rhetorical ploy
which plays within the folds o f Modernism rather than postmodernism. A postmodern
deconstruction of the organicism versus mechanicism dichotomy reveals that
organicists and mechanicists are often espousing very similar worldviews.
The final chapter of this Part, and o f the whole work, addresses the remains of
the deconstructed unity o f nature concept. From these remains, Chapter Eight seeks
to address the nature o f what a more aggressively postmodemised environmental
narrative might look like, especially with regards to the area of environmental concern
most immediate to the minds o f many Unitarians: the terrestrial ecological
communities o f the world. If environmentalists do need to find themselves a narrative
about the world’s ecology it is suggested in this chapter how they might find one
through a splitting up of the metaphysics of ecological unity into a metaphysics of
otherness.
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CHAPTER 6
W hat is This Thing Called Postmodern
Science?

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to critique the scientistic ideals that developed strongly throughout
the 19th Century, scholars in the past couple of decades have come to formulate a
particular term to describe Western intellectual traditions and practices since c l 850;
they term it ‘Modernism’81. Modernism stands out (sometimes starkly, sometimes not)
against what is believed to be ‘postmodernism’82. Some believe postmodernism can be
characterised and chronologised as that period from about the 1960s until now,
whence new modes o f capitalism, art, architecture, culture and communication have
invaded the social world83.
Having heard about this critique of Modernism, many thinkers of both a scientific
and an environmental bent have decided that this is what they were also critiquing.

81See, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer (1947), Lyotard (1984), Habermas (1985), Foucault (1986), Hall, ed,
(1992), Tester (1992), Docherty, ed, (1993), Grenz (1996). Modernism stands out as a self-aware phase of a
perioid of history often referred to as Modernity. Where modernity7might be said to extend back beyond Newton
and Descartes to the start of the renaissance, modernism is often given the starting date of 1846 when Charles
Baudelaire defined it in relation to contemporary art.
^Postmodernism is neid by postmodern scholars as being an inherently more lovable way to approach the study of
life, society, science and art because it doesn’t get caught up in a Progress fetishism, it relinquishes a pointless
search for the ultimate, truth through ideological politics, it promotes an inherent look at diversity and difference,
and multiplies the stories which are afforded believability and value.
83 For example, see Bell (1979), Lyotard (1984), Jencks (1986), Calinescu (1987), Lash and Urry (1987), Harvey
(1989), Jameson (1991), Lucie-Smith (1992).
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Thus Donald Griffin (1988), Charles Birch (1990), Carolyn Merchant (1994), David
Bohm (1994), Arran Gare (1995) and Frederick Ferre (1996) have recently
announced the rise o f ‘Postmodern Science’. Out of the ashes of a receding
Modernism they have endeavoured to embark on reconstructing a Worldview that
avoids the pitfalls of Modernist science such as extreme reductionism, mechanicism
and atomism84. If these Modernist pitfalls (which had been brewing in western culture
since before the Enlightenment but reached a crescendo when scientists had fully
bought into Modernism in the 19th Century) can be ejected from science, then so
much the better, they feel, for the environment, since a new environmentally friendly
worldview will be encouraged to take centre stage in the metaphysics of Western
culture.
The point I wish to make in this chapter, however, is that Postmodern Science
might well be so inculcated with Modernism (as it is defined by postmodern
intellectuals and as it is defined by Postmodern Science itself) that it can hardly be
called postmodern. One o f the ways that this inculcation is made manifest is the close
association between Postmodern Science and both systems theory and the New
Sciences. The closeness of association between Postmodern Science, systems theory
and the New Sciences infects Postmodern Science with various Modernist impulses so
that the project of Postmodern Science (to create an environmentally friendly
worldview) is—by its own terms—undermined.

POSTMODERN CHARACTERISTICS

Before going on to detail the core theoretical premises of Postmodern Science, it
is worth taking a look at the intellectual movement from which Postmodern Science
takes its name. By doing this we can then go on to carefully analyse to what extent
Postmodern Science is an expressions of postmodern sentiments.

84Unlike the intellectual postmodern movement which makes a critique over a whole spectrum of Modernist
currents in history, society and culture, Postmodern Science tends to reduce Modernism to Modernist Science,
whose major drawbacks are held to be the scientific principles of reductionism, mechanicism, atomism and
dualism. These are, of course, the same things that Birch, Ferre, Gare, Bohm e t a l were critiquing before they
latched onto the ‘postmodern’ label (see Chapter One).
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As the Unitarians like Birch, Ferre, Bohm and Gare are so fond of identifying
themselves with the term postmodernism, it is as well that we identify what
postmodernism actually is. However, when defining postmodernism we immediately
come into problems. Postmodernism defies definition. For reasons which may become
more obvious in the following section postmodernists are loathe to define
postmodernism since such self-definition might totalize the identity of the movement
towards a narrow, restrictive and objectifying synecdoche, or as Sassower (1995:18)
puts it:
providing a definition goes against the postmodern grain since it pretends to
capture a moment that is too fleeting to catch85.

This penchant for ephemerality and this disdain for the restrictive notion of
identity are not just principles o f anti-definitionism, however, they permeate through
the whole gamut of postmodern subjects of study. Postmodern sociologists decry the
use o f identity in social studies, for instance. They choose instead to focus on
differences, diversity and heterogeneity. In doing this they often believe that they have
unearthed the ephemerality and changeable nature of things. Life is hardly stable, or
even progressively changing in an evolutionary manner, nor does it operate in clearly
observable cycles or any other observable pattern.86
These tendencies towards heterogeneity, difference and plurality, like
ephemerality and anti-identity, also serve as some of the core descriptions of
postmodernism:
pluralism...has become the irritable condition of postmodern discourse, consuming

85The use of definitions to elucidate upon an object, subject, act, term etc. would strike many postmodernists as a
way of not only describing what that object, subject, act or term is but also what it is not. Definitions categorically
set up and describe what an object, subject, act or term is capable of being and is incapable of being. Definitions
also enforce one dimensional elaborations of objects, subjects, acts and terms that might potentially be explained in
a myriad of ways if these ways were not categorically excluded by the definition.
86 It could be noted that within this the perspective, all of life (sociological life or ecological lire) and the things in
it are transient and indeterminate:
“Indeterminacy often follows from fragmentation—the postmodernist only disconnects, fragments are all
he pretends to trust. His ultimate opprobrium is ‘totalisation —any synthesis whatever, social,
epistemic, even poetic. Hence his preference for montage, collage. (Hassan, 1987.168).
In this process of disconnecting and dis-aggregating the total, the category of ‘Life’ itself is tinctured; becoming
ephemeral, diverse, fragmented, heterogeneous and decentralised. What emerges from the ashes of Life are
pluralised ‘lives’. The category of Life succumbs to the overwhelming expression of different fives; fives which are
too diverse to be able to be categorised by the one common abstract notion of Life.
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many pages of both critical and uncritical inquiry. (Hassan, 1987:167).

The very foundation of postmodemity consists of viewing the world as a
plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities. (Heller and Feher, 1988:1).

Postmodernism lends itself to...heterogeneity without any critical ordering
principle. (Zagorin, 1990:265).

The heterogeneous nature ot language, society, geography and culture and the
transient nature of intellectual, social and artistic trends, truths and traditions
promotes heterogeneity and ephemerality as common postmodern characteristics over
different subjects of study. As West would put it, postmodernism tends to:
trash the monolithic and homogenous in the name of diversity, multiplicity and
heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal in light of the concrete,
specific and particular; and to historicise, contextualise and pluralise by
highlighting the contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting
and changing. (West, 1994:65).

Along with difference and diversity, fracture and fragmentation are also often
held to be symptoms of Postmodern thought. Whether they are talking about the
fracturing o f the signified from the signifier, the fragmentation o f social structures into
cultural groupings or the breaking up of unilinear history into multiple histories,
fracturing and fragmentation of some sort often lies within the studies of
postmodernists.
Needless to say this advocacy of fracture, indeterminacy and pluralism has often
been equated with intellectual decadence, nihilism, and impracticability by some
writers87. It is acknowledged within postmodern circles that postmodernism::
rejects epistemological assumptions, refutes methodological conventions, resists
knowledge claims, obscures all versions of the truth, and dismisses policy
recommendations. (Rosenau, 1992:3)

Because of this program, postmodernism is sometimes seen as intellectual chaos
with little ability to address major intellectual or practical problems. Or as Tester
(1993:28) puts it:
from the point of view of certain modem boundaries postmodemity seems to be

87

See Haber, (1994), for example.
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direction-less, blurred and lacking in rigor.

Tester, however goes on to reply on behalf o f postmodernists that:
from the point of view of postmodemity, modernity is a prison of one sort or
another towards which the only proper attitude is incredulity.

This incredulity applies since Modernism marginalises what is held to be unusual,
generalises rather than specifies, and congeals together things which should be
allowed to fragment apart.
For many who have in some way utilised or sympathised with postmodernism the
broken nature o f the social, cultural, or geographical world is only a secondary result
of postmodern analysis. The primary result is the unearthing and deconstruction of
ideas that have hitherto been thought o f as being part of fundamental knowledge.
Although they sometimes try to deny that what they are doing is analytical,
postmodernists nevertheless critically analyse the founding ideas of their subjects of
study to see what previous students in the field have failed to see; that these founding
ideas are merely assumptions. Founding ideas, otherwise known as foundations, are
thought by many in the postmodern movement to be the core problematic in
Modernity and their deconstruction the core programme of postmodernism.
Foundations are said to be expressed most cogently through the enunciation (and
re-enunciation) of metanarratives:
...in Lyotard’s view, a metanarrative is meta in a very strong sense. It purports to
be a privileged discourse capable of situating, characterising and evaluating all
other discourses, but not itself infected by the historicity and contingency
which render first-order discourses potentially distorted and in need of
legitimisation. (Fraser and Nicholson, 1994:139).

WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED POSTMODERN SCIENCE?

Although postmodernism might like to characterise science as the epitome of
Modernism there is within professional and popular science circles an ongoing
attempt to postmodemise science. Having been made aware of the postmodern
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critique o f Modernity some scientists and science writers who have been critical of the
traditional scientific methods and principles have chosen to affiliate themselves with
postmodernism. Instead o f rejecting science altogether, however, they opt for
replacing Modem science with ‘Postmodern Science’. Therefore, it may be said that
instead o f harbouring desires for a revolution against science, they want reform.
As in other intellectual fields that are involved with postmodernism, at the
forefront o f Postmodern Science there is an interest in metanarratives. Instead of
abandoning all metanarratives, however, Postmodern Science supporters want to
resurrect environmentally friendly and socially benevolent ones. For many
‘Postmodern Scientists this is the program of Postmodern Science; to resurrect more
appropriate metanarrative statements about the natural world. Postmodern Science’s
penchant for the reconstruction of metanarratives, rather than their total
de(con)struction in the wake o f general postmodern and anti-science attacks in the
last thirty years leads Postmodern Scientists to label their peculiar brand of
postmodernism: ‘Constructive Postmodern Science’. As Gnffin points out in his
book, and the series in which it is located88, whereas most postmodernism has a
penchant for breaking down bastions of Modernism in a destructive way:
[tjhe postmodernism of this series can, by contrast, be called c o n stru c tiv e or
rev isio n a ry .

it seeks to overcome the Modem worldview not by eliminating the

possibility of worldviews as such, but by constructing a postmodern
worldview through a revision of modem premises. (Griffin, 1988:x).

Where postmodernists have generally been critical of the competence of science
to reveal the natural world, and where postmodernists are often critical ot the
worldviews that science does ‘reveal’, Postmodern Scientists believe that science has
now got something new to offer. Late Twentieth Century science, it is claimed, is
now beginning to understand the universe in a whole new light, a light supposedly
compatible with many postmodern concepts.
Introducing this new Postmodern Science, Fabel (1994:303) says there is a new
science, just now arising...with a conception ot the cosmos as a self-organising
genesis” .

88 The book by Donald Griffin is Griffin, ed, (1988). This forms, according to Griffin’s introduction, the first
instalment on a series on Constructive Postmodern Science. Ferre (1996) is the latest instalment in this series.
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This one comment o f FabeFs is, even by itself, quite telling. As he explicitly
refers to the ‘new science7 (i.e.: New Science) o f ‘self-organisation7 as being
Postmodern, Fabel seems to want to ally Postmodern Science with the
self-organisation ideas of the New Scientists that were discussed in Chapter Three.
This connection is confirmed by the comments of numerous other Postmodern
Scientists. For example, although Davies does not use the label ‘postmodernism7,
Arran Gare labels Davies7 New Science as Postmodern Science (Gare: 1995:110).
Whether he wants to be or not Paul Davies, and many who share Paul Davies7
worldview, are pulled in to the circle of Postmodern Science by self-confessed
Postmodern Science enthusiasts like Gare by deed of the latter7s willingness to class
the former's scientific approach as Postmodern Science.
Charles Birch further strengthens the affinity between the complex systems
theory of the New Sciences and Postmodern Science by repeating for Postmodern
Science what he has for a long time said about systems theory:
In a postmodern world, the new images are no longer mechanical: they are organic
and ecological. The universe turns out to be less like a machine and more like a
life. (Birch, 1990: 75).

Birch then goes on to define more closely what Postmodern Science is in a
section entitled: “Five Axioms for A Postmodern Worldview77 (Birch, 1990:128):
The first axiom: Nature is organic and ecological...The postmodern worldview takes
seriously the proposition that we live in a universe and not a multiverse. it is
ecological through and through. (Birch, 1990:128-129).

Birch’s second axiom o f the ‘Postmodern Worldview7 declares that we must
interpret lower levels of reality in terms of higher levels. His third declares that we
should interpret the world in terms o f monism as against a Nature/Humanity dualism.
His fourth emplores us to adopt biocentrism and his fifth asks us to be
post-disciplinary, simplifying and universalising.
Knowledge is lost in a sea of beliefs from a multitude of disciplines. The general
purpose of the modem university is lost amid the incoherent variety of special
purposes that have accumulated within it. The outlook of the postmodern
worldview is for fewer beliefs and more beliefs. (Birch, 1990:140).

We shall come back to the themes o f Birch’s fourth and fifth axioms latter on but
for now we can identify his axioms 1-3 as programmatic statements that any
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Postmodern Science must look towards organicism, unitarianism and holism in some
way.
For Wiessert and Hayles, that ‘some way’ towards holism and unitarianism and
organicism is via Chaos theory. For Hayles (1990, 1991) and Wiessert (1991), Chaos
and Complexity theory (which Davies loves to death) are examples of Postmodern
Science because they approach the study of nature with an outlook that rejects the
notion that physical matter is inanimate and particulate and that says physical
processes are deterministic and isolated. Wiessert’s and Hayles’ versions of Chaos
theory (which are the same as Davies’) posit chaos as an indication of the complexity
of order and not as the absence of orderliness and they suggest that such order can
only be understood by new mathematical ideas which have yet to be fully elaborated.
Such new mathematics-which I suppose will be called Postmodern Mathematics-will
liberate nature from determinism and go on to provide a dynamic view of matter.
Best (1991) would agree with most of this, stating: “Postmodern Science has
three main branches o f influence” : thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, and Chaos
theory which all
emerge as a break from the mechanistic, objectivist and deterministic worldview of
modem science. (Best, 1991:189).

Best goes on to say that “Postmodern Science rejects the crippling dualistic
outlook o f modem thought; instead it sees nature, human beings, and the relation
between human beings and nature in holistic terms” (Best, 1991:189). David Bohm’s
Unitarian physics also displays predilections towards this use of the term
postmodernism. For most of his long life Bohm was without a label for his holistic
physics but he found it just before he died: “I am proposing a postmodern physics that
begins with the whole” (Bohm, 1988:119). Similarly Ferre (1994) believes holistic
ecology to be Postmodern Science stating that Postmodern Science is a return to
organic ecological ideas.
According to Krippner (1991) the Modem scientific worldview can be partially
attributed to the unprecedented fragmentation, nihilism and destruction that we find in
the world. He then goes on to say that as a corrective to this situation:
‘postmodern’ or ‘holistic’ thought hopes to preserve the virtues of the Modem
worldview while replacing its mechanistic and reductionistic assumptions with
those that are more organic in nature. (Krippner, 1991:133).
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So Postmodern Science is the science o f self-organisation, the science o f Chaos
theory, the science o f Complexity theory, the science of unity, organicism and holism.
All this exemplifies the following conclusion. Postmodern Science is basically
equivalent to the complex systems theories which in Chapter Three we called the New
Sciences.
Sometimes this conclusion becomes obvious when considering the prescribed
political responsibility o f both systems theory and Postmodern Science, respectively.
Consider the similarities between Capra, an explicit advocate o f ‘systems theory’ with
those o f Gare an explicit advocate o f ‘Postmodern Science’. In the same way as
Capra, the systems theorist, says that a new worldview must be forged for
environmental reasons so Gare, the Postmodern Scientist, says “what is required to
address the environmental crisis” is a “postmodern cosmology” (Gare, 1995:3). And
just as Capra labels Deep Ecologists the grass-roots organisers o f the new paradigm,
so Gare states: “Postmodern environmentalists, that is, the ‘deep ecologists’ and
associated movements” are those who reject Modernist environmental destruction
(Gare, 1995:87).
Because o f their very similar critiques o f Modem science and Modem living both
Capra and Gare would, with little doubt, agree with Best’s following comments on
postmodernity and living in harmony with nature:
in rejecting modernity as a historical era of wanton destruction, many advocates of
postmodern science embrace the concept of postmodemity as a new historical
period yet to be created—where human beings exist in harmonious relations
with nature, each other, and their own selves. (Best, 1991:189).

All this is to say that what is presented as holistic/unitarian thought in Chapter
Two and as the New Sciences in Chapter Five is painted as Postmodern Science by
those who, in this chapter, are called Postmodern Scientists. If this is so, then surely
we have a contradiction emerging. Given the penchant for unity and generalisation
and universalisation in the holistic sciences, systems theory and the New Sciences, and
given the penchant for heterogeneity, fragmentation and difference in postmodernism,
how can Unitarians contemplate labelling holistic science, systems theory, and the
New Sciences as ‘Postmodern’?
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POSTMODERNISM AND POSTMODERN SCIENCE IN (A) WORDLSV

When investigating the legitimacy of the claims to postmodernism by Postmodern
Scientists we can do so by aligning the commonly-accepted characteristics of
postmodernism with the characteristics ot Postmodern Science as announced by its
advocates. To cover a lot ot ground quickly this can be done by listing twenty or so
one word characteristics o f postmodernism and comparing them to the characteristics
of Postmodern Science89. In this vein postmodernism can be characterised as being (or
emphasising)90:

'Anti-scientific7: (for example as expressed by: Lyotard, 1984; Eagleton, 1986;
Harvey, 1990; Best, 1991; Grenz, 1996; Grant, 1998)
This feature is succinctly expressed by Grenz (1996:46) who declares:
“postmodernism is the end o f science77. Here Grenz expresses the idea that science is,
in fact, the epitome o f Modernism, and its end paves the way for postmodernism since
it will involve the end o f scientific expertise, scientific management and the end of
power struggles based on knowing the scientifically-refereed truth. In light of this, the
term 'Postmodern Science7 ought to be considered an oxymoron. The fact that
Postmodern Scientists can think up the term, and then espouse worldviews of unity
from it, must also be seen as oxymoronic in the light of the postmodern critique of
science. If Postmodern Science wishes to use science to erect a new philosophical
worldview, then this sits uneasily with the claims o f most other postmodernists who
would declare that:
science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose metaphysical claims and

89

•

*

There is also another important purpose in the laying out of this section. Later in this work (i.e. in Chapter
Eight: A fn o th er) P o stm o d e rn E c o lo g y ) I enter into an altogether different attempt at postmodemising ecological
science, natural philosophy and environmentalism. This alternative attempt at a postmodemising effort will also
draw on some of the ideas outlined in this section. This dual purpose must be kept in mind throughout the reading
of this section. What must also be kept in mind when viewing this section is the fact that it is not me
characterizing the following listed attributes as postmodern, but the many people cited and named under the
various attributes.
^It should be noted that the names of those postmodern scholars who have declared the following properties as
being distinctively and definitively ‘postmodern’ are included after each characteristic. It is not me who is
classifying these characteristics as postmodern (as opposed to any other ‘ism’, say ‘poststructuralism’, but the
people cited; all of whom are acknowledged academic postmodernists or students of culture and society.
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view themselves more modestly as just another set of narratives. (Eagleton
quoted in Harvey, 1990:9).

On the count of being anti-scientific, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails
to be postmodern.

'Pessimism7; (e.g.: Best, 1991; Kroker and Cook, 1991; Bauman, 1993; G renz,
1996).
According to Grenz (1996:89) a “gnawing pessimism” pervades postmodernism.
After being influenced by Foucault et a l it now seems to many social scientists that
revolutionary and reforming Utopians are no longer able to validate their knowledge
with references to the truth o f things and the nature of nature since:
1) the knowledge (of nature and of society) that is said to be possessed by
Utopians/ reformers/revolutionaries is not separable from their political aims, and
2) the politics and philosophies they espouse will be dangerous and oppressive to
someone or other. With regard to number 2, Zygmunt Bauman (1992, 1993) would
want to draw our attention to the omnipresence of dilemma in the postmodern world.
If the ideas associated with a utopian or revolutionary plan are ever manifested in the
name o f liberation from oppression, genuine oppression of other ideas must
necessarily follow for they cannot, too, be manifested. In a (postmodern) world
replete with the values of diversity and difference it seems as though any utopian that
somehow has his or her utopia come to fruition will be totally incapable of sparing
themselves “the bitter after-taste which comes unsolicited in the wake of decisions
taken and fulfilled” (Bauman, 1993:32).
This dilemma-ridden angst within postmodernism is, however, a topic that is
avoided in a major way in Modernism. Dilemmas between interests have always been
smoothed out or smoothed over by abstractly converting the opposing parts into a
whole whose ongoing benevolence is served, maintained and delivered by the same
processes that give rise to the dilemmas. Indeed, Modernism might be characterised as
the era without any recognition of dilemma. Any dilemma could be solved simply by
appealing to an abstract whole and the processes that form it such as the Adam
Smith’s Invisible Hand, Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’, Parson’s social homeostasis
and Lovelock’s Gaian self-regulation. From within this Modernist metaphysical
viewpoint it is hard to get gloomy about the dilemmas of interest which are cruelly
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distributed amongst the members o f the world since in the end—and over the entirety
o f the world—the whole is held to be bettered by the presence o f such dilemmas.
However, if no abstract whole (like society, the economy or Gaia) exists then the
processes that are said to regulate and maintain it are brought into question and the
value o f dilemma as a progressive and self-ordering force is annulled.
So where does this gnawing pessimism leave Postmodern Science? Firstly those
within its ranks who harbour utopian ideals might be seen to be conflicting with
postmodern thought. Utopias, including environmental utopias and intellectual utopias
that the likes o f Capra, Goldsmith, Birch et a l describe, exist as single-dimension
unitary fixations with a certain specified state o f social being and thus are not only
programmatic challenges to a particular status quo (in how we view the world or how
we should change it) but attempted constructions o f idealistic unities which
necessarily exclude those that can not or will not conform to them.
The pessimism o f postmodernism is most ardent when considering the various
technotopian ideals that spill out from technocratic Modernists and their companions:
the promoters o f science. Far from enabling a better and better society, science and
technology is only capable o f producing self-denying nightmares o f social poverty and
environmental destruction. Science’s ability to get a handle on understanding these
problems is undermined by the Power-Knowledge relationships within science so
that—whether it is Modem science or Postmodern Science—it is void ot any ability to
objectively convey to the planners o f utopia and social betterment the grounded
knowledge upon which value neutral policy decisions can be made.
Postmodern Science, however, is not nearly so pessimistic. Postmodern
Scientists are sure that new ways o f conducting science, i.e. organically and
holistically; and new ways o f viewing the universe, i.e. organically and holistically, will
infiltrate both science and technology policy and social policy to deliver a civilisation
o f humans more at harmony with itself and its environment. Stephen Best iterates this
difference between postmodernism and Postmodern Science when he says.
Although both postmodern science and social theory are critical of modem
rationality postmodern science tends to be far more optimistic about the value
of science, technology and rationality than most postmodern theory .
(Best, 1991:213).

Whether Postmodern Science is correct in thinking that it can produce a socially
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and ecologically agreeable scientific response to the world’s woes is not the really the
point here. The point is that Postmodern Science is incongruously positioned with
regard to the attitude o f most postmodernists towards the optimism o f science and
planning.
The incongruity between Postmodern Science and postmodernism can also be
spotted in the following declaration coming from Paul Davies that (1987:197) “the
new way o f thinking about the world is more cheerful” . Davies here, as we noted in
Chapter One, believes that the social acceptance o f holism is directly related to
collective despair promulgated by living in a reductionist universe. Although he does
not otter any evidence to equate despair with reductionism he nevertheless supposes
holism and the New Sciences (i.e. Postmodern Science) to be relatively optimistic
points o f view. This, too, differentiates the optimism o f Postmodern Science and its
worldviews with the pessimism o f much postmodern critique. On the count
pessimism, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.

Anti-truth and anti-realism (e.g. Baudrillard, 1983; Lyotard, 1984; Appignanesi
and Lawson, 1989; Bauman, 1992; Rosenau, 1992; Zimmerman, 1994; Easthope,
1998; Scott, 1998)
Postmodernists have often held Nietzsche to be a proto-postmodernist91, so it is
with one o f his many aphorisms that I shall begin this sub-section. Nietzsche would
say that ‘truths are illusions that we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors
that have become worn out’92. Postmodernists, too, have a particular (but not
necessarily peculiar) take on both truth and reality; neither exists. That is to say truth
and reality are not independent objective references but socially constructed
contingencies decided upon temporarily by the social milieu of particular situations.

91See Vattimo (1988), Zimmerman (1994), Keolb, ed, (1996).
92Nietzsche’s view on truth may be summarised by quoting the following well-known passage:
“What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, a sum, in
short, of human relationships which, rhetorically and poetically intensified, ornamented, and
transformed come to be thought o f, after long usage by a people, as fixed, binding and canonical.
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn out metaphors, now impotent to
stir the senses, coins which have lost their faces and are now considered as metal rather than currency
(Nietzsche, 1979:84).

164

“Any particular truth...”, so says Rosenau (1992:31) “...is relevant or valid only to
members o f the group or community within which it is formulated. Knowledge, then,
is relative to the community”. Inspired by Bruno Latour93, Rosenau (1992:110) goes
on to summarise the postmodern view on reality as: “no external reality actually exists
as the ultimate ‘arbitrator.’”
Far from being universal and independent of human activities, truth and reality
are localised human inventions, but in addition to this, the concepts o f Truth and
Reality are themselves local inventions o f the Modernist world which have been
constructed and reconstructed by political and intellectual players to serve their own
purposes. Truth and Reality in the modem age have become such hugely important
ideas because they exist as the socially-accepted final referee in the political games of
all Modernists. Needless to say virtually all players in Modernity have inevitably
described the referee of Truth and Reality as confirming their own claims to rightness
and righteousness. To play outside o f Tmth and Reality, to tail to utilise them in your
knowledge claims during Modernity has meant to immediately cast yourself oft' as
superstitious or irrational, mad or deviant, pagan or uncivilised. Within
postmodemity, however, political play without Tmth and Reality has become
acceptable.
For those postmodernists inspired by Foucault, tmth (and Tmth) is intimately
linked to Power:
Tmth does not consist of propositions that correctly ‘mirror’ or ‘represent’ an
independent, pre-existing reality. Instead, what passes for ‘objective’ tmth is a
construction generated by power invested elites. (Zimmerman, 1994:94).

For Foucault, Power, because it is, itself a founding idea, is deconstructed and
rearranged so that it does not resemble a pyramidal hierarchy as conceptualised within
class, gender or race activism but is instead a pluralised notion reflecting a whole host
of different and inter-relaying forms. Power thus operates in uniquely arranged local
sites but always as part o f the fabrication of tmth: “[i]t is impossible to separate tmth
from power, and so there is no real possibility of any absolutely uncormpted tmth
(Rosenau, 1992:78).
If this is so then environmentalists thus constmct truths (for instance; the unity of

93See for example Latour and Woolgar (1979).
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nature and the balance ot nature) as much around political aims and aspirations as do
their anthropocentric industrialist foes who speak o f the duality o f Humanity and
Nature, the superiority o f Humanity and the necessity to conquer Nature. Thus it can
be said that:
Postmodern theorists...insist that no one is innocent; eveiy one...is concerned with
defining truth as a way of acquiring and retaining power. (Zimmerman, 1994:135).

All this would tend to indicate that truth is never further from your grasp than
when you think you have got it. One of the defining features of Modernism, according
to postmodernists, is that all Modernists think they have got to it, or have at least that
they have got privileged access to getting it.
For many critics o f this facet o f postmodernism the debate over issues such as the
existence o f an independent reality are of interest only to postmodernists (and other
intellectuals) who, insulated from reality, never personally experience the violence,
terror, and degradation prevalent in modem society. (Rosenau, 1992:111).
From such a point o f view a postmodern engagement with the de(con)struction
o f all truths is also a disengagement from political fighting and social change
altogether. Such disengagement with the ‘real’ issues of political and social life would
constitute a conciliation to the enemy.
However, for postmodernists, there are ways around this. One can disregard both
truths and Truth without conciliating to the enemy. For instance;
[tjo be sure, finite beings have no access to absolute truth, and establishing finite
truths is often a difficult, disputational, and politically charged process. Still, none of
this prevents some historical, philosophical, or scientific texts from being more
informative or illuminating. (Zimmerman, 1994:100).

This is to say that although there is no independent reality or truth the
operational mode of what was once seen to be true is just used now as a model to get
things done. Such an approach is exemplified in the writing of Jean-Francois Lyotard
where the undercurrent o f expression is that as long as the model is always seen as a
model and not mistaken for reality this approach will work94.
For some postmodernists, however, this approach might lie too close to the
rhetoric o f Modernist science to be comfortable. Modem scientists still revel in and

94See Lyotard (1984).
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celebrate the dictums ot science that state that science has no pretenses to finding the
final word on all things but only towards offering temporary solutions to intellectual
and practical problems until better ones come along. Nullius in verba reads the Royal
Society’s motto; ‘No man’s word shall be final’.
The problem with this idea is that the so-called ‘temporary’ truths in Modem
science have often reached such levels o f acceptance and dependability that they have
come to be very permanent. So much so that they serve as the basis o f the
construction o f the narratives of many other fields of human endeavour, including
those in less well-formulated younger sciences95. And when science speaks of its
‘temporary’ truths it does so with the claim that its ‘temporary’ truths are more
truthful than non-scientific truths. Postmodernism would seek to arrest the arrogance
of science and wrench from it its claim to be the only field of human endeavour
capable o f supplying us with useful models. If other endeavours are allowed a claim to
be able to model the universe (and all things in it), then the voices of difference and
dissent are allowed to reign and all models will be encouraged to be viewed for what
they are, mere models.
Another way to puncture independent truths yet still retain some form of
knowledge claim based political attack is to state that for every situation there are
multiple truths;, i.e.: there is more than one adequate/accurate representation of
reality which can be acted upon as a physical, social or historical base. To avoid the
vortex o f absolute relativism we can still admit that while there is more than one truth
not all o f these provide an equal base upon which to enact the particular social and
physical change that we desire.
In a world suspicious of truth and reality, metaphor plays an important role.
Truths can be seen as metaphors that have just been sufficiently inculcated into
language and culture that they have lost their status as metaphors. This Nietzschean
view o f ‘truths are metaphors’ would opine that we have long forgotten the parentage

95For instance, although there are hundreds and hundreds of disciplines and sub-disciplines in biology all are
believed to have come to terms with the founding idea of ‘evolution via natural selection . Indeed, they must do
this in order to sustain their scientificity. In this way the founding idea of evolution is not merely a temporary truth
which might be abandoned if a better founding principle comes along, but is actually a un-abandonable and
inalienable premise which defines scientificity and truthhood. There may be little things wrong with evolution by
natural selection, the argument of Modem scientists would go, but these things will be sorted out through the
course of good science’ , so the ‘evolution via natural selection’ idea as a whole is thereby ossified in biology as
nothing other than an obvious truth.

167

ot our truths (from what sites the metaphors were originally casting comparisons
from) and we have long forgotten the original purpose of their use.
We might even choose to go iurther than this--and put trust in the previous
chapters7 studies of the history and sociology of unity~to decide that the ‘original7
metaphors were themselves not based upon grounded referents but upon other
socially ingrained metaphors. Each truth that is uttered, therefore, is a metaphor based
upon another metaphor96. There is no ultimate basis from which to make
comparisons—and our truths ultimately float free and unattached above a never found,
non-existent reality. From the perspective of examining big truths (like the unity of
nature) as well as some not-so-big truths (like the self-organisation of plant
communities) truths may be classified as attempts to describe the world by the use of
metaphorical narratives that themselves are derived from elaborate and now dead
metaphors o f metaphors.
Some more recent students o f metaphor charge that we do not have to stop at
assuming that only large metanarrative structures are free-floating metaphors. Lakoff
and Johnson (1980:3), for example, maintain that:
our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature, if...our conceptual system is largely
metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do
every day is very much a matter of metaphor.

If we agree to dispose o f the idea that there is—in either micro or
macro-metaphors—a grounded, reality-checked ‘original7 metaphor we soon come to
believe that every utterance we make, every conceptualisation we hold and every
action we take is dependent on an endless cascade ot metaphors o f metaphors ot
metaphors. A thing is elaborated not in literal terms as to exactly what it is but in
terms o f how it is like something else and that something else is elaborated in terms ot
how it is like another something else (and sometimes in terms ot how it is like the first
something else). If metanarrative metaphors such as the unity ot nature exist in such a
cascade then there should be no wonder that we find it impossible to locate the
singular origin o f the unity metaphor and its supporting concepts.
What this emphasis on metaphors might suggest is that the popular duality

96A conclusion that Don Miller (1982a, 1983) is also forced to arrive at.

168

between literal and metaphor is no longer in existence (Miller, 1983). It seems that
rearranging and resurrecting metaphors (and hardening them into ‘truths’) gives us
historical change and intellectual contingency. Rearranging and resurrecting
metaphors also gives us politics since the rearrangement and resurrection o f specific
metaphors for political gain-rather than the search for the truth~is all that there
seems to be. Relating this to the Foucauldian Power/Knowledge thesis we might state
(as Lakoii and Johnson, 1980:160, do) that in Modernist culture the belief in Truth
is very much alive and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose
their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true—absolutely
and objectively true.

Rearranging and resurrecting metaphors is also the only activity of the human
sciences, suggests Don Miller, since the human sciences “can only be engaged
knowingly or otherwise in one enterprise: the creation of metaphors to analyse other
metaphors” (Miller, 1983:6)
So how does all this relate to Postmodern Science? It seems that a lot of
Postmodern Scientists are convinced that their worldview is not just a metaphorical
rendering o f the universe but a description of actual reality. For instance Charles Birch
(1990) indicates that although the mechanist worldview is metaphor, Postmodern
Science exposes an Ecopolitical reality. New Scientists, like Paul Davies may be even
more committed to the truth-rendering properties of the sciences of Chaos,
Complexity and Self-organisation. For instance, o f his own work Davies says:
while emphasising the short-comings of a purely reductionist view of the nature, 1
intended that the gaps left by the inadequacies of reductionist thinking should be
filled by additional scientific theories that concern the collective and organisational
properties of complex systems, and not by appeal to mystical or transcendental
principles (Davies, 1987:203).

Here Davies can be noted as explicitly defending both reductionism and the New
Sciences as purveyors of scientifically refereed reality while also relating his
commitment to the truth exposing nature of the New Sciences compared to the
story-telling nature o f religious narrative
Added to this we might note the work of Mainzer (1995) who described that out
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of the twenty New Scientists he had studied, only one (Humberto Maturana) accepts
the social construction o f his scientific work97. New Scientists generally feel that their
work is only contingent from the perspective that all of science is contingent (in the
vein o f the Royal Society motto). This would tend to indicate that on the subject of
truth and reality, Postmodern Science is not strongly allied to the rest o f postmodern
thought.

absence (Hassan. 1987; Bauman, 1992; Rosenau, 1992)
For postmodern intellectuals, o f various disciplines, a familiar theme within
postmodernism is the rejection o f the notion of presence. In postmodern literary and
art history this involves the rejection o f the author or the artist as authoritative
meaning-generating presences in the works that they produce. It also over-turns the
premise that art and literature must reflect some reality since reality is taken away.
This makes the work float free in its own local reality. In academic studies about how
humans come to know things the predilection towards absence manifests itself in the
rejection o f reality against which words and sentences can be measured and
quantified. In sociology and political studies it has come to mean the absence of a
fundamental social or political reality.
One consequence of this penchant for absence, according to Rosenau, is the
postmodern predilection towards “absence of unity” (Rosneau,1992:14). No single
theory can explain away all experiences and episodes and, therefore, the experiences
and episodes are hardly united or unifiable.
So how does this postmodern notion of absence relate to Postmodern Science? It
seems only negatively, since Postmodern Science is devoted to understanding nature
in unity, a unity whose presence is taken to be both real and of deep consequence for
the future o f humanity and the Earth.

"Aporia7 (e.g. Derrida; 1976; Bauman, 1992).
Related to absence, and specifically the absence of unity that Rosenau talks about
above, is the concept o f aporia. Aporia is a word derived from Greek that translates

97Some of the other twenty New Scientists include the people explored in Chapter Five: Merry, Ayres, Davies.
Maturana’s admissions of the social construction of his own work are described in Mamzer (1995).
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into English as ‘the absence o f a passage’. It is a word that indicates the loss and
attenuation o f connection between things. Such loss must inevitably frustrate any
attempt to unify things together.
Zygmunt Bauman explains postmodern aporia like this:
‘postmodemity’ being a semantically negative notion, defined entirely by
absences~by the disappearance of something which was there before—the
evanescence of synchronic and diachronic order, as well as of the directionality
of change count among its most decisive defining features. (Bauman, 1992:29).

In this regard the holistic unity of Postmodern Science is an inadequate reflection
o f either a) the absence o f connections between things or b) the absence of unity all
together. Whereas Postmodern Scientists like Charles Birch would maintain the total
interdependence and interconnection o f all things in nature**, and thereby attach
supreme importance to the notion of the causal web—where one thing always affects
another then another then another—postmodern aporia would, at the very least,
describe the existence o f non-dependencies and non-connections in the causal web. It
may even do more, going on, perhaps, to declare the death of the causal web through
aporia. Postmodern aporia would then describe the world about which Birch’s
Postmodern Science narrates as being devoid of unity and connectivity. On the count
of absence, then, it seems that Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.

‘Anti-communication’ (Barthes, 1975; Derrida, 1976; Lyotard, 1988; Kroker and
Cook, 1991).
It has been highlighted many times before how postmodernism involves a intense
investigation o f communication and the impacts ol changing schemes of
communication on culture and society and identity**. However, postmodernism is not
necessarily a celebration of the ultimate efficacy of communication and indeed might
be considered to render a view of communication that declares that communication is
in fact a utopian intellectual promise that is never fulfilled. By this I mean to invoke
the postmodern penchant towards the fragmentation of the referent, the fragmentation

98See Birch (1990:81-85.)
99 Such as that in Lyotard (1984); Poster (1990); White (1997).
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o f the sign, and the fragmentation o f presence to indicate that when a communication
is made (by any one to any one else, or by any thing to any thing else) it is never an
exact communication; it is never a 100% sound and clear reproduction of the intended
message.
When someone is communicating to someone else there are many constraints and
barriers placed upon on their communications. For example, language itself is
metaphorical and suggestive rather than representative and literal (Miller, 1982a) and
the private linguistic experiences of each individual to the referent forbids the
possibility that two communicants are necessarily talking about the same things
(Miller, 1982b) as does the individual experiences o f the communicators to a specific
or purported referent. The power structure of the communicants also exacts a price as
the communication becomes political. The schizoid and polysemous nature of most
words must also be hurdled since, as Sim (1998:316) points out by paraphrasing
Derrida: “any given word has a cluster of associations around it that undermine its
supposed purity”. We must almost acknowledge the ideological components of many
communication and language systems whereby a mode of communication or language
is entrenched with a certain way oflooking at things (a la Karshevskij, see Steiner,
1976). Communication thus has to be undertaken within a changing medium by
changeable communicators in schizophrenic and unequal social circumstances.
Although one might gain satisfaction from a communication it is just as likely that a
communication will leave one unsatisfied. The reality ol communication (say Kroker
and Cook, 1991 :vii) is o f “radical isolation.”
So is this anti-communication sentiment reflected in Postmodern Science? To
start with it seems fair to say that a Postmodern Scientist may able to operate his or
her metanarrative whether or not they adopt the stance ot anti-communication. For
instance, acknowledging that the power structures often make communication a
barrier to, rather than a conduit of, the expression ol certain lived experiences is
possible whether you are an advocate ol Postmodern Science or not. A proclivity to
acknowledging the pervasivity of communication as a barrier (rather than a conduit) is
not extinguished by buying into holism, unitarianism and organicism. it is an individual
conscience vote rather than a party policy ol Postmodern Science. This would suggest
that as far as anti-communication is concerned, the case is thrown out ol court.
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However, if Postmodern Science is the intellectual baby o f systems theory, or the
1990s incarnation o f systems theory, then there may be a link between communication
and Postmodern Science that does entice the jury to reconvene and charge
Postmodern Science as failing to be postmodern once again. Here, I wish to
acknowledge that a primary theoretical position within systems theory is
communications theory. As Lilienfeld (1988:49) says “communications theory is
largely concerned with the processes whereby messages can be coded, transmitted
and decoded” in a whole variety of systems. Within communications theory codes are
transcribable in a literal way. What a biological molecule says when it is encoded in
one cell is the same as what it says when it is decoded in another cell; and what a
radio receiver receives in decoded form is the same as the transmitter codes in a
transmittable form. If Postmodern Scientists are keen to adopt this theory from their
intellectual parents, then it too may find itself with a fetish tor communication;
marvelling about the way things are communicated in both natural and artificial
systems. Such a fetish may de-legitimise Postmodern Science’s claim to be
postmodern.
Interest in communication theory is, however, not a general characteristic of
Postmodern Scientists. Where some New Scientists like Merry and Ayres are very
fond of it, Postmodern Scientists like Birch and Gare are either unaware of it, or feel
it has no place in their elaboration of a Postmodern worldview.

'Pastiche’ (e.g.: Jencks, 1986; Harvey, 1990; Rosenau, 1992; Appignanesi eta l,
1995; Lewis, 1998)
In the art world the term pastiche refers to art works composed of varied parts
brought together, often haphazardly and arbitrarily. In postmodern art the style is
developed to mean the taking of all sorts o f unrelated and related objects and styles,
none o f which acts as the focus or control or base upon which the others rest. This
emphasis o f defocus, un-controlledness, and baselessness means that no part of the art
work can be called the basis or the essence of the work. Similarly when referred to in
the world o f the social, postmodern pastiche conveys a sense of the intermingled
curdling o f social space and social time. In any one place all sorts of cultures may
pervade and then articulate upon others, be infused and defused by both similar and
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dissimilar politics, and project and reject all sorts o f value frameworks. A social space
is thus a mosaic ot sometimes interlocking and sometimes independent ideas, practices
and values. No one social theory can explain how all these parts work or how they
come together. Nor can social change predicated upon these theories change the
whole society.
Again this characteristic o f scholarly postmodernism may seem to only relate to
Postmodern Science in the sense that they are incompatible. Postmodern Science as
advocated by Ferre, Birch, Gare, Bohm, Griffin and others seeks to work out how all
the parts come together and totally interact to form a coherent whole. Clements’
superorganism and Lovelock’s Gaia are hardly pastiches but more like complete
all-seeing murals of the natural world.
Chaos theory might be thought to be compatible with pastiche since pastiche is
sometimes arbitrary and impervious to theorisation. However, the arbitrariness o f the
chaos in Chaos theory is directly related to an impending, implicit or underlying order.
This order takes away much of Chaos theory’s claim towards being a science of the
arbitrary. It also imposes a precise theoretical principle upon its subjects of study,
unlike the artistic and social pastiches envisaged by postmodern art and postmodern
sociology. On the count of pastiche, then, Postmodern Science fails to be
postmodern.

"Fragmentation’ (e.g.: Heller and Feher; 1988; Harvey, 1990; Ashley, 1991;
Lewis, 1998)
When he is describing his Postmodern worldview David Bohm states:
We have seen that fragmentary thinking is giving rise to a reality that is
constantly breaking up into disorderly, disharmonious, and destructive
partial activities. Therefore, seriously exploring a mode of thinking that
starts from the most encompassing possible whole and goes down to the parts
(sub-wholes) in a way appropriate to the actual nature ot things seems reasonable.
This approach tends to bring about a different reality, one that is orderly,
harmonious and creative. For this actually to happen, however, a thorough
going end to fragmentation is necessary. ( Bohm, 1988:86).

How do we reconcile this with David Harvey’s rendition of a postmodern
worldview?:
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1 begin with what appears to be the most startling tact about postmodernism:
its total acceptance of the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the
chaotic that formed the one half of Baudelaire’s conception of Modernity.
But postmodernism responds to the tact of that in a very particular way. It does
not try to transcend it. counteract it, or even define the ‘eternal and
immutable’ elements that might lie within it. Postmodernism swims, even
wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all
there is. (Harvey, 1990:44).

Harvey does not deny that Modernity and Modernism can be, and is, conceived
as a period and a mindset where change and fragmentation is a persistent
phenomenon. He does however feel that within postmodemity and within the
postmodern mind such fragmentation and change is hardly intermixed, undergirded
by, or contributory to either integration or stability. In the Modem world, change and
fragmentation is ever-present but so are integration and stability. Not only that but
Modernism has always utilised fragmentation and change as factors to contribute to
ongoing changeless essences such as Man, Freedom, and the endless Progress of
Science, Technology or the Economy. Change is thus linked to technological and
economic development, two icons o f the Modernist age. Fragmentation within this
social and cultural framework is usually conceived of as part o f modernisation and
improvement and the fragmentation o f community/society into its individuals is
important for the development of individualism and o f entrepreneurship.
If fragmentation and change are recognised as characteristics o f Modernity, they
are always linked to adjunct Modernist concepts like Progress, Mankind and
Freedom. All these concepts were bom in Modernity and died—without changing—by
the time o f Modernity’s supposed end; i.e. now.
When reconciling Bohm and Harvey we might note that Bohm is talking o f the
natural world and humanity’s relation to it and that Harvey is talking of the social
world and the human interest in explaining it. Harvey and Bohm are naturally more
interested in the social and natural worlds respectively since Harvey is a social
scientist and Bohm is a natural scientist and if engaged in conversation about
fragmentation they would likely talk past each other. Where Harvey would talk of the
fragmentation o f Modernity in terms o f social fragmentation and of postmodemity in
terms o f cultural, social and epistemological fragmentation, Bohm would prefer a
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simple binary division ol Modernity equals fragmentation and Postmodemity equals
an end to fragmentation.
For many postmodernist scholars this binary division of Bohm’s (Modernity is
that period where fragmentation exists in our views o f nature and Postmodemity is
that where nature’s unity is recognised) is either interpretable as 1) two strands o f
Modemism~i.e.: industrialism and romanticism—fighting it out, with romanticism the
rightful victor, or 2) as a clear cut case of Modernism and anti-Modernism. In this
regard we could abruptly state that Bohm has just got his postmodernism wrong. His
repulsion towards fragmentation is hardly a postmodern characteristic and this
compels me to declare that on the count o f fragmentation, Postmodern Science, once
again, fails to be postmodern.

cAnti-representational’ (e.g.; Lyotard, 1988; S.K. White, 1991; Adair, 1992;
Boyne and Rattansi, 1992; Trodd, 1998)
“I only want to speak out for Gaia because there are so few people who do,
compared with the multitudes who speak for people” (Lovelock, 1988:xvii). So says
James Lovelock in his second book on the Gaia theory; The Ages o f Gaia. Through
his geophysiological science of the biosphere Lovelock claims to have unearthed the
real nature o f life and to offer an appropriate avenue whereby the needs o f the whole
(Earth)—which were for a long time hidden from environmentalists—are now
displayed with abundant clarity.
As we can see from the statement above, Lovelock claims, no less, to represent
the Earth. Herein lies another problematic explored by postmodernists, that of
representation. Representation, it is said by postmodernists, is not feasible because
representation always involves ‘re-presentation’. Whether we are talking about the
epistemic representation o f the Truth by science, the political representation o f the
people by elected politicians or the cultural representation of identity through national
and social mythologies, representation is seen as an insidious cover for
non-participation, elitism and status quo politics. Given this, the Earth’s laws, desires,
needs et cetera are not so much represented in Lovelock’s Gaia theory so much as
they are ‘re-presented’ via particular cultural, political and philosophical biases that
afreet Lovelock and his theory.
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Whereas Modernist social progress has been advocated time and time again as a
widening o f representation in various social settings, “postmodernists believe that
representation encourages generalisation” (Rosenau, 1992:97). Indeed, this is what we
find in Lovelock’s representation o f Gaia since the nuances and plurality of the
world’s ecological communities are overshadowed by preoccupations with the big
picture. In this process o f generalisation Lovelock’s claims to representation are
helped by the abstraction o f the category of Life. Just as categories and abstractions
such as Reason, Man and Truth are too general to account for specific reasons,
humans and truths so Lovelock’s use o f Life is over-generalising. In this way when
Lovelock talks of Gaia maintaining the planet for Life he is re-presenting the lives of
species with the Life of Gaia. For many a postmodernist this victory o f the abstract
over the concrete is a hallmark of Modernism. If Gaia theory is inherently part of
Postmodern Science, as claims Merchant (1994), Ferre (1996) and Birch (1990) then
Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.

'Otherness’ (e g.: Foster, ed, 1983; S.K. White, 1991; Harvey, 1990; Pefanis,
1991; Tester, 1993)
David Harvey (1990:47) declares that:
the most liberative and therefore the most appealing aspect of postmodern
thought {is] its concern for otherness.

Otherness is usually described by postmodern sensibilities as that category of
objects and subjects which do not conform with, contribute to, or admire the
mainstream majority, mainstream Reason or mainstream knowledge. Usually this
refers to those members o f humanity whose histories, values, traditions and lifestyles
have been described (by that mainstream) as abnormal, strange, savage, uncivilised or
unnatural, and whose voices have been marginalized, patronised, forgotten or have
been filtered through mainstreamism. As far as the living world is concerned all
non-humans in the Modernist world have been treated in this way and so have been
sub-consciously branded by Modernist sensibilities as the other .
There is often a case made that ‘Nature’ itself has been badly treated by humans
in this way and, as a whole, is confined by humanity to the category of being an
‘other’. Thus it can be claimed that if you are protecting, speaking tor, and celebrating
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Nature in any shape or form you are celebrating ‘otherness’. Thus Lovelock can, and
does, claim that he is speaking for the silenced Earth as though it is a marginalized,
forgotten entity100.
However, Lovelock’s role as spokesperson for the planet Earth can also be
interpreted as shunning otherness. Instead of bringing every living thing into the fold
of the ecological community (as in Clements), the ecosystem (as in Odum) or the
global system (as in Lovelock), a postmodern approach might look at the differences
contained within these groupings; identifying how the parts are different from each
other rather than the same. When identifying the uniqueness of the parts, their
otherness is in some way released. In generalising the activities and properties of the
parts under the rubric o f the ‘superorganism’, the ‘ecosystem’ or the ‘global system’,
otherness is washed away. If Postmodern Science allies itself to the celebration o f
these unitary concepts then it, too, can hardly claim to be an effective celebrant of
otherness. On the count o f otherness, then, Postmodern Science fails to be
postmodern.

‘Intertextualitv’ (Barthes, 1970; Riffaterre, 1983; .Rosenau, 1992; Storey, 1998)
As indicated in Birch (1991) one of the ‘doctrines’ o f a worldview derived from
Postmodern Science is interconnectionism. It may be pointed out that there is a
potential articulation between Postmodern Science and postmodernism through their
respective focus upon interactionism and intertextuality, respectively.
Intertextuality, in postmodernist circles, is the acknowledgement of the
interconnected processes that go on in the making up of a text:
Writers who create texts or use words do so on the basis of all other texts
and words that they have encountered, while readers deal with them in
the same way. (Harvey, 1990:49).

This means, as Stephen Heath (1998:258) makes clear, that a written work “is
not a self contained, individually authored whole, but the absorption and
transformation of other texts”. Heath goes on to recite Kristeva (1967) to edify this
idea: a text is “a mosaic o f quotations” .
Now this would only seem to relate to Postmodern Science in a tangential way

100

See Lovelock (1979), Lovelock, (1988), and Lovelock (1991).
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since the interaction!sm supposed in postmodern intertextuality is only pertinent to
written documents. However, postmodern discourse analysts have concluded that all
discourses can be read as texts, whether written/printed or not. Therefore everything
that humans say anything about becomes a text, including those things we say about
nature and the things in it. In this way, nature, and the things in it, can exist in an
“infinitely complex interwoven relationships. Absolute intertextuality assumes that
everything is related to every thing else” (Rosenau; 1992:xii)) Postmodern Science
can thus possess the postmodern attribute of intertextuality because of its penchant
tor interconnectionism.
We may also, at this point, note Rosenau’s (1992:xiv) statement that:
[ejverything comes to be defined as a text in a postmodern context, and yet the text
is marked by an absence of any concrete or tangible content.

This statement can be compared with Charles Birch’s idea that there are no
objects and that Postmodern Science looks at events and processes as primary
compared to substances and objects (Birch, 1990) and realise a possibility of common
ground. However, whereas Birch would maintain that these ideas refer to real things
out in the real world, postmodern intertextualists would be inclined to believe that
their texts and their intertextualities are merely maps of an impossible-to-know, or
non-existent, reality. Texts such as Birch’s five doctrines of a Postmodern Worldview
are thus socially-complex human attempts to classify, describe and change our maps
o f the world—rather than actual reflections of the real world. Thus rather than
believing that atoms on Jupiter are interconnected with gorillas in the misty mountains
of Rwanda—as Birch might—postmodernists would say that gorilla’s are
socially-construed beings whose construction may be dependent upon the atomic
theories, scientific metaphors, cultural processes and intellectual contingencies that
describe the physics of Jupiter.
We may also be able to delineate another possible difference between
Postmodern Science’s holist interactionism and postmodern conceptions of
intertextuality. Whereas Postmodern Science thinks of things as being so
interconnected that they constitute a unity, postmodern intertextuality allows for holes
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in the net o f intertextuality; areas where there may be isolation between any two
texts.1U1 If Postmodern Scientists were to adopt similar ideas for their Postmodern
Science they would have to acknowledge the incompleteness of the world’s physical
and ecological interactions.
One aspect of interactionism that has been linked by Postmodern Scientists to
interactionism is the concept o f the unity of the observer and the observed, as
epitomised in Bohm’s view o f quantum physics. The familiar wave-particle thesis is
thought to be antithetical to Modernist sensibilities by Bohm (1994) because the
thing-ness o f the thing is determined by the context of the observer. Observed one
way an elementary particle can appear as a particle, observed another way, it appears
as a wave: “the quality o f the thing...” says Bohm (1994:347) “...depends on the
context”. For Wiessert (1991) this observer dependency also exposes the postmodern
nature o f quantum physics despite quantum physics obvious périodisation within the
Modernism of early Twentieth Century science.
So how does this relate to postmodernism? Well it might strike some readers as
being comparable to the postmodern predilection towards the elimination of a
context-independent reality as outlined in the above section on Truth. This would then
convey a certain degree of complimentarity between the postmodern intellectual
movement and Postmodern Science. I would warn against giving this complimentarity
much cognisance, however, since the context dependency of quantum physics as
described by Bohm and many others is a purely physical phenomenon dependent upon
the physics o f the equipment used to measure the subject of its studies (i.e.
fundamental particles); whereas critical postmodern views of context dependency are
thoroughly social and cultural in nature. The thing-ness ot a thing in ‘postmodern’
quantum physics is dependent on the equipment used to measure it but is otherwise
invariable whereas postmodern context-dependency would bring in those micro- and
macro socio-cultural factors that give rise to varying interpretations ot reality despite
the use o f exactly the same equipment.10

101This intertextual holiness is, in fact, necessary within the theory of postmodern intertextuality since if all
authors constructed their texts and if all readers read their texts on the basis of complete intertextuality then it is
likely that every writer/reader will have been exposed to very nearly the same collection of texts (a collection that
could be said to constitute a unity) and will very likely be writing and reading very similar things in those texts.
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‘Chaos7 (e.g.: Harvey, 1990; Hassan, 1987; Grant, 1998; Lewis, 1998)
Another one word characteristic of postmodernism might be chaos.
Postmodernism finds that differences in social situations and in the natural world
explicitly reflect the implicit chaotic nature of the social and natural universe. If this is
so, then it might be thought that Chaos theory is immediately relevant to postmodern
theorising. Indeed, this is the declared view of many Postmodern Scientists:
Advocates of postmodern science claim that the modem scientific paradigm...is
giving way to a new paradigm based on principles of indeterminacy, chaos
and evolution. (Best, 1991:189).

Wiessert (1991:224) is an example of one of these ‘Chaos theory is postmodern7
advocates and he talks about the ‘postmodern revolutions in Twentieth Century
science7 presented by Chaos theory102.
As we have seen in the previous chapter Chaos theory is held to be the
mathematical manifestation of the order from chaos concept:
new forms of order emerge out of chaos, albeit considerably more complex,
intricate and irregular in nature than the forms of order which previously
were thought to exist. (Best, 1991:202).

Chaos theorists have often derided ‘society’s7 fixation with the goodness of order
and the badness of chaos. This is a mistake, they believe, because chaos is a friend of
the world since it gives rise to order. Chaos and order, Chaos theorists say, are
connected and complimentary: chance is a part of purpose, stability is achieved
through change and order is hidden within chaos. As Best explains:
It should be emphasised that the chaos scientists are finding everywhere today
is not perceived as the logical antithesis ot order, for that is the type of rigid
binaristic thinking that postmodern science attempts to displace. (Best, 1991:66)

Although Chaos theory might disrupt the binary nature of the chaos-order
dichotomy in Modernist thought, it does this in a thoroughly Modernist way, by
having order usurp chaos. Although Chaos theory has been claimed as a Postmodern
Science and as a celebrant ot chaos, the chaos in Chaos theory is a bounded and
packaged user-friendly chaos, a chaos that can be managed, controlled, utilised and

102 Likewise Chaos theory has been associated with postmodernism by Hayles (1990), Worster (1993) Zimmerman
(1994), Gare (1995), Kember (1996), Jagtenberg and Mckie (1997) and Grant (1998).
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functionalised. Chaos is dished out in small doses—like vitamin pills—to help develop
orderly, progressive processes. In this way the chaos in Chaos theory is Modernist,
not postmodern. Modernists try to limit disorder and contingency; and this is what
Chaos theory, despite its claims, is largely about. Postmodern chaos, if it were
theorised, would not be bounded so. It would flourish uncontrollably. It would be a
chaos constituted by the happenings of local agents whose collective pattern is
sometimes interesting but hardly meaningful. Postmodern chaos could not be
packaged as some sort o f subsystem of variability within a mainframe system. It
would exist precisely because it could not be systematised and packaged.
This need not be a reinstatement o f the binary nature of order and chaos as Best
might allude, it can be a pluralisation of both sides of the dichotomy. Where
traditional conceptions (i.e. Modernist conceptions) of chaos and order have
presented them as a duality (i.e. have set them up as chaos versus order), and where
Chaos theory presents the chaos/order relationship as a union, deconstructive
postmodernism would see order and chaos, and the order/chaos duality, in plurality so
that there are many types of order and many types of chaos.
The chances are, however, that postmodernists might not even be prepared to
pluralise order and chaos so that there are many forms and instances of both order and
chaos. Instead they might wish to get rid of the concepts altogether, acknowledging
them as no more than power investing and power divesting cultural categories.
It is possible to respect the argument made by chaoticians that under Modernism,
chaos is regarded generally as a bad thing. The problem is, however, that their
particular chaos is such a pathetic chaos that they, too, appear to want it restrained by
order. In this way it seems as though Chaos theorists covertly regard chaos as bad
too. With a name like ‘Chaos theory’ and with its avowed interest in chaos you would
think that chaoticians were setting up a celebration of all those things that have come
to denote chaos; including for instance; anarchy, un-controlledness, wildness et
cetera. This is hardly the case, however. As intimated before Chaos theory is more of
a continuation of the Modernist celebration of order and how it is achieved than an
advocate o f its supersession.
Chaos theory only venerates chaos because it contributes to the natural order of
things. In Chaos theory, chaos is not the only thing worthy of value and of study; both
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order and chaos are valued and studied. Systems theorists call it ‘Chaos theory’, as
opposed to ‘Order theory’ because they believe that they are laying down new roads
towards the idea that chaos is valuable.
Order and chaos, even within Chaos theory, and very many times outside o f it,
are valued in different ways. Order is valued intrinsically, and chaos, instrumentally.
Thus order o f any type is valued in and o f itself; a manifestation the universe’s
essential goodness, whereas chaos is valued because it is instrumental in the making o f
order. We can detect this differential valuation of order and chaos in the following
statement by a chaotician: “[d]eep chaos is a natural, inescapable, essential stage in
the transformation of all life” (Merry, 1995:13). Here chaos is presented as a
phenomena that should be valued, not for itself but for its contribution to all life. If
chaotic phenomena are valued at all by Chaos theory, it is not because o f their
intrinsic worth, and it is not on parity with orderly processes, but because they
contribute to the intrinsic value held to lie in order and orderly phenomena.
What this means is that chaos, and those things deemed to be chaotic, exist as
secondary entities to those things deemed to be orderly. In the ecological arena this
means that those things which are held to be chaotic—which for many ‘order from
chaos’ metaphysicists often means such things as the behaviours o f individual
organisms and the groups they form—are only of value because they contribute to
orderly ecosystems and then the overall Gaian order. To entertain ‘ecological’ and
postmodern affinities, chaotic entities and processes must be given frill parity in value
with orderly entities and processes. Chaos must be regarded as a valuable whatever its
relationship to order.
Another way that Chaos theory tails to live up to the claims by Postmodern
Scientists that it is a postmodemisation o f science has been made by Rosenau (1992).
Despite being hailed as radical, revolutionary and anti-Modem science, Chaos theory
nevertheless emerged from traditional mathematical and physical sciences. Its
formalistic nature and its presumptions towards the practical problems ot Modem
physical problems thus enfolds it into the traditional techno-scientific framework. As
Rosenau points out:
[cjhaos m^ins not the end of modem science but rather a new science
that improves on the old and makes it even more powerful. (Rosenau, 1992:170).
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One particular advocate o f the ‘Chaos theory equals Postmodern Science’
equation admits as much, stating:
Chaos theory is not opposed to normal science. It is normal science. Its criteria
for evaluating evidence, reproducing results, credentialling investigators, and
so on, differs not at all from these other physical sciences. (Hayles, 1991:4)

Not only this but Chaos theory, and its relatives in the New Sciences such as
Complexity theory and Self-organisation theory are delivering messages of Baconian
utilitarianism in the same old way that Modernist science did:
Complexity is on the cutting edge of science. Physicist, Heinz Pagels put it
this way: 1 am convinced that the societies that muster the new sciences of
complexity and can convert that knowledge into new products and forms
of social organisation will become the cultural, economic, and military
superpowers of the next century. (Merry, 1989:53).

Having said all of this, however, there is a possible link between postmodernism
and Chaos theory and it proceeds as follows. Much of the postmodern movement has
been about capitulating to the fragmented material democracy that is thought to exist
in Free Market societies and culture. The Free Market is held to exist as a chaotic,
fragmented, heterogeneous social anarchy; very ‘postmodern’ one may think. But the
breed o f postmodernism that I am advocating here suggests that the Market is not an
unplanned assemblage of chaotic self-ordering and self-renewing fragmented
assemblages o f localised free and autonomous agents. The Market is more of a
totalitarian concept whose shallow plurality and plastic-coated anarchic freedom is a
public relations endeavour on a mammoth scale. Free Marketism portrays itself as a
free, open, unbounded and unplanned but, far from being unplanned, the capitalist
Free Market is very much a forced economic practice instituted by planning on the
mega-scale of multinational companies, international alliances, state-subsidisation and
centralised authoritarianism. As much centralised planning goes on within this
framework as ever did in Stalin’s Department ot Internal Aftairs but it seems that
Chaos theory lets its advocates feel proud of being part ot the benevolent chaos that is
the Market.

‘Incoherence’ (e.g.: Bauman, 1992; Babich, 1994)
According to Babich et a l (1994:1), postmodernism can be seen as “running up

184

against the modem ideal o f clarity and distinctness”. This, for some, is interpreted as a
negative thing and for others it is a positive.
Coherence serves as both a tool for action but also as a prison. It enables policy
formation since it oilers views upon which action may be taken but it also codifies
into a unitary form the widely divergent phenomena and experiences within the world;
rejecting difference and atypicality so that something can be said about some situation
and action can be put into effect.
When examining the relavance o f coherence to unitarianism we see that Edward
Goldsmith, for one, tells us that coherence is a most definite plan o f his
‘post-industrial metaphysics7:
1 have tried in this book to state clearly the basic principles underlying an
ecological worldview. These principles are closely interrelated, forming an
all-embracing and self-consistent model of our relationship with the
world in which we live. (Goldsmith 1993 pxvii).

Likewise Paul Davies seeks to realise the inherent coherence o f all o f nature’s
laws when he talks of the laws of the nature operating together, ‘dovetailing7, to
neatly present a coherent whole (Davies, 1987). Neither Davies, nor Goldsmith use
the term postmodernism in their elaboration of the metaphysics o f the New Sciences,
but their views on the meaning and operation of the universe are supported by many
of those that do (for example Birch, Gare, Griffin, Ferre). These Postmodern
Scientists also implicitly testify to the importance o f arriving at a coherent natural
philosophy.
What all this means in this analysis, however, is the unearthing of yet another
divergence between aspects of Postmodern Science and aspects of postmodernism.
Whereas Postmodern Science wants to codify and integrate a precise worldview upon
which ethical changes can rest soundly, postmodernism might choose to explicate
wholly variable, multiple and sometimes contradictory worldviews in which the
objects and subjects therein contained are also thought of as being variable, multiple
and self-contradictory. In this light, a single view of nature as unitary, holistic,
interconnected—and a single view of all the various processes of nature as
self-organising orderings—may be coherent and understandable concepts but they are
also imprisoning concepts since by imploring us to believe that the universe, and all
life in it, is a single self-organising, holistic system (for whatever intellectual or

-
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political reason) other ways that the universe may be understood and interpreted are
de-legitimised.

'Anti-teleological7 (e.g.: Slack, & Whitt, 1992).
After observing the order in Gaia and her ecosystems and after observing the
evolutionary legacy of the members o f Gaia and her ecosystems, Paul Davies declares
that life on Earth “has a pleasing teleological character to it77 (Davies, 1987:132).
Charles Birch (1991) a self-declared Postmodern Scientist reiterates the same point
over and over again in his book on metaphysics titled On Purpose. This is a book
obviously designed to counter what Birch perceives as the predilections towards
meaninglessness in science and the meaningless human lives it supposedly leads to.
Reconciling Davies7 and Birch’s focus on teleology within the 'New Paradigm7 o f
Postmodern Science with more general postmodern sensibilities in academic writings
is not easy since many postmodernist writers would be classified as being avowedly
anti-teleological in their approach. Such postmodern suspicion of teleology arises
from a variety of quarters; its relationship to Progress being a primary site.
Postmodernists see that Progress has become such a mythic emblem within
Modernism that it is hard to contemplate social change without the word and the idea
being raised. Technological and economic progress are particularly relevant here.
Grenz (1996:7), for instance, declares that postmodernists are involved in “eschewing
the enlightenment myth o f inevitable progress77. Progress, the idea, is thus described
by postmodernists as a product o f Modernism and it manifests itself mostly as
pertaining to economic, technological and scientific development. lu3 To abandon
Progress as basic and fundamental, as the postmodernists have, is:
is to accept the idea that history may have no purpose, that it is not an
evolutionary or progressive march towards an emanicpatory te lo s, but rather
a contingent set of events, often accidental and with many unanticipated
consequences. (Farganis, 1993:364).301

103
However, it also pervades other fields of human endeavour and much borrowing, analogising and
metaphorical interplay between the fields can be found. I will not go into these interplays here except to restate that
when the history of science and the history of economics are analysed together the exact origins of the Progress
myth become blurred. Neo-classical economists used analogies from Darwin and Spencer that were themselves
informed by the work of classical economists (see Mirowski, ed. 1994).
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When dismissing Progress, postmodernists are usually talking from within
disciplines dealing with human agents and processes, for example history, philosophy,
development studies, sociology, cultural studies, history of science et cetera. Within
all o f these disciplines, Progress has been abandoned by the resident postmodernists
and along with it any teleological arguments which state that what has gone on
before, say in society, is leading in an identifiable direction towards more social
complexity, higher living standards, greater knowledge, expanded freedom and so on.
Science itself has long been hooked up on the idea of Progress. Not only does
Progress in scientific discovery and knowledge occur most profoundly in science
compared to other human endeavours, but also in the subjects of its study. In biology
(and also a lot of non-biological disciplines) this progress is encapsulated in various
evolution theories, most notably ‘evolution by natural selection’. Within biology there
lies a metaphysical tendency to pronounce on about how complex things evolve from
simpler things.
While many scientists try to eschew teleology as an explanation within evolution
most Postmodern Scientists are not so adverse to the use ot teleology and purpose
when describing the activities of nature. Birch, Davies and Goldsmith, for example,
feel that it is an integral part of their scientific and metaphysical descriptions ot the
world. If this is so, then there is obviously a sharp difference of opinion between
Postmodern Science and that of postmodernism, generally. On the count of
anti-teleology, Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.

‘Heterogeneity’ ( e.g. Hassan, 1987; Heller and Feher, 1988; Zagorin, 1990;
Pefanis, 1991; Sim, ed,1998).
Where Modernity sought to unite science, art and philosophy with reality in an
attempt to change things for a universally acknowledged better world, where
Modernity sought to unite the troubles ot the all the world s peoples under the banner
o f countering classism, racism and sexism; where Modernity s theories ot social
change posited utopian ideals to mark out a desired model and pre-planned course ot
improvement; postmodemity would do otherwise. Postmodernism seeks to reveal
reality as a multifarious assemblage of elements. It diversifies and multiplies the
oppressions and concerns of people and the angles ot attack against such oppressions
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and for such concerns. Postmodernism recognises that single master models of social
being and social development must give way to, what Foucault would say are,
heterotopian images o f what is and what can be. In a world acknowledging
heterogeneity we must, says Foucault (1983 :xiii), “prefer what is positive and
multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over
systems”. In heterotopia there can be little room for confining belief in just a single
idea or a single God, and there is also little room for an all-embracing metaphysics
and for universal laws and principles.
So does Postmodern Science, or the Constructive Postmodern worldview, allow
for heterogeneity and pluralism? Its allegiance with systems and unities would not
convince Bauman, Derrida or Lyotard since these postmodernists have taken as a
prime problematic the need to disintegrate the systems concepts and their
homogenising tendencies . Charles Birch’s dismissal o f the idea that the universe can
be considered fractured, and his entrenched commitment to a single universe and a
single way o f looking at it104, would, in this regard, seem to place him firmly within
the Modernist mode. And along with Birch, are carried many other Postmodern
Scientists who would, likewise, tend to very similar single and unitary views of reality.
Given this different attitude with regard to heterogeneity, it seems likely that
Postmodern Science fails to be convincingly associated with postmodernism.

'Anti-hierarchical’ (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Bauman,
1992))
Bauman believes “postmodemity...is about flattening of hierarchies, absence of
discretion and equivalence” (Bauman, 1992:34). This again imposes a distinction
between Postmodern Science and postmodernism because Postmodern Science, as we
have seen, involves a promotion of a self-organising, united universe which, as we
have also seen, is necessarily inscribed with hierarchy and hierarchical concepts.
Postmodern thought, instead of ascribing nature and society in hierarchical terms,
would attach itself to non-hierarchical conceptualisations such as Deleuze and
Guattari’s 'Thousand Plateau’s’ (1987) where knowledge and the things it refers to

104Birch (1990:129) states “the postmodern worldview takes seriously the proposition that we live in a universe
and not a multiverse. It is ecological through and through”.
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are disseminated into multiple planes, none o f which are more basic or o f higher
stature than others. On the count o f being ‘anti-hierarchical7, Postmodern Science
tails to be postmodern.

‘Meaninglessness7: (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Harvey, 1990; Bauman, 1992)
If we allow only one thing to characterise Postmodern Science, that one thing
might well be its search tor ultimate meanings. If we allow only one thing to
characterise postmodernism then that one thing might well be its rejection o f ultimate
meanings. For postmodernists ultimate meanings, and the search tor them, totalise the
myriad realities o f the world into restrictive schemes that can hardly do justice to the
differences o f opinions, ways o f living and experiences that abound.
For Postmodern Scientists, the search tor new ultimate meanings must go on in
order to both free us from the meaninglessness o f the Modernist universe and to
overturn oppressive Modernist ideals:
if there is no formulation to the meaning of our life, we are adrift. One of the
agonising dilemmas of our times is the death of meaning. The relentless
march of the empiricist worldview has denuded us of meaning.
(Skolomowski, 1981:100).

Charles Birch is one o f the Postmodernist Scientists who has been searching for
the meanings that have been ejected by Modem science. Here, again, Birch’s focus on
meaning is unitary and singular; there is only one meaning and all must follow it. Birch
admits that the universe is in some way composed o f numerous individual entities that
appear to be manufacturing their own experiences and their own meanings but about
this he states:
A multiplicity of creative agents implies the need for the rule of one. Too
many cooks spoil the broth. There must be something that sets limits to the
contusion and anarchy possible with a multiplicity of creative agents.
Individual purposing agents need to be co-ordinated. (Birch, 1990:43).

These two sentences tend to express exactly what Postmodern Scientists are
willing to give up in the search for their ultimate meaning, namely difference, dissent,
and contusion. The need for an ultimate ordered and ordering meaning takes away the
individualistic nature o f meaning. Meanings can only exist as mega-entities for
Postmodern Scientists not as micro-entities which are merely part o f the changing
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mindscape in the lives o f individuals and groups o f individuals.
Both Skolimowski and Birch try and characterise the lack o f meaning as a
Modernist project but Modernism is replete with many founding principles that are
equivalent with meaning. Progress, Truth, Unity, Freedom, Man; all o f these concepts
are positioned within Modem science as fundamental and all are hailed as meaning
invested conceptualisations replete with a religious ambience to the point that people
not affirming them are held out as heretical.
Another reason for requiring ultimate meanings to be discovered and
disseminated, according to the ideas o f Postmodern Scientists, is to replace
environmentally and socially malignant ultimate meanings105 with new,
environmentally and socially benign ones. On this score we can note how many
philosopher-environmentalists, including all known Postmodern Scientists, have
attempted to wrestle the struggle for existence metaphor away from nature and
expose it as a bourgeois interpretation o f the natural world which justifies the laissez
faire capitalism o f Modernism. In its place they seek to imbue nature with an intrinsic
co-operative meaning; upon which they wish to erect their varying aspirations for a
post-industrial or postmodern ecological society (see Bookchin, 1990;
Goldsmith, 1993; Sylvan, 1994, as recent examples)
A thoroughly postmodern appraisal of the situation, however would not attempt
to describe nature with any meaning. Although a meaningless nature casts our
metaphysical outlook on life adrift from any cosmic purpose, at least we are not
enslaved into the metaphorical ravings of those who attempt to exercise control over
us by appealing to the natural law o f things. Each individual106 develops its own
meaning o f nature (though this is, most of the time, mediated by its socio-ecological
context) whose precise characteristics are unique to that individual. The unique
contextualised experiences of each individual and the absence o f totally transcribable
true representation and communication of those experiences (due to the inherent
difference in each individual7s contextualised experiences) means that no two
individuals can have the same compliment of experience-generated meanings. Every

105Which for Postmodern Scientists sometimes includes those meanings that I have identified above as arising
within Modernism. For example: Humanism, Materialism (and its associations with productivism and
consumption!sm), and Progress.
106Here an individual might be human or non-human.
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individual thus carries around with it its own hermeneutical universe. Meaning is thus
localised and de-centred into the mini-universes that exist as each individual. Where
meanings do overlap from one individual to the next, there are plenty of meanings to
divide and differentiate them.
Something to note here is that such individuation o f meaning within the human
realm does not have to lead directly to nihilism and the abdication of social
responsibility (although many a modernist and postmodernist alike often allude to this
as being the case). While meaning is individualised, the inter-subjective abrasion of
meanings—via the collision and conflicting of clashing universes—is a prime medium
for the voices of difference to be heard. An over-arching meaning acts to stifle this
abrasion and silence the exchange that flows from inter-universal conflict.
Because “the postmodern perspective reveals the world as composed of an
indefinite number of meaning generating agencies, all relatively self-sustained and
autonomous, all subject to their own respective logics and armed with their own
facilities o f truth validation” (Bauman, 1992:35), then to prescribe meanings for other
universes is an act of metaphysical imperialism; an attempt to colonise another
universe and reconfigure its reality.
To construct a particular underlying or ultimate meaning for nature (whether that
meaning is based upon co-operation or competition, or unity or duality) has a
tendency to neglect the many instances in nature where neither co-operation nor
competition nor any other ultimate meaning are relevant. Such neglect would defocus
empathy with the lived experiences of individual organisms and the collections they
comprise. Somehow there must be a willingness to allow multiple sets of meanings
and multiple sets of purposes in the universe rather than one ultimate meaning and one
ultimate purpose.
For many postmodernists the idea of meaning is itself a dangerously stifling and
totalitarian concept. It places singularity and closed-ness on whatever it is referring to;
a sentence, a social pattern or the whole universe. For postmodernists the only way
out is to get rid of it. And this applies especially to the penchant for ultimate meanings
that Postmodern Scientists advocate are floating around in the universe waiting to be
uncovered.
As an example o f the tyranny of meaning consider Wheatley and her
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organisational attractors. She asks the question ‘Is there a magnetic force, a basin for
activity, so attractive that it pulls all behaviour toward it and creates coherence?” Yes,
she answers, by saying:
[mjy current belief is that we do have such attractors at work in organisations
and that one of the most potent shapers of behaviour in organisations, and
in life is m ean in g. (Wheatley, 1992:187).

Wheatley’s equation o f attractors with meaning is a telling connection between
Chaos theory and its closeness to unifying and universalising thought. Remember;
Wheatley’s theories are an attempt—or at least they make a pretence
towards—breaking down the monolithic structure of organisations and their
decision-making and action-taking systems. With pretences towards this supposed
new liberty and localisation o f organisation decision-making and action-taking
Wheatley nevertheless feels it important to bring in the concept o f ‘meaning’. Suppose
we think o f ‘Meaning’ as a word given over to describing a ‘unity of purpose’, a
‘reason for being’. This, in relation to Wheatley’s statements above, suggests that she
is claiming that the behaviour of parts of an organisation are governed by a ‘unity of
purpose’ or ‘reason for being’.
If this is so, then the important question to ask here becomes: ‘where does this
leave freedom and autonomy in these organisations?’ Freedom and autonomy have
been granted if, and only if, it conforms to the ‘natural’ boundaries of the strange
attractor that Wheatley calls meaning. This might be all right if the organisation exists
under a meaning that is imbued with sentiments that indicate the importance of those
who work in the organisation and how they may be kept happy and contented.
However, the ‘meaning’ o f an organisation, especially in the late Twentieth Century is
almost always more likely to revolve around either profit or efficiency, than it is
around worker iulfilment.
Under the operation o f an ultimate meaning like profit, it individuals do not
contribute to, or at least live by, this meaning (to this ‘unity of purpose , to this
‘reason for being’) they cease to be part of the organisational system and will be either
made to come back into line or be expunged from the system altogether. What this
means for those entities that make up the system, otherwise known as people, is that
they have to do what the management says or be let go. If Wheatley’s organisation is
to eschew this totalitarianism, and if organisations are to be made more able to deal
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with freedom and localism, they must eschew the existence o f a primary overarching
meaning and realise that an organisation is full o f highly dispersed and highly
contingent meanings, none of which should be necessarily applicable to all members.
From this analysis, it is necessary to conclude that, on the count of
‘meaninglessness7, Postmodern Science fails to be postmodern.

‘Anti-foundational7 (e.g. Hassan, 1987; Harvey, 1990; Best and Kellner, 1991;
Lyotard, 1988)
As Best and Kellner (1991:4) point out, postmodern theory finds that:
Modem theory-ranging from the philosophical project of Descartes,
through the Enlightenment, to the social theory of Comte, Marx, Weber
and others~is criticised for its search for foundational knowledge, for its
universalising and totalising claims, for its hubris to supply apodictic truth,
and for its allegedly fallacious rationalism.

Although Postmodern Science is often hard on rationalism it nevertheless stands
within Modem theory as Best and Kellner fashion it in the above quote. Just as
Enlightenment thinkers searched for principles that could be placed at the foundations
o f all social and philosophical theory so Postmodern Scientists search for the
foundations o f a true description of the world which may forever-more be held as
basic knowledge. As has been revealed above the foundations for Postmodern Science
lie within the unity concept, and its accompanying ideas of balance, hierarchy and
order, and it is upon this foundation that new scientific knowledge, ecological insight,
environmental evaluation and social policy must be crafted. It the characters of these
latter human endeavours may change, waxing and waning to historical contingency,
Postmodern Scientists like Birch, Gare, Ferre and Artigiani are nevertheless
determined to embed unity as the bedrock foundation of all being-ness.
If, as Haney (1994) alludes in his studies of postmodemity, anti-foundationalism
is an openness to the questions o f is-ness of the world, then Postmodern Science must
be interpreted as belonging to Modernity since it has closed down this avenue of
debate by stating and restating that the is-ness of the world is one of undeniable unity.
Another obvious problem for Postmodern Scientists revolves around the
enunciation o f alternatives. Postmodernism, it is usually suggested by its supporters,
offers an explanation o f worldviews without a recourse to an alternative since to do
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so would harden a whole plethora o f biases, metaphors and illusions into dangerous
theoretical unities that might soon act as foundational statements-casting down their
own sermons and policy-plans. Alternative foundations (in the study o f nature or of
society) are just not an alternative for most postmodernists. Postmodern Scientists,
however, jump easily from critiquing certain foundations-that of atomism, for
instance-into erecting another in its place-that of holism. This active programme for
the construction o f an alternative foundation, from which all perspectives of the
universe must in some way associate themselves, shows that, on the count of
anti-foundationalisnT, Postmodern Science may well fail to be postmodern.

cAnti-systems7 (Bauman. 1992; Lyotard, 1984; Foucault 1994; Sim, ed, 1998)
The first victim of advancing postmodernity was the invisibly present, tacitly
assumed spectre of the system, the source and the guarantee of meaningliilness of
the sociological project and in particular, of the orthodox consensus. (Bauman,
1992:39).

Pertaining to Bauman’s above comment, there seems to be a sharp contradiction
between Postmodern Science and postmodernism. While postmodernists have
sometimes expressed an intellectual outrage against the unifying assumptions implicit
in systems thinking, Postmodern Science is actually dependent on, descended from
and completely at ease with systems theories of all sorts. Whereas Artigiani, Birch,
and Gare and other Postmodern Scientists advocate one form or another of systems
thinking, Bauman goes on to state:
postmodemity would do well if it disposed of concepts like the system in its
orthodox and organismal sense...Suggestions of a sovereign totality
logically prior to its parts, a totality bestowing meaning on its parts, a
totality whose welfare or perpetuation all smaller (and by definition
subordinate) units serve; in short a totality assumed to define....the
meanings of individuals....that compose it. (Bauman, 1992:190).

POSTMODERN SCIENCE AS POSTMODERNISM: THE VERDICT

What this section tends to show, then, is that Postmodern Science is hardly
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postmodern. Instead of recognising heterogeneity, diversity, difference,
meaninglessness (all o f which are acknowledged characteristics o f postmodernism)
and instead o f rejecting fbundationalism, systemisation and teleology (which are
rejected by most academic postmodernists), Postmodern Science promotes systems,
defends unity against fragmentation and aporia, calls for foundations and searches for
foundational meanings (including the ultimate meaning of life and the universe).
To be sure, you do not have to exhibit all of the above characteristics to be
postmodern, and many postmodern studies have little to do with some o f them, but
any strong claim towards postmodernism might be thought capable o f generously
embracing at least a tew o f the ideas in some way. With regards to Postmodern
Science and its claims towards postmodernism, Postmodern Science might be seen to
reflect aspects o f some particular postmodern characteristics listed above, perhaps
intertextuality for example, but surely if you can qualify as being postmodern by
exhibiting a tenuous link with just one particular characteristic of postmodernism then
might you not be disqualified from postmodern membership if you exhibit the
antithesis o f any other one characteristic—and certainly if' you exhibit the antithesis of
nineteen o f those characteristics?

INTELLECTUAL IMPERIAL! SM/TOTALITARIANISM

We have already seen how Gaia exhibits a tendency for space imperialism but we
can also raise questions with regard to its intellectual imperialism. When Lovelock
speaks o f modem science he says:
The Victorians were careless when they allowed science to divide and become
an array of sectarian expertises. Each newly separated science soon developed
its own argot and gang of professors who ruled, from the cloistered turrets of their
universities, over sharply bounded fiefs. (1991:90).

As we shall see, however, far from attending to a destruction of these cloistered
fietdoms o f knowledge, it seems as though Lovelock and his systems colleagues
would like to erect systems theory as the all pervasive imperial ruler over the kingdom
o f science (and over the whole cascade o f human knowledge).
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To see the how the New Sciences are involved in such an intellectual colonising
endeavour, witness this statement by one of its agents of colonisation in the area of
organisational management:
1 share the sentiments of physicist Frank Oppenheimer who says 'if one has a new
way of thinking why not apply it wherever one’s thought leads to?’ (Wheatly:
1992:13).

By intellectual totalitarianism I am referring to the desire to have a theory explain
the totality of existence (or a large chunk of it) without the need for alternative
theories. This sort of totalitarianism is most manifest in what we might call the
colonising o f other disciplines. Systems theory, for instance, seeks to make itself the
central idea in the study o f biology, ecology, economics, society, physiology, et
cetera. This type of colonising endeavour sometimes goes by the name of
‘multi-disciplinarianisnT. Systems theory is put forward as a theoretical nexus of
various disciplines but if the traditions of those disciplines are inimical to the systems
approach they are ignored; cast off as ephemeral practices and consequently
marginalised. This is the way that systems theory has characteristically rode into the
various areas of its concern. In sociology it accepts the unity of culture of Durkheim
and Parsons without looking at the dissension of Marx and Baran. In ecology it looks
at the integration of ecosystems and communities by Odum and Clements without
looking at the disintegration of ecological communities by Gleason.
This intellectual totalitarianism started early in the history of what Postmodern
Scientists would probably have us believe is the forerunner to their Postmodern
Science; i.e. systems theory. For instance, when talking about the systems theorist
Norbert Wiener, Fritjof Capra says:
Wiener was not only a brilliant mathematician but also an articulate philosopher.
(in tact, his degree from Harvard was in philosophy). He was keenly interested
in biology and appreciated the richness of natural, living systems. He looked
beyond the mechanisms of communication and control to larger patterns
of organisation and tried to relate his ideas to a wide range of social and cultural
issues. (Capra, 1996:54).

Capra then goes on to explain the universalist tendencies ot another early systems
theorist (and proto-Postmodem Scientist); Ludwig von Bertalanfiy:
[s|mce living systems span such a wide range of phenomena, involving individual
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organisms and their parts, social systems and ecosystems, Bertallanfy believed
that a general systems theory would offer an ideal conceptual framework for
unifying various scientific disciplines that had become isolated and fragmented.
(Capra, 1996:116).

Capra then goes on to approvingly quote Bertalanfly (Capra, 1996:49) when he
says:
General Systems Theory should be an important means of controlling and
instigating the transfer of principles from one field to another, and it will no
longer be necessary to duplicate or triplicate the discovery of the same
principle in different fields isolated from each other.

As already noted in earlier chapters Bertalanfly himself has explained the exact
nature o f systems comparative studies as “The search for such isomorphies is a major
pursuit o f systems science” (Bertalanfly, 1967); these isomorphies being
a consequence of the fact that in certain aspects, corresponding abstractions
and conceptual models can be applied to different phenomena. It is in view of
these aspects that system laws will apply. (Bertallanfy, 1967:118).

Carrying on this tradition—that systems theorists might call
multi-disciplinarianism but many postmodern intellectuals might feel to be intellectual
imperialism—the systems theorists of the late Twentieth Century also state that
systems theory is applicable to diverse and seemingly disparate fields. Capra, for
instance, states that since:
living systems cover such a wide range of phenomena—individual organisms,
social systems, and ecosystems—the theory provides a common framework and
language for biology, psychology, medicine, economics, ecology, and many
other sciences, a framework in which the so urgently needed ecological
perspective is explicitly manifest. (Capra, 1994:335-336).

Agreeing with Capra, and problematising it in terms of Postmodern Science,
Kuppers claims that the new paradigm of Postmodern Science might have roots in
physics but has obvious and not so obvious “applications to the humanities. ’
(Kuppers, 1990:52).
Similarly Merry likes to see the New Sciences as being directly applicable to
social science:
The social and behavioural sciences, both theoretical and applied, are at the
beginning of the road of applying the insights of the New Sciences to their

197

field of study and practice. (Merry, 1995:24).

Wheatley (1992), as we have already seen, sees the complex systems theory of
the New Sciences as being applicable in organisational management. Others, however,
do not stop at proclaiming the relevance of systems ideas to just one particular
discipline; they believe Postmodern Science’s applicability is quite universal. Merry
(1995) for instance talks o f Ilya Prigogine’s chemical ‘order from chaos’ concept107 (a
central tenet in the New Sciences and also--as Fabel, 1994, tells us—in Postmodern
Science) as being applicable to many other areas:
Prigogine’s theory could be applied to chemical solutions, to termites
building nests, to traffic jams and to the growth of cities, it could describe
and explain transformation in a person’s belief system, in organisations, in
cultures, in political systems, and in all historical eras. In all of these systems
new patterns of order emerge out of chaos. In all of these, the same phenomenon
takes place. (Merry, 1995:44).

Mingers says much the same of self-organisation:
Maturana’s and Varela’s concept of autopoesis, originally a biological
concept has made a remarkable impact not just on a single area, but across
widely differing disciplines such as sociology, policy science, psychotherapy,
cognitive science and law. (Mingers, 1995 :ix)108.

For Capra the same is said of Erich Jantsch’s (1980) self-organisation ideas:
Erich Jantsch...makes it possible to begin to understand biological, social,
cultural and cosmic evolution in terms of the same pattern ol systems dynamics.
(Capra, 1982:310).

Davies also finds the universality of self-organisation appealing:
Again and again we have seen examples of how organised behaviour has
emerged unexpectedly and spontaneously from unpromising beginnings. In
physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, computing—indeed, in
every branch of science-the same propensity for self-organisation is
apparent. (Davies, 1987:200)

Not to be outdone, Capra also reaffirms the universality ot self-organisation.
As 1 mentioned before, living systems include individual organisms, social

107See Prigogine and Stengers (1984).
108Maturana and Varela’s work on self-organisation can be fcund in Maturana and Varela (1980).
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systems and ecosystems, and thus the new theory can provide a common
framework and language for a wide range of disciplines --biology,
psychology, medicine, economics, ecology and many others. (Capra, 1994:338).

Another advocate o f the New Sciences, Alan Moore, expresses this ability
of the New Sciences to explain everything in an even stronger fashion:
In a way Chaos and fractal maths gets rid of the need for a God. Previously people
said that the unfathomable complexity of existence was the best argument lor
the existence of a creator. But Chaos and the Mandelbrot Set say that’s not
the case, that with one simple rule fed into a primordial mess, you can
have infinitely complex, perfect order emerging. (Moore quoted in Wright, 1996:228)

This universalism is such a strong current in complex systems theory that it has
been expressed as being a core characteristic of the discipline. For instance witness
Krohn et a l (1990) who proclaim that we are:
lojbserving a present day scientific revolution encompassing many fields of
the natural and social sciences as well as of the humanities109.

109 While all these programmatic statements show us the totalising intentions of Postmodern Scientists, can it still
be claimed that such colonising actually occurs? As Postmodern Science is very young as a label (only being
properly bom in the 1990s) it is more suitable that I give examples of the colonising feats of its intellectual parent;
systems theory. This has been done in some detail by Lilienfeld (1988) who, in a chapter titled ‘The M ig ra tio n o f
S ystem s T h eo ry ’, lays down evidence that the ‘besetting vices’ of systems theory have migrated into public
policy-making, psychiatry, organisational studies, social work, and global economics. If the New Sciences follow
its parent—as its advocates are hoping and working for—then a similar migration of Chaos theory.
Self-organisation theory and Complexity theory from the realm of the abstract and the mathematical to ‘real-life’
application will ensue. Some notable examples of such migration of the New Sciences into various disciplines
include: literary theory (Hayles,1990), sociology (Luhman, 1990), psychology (Sulis and Combs, 19%), planrung
(Cartwright, 1991), art theory (Sobchack, 1990; Schlain, 1991), economics (Anderla e t a l, 1997), market analysis
(Parker and Stacey, 1995), geology (Turcotte, 1992), population geography (Dendrinos, 1990), neurobiology
(Basar, ed, 1990), history (Abraham, 1994), electronics (Van Wyk and Steeb, 1997) and organisational studies
(Wheatley. 1992). It might be noted here that given its tendency to cross-disciplines, postmodernism might itself
be accused of being a colonising discourse. However, most postmodernists would hold that postmodernism hardly
issues programmatic statements aimed to inspire trans-disciplinary colonisation. Instead postmodernists would
point out that when postmodernism does cross disciplines it does so in an attempt to re-story the human sciences so
that new stories are opened up or made possible. Systems theory, on the other hand, closes down story-telling by
issuing a monolithic, universal story that acts to position all other stories within itself. Where postmodernism
attempts to pluralise stories wherever it goes, systems theory—and its relations—act to unify various stories. This
difference ran be demonstrated by acknowledging that the stories of systems theory can all be related to the key
concepts of self-organisation and feedback. When systems theory (and the New Sciences, and Postmodern Science)
advance narratives about anything in nature they always include the essential processes of self-organisation or
feedback. Without them, systems theory would have no story; it would not exist. On the other hand there is no
essence to postmodernism; no essential focal narrative which must be retold in order to characterise a postmodern
story as postmodern. Postmodernism is more a ‘structure of feeling’ (Pfeil, 1988) than a codified theoretical
framework. While systems theory’s identity is very strongly linked with its essence of self organisation and
feedback, postmodernism has no identity; or if it does it is plural and heterogeneous. This lack of a central plank
mpanc that postmodernism, when it does enter into unfamiliar intellectual territory, can be moulded and shaped at
will by those whose territory it is entering.
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An explanation for the universal appeal of the systems theory within the New
Sciences and Postmodern Science is attempted by Capra:
it is useful to keep in mind that dynamical systems theory is not a theory of
physical phenomena but a mathematical theory whose concepts and
techniques apply to a broad range of phenomena. The same is true of Chaos
theory and the theory of fractals, which are important branches of dynamical
systems theory. (Capra;1996:112)

Lilienfeld also talks about abstraction. To Lilienfeld this abstractness is the prime
heuristic and practical weakness of systems theory since:
systems theory achieves its all encompassing ‘universality' only by its
very abstractness. All things are systems by virtue of ignoring the specific, the
concrete, the substantive. (Lilienfeld, 1978:192).110

Either way, whether we class mathematics or philosophy (or non-linear physics
or evolution or any other intellectual entity) as the foundation of the New Sciences it
is becoming clear that the New Sciences, and Postmodern Science along with it, are,
despite their veneer o f holism, of a reductionist character due to their appeal to
founding principles which all phenomena may be reduced to. If we define
reductionism as does Dupre (1993:87): “[rjeductionism, in its broadest sense, is the
commitment to any unifactorial explanation of a range of phenomena”, then we see
that the mathematics and philosophy of self-organisation in the New Sciences is such
a unifactorial explanation. All things; mountains, galaxies; ecosystems, eating habits
etc., can be reduced to the mathematics and philosophy of self-organisation and its
associated ideas.
So how does all this relate to postmodernism? The answer that academic
scholars o f postmodernism would give would be ‘only negatively!5. This sort of
universalism is exactly what postmodernists object to. The drawing up of founding
principles that can be applied to all phenomena is one of the most striking critiques of
postmodernism:
The postmodern mind does not expect any more to find the all-embracing, total
and ultimate formula of life without ambiguity, risk, danger and error and is

110It is interesting to note that this is the same criticism that sociologists have often levelled at the idea of the
social system. For instance Abercrombie e t a l (1984) note that one of the arguments against social system theory is
that “many of the propositions of the theory are tautological and vacuous. For example, in the last analysis the
existence of a social system is the only real evidence of its adaptation to its environment.
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deeply suspicious of any voice that promises otherwise. (Bauman, 1993:245).

Postmodernism talks about the pluralising and localising of knowledges and
beliefs, not of their integration into one all encompassing, universalising and totalising
set o f ideas. If this is so then there is surely little justification for Postmodern Science
to continue to call itself such; since it is a name infected with self-contradiction.
We might like to ask, then, how Postmodern Scientists can possibly see
themselves as postmodern? Having enunciated the varied and sometimes unconnected
elements o f postmodernism above it is hard to see how comments like the following
one from Birch (1990:140) can possibly be referring to postmodernism:
Knowledge is lost in a sea of beliefs from a multitude of disciplines. The
general purpose of the modem university is lost amid the incoherent variety
of special purposes that have accumulated within it. The call of the postmodern
worldview is for fewer beliefs and more belief.

One may suspect that Birch and the other Postmodern Scientists are devoid of
knowledge of postmodern theory but this is not the whole story. Birch, like Griffin,
labels the postmodern negativity towards metanarratives ‘deconstructive’, whereas
they themselves wish to pursue a ‘constructive’ brand of postmodernism where
metanarratives are reassembled. Postmodern Science is thus, according to Gare
(1995:159), looking for a new ‘mediating master discourse’ produced by reflection
and mediation between all other discourses.
This word, ‘mediating’, conjures up all sorts of cultural possibilities. It could
refer to a mutually selected governor that brings to the fore a clarity of focus in
assembling the concerns o f differing partners or it could mean the authoritative
handing down oflaw that must be obeyed by both parties whether they like it or not.
Most commonly it conjures up the image of the latter proceeding under the guise of
the former, and this is the concern of deconstructive postmodernists. What might
seem like an innocent, sharing, participatory, universally-pleasing, considerate and
holistic framework for deciding the nature of the universe must always possess the
dangers o f intellectual totalitarianism where micro-narratives are marginalised it they
conflict with larger metanarratives. No worldview can be without the possibility that
totalitarianism might come with it.
Having said all of this, there are a few people that nevertheless put forward
Postmodern Science as being capable o f recognising the necessity of localised and

-
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plural metaphysical viewpoints. Wiessert, for example, in writing about Chaos theory,
says:
In non-linear dynamical systems, island of order arise from the sea of chaos.
The interspersed order comprehensible where chaos is not, implies
abandoning the modernist project of a global theory and attempting to compile
a postmodern catalogue of local theories. (Wiessert, 1991:225)

While complex systems theory might be capable of recognising the localism of
particular islands of order, all the islands of order arise according to the same laws as
each other. They are separated by space but are nevertheless basically the same since
they are governed by the same laws of formation.
This link between superficial difference and universal sameness is noticeable
throughout much of the writings on New Science and Postmodern Science.111 We can
see it, for example, when we look once more at the levels of organisation that New
Scientists are so fond of pointing out. Levels are physically different from each
other—hierarchically separated in space and time—but their underlying laws of
formation and organisation remain the same.
About the levels that both Modernist and Postmodern Scientists see, postmodern
scholars in academia would more likely view them as fields of discourse. Scientific
traditions have carved out traditions of practice and discursive fields within what both
old and New Science announce as levels or scales. To integrate these levels by
presupposing common mathematical principles happening within them is to enact a
unification program so that all the fields of discourse are made to submit to an
over-arching meta-discourse. This, again, is a program of colonisation and
totalization, and it is, again, a program that postmodernists would most commonly
reject.

CONCLUSIONS

Thinking that postmodern intellectuals are academic fashion-slaves who are

111And plenty of old sciences do the same thing.

202

over-sensitive to intellectual trendyism, anti-postmodernists have continually tried to
derail postmodern enthusiasm by declaring it passé or outdated. This is nothing new
to 1990s postmodernism, and was happening within months of the label
‘postmodernism’ being attached to a type of art and architecture in the early 1970s.
Despite this insistence that it is a declining fashion within academia it seems as though
the postmodern critique o f various subjects within the human sciences has become so
entrenched that few academics are able to practice without some reference to it. This
popularity has very many times spilled over into the philosophy o f the natural sciences
and especially those whose natural philosophies lie at the edge of academic culture
and popular culture such as Fritjof Capra, Arran Gare, Frederick Ferre, David Bohm
and others.
However, given that—if the above analysis is correct—Postmodern Science is
hardly reminiscent of the postmodernism as actually theorised by most academics,
how can Postmodern Scientists associate themselves with it? It seems as though most
writers on Postmodern Science grab what they can from postmodern thought. For a
lot o f them it is just the word, and the popularity of that word, along with some vague
acknowledgement of postmodernism’s criticism of Modem society and science. For
instance Laszlo turns his New Age science of the 1970s in to Postmodern Science for
the 1990s. Similarly Bohm was for a long time out of sorts as to what to call his
worldview of interconnectedness and implicate order until the word postmodern was
delivered to him in the 1980s, pre-packaged with a critique of orthodox scientific
ideals.
In the framework o f postmodern localism, plurality and incoherence there is
often an implicit recognition of the incompatibility ot all theories. The whole can only
be dreamt of in its parts; a broken assemblage of disintegrated complicated fragments
that themselves often far supersede our ability to comprehend and imagine them.
Postmodernists, as Bauman (1992) has indicated, have learnt to deal with this.
Postmodern Science (which we might now start to see as indistinguishable from
Modem science) is grossly uncomfortable with this inability to conjure up the wholes.
Gaia is the result, an imagination of the whole Earth modelled in its entirety, complete
with an ethics, a philosophy and a set ot policy prescriptions. Chaos theory is also the
result as it declares that those things that were thought incomprehensibly disordered
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and unconnected, are now comprehensible, ordered and able to be modelled by
science (and if some New Scientists are to be believed, they are also somehow
manageable by science).
Postmodern Science declares that the extirpation of Modernist principles from
science must be undertaken in order to gamer an environmentally friendly worldview.
However Postmodern Science is unable, itself, to escape Modernism. This means that
within its own intellectual framework (which states that a environmentally-worldview
will only come about after Modernism has been exuded from science and natural
philosophy) Postmodern Science has a very weak claim in being able to encourage an
environmentally friendly worldview.
If Postmodern Science does fail to eject Modernism from science, and if such an
ejection is needed within science in order to let environmental metaphysics flourish,
then what are we to do? Is there another way that science, or at least ecological
science, might be postmodemised in a far more nuanced way so that it can properly
call it self ‘postmodern’. The answer to this question is revealed in Chapter Eight,
where an alternative postmodern ecology is suggested. Before then, another problem
that relates to the postmodemisation of the unity o f nature concept is explored.
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CHAPTER 7
Mechanicism Vs Organicism: A False
Dichotomy?

INTRODUCTION

Modem science is mechanistic and the worldview that such science gives rise to
is a mechanised worldview; or so say Davies (1987), Ferre (1988), Birch (1990),
Goldsmith (1993), Zohar and Marshall (1993), Bohm (1994), Gare (1995), Capra
(1996) and many others. According to Moore (1992:157):
Ltjhis mechanisation of the world has led us to believe that we live in an
essentially dead universe where life arises only by chance. The result has
been a total separation of ourselves from nature. This separation finally reached
its logical extreme in the modem myth...that we can use technology to
dominate, manage and control nature for our own benefit.

There is much claim by Postmodern Scientists that what we need in science is an
initiation or resurrection o f organic thinking in science and philosophy in order to
make a sustained attack on mechanistic thinking. This organicism is what Postmodern
Scientists believe lies in Postmodern Science. It is also what New Scientists believe
lies in the New Sciences, what holist environmental philosophers believe lies in
ecological holism, what systems thinkers believe lies in systems science. All these
‘organic’ sciences, together, tend to believe that the Modernist evil of mechanicism is
ejected from these new forms of thinking about the world. Such organicism reveals
the world~and the things in it—to be actively making themselves like a unified living
things.
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By encouraging the supersession o f mechanicism by organicism, Postmodern
Scientists, New Scientists, holist environmentalists et cetera are making a declaration
that Clements should replace Gleason (for example see Odum, 1971; Goldsmith,
1993; Lowe, 1997), that Gaian systems theory should replace the fragmented
sub-disciplines of biology (e.g. Goldsmith, 1993; Lovelock, 1991; Capra, 1996) and
that selt-organisation should become a prime theory to help explain life, the universe
and everything in it (e.g. ; Fabel, 1994; Ayres, 1994; Merry, 1995, Ferre, 1996).
There are problems with this angle of attack. Notably, it is not always clear,
historically, where mechanicism comes from and organicism went. Nor is it easy to
distinguish between the two from a metaphysical perspective.

THE METAPHYSICS OF ORGANICISM AND MECHANICISM

So superorganismic ecology, the Gaia theory and Complexity theory might be
cited as organic. What does that mean? Apart from the obvious idea that “[a]n
organic worldview generalises from observed organisms” (Cobb, 1988:122) instead of
machines, the idea of organicism is often thought to be closely tied to the concept of
unity. Witness this definition of what it is to be organic:
Glacken identified two pervasive views of nature which were evident in
traditional natural history and persist in current discussions of ecological
theory: 1) Mechanical = actions of individual parts of a whole are explained
by known laws, and the whole is the sum of the parts and their interactions.
2) Organic = The whole exists first and its design explains the actions of the
parts. (.McIntosh, 1985:13).

For those who are in the job of promoting organicism, as well as for many who
are not, mechanicism is allied to materialism, reductionism and atomism. For instance
Benton states that whether you may call it mechanical reductionism, reductionist
materialism or mechanical materialism, mechanicism “asserts that living organisms are
subject to the same laws as those that govern inorganic nature” (Benton, 1991:14).
David Bohm, likewise, links mechanicism to reductionism by saying:
The first point about mechanicism is that the world is reduced as far as possible to
a set of basic elements... Second, these elements are basically external to each
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other... because the elements only interact mechanically by sort of pushing
each other around, the forces of interaction do not affect their inner
natures. (Bohm, 1994:343-344).

Similarly Charles Birch contends:
The mechanistic model is properly called atomistic...Its method consists of
subdividing the world into its smallest parts, which at one time were thought
to be atoms. The essence of atomism is that these parts remain unchanged no
matter what particular whole they constitute, be it a stone or a brain. Having
divided the universe into its smallest bits you then tiy to build it up again,
and of course when you do you get a machine. (Birch 1990:57).

Similarly Cobb (1988:107) sees that mechanicism is equivalent to the materialism
o f what he calls ‘substantialism’: “a substance is that which depends on nothing else
tor its existence” and under mechanicism such “a thing remains fundamentally the
same regardless of its relations”.
To counteract mechanicism, and in contrast to materialism, atomism and
reductionism, both Birch and Cobb advocate what they regard as the postmodern
alternatives: ‘processes over substances’, ‘events over objects’, ‘wholes over parts’;
in short ‘organicism over mechanicism’. For both Birch and Cobb, as well as for
Capra, Davies and Bohm, the shift from mechanical thought to holistic process
thought is adequately encapsulated in systems theory and complex systems theory.
The closeness o f the organic approach to systems thinking, as interpreted by
organicists, is reflected in Capra’s assertion that:
It is perhaps worthwhile to summarise the key characteristics of systems
thinking at this point. The first, and most general, criterion is the shift
from the parts to the whole...In the shift from mechanistic thinking to
systems thinking, the relationship between the parts and the whole is
reversed. Cartesian science believed that in any complex system, the
behaviour of the whole could be analysed in terms of the properties of the
parts. Systems science shows that living systems cannot be understood by
analysis. (Capra, 1996:37).

So whereas “[t]he mechanistic outlook reduces reality to a set of basic elements
or elementary particles and forces” (Capra, 1996:50) the organic outlook sees every
element as ‘interconnected’, ‘interrelated’, ‘interdependent’, and ‘part of a greater
whole’.
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It is easy to see here the divide between some o f the ecological traditions and
environmental concepts that have been talked about so far. Clements, Lovelock and
Odum are organic (and indeed they have all had the word attached to their work) and
Gleason, and the community ecologists, are mechanical.
Unfortunately, however, this dichotomy does not hold up in practice, such that
even in ecology (and in science in general) mechanicism and organicism is a false
dichotomy. One way to show that organicism and mechanicism are hardly appropriate
tools through which to dichotomise ecological science is to examine those instances in
which traditional mechanistic ecology can be shown to have what the organicists
themselves class as ‘organic’ principles. In this regard we can focus upon the
predilection of organicists against materialism and substantialism. In the substantialist
thinking o f mechanicism “the substance is independent of relations and then enters
into relations which are always external ones” (Birch, 1990:75). Bohm (as we have
just seen) expresses this idea thus:
these elements are basically external to each other, not only are they
separate in space, but even more important the fundamental nature of each is
independent of that of the other...Third, because the elements only interact
mechanically by sort of pushing each other around, the forces of interaction
do not affect their inner natures. (Bohm, 1988:60).

This is contrasted to the process thinking of systems theory whereby the primary
entities o f existence, i.e. events (instead of substances), are fully constituted by their
interactions. In physics this means that a particle such as an electron turns from being
a mechanical ‘substance’ (that collides into others while not being affected by the
collision except so far as its position in space changes) into being an event (which is
intimately affected by the other events that go on around it). We can see how this
dichotomy might be applied in eco-political natural philosophising since in an organic
ecological worldview the various constituents of nature, both living and non-living,
are turned from mechanical ecological atoms that collide with each other without
really affecting one other into organic events that intimately change the nature ot each
other when they meet. This is to say the major critique that orgamcist Unitarians
would level at atomistic science (including atomistic ecology) is that they treat the
members o f the ecological world as though they were mere mechanical substances.
This might be an adequate criticism of substantialism in ecology if it actually
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concurred with what non-holist ecologists (for example the Gleasonians) say about
what happens in the world, but it does not. The substances that non-holist ecologists
talk about are not ecological atoms but are conceived o f as enormously
heterogeneous, interacting beings capable ot having their ‘internal structure’ (i.e. their
actions and their characteristics) changed when they collide with other ‘substances’.
In tact it seems as though the criticism emerging from orgamcism may be more
aptly applied to process-type thinking in ecology. This is to say we can easily
hypothesise a process ecology (which emphasises ‘events’ over ‘substances’) whereby
the events move around and interact with each other yet remain unchanged by the
interaction. This is, tor example, the point that I make about ecosystems ecology (the
preferred ecology ot orgamcists) in Chapter Two, since the events in ecosystem
ecology (organismal growth, cycling flows, material transfer) might interact proiusely
but still give rise to unchanging essences (i.e. elemental matter and energy) that
remain the same whatever interactions they undertake. Thus it seems, at least in
ecology, you can have mechanical events just as you can have mechanical substances
and you can have organic substances just as you can organic events.
Another way to deconstruct the dichotomy of the organic versus the mechanical
is to look at the intellectual and metaphysical heritage of the organic school of
thought. Here we find some telling dilemmas.

THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE OF ORGANIC THOUGHT

When taking a look at the relevance of organic/mechanical ecosystem debates in
environmental studies and within the unity of nature concept it is more than relevant
to look at that organic entity that organic ecologists are so proud of; the one which is
so indebted to holism, the one which is so guided by the physical laws of the New
Sciences and the one which is the basis o f environmental policy-making; the
ecosystem.
As has already been explored, the usual story in the history of ecology (see
Glacken, 1967; McIntosh, 1985, Hagen, 1992, Golley, 1993, Worster, 1994) is that
the ecosystem was a name dreamt up by Arthur Tansley in the 1930s but it was a
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concept that did not really make any difference in ecology until Raymond Lindeman
used it as a practical concept in his peculiar methodological/philosophical approach to
the study of an actual geographical site. Furthermore, the ecosystem concept as an
environmentally-relevant unit did not really takeoff until the Odums used it,
popularised it and gained grant money for studying it in the 1960s.
For the Odums and their followers the ecosystem was talked about as being the
fundamental unit of ecology. This is a view taken up and supported in modem
environmental practice and policy-making and also in much environmental philosophy.
Amongst other things the ecosystem was held to operate holistically, i.e.: organically.
As we have seen (in Chapter Two) such a view of ecosystems as organic entities is
somewhat strange given the desire by the ecosystem concept’s originator, Arthur
Tansley, to have it used as a mechanising influence on ecology. It is also strange given
that ecosystem studies mainly focus on physical and not biological aspects of natural
areas. I might restate here Golley’s comments about systems analysed species being
mere mechanical objects when he says:
lajithough the advantages were many, the disadvantage was that most of
biological reality encompassed in the species was lost. In the ecosystem model,
species acted abstractly, like robots. The decision to cut ecosystems studies off from
biology and natural history linked them more closely to engineering, physics
and mathematics. (Golley, 1993:107).

What may be considered paradoxical, though, is the use of the Odums and their
work, to promote organicism. Edward Goldsmith, for example, praises the organic
viewpoint of Odumian ecology (i.e.: ecosystems studies) for its inherent organicism
only to go on to unwittingly support mechanicism by favourably quoting Eugene
Odum when he uses intensely mechanical metaphors. For instance in The Way
Goldsmith (1993) firstly praises Odum:
Eugene Odum, one of the tew remaining academic ecologists whose work has
not been perverted to fit the paradigm of mechanistic science, (p.xix)

Then Goldsmith berates modem ecology for being too quantifiable, too obsessed
with energy and for being:
reconcilable with the paradigm of science which sees living things as no more
than machines, (p.54)

Finally Goldsmith approvingly quotes Odum when Odum himself is working
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within the paradigm o f science Goldsmith has just denounced:
Eugene Odum notes how ecosystems are endowed with the necessary
mechanisms for self-regulation and hence homeostasis...These information
networks Odum thought as The invisible wires of nature’ or alternatively as
the 'hormones of ecosystems’ (pl91).

In a similar vein Stan Rowe (1997) makes the same sort of self-contradictory
case for organic ecology. First Rowe decries the reductionism of modem ecology for
concentrating too much on the parts of nature rather than nature as a whole and he
asks for us to reconsider Odumian systems ecology as a new approach to Deep
Ecology. Eugene Odum’s work in the 1950s, Rowe tries to make us believe, is a
manifest example of the holist approach that environmentalists are desiring in science.
The 1950s work that Rowe identifies as being of an organic nature, however, is the
same work in which Odum charts out the similarities of ecosystem flow to ‘networks’,
‘circuits’, ‘organismal physiology’, ‘machines’, ‘water-mills’ and ‘automobiles’
(Hagen, 1992), which are all usually regarded as very mechanical analogies.
Equally ambiguous to organic ecological sensibilities in this respect is the fact
that the Odums, and other ecologists that followed them, used mixed organic and
mechanical metaphors when describing their ‘fundamental unit of ecology’: the
ecosystem. According to Hagen (1994:135):
the Odums’ writings exemplify this Janus-like conception of ecological
systems...For example when he needs an analogy for communication
and control mechanisms in the ecosystem, Eugene turns to the physiology
of the endocrine system.

Another analyst of the history of the Odums’ work, F.E. Golley (1993), also
confirms that at very many times the metaphors in use by both Eugene and Howard
Odum were mechanical and that this could also be said of most systems ecologists and
ecosystem ecologists in the 1950s and 60s. Ecosystems scientists, says Golley, were
generally unafraid of combining mechanistic/organic holist analogies. Ecosystems
were, for example, variously compared to the networks of electrical circuit boards,
organismal and cellular physiological systems and automatic machines.
Eugene Odum delivers these metaphors as much as anyone but sometimes he
goes further than that, indicating that machines are not merely metaphorical when
applied to ecosystems but in fact analogous at the level of fundamental laws. For
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example, he is quoted as saying that:
The relationships between producer plants and consumer animals, between
predator and prey, not to mention the numbers and kinds of organisms in
a given environment, are all limited and controlled by the same basic laws
which govern non-living systems, such as electric motors and
automobiles, (in Hagen, 1992:136).

Odum, when he said things like the above, might be interpreted as being in a
historical point o f ecology (the 1950s and 60s) that required a mechanical outlook just
to insure the success of his field during the mechanistic predilections of science at the
time. The ecosystem concept, from its inception in the 1930s to its acceptance in the
1960s, was viewed by its practitioners and advocates as a modernisation program.
The ‘New Ecology’112 movement that was systems ecology was presented as a
modernisation movement also by the Odums, and the famous 1953 Odum textbook on
ecology has been seen as a manifesto for such modernisation (see Kwa, 1987, Kwa
1993, Golley, 1993). Golley, for instance states:
In America...the ecosystem concept appeared to be modem and up to date. It
concerned systems, involved information theory, and used computers and
modelling. In short, it was a machine theory applied to nature. (Golley, 1993:2)

However, this is not the whole story behind Eugene Odum’s apparent
mechanicism since he continued his references to mechanistic analogies all his life and
also continued to make comparisons between organic and mechanical systems. He not
only did this for ecosystems but all systems that ecosystems might be connected to. In
this regard human populations, like cities and nations, were hypothesised by Odum, to
run like (his version of) ecosystems. As Steverson (1994:86) notes
Odum even lists cities as examples of heterotrophic ecosystems. One can
isolate the input of energy into the system (e.g. the burning of fossil fuels
to produce electricity), its transfer along various pathways composing the
system (the transmission of electricity along power lines and into homes),
the various uses to which energy is put by constituent organisms (watching
television, heating homes, powering appliances, etc.) and the dissipation
of energy from the system (loss of heat from poorly insulated homes, unused
lights left on etc.)...ecosystemically speaking there is no difference between

112The name given to ecosystems studies by Eugene Odum.
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New York City and the Everglades. They are both simply physical systems,
analysable in terms of patterns of energy production, transfer, and loss.“3

What this may say to those who wish for an ecologically-relevant organic view of
nature is not to focus upon the Odumian version o f the ecosystem in order to do it.
ORGAN1C1SM AND THE CYBERNETICIANS

The Odums were not the originators or the developers of the mixed organic/
mechanical metaphor; they had it virtually handed to them by the cyberneticians. As
Golley (1993:67) notes:
Ecosystem ecology also was formed, in part, in the languages of engineering
and economics and in the new subjects of cybernetics and information.

Cybernetics, as has already been discussed in Chapter Three, owes much to
Norbert Wiener’s projects on the theory and operation of advanced weaponry. When
Wiener retired from service at the RAND corporation, however, his determination to
apply cybernetics to other situations meant that he continued to explore the
parameters of his new cybernetic ideas. Wiener, like holist organic thinkers before him
and systems theorists after him, would talk of homeostatic mechanisms in both living
settings and non-living settings, in both natural and artificial situations and with both
mechanical and organic metaphors.
Today the ambiguity between organicism and mechanicism is continued by
modem day promoters of cybernetics. For instance Capra praises what Birch, Ferre,
Cobb and Davies would regard as organic thinking and incessantly delights in talking
about the need to develop an holistic ‘organic’ ecological worldview. Capra himself
goes on to state that the science of ecology is “the mapping out of pathways of energy
and matter in various foodwebs” (Capra, 1996:172). This is to say that while he
advocates holism and organic-type thought in ecology Capra actually suffers from
mechanicism by choosing an ecology rooted to mechanical materialism.13

113Steverson (1994:86) goes on to detail how this approach by Odum is inimical to environmental evaluation:
""if taken seriously and placed in the context of an ecosystem perspective, the ecocentric claim
that moral consideration should be extended to our ecosystemic flows and to the ecosystem as
a whole might entail extending moral consideration to such things as power stations and
telephone lines. 1 assume that such a conclusion would be unacceptable to ecocentrists.

^
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We can see this, for example, when Capra himself admits cybernetics has a
mechanical heritage. For instance when he tells his readers how the cyberneticians
explained their concept o f self-regulation Capra says:
To illustrate the same principles with a mechanical device for sellregulation, Wiener and his colleagues often used one of the earliest and
simplest examples of feedback engineering, the centrifugal governor of a
steam engine. It consists of a rotating spindle with two weights ('tlyballs )
attached to it in such a way that they move apart, driven by centrifugal force,
when the speed of the rotation increases. The governor sits on top of the steam
engine’s cylinder, and the weights are connected with a piston, which cuts
oft' the steam as they move apart The pressure of the steam drives
the engine, which drives a flywheel. The flywheel, in turn, drives the governor,
and thus the loop of cause and ettect is closed. (Capra, 1996:61).

As the historian Otto Mayr says of this connection between cybernetics and the
steam engine:
When Norbert Wiener in 1947 christened his new science of cybernetics, he
was expressly paying tribute to what he considered the earliest cybernetic device,
the word g o v e r n o r is derived via the Latin g u b e m a to r from the Greek steersmen.
(Mayr, 1986:195).

Capra generally tries to down play the mechanical heritage of systems thinking by
claiming that “the main characteristics of systems thinking...were pioneered by
biologists...in the 1920s... who emphasised the view of living organisms as integrated
wholes” Capra astutely uses the term ‘systems thinking’ instead o f ‘organic thinking’
because he is only too well aware of the contradiction in labelling systems as organic.
This does not stop a whole lot of other people, whose ideas are very similar to
Capra’s, like Ferre, Birch, Cobb, Artigiani, Goldsmith et cetera, from interchanging
the words ‘organic’ and ‘systems’ quite freely.
The ability for systems to be identified with both organicism and mechanicism is
a consequence of the closeness that all three terms have with unity. They can be
interchanged quite freely in public parlance without seeming at all contradictory. For
instance one can describe the ‘machinery of the state , the state as being an organism
and the ‘state as a system’ without sounding contradictory.
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PRE-CYBERNET1C AND PRE-0DUM1ST MIXINGS OF METAPHORS

Since machines and organisms, and mechamcism and organicism, are so
intimately woven when considering the history and theory of cybernetics and systems
science we might ponder on whether there was a time before systems science and
before cybernetics when a pure form ot organicism was around. The superorganism
theory ot Clements might be one example but Clements was really trying to
physiologise ecology: “for Clements, ecology was ‘nothing more than rational field
physiology7” (Hagen, 1992:15). And as Hagen also points out, other natural historians
that were Clements7 contemporaries were also given over to mixing their metaphors:
in feet, the ideas of nature as superorganism and nature as machine were
often used interchangeably...For Forbes, the lake was both a complex
machine and an organism. (Hagen, 1992:9).

Stephen Forbes, like Clements, Gleason, Tansley and Lindeman, is another
reputed ‘founding father o f ecology7 who sits uneasily within one or the other o f the
camps o f organicism and mechanicism. Organicist Unitarians might like to claim
Forbes as one o f theirs for he talked much about the balance o f nature and the unity of
ecological communities. Forbes, indeed may be claimed as the first ecologist (thirty or
more years before Clements) to have postulated about the self-regulatory processes
that kept populations in a balanced unity. In doing this, however, Forbes, himself was
influenced strongly by Herbert Spencer (Kingsland, 1991), who himself had both
organicism and mechanicism embedded deep within his writings about both society
and nature.
This intermixing of the organic and the mechanical was evident, amongst other
places, in Spencer’s work on population equilibrium (which was the work that Forbes
used to map out his balance of nature ideas). Although Spencer’s name is
synonymous with the ‘organic view o f society7--which flowed to and fro with his
similar thoughts on nature—Spencer, was originally trained as an engineer and
maintained himself as “an assiduous... inventor o f gadgets77 (Andreski, 1969) who
“thought o f nature as a moving equilibrium between opposing forces77 (Kingsland,
1991) like those evident in physics. If the metaphysics o f equilibrium in Spencer’s
work is traceable to his machine heritage then we may assume that this had an afreet
on his own writings on balance as well as that of his readers like Forbes. Where
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Spencer used his equilibrium concepts to promulgate the idea that industrial society
was working towards a harmonious balance like that already achieved in a
homeostatic organism, Forbes posited that such self-regulation was also a tendency in
natural communities. And just as Spencer uses concepts o f ‘systems’ and
‘mechanisms’ which are derived from the mechanical sciences, so Forbes uses
mechanical metaphors in his work on actual ecological communities.
As well as this it can also be claimed that when Spencer is being explicitly
biological, (and thus explicitly organic according to many New Scientists and
Postmodern Scientists) his organicism is still linked with mechanical concepts since
the biological metaphors he is using (to describe either social phenomena or different
biological phenomena) are in fact today regarded by environmental sympathisers as
being mechanical. This is to say Spencer’s emphasis on functions, his emphasis on
physiology, his emphasis on systems, could only have come about if he prescribed to
mechanical ideas of biology. Functions and systems, after all, are traceable to earlier
‘mechanical’ ideas that variously flowed from mechanical sciences such as astronomy,
physics and engineering, or from mechanised biological disciplines such as physiology
(see Glacken, 1967; Mirowski, 1989; Christensen, 1989; Mirowski, ed, 1994).
The inability to distinguish (both historically and philosophically) between
organicism is not a view shared by Goldsmith. Goldsmith, as we have seen, berates
traditional ecology for being mechanist and praises Odumian ecosystem ecology for
being organic. In doing this he tries to characterise the organic/mechanic dichotomy
with regards other pre-Odumist players in ecology. This dichotomisation, however,
also fails. Goldsmith picks on the early Twentieth Century mathematical biologist
Alfred Lotka as being reductionist and mechanist for Lotka’s quantitative studies of
population biology seem, to Goldsmith, to treat nature and its members in a robotic
manner. However, Lotka operated within a metaphysical schema so similar to
Goldsmith’s that Goldsmith might end up criticising himself'.
Like Goldsmith, Lotka believed evolution to be a universal biotic principle and
thought “it would be profitable to analyse the evolution of the entire world system as
a whole” (Kingsland: 1994:232). And like Goldsmith’s heroes, Lovelock and Odum,
Lotka then went on to “compare the world to a giant engine or, using an image
familiar in thermodynamics, to a giant mill wheel” (Kingsland, 1994:234). And like
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Goldsmith (and Lovelock and Odum), Lotka also wanted humans to be partnered
with nature, as collaborators rather than manipulators, to altruistically contribute to
nature’s efficient running o f energy and materials (Kingsland, 1994). And also like
Goldsmith, Lotka wanted society not to float free from nature but to be grounded in
the laws o f nature (Kingsland, 1994).
What is interesting is that Lotka got his insights not from ecology itself but from
the mathematical economics of early Twentieth Century capitalist economists
(Kingsland, 1994). This may be interpreted as Lotka being unlike Goldsmith from a
moral point of view but, as has been indicated in Chapter Three, very much like him
from a theoretical and historical point of view since Goldsmith’s metaphysics might be
just as much a construction of capitalist/liberalist philosophy as it is a construction of
late Twentieth Century organic ecology/environmentalism.
What is also of interest to us with regards to the topic of this chapter is that
mechanicism, for Lotka, is not opposed to unity but very workable within unity since
mechanicism, to him, is completely capable of working with the teleology,
interconnectedness and functionalism that we find so prevalent in organic unity
thought. Lotka for instance saw the whole world as one vast machine and he spent
much of his time searching for efficient energy flows within it; much the same task
that Lovelock performs today.
If Goldsmith decries Lotka as mechanist then how does Goldsmith’s preferred
founding father of modem ecology, Frederick Clements, stand up? Perhaps we should
note that:
Late in his career, Clements dabbled in philosophical holism, but his
physiological perspective actually reflected an extreme form of mechanistic
reduction! sm_At all

levels—individual, species, or community--. Clements

explained change in terms of simple, stimulus-response reactions. (Hagen,
1992:23).

So it appears that to Clements delved into both organic and mechanical science
too, even as adjudged from Goldsmith’s own criteria for distinguishing those two
things.
Other important figures in ecology also exhibited what looks like, to modem day
sensibilities, similar ambiguities between unity, mechanicism and orgamcism. For
example; when describing the balance of nature (a very Unitarian idea that Goldsmith
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has much sympathy for), the important mid-Twentieth Century ecologist A.J.
Nicholson chose to express it not in organic terms--as Goldsmith would see fit—but in
mechanical terms:
Nicholson believed that animal populations are normally in equilibrium and
fluctuated only within restricted limits. He used a gas law analogy of a
balloon to illustrate how a population would change if its environment
changed but would rapidly become into equilibrium with the new
environment, presumably as it stabilised. (Macintosh, 1985:188).

And we might also add once more that Arthur Tansley, the inventor of one of the
favourite Unitarian ecological concepts: the ecosystem (a concept that is viewed by so
many Unitarians as being intrinsically organic), actually invented the concept to
mechanise ecology from its organic sensibilities within Clementsianism. Although
“Tansley7s sophisticated mechanistic view of nature also retained strong organismal
overtones77 (Hagen, 1992:80) Tansley often suggested that “all living organisms may
be regarded as machines transforming energy from one form to another77, (Tansley
quoted in Golley, 1993:218).
As has been alluded to the connection between organicism and mechanicism is
not just a thing of the past. It is alive and well today when scientists make natural
philosophical utterances. For instance, listen to the holist sympathiser Rollo as he
explains from where modem ecology might gain better holistic principles:
To forge a unified science of biology, a broad base of understanding that
transcends scales is required. Biologists can learn some strong lessons
from engineers. (Rollo,1995:57).

If unitarianism may express its holistic ideas via both mechanicism and
organicism without fear o f contradiction then what does that say about Gaia, about
whom organicists claim to be the largest organic being in existence? If organicism is
so affiliated with mechanism so that we can hardly speak of one without recourse to
concepts derived from or applicable to the other, and if James Lovelock s cybernetic
heritage is just as imbued with these mixed metaphors, then Gaia is not just the
ultimate living organism as Capra and Goldsmith would state, it is also the ultimate
machine!114

114This does not mean Capra would think it all right to absolutely classify Gaia as the ultimate machine with no
qualifications since he, at times, makes admissions as to the differences between machines and organisms. Witness
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That Lovelock might envisage Gaia in this very vein can be observed when he
states:
In this book I often describe the planetary ecosystem, Gaia, as alive, because
it behaves like a living organism to the extent that the temperature and chemical
composition are actively kept constant in the lace of perturbations. When l
do 1 am well aware that the term itself is metaphorical and that the Earth is not
alive in the same way as you and me, or even a bacterium. At the same time I insist that
Gaia theory itself is proper science and no mere metaphor. My use of the term
‘alive’ is like that of an engineer who calls a mechanical system alive to
distinguish its behaviour when switched on from that when switched
off, or dead. (Lovelock, 1991:6).

Lovelock’s mechanistic heritage is further betrayed—quite openly—when
Lovelock himself describes his program in science as an extension of physiology to
the biospheric level; physiology, of course, being a prime site of mechanism within the
biological sciences. Just as William Harvey’s mechanical renderings of human blood
circulation announced the arrival of physiology in natural philosophy, so Lovelock
wishes to extend and advance Harvey’s insights to invent geophysiology; the
physiology of the globe (see Lovelock, 1991:10).
Furthermore, Lovelock chooses to “describe Gaia as a control system for the
Earth—a self-regulating system something like the familiar thermostat of a domestic
iron or oven” (Lovelock, 1991:11). I suggest that it would be hard for any holist
environmentalist or Postmodern Scientist to interpret irons or ovens in an organic
framework.
this passage from Capra (1992:Chapter 8):
“The first obvious difference between machines and organisms is the fact that machines are constructed,
whereas organisms grow. This fundamental difference means that the understanding organisms must be
process-oriented. For example, it is impossible to convey an accurate picture of a cell by means of static
drawings or by describing the rate picture of a cell by means of static drawings or by describing the cell in
static forms. Cells, like all firing systems, have to be understood in terms of processes reflecting the
system's dynamic organization. Whereas the activities of a machine are determined by its structure, the
relation is reversed in organisms - organic structure is determined by processes. Machines are constructed
by assembling a well-defined number of parts in a precise and pre-established way. Organisms, on the
other hand, show a high degree of internal flexibility and plasticity. The shape of their components may
vary within certain limits and no two organisms will have identical parts. Although the organism as a
whole exhibits well-defined regularities and behaviour patterns, the relationships between its parts are not
rigidly determined. As Weiss has shown with many impressive examples, the behaviour of the individual
parts can in fact, be so unique and irregular that it bears no sign of relevance to the order or the whole
system. This order is achieved by co-ordinating activities that do not rigidly constrain the parts but leave
room for variation and flexibility, and it is this flexibility that enables firing organisms to adapt to new
circumstances”.
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CONCLUSION

There are numerous ways to look at the organic/mechanic dichotomy. The first is
to say that orgamcism and mechamcism are completely separate and different ways of
looking at the world. This is the way Postmodern Scientists look at the dichotomy.
This may be the only wrong way ot looking at the organic/mechanic dichotomy.
However, there are several right ways. You can look at the dichotomy as cloudy and
see that the organicism as presented in science is actually mechanical and then try and
find the right (pure) type o f organicism. Alternatively you can say that organicism is
infected with mechanical bits and pieces that must be severed oft' and taken out.
Another alternative is to break down the inherent objectivity o f ‘organicism7 and
mechanicism7 altogether and then go on to say that they are virtually the same things.
Under this view, and with regards to Twentieth Century science, to call something
organic is to invoke mechanical metaphors and to call something mechanical is to
invoke organic metaphors. This is most stark in relation to the science o f ecology and
its attempts to form ideas about ecosystem structure and function. What defines both
organicism and mechanicism through these metaphors can always be applied to the
other.
To define organicism more precisely organicists have had to invoke other, not
necessarily related concepts, such as holism versus reductionism and materialism
versus process thinking. In this they also fail since reductionism and holism are linked
as are materialism and process thinking. What this deconstruction o f organicism and
mechanicism tends to do, then, is to unsettle the normative and epistemological appeal
of organicism. If New Paradigmers, New Scientists and Postmodern Scientists like
Capra, Birch, Ferre, Cobb, etc. are to appeal to the normative righteousness and the
metaphysical rightness of organicism, then they also appeal to the normative
righteousness and metaphysical rightness of mechanicism. The construction of a
worldview that is supposed to be environmentally friendly must be aware of this
mixing o f natural philosophies and must be aware that an environmental narrative
might have to be both a post-mechanist and post-organicist narrative.
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CHAPTER 8
An (Other) Postmodern Ecology

INTRODUCTION

If the unity of nature concept is an environmental metanarrative which is unable
to do the things that environmentalists ask of it, i.e.: value and protect the
environment, then where may we look for one that does? Can we erect an alternative
narrative that does not rely on systems, physicalism, functionalism, anti-individualism,
self-regulation or progressive evolution and which does not posit ontological unities,
hierarchies or organic/mechanical balances? Is there an alternative that might eject the
metanarratives of Modernism, an alternative that we might properly call postmodern?
This chapter attempts to identify what such a narrative might have to be like in order
to relinquish Modernist sentiments and live up to postmodern ideas. As such it
recounts some of the criticism drawn in Chapter Six to make such an identification
and instigate such a relinquishment.
The first thing that a postmodern environmental narrative might have to give up
is its ‘meta -ness’. Given that postmodernism is not fond of universahsing tendencies
it is right to restrict our metaphysical schemes to just to a part o f the universe. To this
effect this chapter can be seen as addressing that part of the universe that Unitarians
are most fond o f uniting in order to pursue ecopolitical endeavours: the terrestrial
forest communities of the world. As we all know, the science that narrates about this
part o f the universe, and the science which, as we have seen, has been the playground
o f Unitarian thinkers, is ecology. This chapter, then, can be simultaneously thought of
as; 1) an attempt to document what a postmodern ecology might be responsive to and
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acknowledging of, and; 2) an attempt to postmodemise ecology, and 3) an attempt to
proffer an example of what a postmodern ecology might possibly look like.
When doing this it must be remembered that it will not be the only postmodern
ecology, or postmodemisation o f ecology, that may exist, since:
An infinite combination of alternatives allow different and varying ways
to put together the elements that constitute postmodernism. (Rosenau 1992:14).

To start with, however, we need to identify what a postmodern ecology would
need to be appreciative of. Here we may draw on the analysis provided in Chapter Six
to assert that a postmodern ecology would appreciate ephemerality, change, dissent
and disunity, atypicality and non-universal story-telling. A postmodern ecology might
also be thought to exhibit at least some of those one-word characteristics of
postmodernism detailed in Chapter Six. For example, a postmodern ecology might be
anti-scientific, anti-systems, anti-hierarchical, anti-teleological, anti-foundational and
inclined towards fragmentation, heterogeneity, absence, aporia, pastiche,
meaninglessness and the value of otherness. To do this with any effect (and as alluded
to throughout Chapters Two to Seven) a postmodern ecology would also be
non-mechanist/non-organic, non-functionalist and appreciative o f chaos without
supposing such chaos gives rise to order. Within such a postmodern ecology each
pattern, operation, behaviour, process, object or subject in such an ecology would
have to be explained in terms of its own local narrative history rather than as
contributions to an overarching unity, purpose or process. Such a postmodern
ecology would also be aware of its own metaphoricity; its own social creation as a
malleable and underdetermined political tool in ecopolitical discourse. There may be a
tradition within ecology that does all this or at least has the capacity to do so;
Gleasonian ecology. In this chapter a postmodemised Gleasonian ecology is written
out. Such a postmodemised Gleasonian ecology is not presented as offering a
superior project in ecological metaphysics, but as offering an alternative one that does
not rely on unity and that utilises atomism in a positive environmental way (something
which unity intellectuals have maintained couldn t be done).

A POSTMODERN GLEASON?
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The strand ot ecology that may possess some affinity with the postmodern is
derived from Henry Gleason. We might recall that Gleason’s ecological oeuvre was a
reaction to unity and uniformity in professional ecological theory. In contrast to
Frederic Clements and other superorganicists, Gleason maintained that there is not a
lot o f order in ecological communities and hardly a direction of change towards
climax. This seems to exhibit some resonance to comments by some postmodern
intellectuals. For instance when Zygmunt Bauman makes the following statements he
could be talking about Gleason’s ecology just as much as about changes in society
and culture in the late Twentieth Century:
"Postmodemity’ |isj a semantically negative notion, defined entirely by
absences—by the disappearance of something which was there before—the
evanescence of synchronic and diachronic order as well as of directionality
of change. (Bauman, 1992:29).

Gleasonianism’s appreciation of disunity accompanied by its pervasive incredulity
towards large structures might lead us into investigating Gleason’s ecology as a
postmodern form of ecology. Viewing the terrestrial assemblages of plants and
animals in the world as anarchic patches of unrelated individual (and groups of
individuals) does confer upon Gleasonianism a parallelism with postmodern art and its
penchant for pastiche and muddled mosaic. We could also note that Gleasonianism’s
recognition of the typicality of non-conformity-rather than the subjugation of
non-conformity towards the realms of negligibility and exception—superficially
resembles postmodern social and political theory.
If “the very foundation o f postmodemity consists of viewing the world as a
plurality o f heterogeneous spaces and temporalities” (Heller and Feher, 1988:1), and
if postmodernism is held to seek “the uniqueness of the parts rather than the unity of a
theoretical whole” (Rosenau, 1992:81) then it is probably legitimate to acknowledge
the postmodern credentials of Gleasonian ecology over Clementsian ecology.
However, such a fracturing of theoretical unity does not necessarily contribute to
another major postmodern aim: the fracturing of metanarratives. Just because there is
a dissolution o f unity within Gleasonianism does not mean that there is a dissolution
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ot foundations. Although fragmentation lends itself to the extirpation of foundational
principles115, a fragmented view of the world’s ecology does not, by itself, sufficiently
derail foundational ecological theory. If we extend Gleason’s scepticism towards
superorganismic unity in ecology through a postmodern deconstructionist type of
critique we may, however, dissolve the need for both ecological unity and a whole
gamut of interrelated foundational principles that prop it up and support it. When
doing this we elicit, in this particular case, what might be named ‘postmodern
associationism’116.
According to Tester (1993:153) the “dismantling of bounds and boundaries is an
inherent project of postmodemity”. While Gleason makes inroads towards breaking
the ontological boundedness o f ecological communities (by denying the fact that
communities are bounded), a postmodern critique would extend the breaking up of
boundaries to the epistemological realm. In modem ecology epistemological
boundedness is most explicit in the idea o f ‘levels of biological organisation’. As we
have seen the orthodox way to present this is through a hierarchy framework like this:
cell—organ—organism—population—commumty—ecosystem—landscape--biome—biosphere.

Under unitarianism the varying levels of biological organisation are essentially the
same phenomenon. Individual organisms are much the same as ecosystems; they
merely operate, or are characterised, at different scales. This is evident in the systems
theory of both Lovelock’s Gaian ecology and also in the Odums’ ecosystems studies.
For example we can spot this as a working metaphysical viewpoint in Eugene Odum
when we note Hagen’s comments about Odum’s doctoral training. Hagen (1992:123)

*15 If no generalisations can be made, laws cannot be found and defined, and theories will always remain
gap-ridden and local.
*1Postmodern associationism might be considered an ironic and self-contradictory label for that which it purports
to describe, in the sense that the members of an ‘association’ are much of the time not at all associated but merely
coincidentally arranged as neighbours in space and time. Gleason, himself, reflects this ambiguity since while
using the term association as a key metaphor when describing certain aspects of ecological settings he, in his 1926
paper, alludes to the non-existence of associations as distinct entities:
we not justified in coming to the conclusion, far removed from the prevailing opinion, that an
association is not an organism, scarcely a vegetational unit, but merely a co in cid en ce ? (Gleason,
1926:16).
"A i q

Having acknowledged this, it becomes acceptable to use the term association as Gleason would have us use it. to
refer to a loosely-gathered group of coincidentally-arranged, separate ‘unitary organisms that live in a common
(though impossible-to-define) geographical site without contribution to the regulation, maintenance or ordering of
the ‘whole’ contained within that site.
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quotes Eugene Odum as saying:
The transition from bird physiology to ecosystem function was quite natural
for me since it involved moving up the hierarchy from physiological ecology
of populations to physiological ecology of ecosystems. It’s really not such a
big step to go from whole organism metabolism to community metabolism.

Here we see how Eugene Odum’s particular conceptualisations o f ‘levels of
organisation’ follow fairly strictly the framework outlined just above. An ecosystem is
virtually the same as an individual bird. All the various organisms of an ecosystem
become unified into an individuated unified entity that is Odum’s ecosystem.
Under Gleasonianism, however, any properties of individuation (such as
self-preservation, teleological behaviour, autopoesis, psycho-physical unity et cetera)
afforded to the levels o f organisation above the individual can only be maintained with
much analogical manoeuvring. Due to the indefinite and unbounded character of
Gleasonian ecological communities, the very concept of hierarchically-arranged levels
of biological organisation can be brought in to doubt. This is due to the fact that while
levels may be heuristically convenient and pedagogically useful they also
compartmentalise and unify spatio-temporal phenomena that are much more
heterogeneous and unbounded than the concept of the level signifies.
In many breeds of ecology (most notably community ecology) the concept of the
level is acknowledged as a mere abstraction, flowing—as it does—around, over and
under the many nuances o f ecology to which it cannot apply. Unitarians, however,
tend to use the concept in a totalizing manner, envisaging biological levels to exist as
clearly defined layers like floors of a modem building. The various levels are held to
be variously connected by ladders of information (Margalef, 1968), staircases of
feedback mechanisms (Allen and Starr, 1982) or elevators of energy (Odum, 1971).
This view of the world’s ecology is one of a well-ordered and intricately organised
hierarchy whereby the process of downward causation acts to keep all lower levels in
line:
[ajs smaller units integrate and aggregate into larger units, so they give rise
to new rules, which in turn constrain and regulate the component
subsystems to comply with collective behaviour of the system as a
whole. (Davies, 1995:149).

Goldsmith expresses the idea of downward causation like this:
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larger systems, from Gaia downwards, control and co-ordinate the behaviour
of their constituent parts... [ and the]...adaptive strategies [of these parts] are
all geared to maintaining the stability or homeostasis of the entire Gaian
hierarchy. (Goldsmith, 1993:106).

Capra, in turn expresses it like this:
order at one system level is the consequence of self-organisation at a
larger level. (Capra, 1982).

A postmodern alternative would want to obliterate such an orderly and
hierarchical conceptualisation of ecology (especially since the presence o f such order
and hierarchy tends to rely on the concepts of self-organisation and self-similarity).
The postmodern penchant for fragmentation, heterogeneity and anti-hierarchy would
also reject any attempt to place individuals and groups of individuals within neatly
defined hierarchical levels117. If explicit metaphor is required, rather than envisaging
the organisation of the biotic world as a well structured building, postmodern
ecologists might choose to follow a path of de(con)struction and disintegration so as
to view the ecological world as resembling a broken and fragmented jumble of
variously shaped and precariously perched shards of debris in whose nooks and
crannies the lives of individuals are contextualised and from whose micro-fissures
reflections of localised worlds are ricocheted118
Many contemporary natural philosophers and environmental thinkers like to
invoke the use of levels organised into a hierarchical scheme since it allows them to
discern level specific laws; laws that operate at one level and not others. Given this
the heinous crime of reductionism cannot be conferred upon them since it is willingly
acknowledged that lower level laws (such as genetic rules or atomic behaviour) do
not determine the operation of higher level laws (such as populations or
ecosystems)119. Although such a hierarchical view of ecology might render

117 Recall the anti-hierarchical stances as exemplified by of Hassan (1987), Deleuze and Guattan (1987) and
Bauman (1992) in Chapter Six, as well as the discussions on heterogeneity and fragmentation in the same chapter.
118 Yet even this metaphor is unsatisfactory, for it does not capture the idea that the splintered structure of the
ecological world emerged from the activities of contextualised individuals but suggests the shards and splinters are
mere remnants of a once organised higher whole or level.
119For instance this is how Goldsmith looks at reductionism:
“The Cambridge zoologist and ethologist W.H. Thorpe defines reductionism as ‘the attribution
of reality exclusively to the smallest constituents of the world and the tendency to interpret
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reductionism a benign force, hierarchical conceptions tend towards breeds of
essentialism and holism within ecological science which are every bit as totalizing as
reductionism120. When utilising the epistemological framework of ‘levels’ to describe
biological organisation the member entities of levels tend to become characterised by
the essential properties held to exist for their particular level and are deemed to
operate according to level-specific laws that confer upon them their totality of
identity. A population ot beetles becomes essentialised to the characteristics that
populations ot any type o f organism are said to possess. A benthic ecosystem is made
to suffer the indignities o f being considered fundamentally the same as any other
ecosystem upon the planet. The endothelial cells o f a bandicoot are held to be
basically comparable to algal oocytes. Intra-level generalisation is held to exist over
and above any intra-level differences.
This type o f intra-level generalisation is exhibited in the Wu and Louck’s paper
that attempts to generalise modem day ecological theory. In this paper they state:
Such a hierarchically organised system can be seen as a system in which
levels corresponding with progressively slower behaviour are at the
top, while those reflecting successively faster behaviour are lower in
the hierarchy. Higher levels impose constraints on the lower levels, and
thus can be expressed as constraints. On the other hand, the dynamics of the
lower levels can be so last that their signals are smoothed out at higher
levels, and often can be treated as averages. (Wu and Loucks, 1995:449).
higher levels of organisation in terms of lower levels’” (Goldsmith, 1993:9).
This is also the reductionism that Davies thinks he avoids by using levels:
“Starting with atoms, building up through molecules, cells and organisms to conscious
individuals and society, each level contains and enriches the one below, but can never be reduced to it”
(Davies, 1987:146)
However, Paul Davies himself is liable to forget this in his own schemes of elaboration, as sample of his own
writing, reproduced below, shows:
“So are we all doomed to act out a pre-programmed genetic agenda that all too often serves to
make men and women miserable or can human beings successfully override their genetic legacy?
Alas, the statistical evidence suggests that whatever the prevailing social or religious norms, our
genes manage to manipulate us with surprising efficiency. We may not be able to alter human sexual
behaviour much, but at least it helps to understand how it originated.” (Davies, 1996:1).
120In light of this we see the convergence of holism and reductionism. If reductionism is that which describes the
existence of ecological phenomena according to a set of simple (usually physico-chemical or mathematical) laws,
then it stands very close to holism which dictates that ecological phenomena are at the mercy of simplified general
laws (which again are usually physico-chemical or mathematical) operating at a higher level.
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What should worry us here is the keenness to average out the actions of lower
levels. Despite the chaotic abundance of a multiplicity of organisms producing a
multiplicity o f emergent properties, these properties themselves are capable of
producing a ‘smooth’ base upon which the actions of higher levels can rightly be
assumed to be based.
A postmodern association view would not honour such intra-level generalisation
and would argue that the purported levels have no fundamental laws or essential
characteristics. Nor do they give rise to cohesive ‘smoothable’ emergent properties as
Wu and Loucks have suggested. Thus, different ecological communities are more
different from each other than they are similar. Similarly, ecosystems cannot be
generalised into a tew laws, and there is no one typical cell that all others aspire to.
If there is not a definable set of cohesive general features that can be invoked to
characterise a particular level, then the actual existence of levels must be called into
question. Each plant community, each marine ecosystem, each temperate biome or
each bird population must exist as a unique and non-essentialisable collection of
individuals that must demand to be studied on its own terms. They cannot be bounded
by the concept of level without receiving decrees o f generalisation which are
ill-fitting. Thus the application of levels (populations, communities, ecosystems)
become vague and necessarily fluid.

UNGLUING THE ECOLOGICAL WORLD

The postmodern deconstruction of levels of organisation in nature is one way of
countering the modem scientific preoccupation with order and unity. Another way is
to identify and eject two other metanarratives of contemporary ecology; competition
and co-operation, which are both very important to unity.
According to most spokespeople in the natural sciences there are two common
ways o f looking at the interactions that prevail in nature. The first way is to perceive
nature from the Darwinian perspective; a competitive struggle for existence. The
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second may be described as the Kroptkinesque view121, whereby the dominant
interactive process in nature is co-operation or symbiosis. While the co-operative
view o f nature is a common line of thinking to many Unitarians, Darwinism is still, by
far, the dominant paradigm in ecological science when it comes to explaining
inter-organismal relationships and the structure of ecological collections. Of course
Darwin said a lot more about evolutionary ecology beyond competition, and an
exclusive emphasis on competition as being the only contributor to community
structure is held to be unwarranted by most ecologists. The American biologist Jared
Diamond has been cited as indicating that competition is virtually the only determining
factor o f community structure (McIntosh, 1985:266). But other biologists feel that
competition is only one factor and not necessarily the most important one, in
determining the structure of particular ecological communities. For instance;
predation and herbivory (Paine, 1980; Crawley, 1983), disturbance (Drury and Nisbet,
1973; White, 1979), parasitism (Anderson and May, 1979; May and Anderson, 1979),
and symbiotic mutualism (Faegri and van der Pijl, 1971; Boucher et al, 1982) have all
been noted as being important factors in influencing community structure.
This last process is often hailed by Gaians and Unitarian environmentalists as
being the prime relationship in nature, such that it is said to be a major determinant of
the biotic structure of ecological collections. Darwinians do not necessarily negate the
importance of symbiosis in ecology but they do try and bring it into the fold of
Darwinism by claiming that mutualist relationships are naturally selected adaptations
that give the symbionts a competitive edge over other organisms; allowing better rates
of survival in the face of nutrient shortage, predation or environmental stresses.
Scientifically trained Gaians, alike, do not want to rid ecology entirely of Darwinism;
they merely like to see natural selection as operating at higher levels than Darwinians
have hitherto appreciated. Ecosystems, and even the whole biosphere, thus become
the unit o f natural selection, hinting at the immense co-operation that must go on to
achieve this.
Whether competition or co-operation is seen as the underlying expressive force

121After Kropotkin. Kroptkin’s anarchist ideals for utopian societies required the revocation of Darwinian
competition and its replacement by a metaphysic proposing cooperation as the essential driving force of nature. See
Kropotkin (1902) and, for a modern-day interpretation. Pepper, (1993).
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in nature, both Darwinism and Gaianism can develop causal explanations about nature
from these metatheoretical bases. Co-operation and competition are needed to glue
the individuals to the whole. Their action in nature is to work to supply a uniform set
ot emergent properties which give rise the the community or ecosystemic level of
organization.122 Getting rid of co-operation and competition will undo the unity
concept in ecology by eliminating the need tor intense (competitive or co-operative)
relationships between all nature’s members and by breaking up the levels o f biological
organisation whose very existence relies on the identifiable emergentproperties that
co-operation and competition are said to produce.
As both competition and co-operation serve as metatheoretical bases in
ecological explanation, a postmodern approach to ecology would probably agree to
regard them both with suspicion. For instance, postmodern associationism would cast
doubt on competition and co-operation not only because both approaches may be
right in differing circumstances but also because one of the most common
relationships in nature is non-interaction. Yes, a particular predator may hunt and kill
a particular prey, and yes, a particular tree may compete with another particular tree
for light, and yes, a particular alga might live symbiotically with a particular fungus.
But it is just as possible to say that the most prevalent relationship in nature is no
relationship. From this view there are no connections between most organisms in the
world, they exist in their own environmental context of course, whereby they interact
on a local and capillary scale, sometimes in strangely-contorted and complicated
networks, but any organism is profoundly disconnected with nearly all the other
organisms in the world. Networks are never complete, never total. If they exist, they
exist in a state of aporia.
While this work suggests ecological interactions as being much more variable
than the physicalism of systems ecology and Gaianism presupposes, the prevalence ot
fragmentation and disparity between the world s ecological members must be
emphasised, so that interactions and interconnections are many times non-existent.
The absence o f interaction, however, does not make the world a simpler place. It

l22Co-operation gives rise to the community or ecosystem level of organisation by tying all the organisms within a
community or ecosystem into a tightly bundled and complimentary assemblage of related parts. Competition ties
the individual to the whole by invoking the concept of evolution through natural selection as a feedback
mechanism that also produces a tight and complimentary asemblage of well-adapted individual organisms.
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makes it more chaotic (remember the cha in chaos denotes absence) since there is a
constant fragmentation of cause and effect in a world thought to be intimately linked.
The connectionism so apparent within ecological thought has been built up to
convey how the delicate web of nature is prone to collapse if ill-inspired tampering
with nature is undertaken by human beings. The postmodern view that is presented
here, however, does not see the environmental crisis as the result of misguided
tampering with the delicate balance and interconnections evident in nature but as a
wholesale destruction of the ecological world itself. The forests of the world are not
collapsing due to the web destroying nature of pollutants and micro-disasters which
destroy a particular ecosystem by untangling the various networks that make it up,
they are being destroyed by a sweeping and blanketing destruction that eliminates all
members o f an ecological community in near unison. Forests are mowed down in
bull-dozer like fashion, rather than slowly advancing towards a state of morbidity due
to the surgical removal of species.
What this might suggest is that there is not one great big global ecological
disaster lying over the horizon in the future due to ongoing disentanglement of
ecological networks (as Lovelock would suggest) but bundles of smaller concentrated
disasters, each itself a travesty, occurring right now. This is to say that extinction and
environmental disaster, if we are to regard them as ethical issues at all, are local
phenomenon. The environmental crisis occurs every day, when a beetle becomes
extinct, when a town gets swamped by a dam, when a lake gets polluted by industrial
waste: these are the environmental crisis in action, here and now. In contrast
Lovelock would have us believe that the environmental crisis is only a potential; only
something that will happen one day if we keep doing these minor things so that one
day, together, they cause a change in the Earth’s ambient conditions. Such a
big-picture view of the environmental crisis as forever imminent rather than present
devalues the daily tragedies that keep going on.

THE POSTMODERN ECOLOGICAL INDIVIDUAL

The destruction of levels, as well as competition and cooperation, in nature
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releases individuals and their aggregates from being trapped in an over lording holism
whereby their lives are constituted according to a greater whole. Downward causation
cannot exist in postmodern ecology since there are no higher levels from which to be
dictated to or determined by, only a heterogeneous cascade of shard like collective
features whose effects are ungeneralisable, lawless and self-contradictory and whose
interactions with individual organisms and their environments are fragmented in scale
and intensity.
If individual organisms are thus freed from the action of downward causation
they are disassociated from the actions of any greater ecological whole. Such wholes
only exist in the mental and social milieu of humans. As some postmodernists have
alluded, postmodernism sometimes has the tendency to shatter structural entities to
near non-existence123 whereby the primary agents of any theoretical or normative
relevance are individuals. This emphasis upon ecological individualism tends to
concur with other postmodern analysts who maintain that while the cohesive identity
of the autonomous Modernist subject may be pronounced dead, “the postmodern
individual is still very much alive” (Rosenau, 1992:53) so that postmodemity has
become the ‘Golden Age of the Individual’ (Hassan, 1987).
However, such fragmentation towards individualism could be seen to represent
an alternative foundationalism by appealing to individualism as ontological reality.124
This appeal would give heart to many a neo-Darwinist who would see in such a
postmodern deconstruction of nature philosophical support for natural selection
(which is founded upon the sanctity of the individual as being the basis of the selection
process).
Here we see that the concept of individuality itself can become a unifying and
totalizing concept (and here I refer not to the ease to which Liberalism focuses on
individualism but to the anthropogenic construction of the individual as the theoretical
base in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory). Darwinian evolutionary biology posits
that the unitary nature of the individual is manifested through its genetic essence. An
individual equals this genetic essence and vice-versa. On a closer inspection than that

123See Bauman (1992), Lemert (1992) and Waugh (1992) as examples of this.
1240n this aspect of postmodernism it might be prudent to remember that ‘there is often an alternative
foundationalism lurking in many postmodern arguments” (Waugh, 1992a: 11).
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which Darwinists are capable, it becomes apparent that the genetics of an organism
does not solely define an individual’s life. Nor does the ‘selfish gene’ even lay down
the parameters ot an organism’s existence. An organism is much more pluralistic than
is generally accepted. It the genetic program of an individual does not enable it to feed
from a particular energy source, the organism is not about to give up the ghost and
submit to its pre-ordained genetically prescribed extinction. It goes on attempting to
escape the essence reputedly embodied in its genes. It tries other food sources in
order to do what it wants...survive, propagate, lie around in the sun...whatever. It has
no essence, no essential drive to survive or to reproduce. It is essence-less and has a
myriad o f other things that it might like to get up to.
By acknowledging the relevance of a certain degree of ecological atomism in the
description of ecological communities it might be assumed that postmodern
associationism tends to give rise to a coherent and cohesive notion of an ecological
self; an organism is a rational and autonomous actor blessed with a high degree of
ecological agency and a fixed identity. However, postmodern associationism might
choose to parasitise upon the postmodern predilection towards schizophrenia to assert
that ecological actors operate under a plurality of self. The Gleasonian view of natural
history might be interpreted to confirm that in any one ecological situation an
individual can act in one (or more) of a multitude of ways. The exact way which is
enacted being just as influenced by extra-genetic factors as by genotypic boundaries
held to exist within the organism
We are all familiar with the extragenetic cultural activities of primates that might
be cited to indicate the plurality of the ecological self; tool-using chimpanzees
(McGrew et al, 1979) and potato-washing macaques (Kawai, 1965) for example. Yet
there are many other animal types that exhibit a plurality of self. From the milk-cap
ravaging blue-tit (Barber, 1993) through the jumping spider that chooses different
predatory tactics for the various prey it encounters (Jackson et al, 1993) to the
rock-leaping Gobi fish that jumps from rock-pool to rock-pool at low tide based upon
topographical experience gained at high-tide (Aronson, 1971) the pervasivity of
extra-genetic ecological activities is notable. All this lends credence to the conclusion
that: “It is also becoming increasingly clear that animals share with us potential for
cultural adaptation” (Cavalli-Sforza, 1986:845).
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The plurality of self in plants is demonstrable in the way that individual shrubs
and trees adjust to the variations in spatial patterns, herbivory episodes and dispersal
agent availability that they experience in subtle and diverse ways. These environmental
variations cannot be predicted by genetic essences, thus implicating a great degree of
sensitivity to its lived environmental context.
Microbes too exhibit a plurality of self where they are called upon to act
according to extragenetic factors, tor instance the irregularity of algal cell movements
(Goldstein, 1992) and protozoan disturbance responses (Applewhite, 1979) might
indicate a plurality of options afforded to members of these microbial groups. What
this says, at least to Postmodern Associationists, is that it is possible to conclude that
“[a]t the moment one should accept with extreme caution any statement on the
inheritance of behavioural traits”, Cavalli-Sforza (1986:855). It also says that far from
being an automaton with a genetic essence; non-human individuals exist like
Rosenau’s postmodern characterisations of human individuals, since they submit “to a
multitude of incompatible juxtaposed logics, all in a perpetual movement without
possibility of permanent resolution or reconciliation” (Rosenau, 1992:55). Whether or
not it is wise to assume that non-human organisms are manifestly capable of multiple
self-construction that postmodernists believe of humans, it is at least worthy to
consider them as capable of experiencing pluralised lives whereby they operate as
though unbounded by any coherent anthropogenic laws.
With the genetic blueprint gone, with the essences of instinct downgraded in
importance, the non-human organisms of the world must attract the same sort of
detailed and pluralistic study as human individuals. Instead of existing as
manifestations of their genetic heritage and phenotypic morphology they become (as
Hollinger says of postmodern human individuals):
multiple, not fixed...with no overall blue print. The various multiplicities
that constitute the self at a given time are marked in play and dance with each
other. (Hollinger. 1994:11).

THE METAPHORS IN A POSTMODERN 1SEP GLEASON IAN ECOLOGY

Because of its emphasis on an individualistic explanation ot ecological
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communities, and because its penchant for atomistic deconstruction of larger
ecological abstractions, the ecology of Gleason has often been held to be both
mechanistic and reductionistic by holist ecologists. Goldsmith (1993) and Rowe
(1997), for instance, have attacked modem day versions of Gleasonianism in this vein.
However, Gleason’s associations are hardly mechanistic. The Gleasonian units, i.e.:
individuals, o f an ecological community are not hollow mechanical shells and they do
not just bounce of each other like solid particles. Nor would a postmodern
Gleasonianism insist upon chaotic or atomistic individualism as an absolute. Local
unities are often constructed (and dissolved) by the peculiar activities of individual
members and the groups they comprise.
What this tends to indicate is that postmodern associationism is not an ecological
form of a billiard ball universe; comprised of crashing and clashing atomistic
individuals that operate according to predetermined laws12i. Postmodern
associationism does not “see the world as consisting of mindless, meaningless, totally
determined physical bits and pieces that are non-purposive” as Charles Birch
(1990:xi) would claim of non-organic philosophies. Nor does postmodern
associationism necessarily advance an ethical theory promoting the sanctity of the
individual over an ecologically or socially constructed whole. But a postmodern
ecology such as postmodern associationism would place emphasis on respecting the
individual other as arbiter of its own reality without imposing metaphysical
imperialism under the guise of organic unity.
If mechanicism is hardly an apt scheme of description within Gleasonian ecology
then another of the Modernist characters outlined by postmodernism, i.e. centralised
control, is also hardly reconcilable with Gleasonianism. According to two community
ecologists who followed a neo-Gleasonian line in the 1960s:
There is in the community no centre of control and orgamsation, and no
evolution toward a control system (Whittaker and Woodwell in
McIntosh 1985:239).125

125If postmodern associationism were a metaphysical announcement of a billiard ball ecology it would state that
each of the ecological billiard balls would be of different sizes and weights, would walk about on their own without
needing to be hit would cling unpredictably to other billiard balls, would refuse to sink mto the (w)holes. would
jump chaotically from table to table and would then probably proceed to invent their own rales of billiards without
much recourse to known laws.
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Whittaker and Woodwell were reacting to the rise of systems ecology in the
1960s126 and they were expressly interested in denying that there was a tendency for
the biotic components o f ecosystems to work with the abiotic components in order to
evolve into a stable, self-controlling and self-maintaining system.
Systems ecologists may claim the same tor the ecosystem but the point that
Whittaker and Woodwell would make, and which prompted them to make the above
statement, is that an ecosystem conception of nature is a centralised form of natural
history since everything o f importance is run via the negative feedback processes of
ecosystems.
This decentralisation within Gleasonianism might be made more visible if we
attempt to graphically represent the worldview of ecology as presented by someone
like Frijof Capra and the postmodern natural history described in this chapter.
Capra’s model would look something like figure one (next page). In Capra’s
model organisms A, B, C, D and E contribute to emergent properties which are so
hard and fast and unified that they form (or 4self-organise’) into a coherent set of
emergent properties that equals a unified entity (which may be Clements’ community,
Odums’ ecosystem or Lovelock’s Gaia). The unified entity then acts homogeneously
(though homeostatic feedback) mechanisms to envelop, control and limit organisms
A, B, C, D and E. All of this together then rolls progressively forward via evolution to
ever more stability (see Goldsmith, 1993) or higher complexity (see Davies, 1987, and
Capra, 1996) or more diversity (see Merry, 1995).
If we attempt the same sort of modelling with Postmodern Gleasonianism then
we end up with something different (see figure two, next page).
In this alternative model organisms A, B, C, D and E give rise to multiple,
divergent and contradictory emergent properties which are not unified enough to act
homogeneously and thereby effect a controlling influence via uniform negative
feedback on the organisms. This disorder is set amongst, and gives rise to, various
'directions’; increasing complexity, decreasing complexity, increasing stability,
decreasing stability, increasing diversity, decreasing diversity etc.

126As detailed in Chapter Two.
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THE REFLECTION SEC I lON

A single cohesive alternative to any reputedly debunked metatheory sounds
suspicious, especially to the postmodern mind127. Some might suspect that in
proposing postmodern associationism at the expense of the Unitarian perspective, this
work is merely replacing one totalising discourse for another. This concern is
legitimate and there are a number of ways that it may be addressed.
Firstly it might be wise to restate the metaphorical nature of all human
endeavours; our truths, our models, our maps and our speeches (in the vein of Lakolf
and Johnson, 1980; Miller, 1983). It'this is so then we can no more regard
postmodern associationism as a literal translation of the reality of nature than we can
regard superorganicism, the New Sciences or Postmodern Science as sciences of the
literal with a privileged ability to represent nature. If “[a] worthwhile application of
metaphor...must begin with the awareness of its own problematic; its own
metaphoricity” (Miller, 1983:6) then we must conduct postmodern associationism in
the light of its own metaphorical nature. This thought will sober (or condemn) a
postmodern associationist towards modesty with regards to the authentic
correspondence with nature that postmodern associationism may suggest. Or as Miller
puts it:
[tjhe rejection of a metaphor [like the unity of nature! is not the work of
objectivity, rationality, science, let alone ‘purer’ language; it can only be
the challenge and replacement of a n o th er metaphor. (Miller, 1983:7).

This said it nevertheless becomes important to qualify postmodern associationism
as a worthwhile alternative metaphor that avoids the pitfalls ol unitarianism.
On the issue of being yet another totalising discourse it may be asserted that the
postmodern associationist outlook enables, or accepts, that (as in the construction of
meaning) each biotic member on the planet constructs its own version of reality
(although whether the member is doing anywhere near all of the constructing is
seriously open to debate) rather than having its reality thrust upon it purely by its
functional position in a unity. Postmodern associationism thus reflects a pluralistic

127 Recall the attacks of the Postmodernists against foundations discussed in Chapter Five.
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way o f looking at the world. It argues that we should not look to extra-galactic
astronomy, quantum physics or science tiction to detect other dimensional universes.
The plurality inherent on planet Earth reflects that every organism has its own
de-centred, essence-less and fragmented reality. Each individual is its own universe
with its own peculiar set of laws and generalisations. This suggests that we might
need to redefine this thing that we live in as a pluriverse.
Furthermore, to counter claims that postmodern association is totalising it might
be declared that the postmodern association outlook is not a metaphysic of the
universe, nor a metanarrative of life or of all things living but merely a micronarrative
story of some of the vegetation stands of the planet Earth. Thus it is a story that is
only locally applicable from a spatial and disciplinary point of view, having very little
to say that might be influential beyond the various sub-disciplines of the scientific
tradition known as ecology and having nothing whatsoever to say about the
ontological character of the physical universe.
Unlike systems science and unitarianism it makes no colonising forays into
adjacent sciences and it certainly does not entertain the thought of being another
‘New Paradigm’ which must be adopted by the world’s human members in order for
an environmentally and socially benevolent society to be enforcedliX.
Students of the postmodern association outlook might also be unwilling to
propose postmodern associationism as the only viable narrative of the world s natural
history. Concessions are willingly made with regard to the relevance of ecosystem
ecology and unitarianism by admitting the importance of emergent properties,
ecological interaction and symbiosis in the practice of ecological study. And while
Gleasonianism might like to see forests and other natural collections as heterogeneous
mosaics varying unpredictably in composition throughout space and time, there is
plenty o f room within Gleasonianism for acknowledging the existence of uniform
patches o f nature within a particular area of ecological interest However, Gleason
inspired ecologists would probably be more inclined to view these uniformities in
composition as attributable to the adaptive significance and physiological tenacity128

128Compare this with the rhetoric of some (self-proclaimed) ‘paradigm-shifting’ umtanan thinkers who make
detailed social and moral prescriptions based upon the universal values that are held to flow from a metaphysical
commitment to unity and systems thinking (see Devall and Sessions, 1985; Spretnak. 1986; Birch, 1990; Zohar
and Marshall, 1991; Goldsmith, 1993)
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developed by particular species rather than with any theory invoking
super-individualistic homeostasis, in addition the science of community ecology is
well endowed with unity-like concepts (taxocenes, patches, guilds, co-evolution) that
emphasise the many close relationships within ecological collections; thus postmodern
associationism may be interpreted as a molecular rather than atomistic view of
ecology. We might compare such molecular natural history to Deleuze and Quartan’s
postmodern molecular epistemology, whereby they:
advocate a molecular (as opposed to both an atomistic and macro)
analysis. (Hollinger, 1994).

This is not to deny that in the case of ecology some of these molecules can be
amazingly long.
By constantly attacking the ecosystem outlook of nature this work might,
perhaps, be thought a little cruel in its attempted extermination of totalitarian
ecological theory within systems science. In constructing an alternative from the
remains o f such an extermination it might be thought more charitable if ecosystems
analysis is not wiped from the face of the Earth but merely downgraded in its
universality. Using this perspective, and from the point of view of postmodemity’s
schizoid individualism (where the death of the Subject as a concretely conscious and
stable identity is acknowledged but the multi-dimensional character of the Self is
regarded as alive and kicking) it is easy for postmodern associationism to
acknowledge that the ecosystemic dimension of the ecological self may indeed be a
transiently important part in describing the life and times of an ecological individual.
But it is repugnant to postmodern sensibilities, however, to regard the ecosystemic
part as the only part worthy of consideration in ecological study or in environmental
valuation.
There is also a need to point out that although there are many calls for
community ecology and systems ecology to become more unified so as to elicit a
more balanced scientific approach129 this work is not one such call. Such calls allude
to the possibility of a single intellectual utopia emerging that balances between
respective methods and metaphysics of community ecology and systems ecology

i29por example see Allen and Starr (1982), Bazzazz and Sipe (1987), Wiegert (1988), Carney (1989), Westra
(1994). Wu and Loucks (1995).

240

which, when articulated, will supply humanity with an undistorted version of nature.
All versions o f nature and natural history, whether carefully crafted hybrids or not,
must admit to being distortions through specific cultural/philosophical lenses. A
systems-community hybrid is just as loosely bound to the referent about which it
narrates as either systems ecology or community ecology by itself.
On the issue of foundationalism, and the postmodern desire to transcend it, we
may adopt the sentiments o f Waugh’s (1992a) statement about how many
postmodern arguments are infected with alternative foundations and then go on to
admit that postmodern associationism is just one such infected beast. Postmodern
associationism might reject unitarianism, natural selection, levels of biological
organisation, balance of nature... etc. as unifying principles in ecology, but it still
appeals too much to founding principles (methodological individualism, ontological
‘being’-ness, or biocentism, perhaps) to claim total ejection of foundationalism.
Alternatively we may wish to go beyond Waugh’s (1992b) statement and assert
that every postmodern theory necessarily has its lurking foundationalisms since,
despite claims to the contrary, any postmodern view that constitutes itself into a
theory will appeal to some or other foundationalism, either because: 1) it wishes to
survive in the academic world, 2) any theory has to make some suppositions about the
nature of reality or knowledge, 3) theory is inherently unable to avoid constituting and
defining that which it is explicating without pre-existing foundation laden theory or 4)
theorists are unable to escape the myriad of foundations contextualised into their
lives. If postmodern associationism, or any other narrative of the world, is able to
escape such problems of foundational transcendence it may only do so by miring itself
into a foundationalism of anti-foundationalism. This is to restate a persistent problem
within postmodernism that a belief in no foundations or metanarratives might be
classed as such a strong and ever-present assumption that it is a kind of foundation
and metanarrative in itself. (We might also argue, however, that the idea that we can
never transcend foundationalism in narrative construction is itself such an absolute
statement that it displays inherent totalitarianism).
The relevance of all these musings to postmodern associationism’s desire to end
ecological foundations once again recounts Bauman’s allusions to the ever-present
existence o f dilemma in postmodemity;
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behind the postmodern...hides a genuine practical dilemma: acting on one’s
moral convictions is naturally pregnant with the desire to win Tor such
convictions an ever more universal acceptance; but every attempt to do just
that smacks of the already discredited bid for domination. (Bauman, 1992:xxrii).

Where Modernism gets over its dilemmas by positing that all dilemmas lead to a
better order, postmodernism accepts the insurmountability of these dilemmas without
trying to sweep them under the mat of self-regulating unity.

DISSOLVING HUMANITY AND NATURE

Every movement operating under modernism has had a great and evil monster
that it is out to slay. For socialists it is the capitalist monster, tor feminists it is the
patriarchy bogey-man, for black-activists it is the great goblin of racism.
Environmentalists, too, have often embarked upon a battle to the death with an evil
monstrous being; one called anthropocentrism. This great and evil monster operates
to undermine the true unity that the species ‘humanity’ has with the rest of nature,
thus ensuring our anti-environmental attitudes and actions which have plunged the
world towards destruction. This section aims to make a specific comment about this
monster o f anthropocentrism.
The view of nature and humanity as promoted in this work is one of pluralism.
Humanity/Nature is not dualistic as orthodox Marxists and capitalists perceive
(whereby there are two ontological categories of which individuals might be a
member, that of humanity and that of nature). Humanity/Nature is not monistic as
Gaian environmentalists perceive (whereby there is only one ontological
category—that of unity—from which you can not escape). Humanity-Nature is, indeed,
pluralistic, whereby there are as many ontological realities as there are members of
the world. Maybe more, given the plurality of self
This postmodern emphasis on a plurality of selves in a plurality of worlds (in
which each member of the living world is its own essence-less universe with its own
schizophrenic and transient laws of reality and its own particular set of interactions
with other members of the world) means that postmodern associationism is inclined to
dissolve the ‘humanity-nature’ barrier in a different way from that of the monism of
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unitarianism.
Since neither ‘Humanity’ nor ‘Nature’ are categories that reflect any cohesive
essence or defining generalisms within individuals and the groups o f individuals that
they purport to represent, their existence as ontological entities may be brought into
question. Both Humanity and Nature are too heterogeneous, too disunited, too
self-contradictory to be defined as unified entities about whose members you can say
anything denoting the fundamental commonality. Certainly in defining ‘Nature’ and
‘Humanity’ we come in to problems.
For example; nature may be defined as that which is not human and humanity as
that which is not nature. (This is, o f course, the point of Derridean deconstructionlJU;
That the poles of such dichotomies are only negatively definable in relation to what it
is not; the ‘other’). If either humanity or nature is dissolved the defining partnership is
perturbed and both concepts must come crashing down, for that which is not human
is not definable because that which is human is not definable. When postmodernists
analyse binary oppositions they typically find that one pole is privileged (ethically,
politically or epistemologically) over the other (environmentalists for instance hold
that the humanity/nature dichotomy is socially positioned so that humanity holds
privilege over nature. However, with the nature/humanity dichotomy the privileging is
not one way but nuanced and confused. Nature for instance is privileged in
sociobiological interpretations of society and in nostalgia laden advertisements that
label their commodities ‘natural’)
Any attempt to define nature or humanity with references to fundamental
characteristics is either doomed to impose generalisations in places they do not
belong, or is doomed to hide from view other hugely important facets of the lived
experiences of the world’s constituent members.
Not being unifiable by a common essence, or definable by core characteristics,
humanity and nature are reduced to historically contingent cultural constructions that
can serve to include disparate members into great projects that will only benefit a few
or that can serve to exclude members from the unified category by claiming that they
do not come up to standard.

130See Derrida (1973) and Derrida (1976).

243

W hile the Unitarian metaphysic dissolves the humanity/nature barrier to elicit one
truly great beast called Gaia, the postm odern association view first dissolves humanity
and nature so that the abstract boundaries that held the individuals, and groups o f
individuals, together dissipates to allow an unbounded jumble o f individuals and
groups o f individuals.

If the duality of humanity and nature are so dissolved (whereby Humanity and
Nature are dissolved out of existence as well) this would suggest anthropocentrism as
being a much more complicated beast than the unified monster currently presented. If
humanity is only a vague and value-laden term used to describe a loose collection of
individuals that possess no inherent essence, then the anthro part of anthropocentrism
becomes less focused. Indeed if Humanity has been a convenient totalising conceptual
tool in the hands of bourgeois, white, male imperialists, then anthropocentrism may be
a convenient political tool in the hands of philosophising environmentalists.
Anthropocentrism is a unifying concept, uniting humanity as a common coherently
identifiable evil which is homogeneously spread throughout the social world. Rather
than viewing anthropocentrism as a ubiquitous, uniform and singularly encompassing
value that inspires attitudes and actions that are detrimental to nature, it is perhaps
better presented as a range of value positions which have differing social and
philosophical bases and varying types of environmental impact. As discussed in
Marshall (1998), anthropocentrism may be just a convenient name (or cover) for,
amongst other things:
a) egocentrism (it is not that we do not value anything but humans but that we
do not value anything but ourselves);
b) chronocentrism (people are trapped in their own particular historical and
temporal framework and they can not see the heritage from which they came, nor can
they see the future to which they are headed. To many people, their past environments
were much as they are now, especially as they are seen through a filter of indifference.
If this is so then there is reason to believe that the drastic environmental changes that
environmentalists keep going on about are only mild afflictions and the future really
will not be any different from the past);
c) humanism (because humans shamelessly elevate themselves “into the absolute
masters o f creation” (Levi -Strauss in Pace, 1983 :247) that can rightly act to benefit
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humans as the ultimate ends of life);
d) materialism (because material possessions are an indicative measure of one’s
interests being happily provided for, anything not contributing to that material
well-being—i.e. much of nature—is valueless);
e) capitalism (alienation from one’s own labor, and this applies to both capitalists
and labourers, means that one becomes alienated from one’s natural heritage, or one’s
‘inorganic body’ in Marxist terms);
t) androcentrism (the ease to which man dominates nature flows from the ease to
which man dominates women);
g) technologism and economism (due to the reiflcation/deification of technology
over and above nature as one of the gods of modernity, natural objects are now
converted into resources, resources which can only be measured in economic terms).
The schizoid multiplicity of anthropocentrism suggests that environmentalists
might fight the destruction of the worlds biota by addressing a whole plethora of
(related and unrelated) value positions rather than engaging in a struggle with one
great ism often thought to be lurking at the base of environmentally malevolent
attitudes.
Having dissolved anthropocentrism in this fashion, postmodern associationism
may still have a specific comment to make in the ethical arena that nevertheless
accords closely with some of the non-anthropocentric environmental thinking. As
postmodernism respects and celebrates the Other (as a disconnected being from
oneself) and as Humanity has been dissolved (so that every being on the planet is
granted the status of Other, rather than just human beings) and as Nature, too, has
been dissolved (so that the members of the ecological world are not represented by a
unified concept of collective Otherness) then any postmodern breed of
environmentalism might be inclined to celebrate and respect every being with equal
fervour regardless of the abstract unified whole that it was once said to be a member
of. Thus the non-anthropocentric value system may be allowed to proceed without
conferring the totalising and essentalist tendencies of unity upon the natural history of
the world.
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THH ABSENCE OF NATURE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

Deconstructing nature has some people worried:
I conclude that the nihilism and relativism of radically constructionist
critiques ot science and the materiality of nature, while popular in some
academic circles, is sophomoric. Further it is harmful because, as we shall
see, it undermines efforts to save wildness and biodiversity....the covert assault
[of social constructionism] is ideological and therefore social; it serves to
justify, where useful, the physical assault. (Soule, 1995:137).

On this score it would seem that Soule would need the concept of nature because
without it governments, industrialists and all those who decimate nature can claim that
nothing is wild, nothing exists which is independent of humans (and therefore worthy
of preservation because of that fact). Nabhan (1995) points out, however, that there is
a difference between mental construction and physical construction so that it is not
that there is no wilderness simply because all wilderness is physically constructed by
humans but that the concept of Wilderness is a mental construction that is represented
differently in many different stories and maps; all of which may have their own validity
within the context from which they come.
If Soule were to maintain the consistency of his arguments he would have to
argue that those stories and maps of wilderness that get rid of wilderness are all
dangerous and those that do not are all good. However there are plenty of stories of
nature and wilderness which affirm the existence of nature and wilderness as
independent referents but which may be regarded as environmentally harmful to those
independent referents. For instance there are many stories and maps of wilderness that
are detrimental to wilderness since they are stories that indicate wilderness is evil or
uncivilised and must be tamed, or is a resource which exists primarily for our
enjoyment. I hope to have shown by now that one particular story that confirms the
existence o f nature, namely the unity of nature, is a story replete with such
environmental dangers. Not only that but I hope to have shown that a story that
dissolves nature, i.e. postmodern associationism, is capable of being environmentally
friendly. What this all means is that the construction of environmentally-appropriate
stories is not dependent on the existence o f ‘Nature’.
Regardless of the above points made by Nabhan and myself, a deconstructed
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Nature might still fall well within mainstream environmental ethics. If postmodern
associationism suggests that individuals of each species are worthy o f respect then it
might be thought of as lying close to the normative ends suggested by individual
rights based environmental ethics of people like Regan (1983) for example, who
generally say that it is the individual organisms and their interests that should be
valued in environmental preservation policies. The intellectual heritage of rights based
environmental ethics and postmodern associationism might be quite dissimilar but if
both emphasise the value of individuals over holistic entities then there may be much
of consequence in common.131
Deconstructing nature to end its existence as a culturally-independent referent,
for example, might seem to banish the very thing that environmentalists have strived
to protect. However, it also invites us to go beyond the reprojective spiral narratives
that many scientists and philosophers have played us into over the last two-hundred
years. If nature no longer exists then the natural laws that it supposedly exudes for us
to understand and obey also no longer exist. We can no longer be made pawns of
natural philosophical discourse without acknowledging the social origins of that
discourse. When Davies and Lovelock and Capra and Goldsmith claim to be the high
priests of nature, the medium through which nature’s truth is revealed, we
immediately have a way of disarming them by uncovering the metaphors within their
work that do more than what they say.

THR WIDENING OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

One way of allaying the fears of those who doubt the political schemes of social
constructionists is to encourage a new view of social constructionism. The possibility
of widening up the base of social constructionism in order to relate it to some

131
If this commonality does exist then postmodern associationism might be thought of as suffering the same
problems as rights-based Environmental Ethics. This may be so and I do not intend to address these issues
as they have already been brought to my attention many times.
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non-anthropocentric sentiments within environmental philosophy is suggested in this
section. As a suggestive section only, this section relies more on the good will of the
reader to entertain speculations based on the preceding eight chapters than it does on
the close referencing of existing support in the academic literature. It should be
viewed as an intimation to a possible line of work rather than as a fully substantiated
piece o f scholarship to which I am indissolubly attached.
If postmodernists are avid fans of social contructionism, and if that social
constructionism applies just as well to the pronouncements of truth and reality made
by science, and if postmodernists agree to deconstruct the divide between Nature and
Humanity, between Nature and Society then we have an interesting thing happening
to social constructionism. If postmodernists approve of radical social constructionism
and they are also sympathetic to the deconstruction of binary categories such as
Nature and Humanity and Nature and Society and Nature and Culture, then the
bounds o f social constructionism must anticipate their own widening. Social
constructionism is not the preserve of just Humans since the category of Humanity
has been deconstructed. They are the preserve of individuals; deconstructed,
multiple-selved, identity-perplexed individuals. All individuals—humans or
not—partake in constructing the stories and metaphors that are formed of them.
Animals and plants are social constructionists too.
When we admit to the constructionist ability of non-humans, two particular
facets of this constructionism may reveal themselves. Firstly, non-humans may help in
the construction of stories we have about them and secondly, they construct their own
stories about the world.
To deal with the first facet first: this suggests that our stories of non-humans, the
metaphors we use to describe them, might, in some way, come from them as well as
from other humans. How is it possible, it may be asked, that non-humans can
contribute to human stories about them when the ‘non-humans are not even able to
communicate with ‘humans’ in order to partake in such story construction? Obviously
‘humans’ do not share the same language as non-humans, but there are
communications going on; albeit fragmented, partial and non-representative
conversations (but the same is evident, it might be pointed out by postmodernists like
Kroker and Cook, in the communication exchanges between one human and another).
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When I suggest that non-humans partake (in some small way) in the social
construction ot our stories about them I am not saying that there is some essence,
some independent referentiality, that shines through from an animal or plant despite
the various human to human social constructions o f non-human nature but that our
constructions can be influenced by the behaviour of those non-humans. An animal like
a bird, for instance, does not reveal itself via its own objective and intrinsic reality into
our stories. The bird that we see in our science, in our novels, in our myths and in our
films is not a mirrored reflection of some independent real bird. It is just that in some
ot the stories we have about birds, the ‘bird-ness’ is negotiated into place with the
help o f the behaviour and activities of birds.
An example of this may be fitting. In his book the human nature of birds, Barber
(1993) describes a sixteen year old male African Grey parrot who has been an
experimental bird in the laboratory of German animal behaviourist I.M. Pepperberg
for most o f his life132:
Alex is not isolated in the laboratory, and he exercises much control over his
life. He is out of his cage about eight hours every working day. During
this time he interacts with the experimenters, who treat him respectfully, as
an important member of the laboratory team, while teaching him words and
concepts and testing him in formal, rigorously controlled experiments.
(Barber, 1993:4).

During his sixteen years Alex has shown, according to Barber and Pepperberg,
that he is able to communicate an understanding of human conceptual systems, from
colour and shape to numbers and sentence structure. Barber is convinced that Alex
does not just mimicking but that he:
understands what he is saying, and when he answers a question correctly,
he demonstrates confidence in his answer. About 5 percent of the time,
student experimenters have mistakenly scolded him for a correct response.
Not accepting their reprimands, Alex confidently repeated his correct
answer. (Barber, 1993:7).
What is, perhaps, of more significance, however, is the following:
Alex is not passive; to a large extent he actively controls his life, tor instance,
when a desired nut was placed by an experimenter under a heavy metal cup

132See for example Pepperberg (1983), Pepperberg (1991). Barber assures us that the African grey parrot is, by all
accounts, living a life of both contentment and adventure within this laboratory.
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that Alex could not lilt, he told the experimenter 'Go pick up cup'. As soon
as the experimenter picked up the cup, Alex walked over and ate the nut. If
the experimenters failed to make the experimental tasks sufficiently interesting
for him, Alex lets them know he is bored. He communicates his boredom by
asking to be moved to a new location or by ignoring the experimenters and
preening. During an especially long and difficult experimental session, Alex
communicates his frustration and desire to stop answering questions by
requesting to return to his cage: 'Wanna go back'. When brought to his
cage, he tells the experimenter 'go away', and climbs inside the cage onto the
swing, ignoring the experimenter and refusing to interact with any one. (Barber,
1993:7)

What we could possibly infer in Alex the parrot’s case is that a non-human can
realign the subject of examination in the process in which it is being studied. Alex the
parrot can contribute to the negotiations about itself, re-sort the problem being
examined into new (admittedly anthropogenic categories), and re-devise the
experiment, or even sabotage the experiment and the experimental dialogue
altogether.
Needless to say this sort of fragmented and partial communication between
non-humans and their human observers does not always happen. The voice of very
many non-humans are, no doubt, hardly ever heard and so are not able to negotiate in
many instances.
To deal with the second facet of the widening of social construction-that
non-humans construct their own version of the world—it is easier to hypothesise the
possible existence of a mediating language between various social constructors, since,
for the most part the construction will be within groups of individuals of the same
species133. These communications (languages) may be verbal, as in birds, or they may
not be.
If we are to describe the communications between non-humans as a form of
language, this is to implicitly to say that non-humans exhibit awareness, intelligence,

133 The acceptance of pervasive intra-species communication (language) between non-humans might not be
forth-coming from every reader but it would be a brave and fool-hardy person that would claim that there has never
been, in the whole history of the world, at least two members of a non-human species that have managed to
communicate with each other in some instance.
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foresight, alertness, purposeful behaviour, willfullness, and many other characteristics
generally only ascribed to humans. It is also to say that the communications using
these languages are involved in effecting change, conveying maps, telling stories, and
exchanging metaphors. Again, perhaps an example is warranted.
Consider the dance language of bees134. This familiar tale of communication
between the members of a non-human species takes on a new light if we recount a
story that Barber narrates about the process of honey bees finding new nest sites:
After the returned scouts have reported the distance, direction, and desirability of
their best nest sites to each other; they all fly out again to inspect sites reported by
others. If another bee’s find is more satisfactory than her own best find, the scout
"changes her mind’ and, when she returns to the swarm, dances for the alternate
site. All scouts now literally "vote with their feet’ (by vigour of
dancing), and the dancing-voting process continues until they are all come to an
agreement. (Barber, 1993:144).

This example may be a possible instance in which the social negotiation of reality
(the best nest site) by a non-human species is undertaken. The way that bees may use
their languages to communicate may be entirely unlike the way humans do it. The
rules of their language exchange, and the processes of the story-telling may very well
be unique to the species that it concerns. A wiggle or a dance is not equivalent to a
word, a sentence, or a syntax device in any human language, verbal or non-verbal, but
they can nevertheless communicate their own stories to other members of their
species whilst these other members offer up their own stories.
A (rather obvious) suggestion that can be made here is that the human inability to
accept communication and language exists in non-human society is because of the
alienness o f their mode oflanguage and the alienness of the stories they tell. The
language o f each non-human species is so specific, so accented, so unique, that
humans can not recognise the immense variety that might possibly occur in a bird
song or a pheromone smell. The scientific stories of humans cannot properly describe
all of these different languages and if it could it would need such a vast orchestra of
laws, rules and assumptions that it could not be housed within any general theory.
This acceptance of culture within animals does not have to deny the biological

134As described in, for instance, Lindauer (1961) von Frisch (1967), or Michener (1974).
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and genetic heritage o f species but it does downgrade it in importance. This process
ot downgrading the importance o f genetics is a prime concern of those ethologists
who describe cultural activities in animals, for instance Beck (1980), Bonner (1980),
Bradbury (1984), Cavalli-Sforza (1986), Pepperberg (1989), Pryor and Norris, eds
(1991), Ristau, ed, (1990), Jackson (1993). It is from the work of such studies that
the sociality and culture within non-humans may be assessed in a new light135.
No doubt some will label the views of these people who see culture in
non-humans as anthropomorphic. However, I would defend these researchers by
indicating that they are not declaring that there is any cultural similarities between
humans and non-humans only that non-humans have cultures: non-determined actions
that are the happenstance of historical contingency and experience.

CONCLUSIONS: POSTMODERN ASSOCIATIONISM AS A POSSIBLE
FORM OF POSTMODERN ECOLOGY

What does an attempt to postmodemise ecology have to consider? A postmodern
ecology would have to give cognisance to many or most of those ideas described in
Chapter Six as postmodern characteristics136.
For instance, a postmodern ecology might try to be anti-scientific. Gleasonian
ecology might hardly be said to do this. Alter all it is a development of Gleasonian
community ecology; a tradition that is steadfastly within the tradition ol ecological
science. However, if we postmodemise Gleasonianism so that it is aware ol its own
metaphoricity, so that it suspects the realism ol science, then postmodern
associationism can be made to be critical ol its own competence to relay the exact
nature o f the world.

135 Incidentally such a program of incorporating postmodern cultural studies into biology rallies behind the call by
Jagtenberg and Mckie (1997) to have cultural studies evaluate environmental issues. Their call mourns the lack of
interest and they suggest a variety of ways this may be entered into. These programmatic statements outlined very
briefly above may be one more way.
l36See Chapter Six pages 101 to 123.
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A postmodern ecology might be pessimistic. Since postmodern associationsm is
sure about its inability to otter up either an ultimate meaning for the world’s existence
or a grand theory that describes what is going on in that world, postmodern
associationism achieves a certain postmodern affiliation with pessimism.
A postmodern ecology might exhibit an affiliation with anti-realism and the total
absence of truth. With this in mind, postmodern association has to narrate itself with
knowledge o f its own social construction. As is detailed in The Reflection Section,
postmodern association may indeed be able to do this.
A postmodern ecology would acknowledge absence and aporia. The section on
Ungluing the Ecological World details exactly how absence and aporia, and especially
the absence of unity, might be an intrinsic part of both Gleason’s ecology and an
attempt to postmodemise Gleason’s ecology. Where Gleason tried to demonstrate
that there is a lack of integration between most members of an ecological community,
a postmodern Gleasonianism goes on to indicate that there is no Invisible Hand, no
self-regulation (indeed, no self) and no unifying process holding a collections of plants
and animals together.
Ecology, if it is to be postmodemized, might also reject the fetishism within
Modernism for communication. From this perspective, postmodern associationism can
claim to be postmodern if it acknowledges that while communication occurs in the
natural world, including between non-humans, such communication is never
monosemic; never exact; never entirely trust-worthy. Unlike the communications
theory that rides along within some systems theory (and in the case of Margelef,
1968, within systems ecology) a postmodern ecology would acknowledge that
communications are polysemous, plural and open to confusion. Postmodern
associationism is capable of doing this because it acknowledges the unique and
specific experiences of individual members within an ecological community (see the
section on The Postmodern Ecological Individual). These experiences make any one
individual organism liable to act with complete specificity to a common ecological (or
social) event.
A postmodern ecology might acknowledge and value pastiche, chaos,
heterogeneity and fragmentation. As Burrows (1990:432) explains, H.A. Gleason
envisaged ecological communities as “temporary and fluctuating phenomenon whose
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composition was decided by chance confrontations with disturbance, parasitism,
geographical specificities and “the availability o f species in the surrounding
vegetation” (whose composition was determined, also, by chance confrontations with
disturbance, parasitism, geographical specificities and by the availability o f species in
the surrounding vegetation, and so on and so). This results, it might be said, in a
chaotic, fragmented, heterogeneous, pastiche o f unrelated plant and animal species
which possess no inherent ecological integration. Such pastiches are not tailored by
any organising factor (such as Succession, Evolution, or Self-organisation), but are
chaotically thrown together by innumerable individual circumstances.
If an ecological community is thus disintegrated into its component parts by such
a narrative, then it is not possible for an abstract representation, such as the
superorganism, Gaia, the global system, or Life, to truly represent the actions of those
parts. Each individual has a story which is unique to it, a story which is not workable
within a ‘general’ story of the whole. In this way the postmodern penchant tor
dismissing representation may be found within postmodern associationism.
Gleasonianism might also be said to reflect the postmodern characteristic of
anti-teleology since its reliance on chaos, fragmentation and heterogeneity disavows
any effort to indicate that any ecological community is developing in any particular
direction. This is demonstrated by the second figure drawn in the section The
M etaphors Within a Postmodernised Gleasonian Ecology.
A postm odem ising o f ecology w ould confer upon ecology a sense o f value in
those w h o se stories and values have traditionally been marginihsed; the ‘other’. Any
environmental philosophy that recognises the intrinsic value o f non-humans might be
said to do this. H ow ever, postm odern associationism, by taking care not to treat
nature as a united other, can go on to recognise and celebrate otherness in a much
more enduring way than can a Unitarian narrative. Postmodern associationism , by
involving itself with the widening o f both culture (so that non-humans are regarded as
being able to possess culture) and o f social constructionism (so that non-humans
becom e social constructionists, to o ) might also unveil a w ay in which the stories o f
others may be subjected to the same intensive quest as is already undertaken in the
human sciences.
Postmodernism, as w e have seen in Chapter Six, is usually steadfastly involved in
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the deconstruction of foundational ideas: ideas that are thought to be so basic that
they have not been questioned. It is with this spirit o f deconstruction in mind that
postmodern associationism attempts to both postmodemise ecology and evict from it
the foundational ideas that have storied ecology since its inception. In this vein, this
chapter has sought to call into question ecological foundations such as the balance of
nature, the unity of nature, Succession to climax, natural selection, levels o f biological
organisation, and the categories o f Nature and Humanity. By entertaining the possible
dissolution of these foundations, new narratives that explore difference, dissent,
atypicality, meaninglessness, and otherness can be opened up.
The full ecopolitical potential o f such new narratives is, o f course, yet to be fully
determined. But they may be just as capable oflegitimising the protection of the
ecological communities of the world as is the unity o f nature metanarrative. Under
postmodern associationism stories are able to be constructed for each and every
biological individual that exists in the ecological world. In this way, through atomising
the ecological stories of the world, the needs, lives, tragedies, interests, values and
historical heritage of each non-human may be told in all their variety and diversity.
Stories which, under unitarianism, are drowned out by the constant re-telling of the
one metanarrative that is unity.
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SUMMARY

If asked to identify those cultural concepts that have given rise to deleterious
environmental worldviews, and therefore (suggest many environmental thinkers and
natural philosophers) to deleterious environmental practices, the concepts of atomism,
mechanicism, reductionism and dualism--in all their various guises—are said to be the
most malevolent. The antidote to this quartet o f death and decay, it is said, is an
enculturation within science (and within culture) of three metaphysical saviours:
holism, organicism, and, most especially: unity. Unity will unite all the processes and
objects in the universe under a worldview that might advise us as to how to
understand the various parts of the universe. Unity will also unite us in our attempts
to revere nature and the things in it, most notably by casting nature, and the things in
it, as alive and therefore, in some way, valuable. Unity will also offer a perspective of
long-termism, overallness and universality from which social processes might be
derived and enforced so that we do not destroy nature and ourselves.
The conclusions o f this work, however, suggest otherwise. Not only does unity
become a socially malevolent concept that plays into the hands of conservatism,
managerialism, and technocentric imperialism but when unity narrates about the
reality of the terrestrial ecological communities of the world, which is one o f the
prized sites of interest for environmentalists, it also becomes a totalizing, foundational
discourse that inappropriately distributes value within those communities.
When looking at society and nature it is often the case that social scientists
lambaste those who take any thing from biology and apply it to society. This work
does not adhere to this view, although it is sympathetic with it. It adheres to a view
that says that we cannot get away from speaking metaphorically in everything we say
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about nature and society and that no referent (including the big ones like Humanity,
Nature, Unity, Truth) can be referred to without some form of metaphorical
utterance. In this case each metaphor must not be castigated as inappropriate just
because it comes from nature to society or from society to nature since all our
speeches and writings about nature and society are metaphors that probably contain
within them references to things in both nature and society. Each metaphor thus has
to be judged on its own merits, with reference to its peculiar political aspirations and
for the things that it does in that context.
If metaphors are omni-present in our modern-day descriptions of the world, and
probably in all our daily lives, we might like to choose to investigate the original
referent from which a metaphor was drawn so that we can better see if it is politically
appropriate or not. However, it seems that, at least in the case of the metaphors
examined in this work, and probably in the case of all metaphors, no point of origin
and nooriginal referent can be determined. Because no point of origin can be
determined for any particular metaphor then the original site can hardly claim to be
absolutely original. The original referent no more adequately reflects reality any more
than the metaphors which might have descended from it.
Theorising about the natural and social worlds means the rhetorical re-activation
and re-deployment of metaphors (in the vein of Mirowski’s Teprojective spiral
narratives’), none of which can maintain purchase on an original referent; they merely
slip and jostle passed one another in their bids to be believed and/or utilised. Neither
nature, nor society, are the base from which things were originally extracted. Each
feeds into the other and back again.
This inability to escape metaphors in our descriptions of the world (and if Lakoff,
Johnson and Miller are to be trusted, in our daily activities, speeches and acts) seems
to leave us at odds as to how to locate ourselves and our politics since both ourselves
and our politics are marked by an ‘irreferentiality’; an absence of the real from which
to concretely generalise, philosophise and politicise. This does not however, preclude
us from making a sustained critique of, and raising an alternative to, any one
metaphor since we can acknowledge that within their own schemes of elaboration,
transmission and value (metaphysics, sociology and politics) a metaphor makes
connections with other metaphors that may or may not be self-consistent with the
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declared aims of the users. In the context of this work this is to state that unitarianism
is a metaphor whose links with other metaphors undermine the very politics and
values of its elaborators, transmitters and valuers. Unitarianism overwhelms its
advocates’ particular political positionings by its associations with other metaphors.
This, accompanied by its associated claim to be a non-metaphorical natural truth (and
also the only ecopolitically-valid natural philosophy of the cosmos) suggests that
unitarianism is not only vulnerable to colonisation by anti-environmental thought but
that it is overwhelming most thought about nature in the late Twentieth Century.
As we have seen in Chapter One, many natural philosophers (who double as
scientists or environmentalists) are nominally aware of the metaphorical nature of
large-scale human pronouncements about the world. (In the language introduced in
the prologue it might be suggested that they are involved in the deconstruction of
certain metanarratives and so are also nominally classifiable as being aware of the
social construction of scientific/natural philosophical knowledge). For instance,
people like Goldsmith, Birch, Davies, Ferre, Merchant and Capra are of the opinion
that mechanicism is a vast metaphorical story with grand deleterious repercussions for
the environment. Notwithstanding the critique in Chapter Seven (which declares
mechanicism versus organicism an artificial division) these writers are concerned that
the metaphorical nature o f the mechanistic worldview has become such a dominant
natural philosophy that scientists and science managers are very often unable to
escape the consequences o f using these metaphors; positing a dead earth, reinforcing
anthropocentrism, establishing fragmented policies and research programs, devaluing
the environment and its members. For the writers listed above, a new view of the
world is emerging that renders mechanism merely an outdated and fallacious
metaphor. This new view is that of holistic unity, organicism and self-organising
complexity.
Environmental thinkers and natural philosophers are not the only ones involved
in the construction o f ‘new’ scientific worldviews, however, and in Chapters Two,
Three, Four and Five it is suggested that environmentalists have, in a major way, had
their view o f the cosmos constructed for them and with them by ideologues of a
conservative and capitalist bent. The metaphors used by environmentalists and
environmental sympathisers like Capra, Zohar, Birch, Devall, Sessions, Merchant, and
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Goldsmith, are the same metaphors used by capitalist and conservative apologists
such as Hayek, Merry, Ayres, More, Maley, Stacey, DiZerega and Rothschild. Indeed
they seem to be the same people some of the time as in the case of Davies, Goldsmith,
DiZerega, and Maley. For instance in Goldsmith’s case we find that he promotes the
unity of nature concept not just for environmental reasons but for the reason that he
also wishes to promote a kind of conservatism that naturalises stability and
changelessness in society and which reifies hierarchy and consensus in favour of
heterarchy and dissent.
The attendent ideas to Goldsmith’s particular construction of the unity of nature
concept (i.e. stability, homeostasis, hierarchy, Succession, unity through diversity etc.)
are also inherent positions within the particular ecological traditions that he entertains;
Clementsian ecology, ecosystem ecology and Gaia theory. We can observe within
these traditions that the leading spokespersons; Frederic Clements, Eugene Odum and
James Lovelock respectively, all share Goldsmiths ecological convictions. For
Clements the plant community was a self-regulating orderly entity, for Odum the
ecosystem was a self-regulating orderly entity and for Lovelock the Earth’s biosphere
is a self-regulating orderly entity. These three traditions are sown together by
Goldsmith, Capra and Davies to present a view of the universe as a
hierarchically-arranged self-repeating unity of levels which interact with each other via
the processes of self-organisation, negative feedback and downward causation. Small
ecological populations and communities are self-organising unities that coagulate to
form ecosystems which are self-organising entities that coagulate to form Gaia. Each
level, Unitarians have suggested, is similar with that above and that below it. And each
level, the advocates of hierarchical backward causation would suggest, also acts to
impose boundaries upon the lower level.
This ‘organic’ or ‘ecological’ worldview, it is concluded in this work, is not a
benign or benevolent one. It does not do the things that Goldsmith, Capra and Davies
ask o f it, and indeed, it positively refutes their suggestions that it is either ecological
or organic. Goldsmith, Capra and Davies suggest that this ecological or organic
worldview vitalises what Cartesian science has killed; it supposedly gives life to
non-human members of the universe and it gives life to the Earth. However, in the
case o f those that are taken as paradigmatic exemplars of this new organic and
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ecological worldview such conclusions are not valid. The life that Odum’ s systems
theory affords to ecosystem constituents and the life that Lovelock’s Gaia theory
affords to the Earth is a shallow physico-chemical kind of life. So shallow is this
version of life, since it is measured in the materialistic terms of energy and matter (and
how Descartes would have loved that), that the members of the ecosystem and the
biosphere display no other manifestation of life apart from their interactions with
energy and matter. If one is of the opinion that animals and plants and microbes are
only alive because of their relation to energy cycles then it appears that they are only
alive as black boxes. Gaianism thus sucks the life out of living things. Any remaining
value is then distributed around the natural world in strict accordance with the
functional attributes and niche roles that underlie the transference of energy and
matter.
We also find that in the end what Goldsmith, Davies and Capra are advocating as
holistic science might also be more appropriately positioned within the realms of its
perceived opposite: reductionist science. Where Goldsmith, Davies and Capra would
advocate Clements’, Odum’s and Lovelock’s superorganismic theories as holistic we
might just as well say superorganicism is reductionists since Clements and Odum
were attempting to physiologize ecology (i.e. they tried to reduce ecological
situations to physiological systems by positing the individual parts of the system as
merely physiological entities and by characterising the system as a whole a one big
physiological system). For Odum and his systems ecology colleagues this
physiologising of ecology meant reducing the members of an ecosystem into mere
shells; components that were in existence only in order to transfer what were
thought to be the real essences of the natural world: energy and matter. In this light it
is not necessary to see that holism and reductionism are opposites, nor are they two
sides o f the same coin. They exist—at least in ecology and environmental
science—within each other. Holism attempts to characterise the whole gamut of
activities within a field of interest by observing common emergent patterns which are
then seen to be operable according to some simple generalisation. Reductionism
similarly attempts to offer simple generalisation of an acknowledged group of
collective activities.
From both holism and reductionism we thus find very similar theoretical

260

consequences. Where reductionism in biology and ecology reduces the actions of
populations, communities and ecosystems first to population and organismal genetics
and thence to molecular biology and organic chemistry and thence to the
mathematical principles o f a very few universally-applicable scientific ‘laws’, so
holism first reduces the activities o f populations, communities, ecosystems to a
general set of emergent properties which are held to be workable entirely within the
narrow and simplified mathematical ‘laws’ of self-organisation and self-regulation.
Where a molecule of DNA adorns the cover of many biological texts written to
expose the ultimate truth about all life via reductionist science, a series o f arrows
making up a circular symbol of self-regulation adorns Ayres book which similarly
claims to explain the secrets of all life using holism. Where molecular biology admits
to its reductionism, Ayres’ program to find ultimate explanations denies its own
reductionism under a veil of false holism.
Gaia theory, perhaps the grandest holism-reductionism complex of all, possesses
many of the problems that false holisms exhibit. It is not only implicitly predisposed
towards environmental malevolence by positing a value framework that denies the
value of individuals and individual species, it is, via its creators James Lovelock and
others, explicitly anti-environmental in the social sphere; positing economic growth,
high technology, and interplanetary colonisation as part of its implications. These
explicit implications are not attached to Gaia like an unimportant redundant organ.
Gaia was made up and developed and pursued by Lovelock precisely because it
sanctioned and sanctified these implications. Lovelock is also of the belief that other
people should see his particular reading of Gaia too. He endlessly berates
‘wrong-headed environmentalists’ while promoting functionalism, economic growth,
big science, high technology and space exploration in his writings on Gaia. Here we
might note that if we are to take seriously the deconstruction of anthropocentrism that
is attempted in Chapter Eight, we might want to confirm that Gaia isn t really
anthropocentric, but Lovelock-centric. All those whose ideas coincide roughly with
Lovelock’s thus suffer from the same kind of centrism; believing that their Gaian
Goddess is advocating—through her unchanging laws—a world of 50 million white
temperately-situated middle class people that rightly possess high technology and
nuclear power stations and who rightly express a desire for economic growth and
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interplanetary colonisation.
Just as Gaianism and systems ecology and Clemenstian plant ecology give rise to
very obvious ecological fascism—where the value of individuals are sacrificed for the
good o f an abstract whole—so it has been charged by other writers, notably Janet
Biehl, that the unity of nature concept possesses potential socially fascist ideas.
Whether or not this is so has not been resolved in this work. However a more
important point is raised. Unity in Nature might give rise to social fascism of the
Nazism type but the manifestation o f the unity of nature concept in the form of the
‘system’ is the way in which this fascism manifests itself in modem day society
through the much more politically agreeable thought of Liberal Capitalism.
If the ultimate opprobrium for postmodernism is totalization then the most
common manifestation of that totalization is the system concept. Radical politics must
fight not just against the System (the status quo system of government) but also
against the concept of the system. By the time they have called the amorphous thing
that they are fighting against a ‘system’, the system has already one, since they have
already accepted the reality, order and necessity of those things which functionalise
us, detract from our individuality and deny us indeterminism
If the systems theory within systems ecology and Gaianism (and also structural
fimctionalism) seems to be a legitimisation of certain conservative forces in
modern-day industrialism we must also note that its prodigy; ‘complex systems
theory’, is also the legitimiser of such conservative forces. Not only that, though,
complex systems theory seems to be a legitimiser of one particular social form within
modern industrialism; Free-Market capitalism. This legitimisation is not half-hearted.
Firstly it involves the naturalisation of the Free Market through the ‘order from chaos’
ideas o f the New Sciences and then it involves the deification of the Free Market
when it is claimed by various New Scientists (most notably Capra and Davies) that
anything self-organising is a manifestation of God. It seems now that it is not enough
to present the Market as an all-pervasive natural process but as an actual God whom
we must revere, learn from and never question. If the New Scientists have their way
and give rise to a society literate in the importance of this self-organisation, and it
Capra and Davies have their way so that humans deify self-organisation, then the
future o f natural philosophising discourse may tend towards tyranny. Anybody caught
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interfering with the self-organisation of the Free Market will not only be thought o f as
going against nature but against God.
According to the New Sciences, God--through the magnificent and divine
transcendental process that is self-organisation—has, like many other divine beings,
our ‘overall7 best interests at heart. He supplies our needs if we revere Him and act
according to His will. (In economics and society this means the preservation of those
things which enable the Smithian Invisible Hand to operate). If we do not, we will
wreak havoc upon ourselves and our environment and we will have only ourselves to
blame.
The Godliness of self-organisation also manifests itself in other ways. The
Goddess that is Gaia, for instance, has her God-hood bestowed upon her in such a
way by Gaians that we are to believe that she is the ultimate Earthly example of
self-organisation. Bowing to Gaia, the Earth Goddess, is not only to submit to the
dubious environmental values of Gaianism, however, it is also (as suggested in
Chapter Three) to give in to the Gaian potential to spread human destruction
throughout the Solar System.
If science and technology give rise to such metaphysical legitimisation of
environmental destruction and social malevolence then what are socially and
environmentally-concerned natural philosophers to do? Well, one of the things they
have done is to latch on to the broad and fragmented critique of Modernist science as
put forward by the intellectual movement known as postmodernism. This strategy is
flawed, however, as the only thing of consequence that emerges from this natural
philosophical flirtation with postmodernism is a name for their natural philosophy:
‘Postmodern Science7. Postmodern Scientists have successfully latched on to the term
‘postmodern7 but that is all they have latched on to. Most of the ideas and critique of
scholarly postmodernism completely eludes them. And, as is outlined in Chapter Six,
the actual metaphysics behind Postmodern Science is patently similar to that of the
systems theorists and New Scientists. This metaphysics itself, as we have seen,
cogently legitimises what the Postmodern Scientists often make out that they are
trying to delegitimise; authoritarianism, Liberalist capitalism, industrialism and
imperialism. Not only that but it seems as though Postmodern Scientists are involved
in an imperialist conquest o f their own; to colonise all disciplines o f thought and
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practice and bring them into the fold ot Postmodern Science.
The conclusion that comes from looking at Postmodern Science closely is that
Postmodern Science is not postmodern. Postmodern Science contributes to the
Modernist inscriptions of unity; of hierarchy; of overlording holism; and of
totalitarianism. Postmodern Science, like the New Sciences, claims victories over
reductionism and mechanicism but these are shallow victories since the
mechanist/organic divide, and the reductionist/holist divide are artificial divisions with
only superficial relevance for environmental evaluation. Buying into these divisions
Postmodern Science only succeeds in extending the tyrannies contained within them:
abstract wholes are valued over multiple-selved individuals; systems are reified and
deified over the parts they profess to organise; intrinsic value is extinguished in favour
of functionalism; order is valued over chaos and ‘lives’ are turned into a single lifeless
‘Life’. The detour of Postmodern Science is thus a blind alley if one wishes to utilise
postmodernism ‘proper’ in order to deconstruct the various environmentally offensive
elements o f Modernism within science. If this failure is so obvious then we might
glean a message from this obviousness. As Postmodern Science attempts to be a
predominately ‘constructive’ narrative of the universe, might we not force our way
into a diametrically opposed direction in the hope that via it we may glimpse a
(‘proper’) postmodern narrative of the ecology of the world. This is to say that a
different approach should be explored. Rather than directly and actively building a
metanarrative on the basis of previous metaphysics, might we not just undertake a
radical deconstruction of those metaphysics to see what we arrive at. Within the
remnants and crumpled ruins of Modernist scientific conceptions of ecology and the
environment we can find such a fractured postmodern narrative: postmodern
associationism. It is not an enlightened, clear and reality-corresponding vision that
translates all o f nature to expose its absolute truth but the crumpled, heterogeneous,
fragmented, localised remains that arrive from investigating the blind spots ot
Modernist metaphysics. Such a narrative is reactionary, such a narrative is
socially-constructed, such a narrative, despite being applicable to only to terrestrial
forest communities, might even be tethered to metaphors whose foundations are yet
to be admitted. But it is still a narrative that releases the stories ot the members ot
these terrestrial ecological communities from an imprisoning unity, and, unlike the
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literal interpretations of the Unitarians, postmodern associationism is a metaphor that
admits its own metaphoricity.
When we arrive at the associationist version of a postmodern ecology we find
that the claims recounted in Chapter One about atomism may not be valid. Atomism is
not such a deleterious natural philosophical principle and may even be a substantial
contributor to an environmental ethics respecting otherness.
We also find that in deconstructing Nature and Humanity we have come more
than just lull circle with respect to the social constructionist approach alluded to in the
Prologue. Where environmentalists and natural philosophers urge us to study nature
on its own terms so as not to destroy it, and where social constructionists (and
especially the postmodernists) believe that such studies are socially constructed, this
work suggests that social constructionism must anticipate the widening of its own
boundaries in the face of the deconstruction of Nature and Humanity so that all living
individuals come to be seen as social, and therefore social constructors. The exact
nature o f this construction is still left unexplored but its mere suggestion is radical
enough that it might hope to surprise and shock natural philosophers, environmental
philosophers and constructionist social scientists out of their commitments to the
bi-polar separation of naturalism and constructionism and so go on to encourage
possibly novel directions of future study in the Nature/Humanity relationship.
Notwithstanding the implications of the widening of social constructionism, if it
is accepted that all of the stories of the New Scientists, Postmodern Scientists,
systems scientists and holist environmental philosophers are only stories, are only
social constructions, are only metaphors (and that postmodern associationism is, too)
where does that leave us with regards to unity? Might unity still be ecopolitically
significant despite admitting to its metaphorcity? The conclusion posited here is that
the unity o f nature metaphor is ill-equipped to handle the political desires of the many
environmentalists who use it. As I foreshadowed in the Prologue Unitarians cannot
utilise the unity of nature concept anymore as though it were purely an environmental
narrative. The unity of nature is a politically-charged cultural construction which is as
politically-charged to act against the political desires that environmental thinkers hold
as it is politically-charged for them. If this is so, then what we must also conclude is
that Goldsmith’s Way, Capra’s Web o f Life and Lovelock’s Gaia do not actually
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contribute to developing an environmentally-friendly worldview. This is a big problem
for them, since these works were written by their authors on the understanding that
they would do this very thing. The eco-political significance of these works is
undermined since when they claim to speak for ecology and environmentalism
through Gaia theory, through systems ecology, through Chaos theory, they do so
through a morass of ethical and political contusions that twist and turn against them.
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